

Phoenix

(part II)

STATINTL

Spy net engulfs all S. Vietnam's citizens

by Stewart Kellerman

in Saigon

LINH is a poor farmer. He grows rice on an acre of land near the South China Sea. He lives with his wife and three children in a cramped hut made of straw and mud.

Linh — like millions of other — has been forced by the South Vietnamese Government to spy on his own family for the Phoenix programme, a controversial allied drive using torture and assassination to destroy the Communist political leadership in South Vietnam.

"I don't want to get into trouble," Linh said through a translator. "That's why I tell the government what they want. I don't tell them everything, of course. Just as much as I have to."

The Phoenix programme has tried to get a *gia truong* (family head) like Linh to spy in every hut, house and shanty in South Vietnam. They're the lowest rungs on a massive intelligence apparatus providing reports on suspected leaders of the Communist National Liberation Front (NLF).

The *gia truong*s don't get any money for their information — just prosecution as suspected Communists if they fail to report accurately on the actions of their families.

Allied sources said the Phoenix programme also employs a large network of paid informers — national police, undercover men, civilian secret agents, army intelligence experts and gung-

of gunmen organised by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The reports from informers move up through channels to hundreds of District Intelligence Operations Commands (DIOCs), the hubs of the Phoenix programme. Each DIOC is manned by South Vietnamese soldiers, police and psychological warfare specialists as well as an unofficial member from the U.S. army, American sources said.

U.S. intelligence officers said the DIOCs use the reports to prepare "target folders" on suspected political leaders of the Vietcong, the Saigon government's name for the NLF.

The officials said green sheets of paper in the folders are used to list such items as physical descriptions, friends and visiting habits of suspects. Pink sheets are used for copies of all agent reports on suspects.

South Vietnamese Phoenix officials said informants are graded on a scale ranging from A (completely reliable) to F (reliability cannot be judged). They said information provided by agents is grade from 1 (confirmed) to 6 (truth cannot be judged).

DIOC members — after deciding a suspect is likely to be a Communist leader — meet to decide how he should be "neutralised." The suspect can be assassinated, arrested or talked into switching sides.

A former U.S. Phoenix coordinator (adviser) said most DIOCs require at least a C3 rating — agent fairly reliable, information possibly true — before "targeting" a suspect for as-

The field police, strike arm of the national police, are usually used for arrests. CIA-financed PRU's, members of Province Reconnaissance Units, are used to kill suspects, according to allied intelligence sources.

But in Vietnam, no operation is water-tight. Allied intelligence officers said most Communist political leaders find out — through information leakage — that they've been targeted for assassination or arrest and go into hiding before the government can get to them.

They said the Phoenix programme then issues wanted posters showing mug shots and offering small rewards for information about the whereabouts of suspects.

The programme recently began a trial project in a few provinces offering bounties euphemistically called "maximum incentive awards" of several thousand dollars for really high Communist leaders — dead or alive.

After a suspect is arrested, the next step is a trip to a Province Interrogation Centre (PIC) also organised by the CIA, according to allied sources.

A former U.S. Phoenix adviser said torture is used at all PICs although interrogators usually use psychological rather than physical techniques. A couple of favorites are:

Cover a suspect's face with a wet washcloth. Pour soapy water over the cloth each time he refuses to answer a question. The water isn't supposed to hurt him, but it gives the suspect the impression he's drowning.

○ Tie a suspect to a chair and attach wires to a 12-volt car battery. Shock the suspect every time he refuses to answer a question. If he's really a tough customer, apply the wires to the genitals.

When the questioning is over, the suspect is brought before a province security committee headed by the local province chief.

The committee has the power to sentence a suspect in secret trials to a maximum of two years in prison. The sentence, however, is renewable indefinitely as long as Vietnam is at war.

U.S. sources said the suspect cannot question his accusers or even find out who they are. "It's pretty much up to the province chief," one American official said. "If he's a good man there'll be a fair trial. If he's not, there won't."

"I think it's safe to say that when it's all over not many people get off," one current Phoenix adviser said. "Just about everybody who makes the whole route winds up in jail."

Many Refugees Neutral About Vietcong

Survey of Attitudes Is Made by Americans

By GLORIA EMERSON

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 25 — An official American survey of attitudes among refugees has found that many take a neutral view of the Vietcong and that they consider living conditions under Communist control to be reasonably good.

The 181 refugees interrogated, from a group believed to number almost 80,000, are from the U Minh Forest, where a campaign to clear out enemy concentrations has been under way since December, 1970. The Government puts the number of refugees at 45,000.

Government assistance is considered inadequate by some of the refugees interviewed, according to the survey. The death and destruction caused by frequent military activities by allied forces — which means troop movements, artillery strikes and bombing — were major reasons why many had fled their homes.

The report on the findings points up the complexities of dealing with the refugee problem despite the long-established apparatus and the benefits ostensibly provided.

Long a Vietcong Base

The U Minh area, long a base for the Vietcong guerrillas of South Vietnam, is at the southern tip of the peninsula in three provinces. It is a complex of dense jungles, open cultivated land, winding streams and straight canals.

The survey and report were done for the Pacification Studies Group, which is attached to Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, the American agency that conceived of the pacification programs and supervises them.

Marked "For Official Use Only," the study is in an idiom meant for United States officials. A summary says:

"Living conditions of the people in the past while under VC control were considered reasonably good. Few of the refugees considered themselves to have been living in want. The people's attitudes toward the VC while under their control were largely neutral, while feelings about their future reception in GVN [Government of (South) Vietnam]

were basically hopeful. Government assistance has been provided to over a third of those interviewed, but it has been invariably late and usually considered inadequate. Their attitude toward the GVN has been generally favorable although they do not credit GVN with doing much for them beyond providing security."

'No Sense of Urgency'

On the question of initial Government assistance to the refugees, the report says: "As in the past, no sense of urgency was felt by the Government."

"Due to the high mobility of the refugees, a 'let-the-dust-settle-first' attitude aptly describes the initial feelings of many officials about future assistance," it continues. "Lack of sufficient social-action cadre and the generally slow procedures of the services compounded this attitude."

In Thoi Binh District in An Xuyen Province, for example, 20 per cent of the beneficiaries failed to show the first time for payments of a 30-day rice allowance, the report notes, explaining that there were "numerous problems": failure to register the refugees, compiled the necessary official documents and notify the refugees when and where to appear.

"Many of these refugees were out working to support themselves," the report says.

When the second payment session arrived, after ample notification, the report says, "many of the refugees who show the first time went away disappointed — someone else had gotten their payments."

While the report says that life under Vietcong control in the U Minh area was difficult for a majority of the refugees interviewed, "a surprising number, 37 per cent, considered it to be good or better."

The area was a major stronghold of the Vietminh, who fought the French. From 1940 to 1954, under Vietminh control, living standards rose to a level where the people could be termed well off, the report says. From 1954 to 1966 the area was a major training and supply center for the Vietcong.

Long exposure to one form or another of Communist control did not seem to worry the people as long as they were able to make a living. As for the future, two-thirds of them worry over their ability to earn a living, while concern about security is found only among half this number, the report says. "Many of them want to return home."

U.S. Advisers Voicing Doubts on Saigon's Desire to Push Operation Phoenix

Special to The New York Times

Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 25 — Many American advisers in the provinces are voicing doubt about the willingness of Vietnamese officials to carry out the controversial program known as Operation Phoenix, whose purpose is to weed out Vietcong political leaders.

"In this province the Government will not allocate even a pencil, paperclip or piece of paper on a regular basis to the program," according to Russell L. Meerdink, senior American adviser in Phuyen, on the central coast.

"It would seem that the problem is common," he said in a confidential report on pacification in Military Region II, a coastal and highland area north of Saigon.

"The low quality of personnel assigned to the program must also be considered something other than 'coincidental,'" he added.

Who Is Being Fooled?

He said it was the prerogative of the Government in Saigon to withhold support from the Phoenix Program, but, he added, "certainly the United States Government should not give the Government of South Vietnam the satisfaction of thinking it is 'fooling' the Americans."

The Phoenix Program, conceived by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1967, was turned over to the South Vietnamese in principle the following year. Americans have since pushed the program, providing advisers and funds as a primary means of seeking out the Vietcong.

Since South Vietnam has not given the program the emphasis some American officials feel it should have, they are considering a reorganization of it program and its basic concepts in the hopes of salvaging it.

Lack of interest in or distaste for the program is not limited to Vietnamese in Military Region II.

Lag Traced to Saigon

"There seems to be a decrease in the interest and emphasis in the program," wrote the senior American adviser in Quangnam Province, which is in the northernmost military region of South Vietnam. He traced the declining interest to

stress the program's importance has resulted in the removal of many Vietnamese once vitally involved in it. Men trained exclusively for the program are being removed without replacement, the report on Quangnam said.

The senior province official in Bac Lieu Province, on the southern coast, reported that the Phoenix program was effective against low-level Vietcong but "ineffective against the hard core" of the leadership.

Experimental Rewards

Last August, in an attempt to bolster the program, the United States and the South Vietnamese Government decided to begin experimental cash rewards in four provinces, paying up to the equivalent of \$11,000 for certain key leaders. It is doubtful that the rewards are effective.

Last May the senior American adviser in Binh Tuy Province, 75 miles west of Saigon, said the primary reason for the lack of success was "the inherent distaste" of people for inducing relatives, friends or people with political connections.

Quota for Each Province

Under the Phoenix operating plan, each province receives a quota of Vietcong to be "neutralized" each month, which can mean arresting a man, taking him into the Open Arms program, which accepts defectors, or killing him.

The quota system led to criticisms here and in Congressional hearings in Washington.

"Volume rather than quality neutralization" became the pattern, a senior adviser wrote, discussing the quotas. "Much of this can be attributed to U.S. guidance and influence and quotas," he added.

Testimony in Washington disclosed that American aid to the program from 1968 to May 1971, amounted to \$732-million. Current contributions have not been disclosed.

STATINTL

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EXAMINER & CHRONICLE
S - 640,004

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STATINTL

Bob Considine

The Diem Case-- A Bloody Bungle

President Johnson's memoirs give appropriately chilling attention to the dumping of Ngo Dinh Diem by the administration of his predecessor, John F. Kennedy.

It was, indeed, a bloody bungle.

There had been a State Department group out to oust Diem, or change him into the group's own image and likeness, for some time before the CIA-backed coup that ran him out of office, replaced him with Gen. Big Minh, and led to his senseless murder. The group's chief spokesman was Roger Hilsman, former OSS operator with Merrill's Marauders in Burma, educator, diplomat, etc.

His favorite warning to Diem (or about Diem) was "that fellow's got to pull up his socks." By that he probably meant that Diem had better stop trying to keep from being toppled by the likes of the Buddhist rabble-rouser, Thich Tri Quang.

The whole ouster process demeaned the dignity and traditional fair play of the United States. Misinformation about Diem was rife. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, for example, assured the Hearst Task Force that was about to interview Diem in Saigon — a week or two before the coup — that we would find him a broken, graying man who had lost his hold. Diem turned out to be a ball of fire, black-haired, vigorous and sure of where he and his country were going. He said, "We won't need your American troops after the end of 1965."

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WE BROUGHT up the question of the troublesome Madame Nhu, wife of his brother and his (Diem's) official hostess at affairs of state. Diem was a bachelor and devout churchgoer who lived an ascetic life. He smiled and defended Madame Nhu's right to act like a female. He told us that Washington had had the audacity to offer to send his brother and sister-in-law to Paris for an extended vacation, at the expense of the American taxpayer, in order to get them out of the way.

Shortly before the interview, the U.S. more or less inadvertently put Diem in a bad spot politically. One night there was a hue and cry outside the Embassy office building. The lone Marine on guard opened the door. Thich Tri Quang, saffron robes flying, bounded in. He was being pursued by Diem's police. The Marine motioned the monk into a room, slammed the front door and locked it. Then he called Lodge, who was dining at his residence.

Hours passed before Lodge could get through to the State Department and ask for instructions. When the word did come it was to keep the monk indefinitely. In the course of our interview, Diem said with some heat that this was an unpardonable affront to him by a foreign power. He demanded that Tri Quang be turned over to the police to be put on trial for the crime of fomenting revolution against a recognized government. Washington refused.

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IT WAS NOT too long after that that Diem was offered asylum in the same building. As the hour of the Kennedy-supported coup approached, Lodge was instructed to call Diem and tell him he'd better leave the palace and take refuge in the U.S. Embassy. Saigon was quiet; Diem felt his army was loyal to him, and so he indignantly refused. Lodge called a second time, and again the invitation was rejected.

Lodge called Big Minh to a secret conference and wrung from him a solemn pledge to give Diem and his brother safe passage out of the country. (Madame Nhu and her children had left before.) Minh agreed, and shook hands on the deal.

Diem and his brother first sought refuge in a church in the raucous Chinese section of Saigon, were rooted out by troops after an all-night vigil, put in a troop carrier and shot in cold blood.

It was the worst day of John F. Kennedy's life as President, more than one of his historians has written. A cloud of conscience hung over him during the three weeks that followed, the last three weeks of his life.

ATLANTA, GA.

JOURNAL

E - 257,863

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CIA Out of Control

The Editors: I have not liked the high command organization in regard to the administration of things in South Vietnam. I have not liked the way in which the Central Intelligence Agency has handled the facts of life. For one thing, the Nixon administration could have moved troops faster from Vietnam than it has accomplished and it has been bombing too much. Better dealings with the National Liberation Front could have taken place at Paris.

The great historians have not favored military offensives in Vietnam. Many escapades in South Vietnam have been run without the knowledge of the American people and the CIA can start small wars without any control by Congress. What the CIA is able

to do is to conceal the motives of a conflict.

Intellectuals believe that the CIA helped put Ngo Dinh Diem out of office. We know that the Kennedy administration did not continue to support the Diem regime so the Diem line could not go on.

I have read reports that contend that the CIA had Prince Nordam Sihanouk removed from office in Cambodia. I think that Prince Sihanouk had a splendid plan for the people of Cambodia. I like his plan better than I like the plan of Richard M. Nixon for military offensives.

I found that John F. Kennedy did well in planning things in Laos.

CHARLES W. SHEPHERD

Atlanta

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THE CIA—An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER CIA EXECUTIVE DEFENDS ITS OPERATIONS

STATINTL

Just how valid are the charges against the Central Intelligence Agency? What guarantees do Americans have that it is under tight control? A point-by-point defense of the organization comes from a man who served in top posts for 18 years.

THE REPLY

Following is an analysis of intelligence operations by Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., former executive director-comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency:

The Central Intelligence Agency was created by the National Security Act of 1947 as an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States Government, reporting to the President. Ever since that date it has been subjected to criticism both at home and abroad, for what it has allegedly done as well as for what it has failed to do.

Our most cherished freedoms are those of speech and the press and the right to protest. It is not only a right, but an obligation of citizenship to be critical of our institutions, and no organization can be immune from scrutiny. It is necessary that criticism be responsible, objective and constructive.

It should be recognized that as Americans we have an inherent mistrust of anything secret: The unknown is always a worry. We distrust the powerful. A secret organization described as powerful must appear as most dangerous of all.

It was my responsibility for my last 12 years with the CIA—first as inspector general, then as executive director-comptroller—to insure that all responsible criticisms of the CIA were properly and thoroughly examined and, when required, remedial action taken. I am confident this practice has been followed by my successors, not because of any direct knowledge, but because the present Director of Central Intelligence was my respected friend and colleague for more than two decades, and this is how he operates.

It is with this as background that I comment on the current allegations, none of which are original with this critic but any of which should be of concern to any American citizen.

CIA and the Intelligence System Is Too Big


This raises the questions of how much we are willing to pay for national security, and how much is enough.

First, what are the responsibilities of the CIA and the other intelligence organizations of our Government?

Very briefly, the intelligence system is charged with insuring that the United States learns as far in advance as possible of any potential threats to our national interests. A moment's contemplation will put in perspective what this actually means. It can range all the way from Russian missiles

pointed at North America to threats to U.S. ships or bases, to expropriation of American properties, to dangers to any one of our allies whom we are pledged by treaty to protect. It is the interface of world competition between superior powers. Few are those who have served in the intelligence system who have not wished that there could be some limitation of responsibilities or some lessening of encyclopedic requirements about the world. It is also safe to suggest that our senior policy makers undoubtedly wish that their span of required information could be less and that not every disturbance in every part of the world came into their purview.

(Note: This should not be interpreted as meaning that the U.S. means to intervene. It does mean that when there is a



Mr. Kirkpatrick

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., now professor of political science at Brown University, joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 and advanced to assistant director, inspector general and executive director-comptroller before leaving in 1965. He has written extensively on intelligence and espionage. Among other honors, he holds the President's Award for Distinguished Federal Civilian Service and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.

boundary dispute or major disagreement between other nations, the U.S. is expected to exert its leadership to help solve the dispute. It does mean that we will resist subversion against small, new nations. Thus the demand by U.S. policy makers that they be kept informed.)

What this means for our intelligence system is worldwide coverage.

To my personal knowledge, there has not been an Administration in Washington that has not been actively concerned with the size and cost of the intelligence system. All Administrations have kept the intelligence agencies under tight con-

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STATINTL

THE CIA--An Attack and a Reply

A FORMER STAFF OFFICER CRITICIZES CIA ACTIVITIES

STATINTL

Is the CIA starting to spy on Americans at home--turning talents and money against students, blacks, others? That is one of several key questions raised in a wide ranging criticism. A direct response starts on page 81. STATINTL

THE ATTACK

The following was written by Edward K. DeLong of United Press International, based on an interview with a Central Intelligence Agency official who has resigned. The dispatch was distributed by UPI for publication on October 3.

Victor Marchetti embarked 16 years ago on a career that was all any aspiring young spy could ask. But two years ago, after reaching the highest levels of the Central Intelligence Agency, he became disenchanted with what he perceived to be amorality, overwhelming military influence, waste and duplicity in the spy business. He quit.

Fearing today that the CIA may already have begun "going against the enemy within" the United States as they may conceive it--that is, dissident student groups and civil-rights organizations--Marchetti has launched a campaign for more presidential and congressional control over the entire U.S. intelligence community.

"I think we need to do this because we're getting into an awfully dangerous era when we have all this talent (for clandestine operations) in the CIA--and more being developed in the military, which is getting into clandestine "ops" (operations)--and there just aren't that many places any more to display that talent," Marchetti says.

"The cold war is fading. So is the war in Southeast Asia, except for Laos. At the same time, we're getting a lot of domestic problems. And there are people in the CIA who--if they aren't right now actually already running domestic operations against student groups, black movements and the like--are certainly considering it.

"This is going to get to be very, tempting," Marchetti said in a recent interview at his comfortable home in Oakton, [Va.], a Washington suburb where many CIA men live.

"There'll be a great temptation for these people to suggest operations and for a President to approve them or to kind of look the other way. You have the danger of intelligence turning against the nation itself, going against the 'the enemy within.'"

Marchetti speaks of the CIA from an insider's point of view. At Pennsylvania State University he deliberately prepared himself for an intelligence career, graduating in 1955 with a degree in Russian studies and history.

Through a professor secretly on the CIA payroll as a talent scout, Marchetti netted the prize all would-be spies dream of--an immediate job offer from the CIA. The offer came during a secret meeting in a hotel room, set up by a stranger who telephoned and identified himself only as "a friend of your brother."

Marchetti spent one year as a CIA agent in the field and 10 more as an analyst of intelligence relating to the Soviet Union, rising through the ranks until he was helping prepare the national intelligence estimates for the White House. During this period, Marchetti says, "I was a hawk. I believed in what we were doing."

Then he was promoted to the executive staff of the CIA, moving to an office on the top floor of the Agency's headquarters across the Potomac River from Washington.

For three years he worked as special assistant to the CIA chief of plans, programs and budgeting, as special assistant to the CIA's executive director, and as executive assistant to the Agency's deputy director, V. Adm. Rufus L. Taylor.

"This put me in a very rare position within the Agency and within the intelligence community in general, in that I was in a place where it was being all pulled together," Marchetti said.

"I could see how intelligence analysis was done and how it fitted into the scheme of clandestine operations. It also gave me an opportunity to get a good view of the intelligence community, too: the National Security Agency, the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), the national reconnaissance organization--the whole bit. And I started to see the politics within the community and the politics between the community and the outside. This change of perspective during those three years had a profound effect on me, because I began to see things I didn't like."

With many of his lifelong views about the world shattered, Marchetti decided to abandon his chosen career. One of the reasons he gave for leaving was that he was leaving.



Mr. Marchetti

LOS ANGELES, CAL.
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SEMIWEEKLY - 35,000

Political Rundown

Breast-beating white liberals — liberals today, neo-fascists tomorrow — are having a field day with the Attica N.Y. prison situation. On Thursday, October the 12, Channel 28 (KCTT) in Los Angeles, will air or rap on the officials in New York; what caused Attica, why the uprising. None of them will really tell you it was plotted, planned from the beginning with the specific purpose of getting rid of Nelson Rockefeller as a potential candidate for the presidency in 1972.

While we were on the issue of Channel 28, we understand that they went digging for "Black Pride." Ladies, and gentlemen, where do you think Channel 28 is digging for black pride? In Africa? No, indeed, Channel 28 went to Brooklyn, New York to dig for black pride, and they came up with a group of black journalists employed by black front newspapers to discuss "black journal."

The black Journal Project deals allegedly with black newspapers throughout the nation. The question, which came to our mind, is how can these people working for newspapers, that are owned by caucasians and fronted by blacks call themselves Black journalists. They do, this is one of the events of our time.

It appears that things are popping in the Watts-Willowbrook area, particularly around Grape Street School.

Our readers will recall last spring that there were some problems at Grape Street School and illness due to fowl food. Some of the parents objected, and the STAR-REVIEW ran the news.

The Principal of Grape Street School came to the conclusion — that one teacher, very well-liked by the children, the Rev. Lloyd Wilkins, was the cause of the problems.

Mrs. Carrie Haynes, the Principal, maintained that Rev. Wilkins gave the STAR-REVIEW the news of the bad food, the poisoned food, which made several children ill.

Mrs. Haynes became famous through her Time Magazine article in which she ripped her black faculty apart with such statements as they were "incompetent" and — "You will never be permanent if you do not learn to respect me." We believe its unfortunate that blacks spend so much time fighting each other but they do.

This Editor explained in person to Mrs. Haynes that Rev. Wilkins did not give us the news relative to the poison food which she served to the black children in that community. Indeed we did get the news, but not from Wilkins. None the less, since Wilkins, according to her own statement, was one of her best teachers, she wanted him removed and worked with the white superintendent to have him transferred. Mr. Wilkins belongs to a Union, which we understand sold him out and went along with the white superintendent.

We have always distrusted Unions — they are a part of the establishment and will sell you out quicker than the establishment when the chips are down.

CHICANOS VS. BLACKS

The danger of Chicanos and Blacks fighting is eminent, as pointed out by the HERALD-DISPATCH from time to time. Now comes the EYOA mess. This poverty program has always been used by the establishment to put the two largest minorities in the state of California against each other. If these two could work together, they could both come up out of the mud.

The Chicano Employees of the local poverty EYOA walked out in protest over the alleged discriminatory hiring practices of the EYOA.

According to reports, Mr. Salvador Velasquez, Associated Deputy Director of EYOA led the protest. Velasquez was formerly Executive Director of Rio Hondo, Community Action Agency, located in East L.A. The same source has revealed that neither Rio Hondo or the former Eastland Community AA ever employed any blacks while Velasquez was the Director.

The HERALD DISPATCH concludes that Velasquez is saying to the black Director, Ernest Sprinkles, who hired him in the first place, "Nigger this is my way of showing my appreciation to you for hiring me. I never hired any of your people when I had the power to do so."

Furthermore, Velasquez should try to be smart enough to realize that the establishment is trying to close the project to put both blacks and chicanos into the streets. Both groups are discriminated against. When it comes to hiring, and give the unions credit, they hire whites. Neither blacks nor Chicanos, some think so, are considered white when it comes to hiring.

We think the Chicanos and Blacks should try to work together for their own good.

UCLA'S EFFICIENCY

We suggest that the public investigate our statements. UCLA the school where Angela Davis was fired from her professor's position is credited with turning out more and efficient Spies than any other college or university in the United States. UCLA graduated Ron Karenga, and he became, before graduating, one of CIA's most efficient Spies.

It appears from investigation that UCLA works hand and hand with the CIA. Everyone knows that the CIA, the largest and most efficient Spy organization in this country, is the main aggressive war — the war

in Korea, Latin America and other places in the world where America's mighty army has killed more non-whites and more black and white boys during the past 3-years than has been killed in the history of the world.

CIA also hires more Foreign Diplomats as spies. First they get them into compromising positions and threaten them. Not so long ago they sent in an African national to threaten an African Diplomat. The national said the Diplomat, could have killed him, but just shot into the ceiling. The Diplomat was not worth killing. First he lost favor with his country and the blacks in this country. He left his African wife and took upon himself a white woman — who was and has always been in the pay of the CIA. They then made him a full fledged CIA spy. He does not travel with his white wife — but he is in the payroll of the CIA.

This African Diplomat, appointed a white man as a Consul General in one of the large cities. There are thousands of African Nationals from his own country in this country who could have filled the position. No, he at the insistence of his white wife and the CIA gang hell bent upon getting the wealth, diamonds, etc. of his country, appointed the white Council General to represent his, a black African country which is supposed to be independent. Death is too good for this skunk. His white wife is an efficient SPY — his half-white children will also be good spies and destroy black Africa. Thus, we submit that it is the responsibility of the African women to kill him if he comes back to his home. If he does not, way-lay him and kill him in this country — but the black African nigger must be killed.

This Black African "nigger" represents a country of people who have suffered under the British, French, Belgian and other Eastern European countries — they know what suffering is. He comes with a white woman to re-enslave them under Neo-Colonialism. During the 18th century the white man kidnapped the blacks and abused

Continued

29 SEP 1971

On civilians and intelligence

U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is reported to be considering a major innovation at the Pentagon, a civilian to be in charge of intelligence gathering and evaluating. And high time.

One of the very big lessons which came out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that Pentagon intelligence was different all through the Vietnam war period from intelligence gathered at CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). And there seems to be little doubt about which was the more reliable.

The Pentagon's intelligence from its own sources was guilty all through of underestimating the capabilities of the other side and of overestimating what various levels of American forces could accomplish. The most pertinent fact about it is that in 1965 Lyndon Johnson agreed to the commitment of a half a million Americans to Vietnam on the assumption that it would be all over successfully in ample time for the 1968 election.

Had President Johnson listened to CIA and State Department intelligence rather than to Pentagon intelligence he would not have made that mistake. Their reports and estimates were consistently closer to reality.

The reason for the difference is plain enough. CIA and State's INR are both staffed by full-time professionals in intelligence work, most of them civilians. There are a good many former military men in these services, but they are men (and women) who have gone perma-

nently into intelligence, not just for a short tour of duty.

Military intelligence is heavily staffed, and always so far headed, by officers to whom it is a temporary duty between regular service tours. They are not professionals devoting their entire time to intelligence. Nor are they civilians who can see such matters from a nonservice-connected point of view. It is difficult for an Army, Navy or Air Force officer to forget his own service when handling intelligence. His inevitable tendency is to hear, see, and stress any information or purported information which will enhance the role of his own service, particularly if he is going on in that service.

Ideally, the Pentagon would take its intelligence from CIA and INR. CIA has no axe to grind but its own, and there is really almost nothing it can want which it doesn't already have -- including relative anonymity and total freedom from detailed scrutiny in the Congress. A select committee of Congress goes over its budget every year. Much of it is totally secret. There are never any debates on the CIA budget in Congress. The committee is always generous to CIA. It has no special reason to turn out anything but the most objective intelligence it can manage to produce.

The Pentagon won't take its intelligence from the CIA. Human nature doesn't work like that. But it would help to have a nonservice-connected civilian in charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would reduce the likelihood of another Vietnam war.

STATINTL

Pentagon's Version Of Papers Published

An expurgated official 12-volume set of the Pentagon papers, weighing 31 pounds and costing \$50 per set, went on sale yesterday at the Government Printing Office. By closing time, 27 copies had been sold.

The screened-and-released version of the Defense Department's secret history of the Vietnam war had been stripped of large amounts of original documentation and some selected paragraphs and pages of historical analysis that had been reported by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers in June.

The official version released yesterday also did not include four studies dealing with diplomatic negotiations in search of a settlement of the war. These four studies, which were not obtained by the newspapers that published articles in June, were listed yesterday as: "Histories of Contacts—1. 1965-1966, 2. Polish Track, 3. Moscow-London Track, 4. 1967-1968."

Rady A. Johnson, assistant to the Secretary of Defense for legislative affairs, said in a letter to Congress accompanying the papers that the four diplomatic studies were being withheld because their disclosure would adversely affect continuing efforts in search of peace and the release of prisoners of war. Chairman F. Edward Hebert of the House Armed Services Committee, who ordered the printing of the official declassified version of the Pentagon papers, said the diplomatic studies "deal with negotiations which are still in progress."

According to the Government Printing Office, the press run for the papers released yesterday was 2,283 copies. Of these, 734 copies were dispatched to members of Congress, congressional committees and the Library of Congress, 32 copies were sent to the congressional press galleries, 73 copies to agencies of the Department of Defense, 25 to the State Department and 525 to U.S. depository libraries throughout the country. Many of the rest—some 500 copies—were reserved for public sale.

Beacon Press of Boston is preparing to publish the entire Pentagon papers—minus the diplomatic studies—in an edition scheduled for release Oct. 17.

The GPO version of the documents released yesterday was printed by a photo-offset process from original copies supplied by the Pentagon. There is no index to the vast collection of material, other than a brief listing of the title of various studies. Some of the material is reproduced from Xerox copies of original documents and in some cases is difficult to read.

The largest collection of original documents published yesterday is from the Eisenhower administration, including many relating to the proposed American intervention at the time of Dienbienphu, just prior to the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina. Many original documents from the earlier Kennedy years are included, but virtually all original documents from the Johnson administration have been deleted although many of them were published in The New York Times.

Other material that has been deleted from the officially released version of the Vietnam history includes:

- References to meetings between CIA operatives in Vietnam and Gen. Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") and other

leaders of the military coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Still a prominent figure in South Vietnam, Minh recently withdrew from the presidential race there in protest against the activities of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

- Certain troop movements by North Vietnamese forces moving northward back across the demilitarized zone late in 1966.

- Official U.S. discussions and estimates of actions that the Soviet Union or China might take in response to various military actions by the United States in Vietnam, and discussion of U.S. counter moves.

- U.S. discussions regarding relations with the troop-contributing Vietnam allies, including South Korea, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, and some discussions regarding the role of neutral countries.

- References to U.S. diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union and Romania regarding negotiations.

- References to corruption in the South Vietnamese government, and U.S. plans for fighting it.

Public Printer Adolphus N. Spence II said yesterday he did not anticipate a large public demand for the officially released version of the Pentagon papers. Referring to the scheduled publication in October by Beacon Press, Spence said, "Why should people buy it (the official version) if there's a commercial edition available that's not supposed to be expurgated?"

PORTLAND, ORE
OREGONIAN

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601

SEP 26 1971

M - 245,132

S - 407,186

Vietnam protests against Americans turn more violent

By KEYES BEECH

Chicago Daily News Service

SAIGON — Political unrest in this uneasy capital took a violent anti-American turn Saturday but threatened mass demonstrations against President Nguyen Van Thieu's Oct. 3 one-man presidential election failed to materialize.

One American GI was wounded by gunfire, four American sailors were beaten up and four American vehicles were fire bombed by roving bands of South Vietnamese student radicals.

The GI was shot in the arm late Friday night as he was walking from the U.S. Army's 3rd Field Hospital, near Tan Son Nhut Airbase, to his barracks. His companion, another GI who was unhurt, said two shots were fired as four young Vietnamese sped by on two Hondas.

The four got away and there was nothing to indicate they were students.

A U.S. Navy chief petty officer died a few days earlier after he was evacuated to Japan for treatment of burns suffered when he was trapped in a parked pickup truck, which was fire bombed in front of U.S. Navy headquarters.

Sailors struck

The four sailors were attacked at the same spot when their van was fire bombed by students at noon Saturday.

As the sailors scrambled out of their burning vehicle, they were attacked by students wielding stones and bottles. The sailors fled.

One sailor required several stitches for injuries suffered when his head bounced against the windshield as the driver braked sharply to a stop when the van was hit by the fire bomb. Another sailor was treated for minor injuries after being knocked to the ground.

Up to now, the students apparently intended no physical harm to the Americans, being satisfied to set fire to empty parked cars.

The new outbreak of violence sharply underscored the U.S. military command's growing concern over in-

creased anti-American incidents. Earlier in Da Nang, in central Vietnam, a GI driver fled for his life as a Vietnamese mob gleefully burned his jeep.

"The question is how much longer we can keep our men under control in the face of such provocations," said a U.S. senior officer. "So far, our boys have for the most part kept their cool, but they just don't think it's fair that the people they are here to help should attack them."

The students apparently switched tactics to hit-and-run attacks on American vehicles after their threatened all-out drive to block the Oct. 3 election failed to get off the ground.

4 vehicles burnt

The liveliest action took place on Le Van Duyet Street, near the Cambodian embassy, where three American cars and a South Vietnamese police Jeep were burned within a couple of hours.

One of the vehicles was a blue Ford station wagon identified as belonging to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The two occupants, one in uniform and the other in civilian clothes, fled when the car caught fire.

But they returned a few minutes later, the civilian carrying a .45 caliber pistol and the uniformed man an M16 rifle, to recover some papers they had left on the front seat.

Masks borrowed

Acting with what most observers felt was commendable restraint, Vietnamese combat police drove off the students with tear gas grenades while Saigon police kept traffic moving.

At one point, a police officer fired several shots into the air to drive away the crowd and student radicals mingling with the curious.

No one was injured during this action.

But U.S. Army explosive experts arriving on the scene asked to borrow gas masks from newsmen before venturing into a cloud of tear gas.

After 1967 expose CIA sought new ties with campus, labor

By Crocker Snow Jr.
Globe Staff

The written report of a confidential discussion about Central Intelligence Agency operations held in 1968, a year after the public controversy over agency involvement with the National Student Assn., shows the CIA was anxious to establish new contacts with other student groups, foundations, universities, labor organizations and corporations for its overseas work.

The discussion was held in January 1968 among ranking government officials and former officials, including several former CIA officers, under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

Though no direct quotes are attributed in the report, the opinion was stated by the discussion leader, Richard M. Bissell Jr., formerly a deputy director of the CIA, that: "If the agency is to be effective, it will have to make use of private institutions on an expanding scale, though these relations which have 'blown' cannot be resurrected."

The discussion also referred to the continued utility of labor groups and American corporations to CIA operations. No such groups or corporations are named.

The written report, like others sponsored by the council, is considered by the participants as "confidential" and "completely off the record."

The document is being circulated by the Africa Research Group, a small, radically oriented organization headquartered in Cambridge, because "it offers a still-relevant primer on the theory and practice of CIA manipulations."

Portions of the document are scheduled to appear today in the "University Review," a New York-based monthly.

The document reflects individual assessments of the CIA by those present. The report includes a number of general statements:

—The two elements of CIA activity, "intelligence collection" and "covert action" (or "intervention") are not separated within the agency but are considered to "overlap and interact."

—The focus of classical espionage in Europe and other developed parts of the world had shifted "toward targets in the underdeveloped world."

—Due to the clear jurisdictional boundary between the CIA and FBI, the intelligence agency was "adverse to surveillance of US citizens overseas (even when specifically requested) and adverse to operating against targets in the United States, except for foreigners here as transients."

—The acquisition of a secret speech by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1956 was a classic example of the political use of secretly acquired intelligence. The State Department released the text which, according to one participant, prompted "the beginning of the split in the Communist movement." Since this speech had been specifically targeted before acquired, the results meant to this participant that "if you get a precise target and go after it, you can change history."

—"Penetration," by establishing personal relationships with individuals rather than simply hiring them, was regarded as especially useful in the underdeveloped world. The statement is made that "covert intervention (in the underdeveloped world) is usually designed to operate on the internal power balance, often with a fairly short-term objective."

—The reconnaissance of

during the '50s provided "limited but dramatic results. Flights were late of the cancellations scheduled summer between President Eisenhower and after Francis G. was shot down in Asia.)

"After five days flights were from the Russian these operation highly secret in States, and with son," reads the these overflight 'leaked' to the press, the US have been for action."

The meeting, was not to consider CIA missions so characterize concepts and procedure discussion was 1 of a council staff "Intelligence as Policy."

The chairman meeting was Dillon, an investment banker who had served in Washington as undersecretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury in the Kennedy Administration.

Twenty persons were listed as attending including prominent former officials and educators like Harry Howe Ransome of Vanderbilt University and David B. Truman, president of Mt. Holyoke College.

The list included Allen W. Dulles, former director of the CIA, and Robert Amory Jr., who had been deputy director, as well as Bissell, who had been deputy director until shortly after the Bay of Pigs invasion, in which the CIA was involved.

The discussion took place just a year after revelations by Ramparts Magazine concerning CIA-funded training of agents for South Vietnam at

The document includes the statement that "it is notably true of the subsidies to student, labor and cultural groups that have recently been publicized that the agency's objective was never to control their activities, only occasionally to point them in a particular direction, but primarily to enlarge them and render them more effective."

In an article in the Saturday Evening Post in May 1967, Thomas Braden, who had helped set up the subsidies with Dulles, defended the concept as a way to combat the seven major front organizations of the Communist world in which the Russians through the use of their international fronts had stolen the great words such as peace, justice and freedom."

The report shows that the publicity had not been as damaging to CIA activities

that the "current SALT" talks may lead to dangerous technological and political imbalances which may leave us without the means to defend ourselves against Soviet attack."

Congressman Philip Crane (R-III), who took part in the colloquy, observed that America's leaders no longer tell us that our country is the world's most powerful. It isn't, of course. The U.S. has 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union has 1,500 ICBMs.

Rep. Crane commented: "It is as if Americans awakened one morning to find that all of their confident assumptions about their country were no longer true, as if they discovered that not only could their country not fulfill its commitments to others, but could not even defend itself."

It is to be hoped that the U.S. public will heed these warnings. Happily, the special order arranged by Congressman Spence and his associates indicates a bipartisan rally in support of stronger defenses. But presidential leadership is needed if the anti-defense lobby is to be overcome. This presidential leadership has been lacking the last 2½ years.

President Nixon undoubtedly erred early in his term when he accepted the strategic doctrine of nuclear "sufficiency" proposed by his chief foreign policy adviser, Dr. Henry Kissinger. In the years after World War II, the U.S. sought military supremacy. This supremacy deterred Soviet nuclear aggression. Now, our supremacy in arms is gone. The USSR is moving ahead in every type of weapons system. The Kissinger doctrine of "sufficiency" is proving to be our undoing. More and more, it is clear that Mr. Nixon has received bad advice from Dr. Kissinger—advice dangerous to the American people. It is imperative that Mr. Nixon dispense with Dr. Kissinger and start listening to concerned members of Congress and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the real experts who are the President's authentic military advisers according to the law of the land.

In the meantime, the American people can be thankful that there is a substantial number of congressmen who take seriously their responsibility to alert the nation regarding the deteriorated condition of the country's defenses.

PHOENIX PROGRAM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER
OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, September 15, 1971

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, during the recent debate and passage of the foreign assistance bill, one of the questions of the so-called Phoenix program in South Vietnam was discussed. Several allegations were confusing if not inaccurate.

I have recently received a letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Mr. G. Warren Nutter, which I believe very adequately sets the record and the facts straight on this matter and I would like to take this opportunity to read his letter into the Record.

But before I do that, I would like to note that as the chairman of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee I am personally aware of the program and have also discussed it on numerous occasions with Ambassador Bill Colby who, until recently, was in charge of Phoenix.

Phoenix operates on the district and province level in South Vietnam with U.S. support and is designed to gather, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence on the identity and movements of members of the Vietcong, the so-called Vietcong infrastructure. These are nonmilitary figures who govern parts of Vietnam still controlled by their movement and who slip in and out of Government controlled and contested areas. And I want to stress, Mr. Speaker, that this information and intelligence data is used to neutralize this Vietcong effectiveness not for "assassination and torture" as was alleged here on the floor in support of an amendment whose aim was to withdraw U.S. support from this program. The letter received from Mr. Nutter which I believe sets this matter straight stated:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., August 21, 1971.

HON. CORNELIUS E. GALLAGHER,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Record of August 3, 1971 (page H7761-2) reports an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act offered by Mr. Reid of New York, which was defeated by voice vote. This amendment would have barred any assistance under the Act to any nation for programs which encompass the assassination or torture of persons, or which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions. In his remarks submitting the amendment (copy attached), Mr. Reid made reference to the Phoenix Program of the Government of Vietnam, which is supported by the United States.

Ambassador William F. Colby, cited by Mr. Reid, has suggested that clarification would be appropriate of certain aspects of the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program in reference of Mr. Reid's remarks and the testimony received by the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Government Operations subsequent to Ambassador Colby's appearance there on July 19, 1971.

As described in some detail in Ambassador Colby's testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970, the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program of the Vietnamese Government was effectively begun in July 1968, as the result of a Vietnamese Presidential directive. United States support of this program has been principally advisory in nature, directed at improving the intelligence methods, the apprehension techniques, the legal procedures and the detention arrangements involved in the struggle of the Vietnamese against the Viet Cong infrastructure, or clandestine, subversive and terrorist apparatus. As testified by Ambassador Colby, unjustified abuse occurred in this struggle in the past, and could occur at present, but the Phoenix Program does not encompass or condone unjustifiable abuses in any way, and in fact is designed to eliminate them. United States policy in this regard was set out in MACV Directive 525-36 of 18 May 1970 (copy attached) which formalized an earlier memorandum of 15 October 1969 cited in Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings February 1970, page 725. The Vietnamese Government in its Community Defense and Local Development Plan for 1971 includes the following provision in its Annex I covering the Phoenix (Phung Hoang) Program:

"In order to gain the confidence of the people and their support for the Government's program to neutralize the VCI, all personnel working with Phung Hoang must closely adhere to the policy of treating the population and the VCI detainees with a sense of high respect for the law and not abuse their authority in their performance

of duty. Consequently, Phung Hoang committees of all echelons must concentrate on the following points in 1971:

a. Cooperation and coordination with village, hamlet, ward, and quarter officials when performing missions in their areas, to include notification of these officials regarding the disposition of any people arrested.

b. Screening should be performed quickly, humanely, and fairly with emphasis on immediate release of innocent people without causing them undue trouble and annoyance.

c. Perfection of target dossiers. Arrests are to be made only when sufficient evidence and accurate information is available.

d. Province and City Security Committees must meet at least once a week (or more often depending on requirements) to consider detainee cases and sentence the VCI as appropriate.

e. Notification of detainee disposition must be made to the appropriate government echelons and agencies to ensure effective monitoring."

As indicated in the Department of State's opinion, filed with the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in response to its request of Ambassador Colby on July 19, 1971, the Phoenix Program is not violative of the Terms of the Geneva Conventions. Although certain aspects give concern in their field of due process, the Vietnamese and American Governments, working together, have brought about a number of improvements in its procedures and are cooperating in the formulation and application of additional measures to bring greater effectiveness to the struggle against the Viet Cong infrastructure and to ensure that the program meets high standards of justice. Reports of unjustified abuses predating the implementation of the Phoenix Program or involving US or Vietnamese military intelligence or combat operations should not be mistakenly ascribed to the Phoenix Program of the Vietnamese Government nor to US support thereof.

In summary, the struggle between the Viet Cong infrastructure and the Vietnamese Government is an integral part of the overall mistakenly ascribed to the Phoenix Program has brought about improvements in the effectiveness and propriety of the Vietnamese Government's conduct of this struggle. United States support of this program is conducted under the same restraints as support of other Vietnamese military and civil programs.

Sincerely,

G. WARREN NUTTER,
ASD-ISA.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. REID OF NEW YORK

Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

"Amendment offered by Mr. Reid of New York: Page 12, line 13, strike out the quotation marks and the period immediately following such quotation marks.

"Page 13, after line 13, insert:

"(x) No assistance shall be furnished under this Act to any nation for programs which encompass the assassination or torture of persons, or which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Convention."

Mr. REID of New York. This amendment is simple, I believe. It is directed to insuring that there are no programs through which the United States provides funds to any nation which encompasses as a program, the assassination or torture, or programs which violate the standards set forth in the Geneva Conventions.

More explicitly, my amendment would require that no U.S. funds would be furnished to programs which are characterized by a pattern of assassination or torture or other violations of the Geneva Conventions, to

Cambodian Stability Shored By Low-Keyed U.S. Efforts

STATINTL

By HENRY S. BRADSHER
Star Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—It was taking the loftiest, most detached possible view.

The American ambassador, Emory C. Swank, expressed regret the other day over the unsuccessful attempt by Communist terrorists to blow to bits himself, his chauffeur, his security guard and his car.

The reason for the regret: It gives Cambodia a bad name and makes the situation here look shakier than it really is now.

Swank's sophisticated reaction to the murder attempt was part of the American effort to create both the appearances and the substance of stability and security in Cambodia, despite the presence of some 60,000 Communist troops in the country.

The United States has accepted almost total responsibility for keeping Cambodia going under Communist military pressure.

'Every Assurance'

U. S. weapons, military training arranged by the United States in other countries, and tactical air support provided by U.S. or American-sponsored air forces have enabled Cambodia to resist North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, while American economic aid has kept the country running.

The foreign minister, Koun Wick, said after a recent visit to Washington that "we got every assurance that U. S. aid will continue for Cambodia.

The embassy staff was at one recent point supposed to

have been pegged at about 100. But the Department of Defense wanted to put more people here to supervise the delivery and utilization of military aid, which is scheduled to be worth \$200 million this fiscal year.

The Pentagon wanted 200 people here. Swank, and apparently the State Department, wants to keep the number of Americans down. They compromised on 50 "Military equipment delivery team" personnel, headed by Brig. Gen. Theodore C. Metaxis.

Questions Raised

The MEDT people took over a job that had been done on a tougher schedule by the small office of Jonathan F. Ladd, the embassy counsellor for political-military affairs and Swank's right-hand man on all things military.

The combination of Ladd's Green Beret background and Swank's own record—he was the No. 2 man in the U.S. Embassy in Laos when the vast American clandestine operation there was growing in the mid-1960s—naturally raises questions about just what the United States is doing in Cambodia besides the public programs for arms and economic aid.

Nothing else, embassy officials insist.

There was a clandestine program of training about 1,500 Cambodian soldiers at a secret camp of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in southern Laos. The soldiers were supposed to operate as guerrillas in the Communist-controlled northeastern part of Cambodia.

But the program has now ended with recriminations and few guerrillas have been deployed.

Cambodia is trying to organize some sort of "pacification" program for areas in which Communist guerrillas are active. So far there is little more than touring propaganda teams to give the government message.

"Pacification" was a fertile field for CIA activities in South Vietnam. But, as one senior American commented, "Our results in pacifying Vietnam don't exactly qualify us as experts, even if we were to bring in people to help here. We're not going to, and it's up to the Cambodians to tackle that problem."

Big Difference

With Americans in Cambodia barred by Washington from training or advising the army, the training that has made a big difference in the army's growing abilities was arranged with U.S. money to be conducted in South Vietnam and Thailand.

There has also been a very secret program for Indonesia to train some Cambodian soldiers in fighting guerrillas. Officials here insist the money for this has not come from U.S. aid to Cambodia.

There is, however, ample precedent for the United States to make indirect payments for such help. It cannot be established here whether the recently increased U.S. military aid program for Indonesia is financing the training for Cambodians.

14 Sept 1971

BUNKER'S FOLLY: The political in-fighting in South Vietnam which has left only one candidate (only President NGUYEN VAN THIEU remains after the withdrawal of DUONG VAN MINH and Vice President NGUYEN CAO KY) in the running for the forthcoming (Oct. 3) presidential election, one saddening fact is as clear as crystal: In its unseemly haste to get things tidied up in Saigon, the United States is guilty of the most blatant and shameful interference in South Vietnamese politics since the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) engineered the overthrow of the late NGO DINH DIEM in late 1963. ✓

SUN-TIMES

M - 536,108

S - 709,123

SEP 13 1971

Morse hits 'executive supremacy'

The United States is moving toward government by executive supremacy and secrecy, former Sen. Wayne Morse of Oregon said here Sunday.

The early critic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam noted that U.S. combat there was never sanctioned by a congressional war declaration.

Morse said "Congress is to blame" for delegating war-making powers to the President that are reserved to it by the Constitution.

He said President Nixon is "fooling the American people" into thinking its armed forces soon will be out of Vietnam when actually "we may be out of Vietnam in 25 years."

President Eisenhower "started a clandestine war in Vietnam through the use of spies, Green Berets and the Central Intelligence Agency," Morse said, claiming that Nixon's present Asian doctrine is a continuation of Eisenhower's.

The former senator described President Thieu of South Vietnam as "a crooked, corrupt politician" for whom "Americans have slaughtered thousands of Vietnamese."

Morse, who served in the Senate from 1955 to 1969, was dean of the law school at the University of Oregon before going to Washington.

He held a press conference in the Executive House to publicize peace awards to be given to 10 persons by Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace on Oct. 1 in Orchestra Hall. Morse will be one of the recipients.

The former senator said that withdrawal of combat forces from Vietnam will not contribute to U.S. disengagement from Asia.

CHICAGO, ILL.
TRIBUNE

M - 767,793
S - 1,016,275
SEP 12 1971

Wayne Morse Rips Nixon's Viet Policies

BY DONALD YABUSHI

President Nixon is creating a government in America run by executive supremacy and secrecy, Wayne Morse, the former maverick senator from Oregon, said yesterday.

"People think Nixon is soon getting [American forces] out of Viet Nam, but he's fooling the American people. We may be out of Viet Nam in about 25 years," Morse said at a press conference in the Executive House.

Defeated by Packwood

Morse represented Oregon in the Senate from 1944 until 1968 when he was narrowly defeated by Republican Robert Packwood. Morse said he plans to run as a Democrat for the seat held by Sen. Mark Hatfield [R., Ore.] in next year's election.

Morse began his career as a Republican but left the party in 1952 to become an independent. He won reelection as a Democrat in 1958.

"Nixon's present [Asian] doctrine is a continuation of the Eisenhower military doctrine of 1953. Ike was untrustworthy; you couldn't rely on his word," Morse said.

"Started Clandestine War"

"While Eisenhower supported the Geneva accord partitioning Viet Nam, he started a clandestine war in Viet Nam thru the use of spies, Green Berets and the Central Intelligence Agency."

Morse was here to meet with members of the Business Executives Move for Viet Nam Peace who are scheduled to give him a special award at

their American Peace Awards program Oct. 1 in Orchestra Hall.

The former senator charged that Nixon has supported dictatorships in Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Burma and Viet Nam.

"Crooked, Corrupt Politician"

"President Nguyen Van Thien of Viet Nam is a crooked, corrupt politician, and Americans have slaughtered thousands of Vietnamese to support him and his police state," Morse said.

He blamed Congress for permitting Nixon to create what he called a "government by executive supremacy and secrecy."

Morse has been recognized as a dove on the Viet Nam War since its inception and has repeatedly objected strongly to sending American forces to Southeast Asia.

"There are a lot of doves in the Senate, but never pay attention to what a politician says unless they vote the way they speak. Many of the so-called Senate doves have continually supported military appropriations to carry on the Southeast Asia war," he said.

About China Trip

Nixon's announced trip to China next year is viewed by Asians as a "great diplomatic victory for the Chinese Reds," Morse said.

"Nixon knows he can't keep Red China out of the United Nations, but he should go to Peking only after the United States recognizes the Communist government there."



JOHN P. BROCKME

How the U. S. Did Diem In

As you know, my reaction to the "Pentagon Papers" was essentially "Ho hum, what else is new?" All over America this reaction is currently being confirmed as copies of the paperback are tucked away with a yawn, destined, one suspects, to end up at a church bazaar or in the Salvation Army's stacks.

However, a number of complaints have been received from readers demanding documentation of my thesis that in substantive terms the papers revealed nothing that was not already public property. Certainly the exact formulations were in many cases released for the first time, but the historical record was already there for those who wanted to find it.

In reply to these queries, let us examine the matter of United States involvement in the coup that overthrew Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem on Nov. 1, 1963. When the "Pentagon Papers" dealing with this subject appeared, a surprising number of people (including General Maxwell Taylor) sounded profoundly shocked.

The documents indicated conclusively that the government of the United States encouraged and sponsored the coup, that a Central Intelligence operative, Col. Lucien Concin, glued together the Vietnamese generals, and that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge coldly informed President Diem, after the coup had begun, that the United States could do nothing for him except provide asylum. It is also clear that an understanding existed between Lodge and the generals (led by "Big Minh") that Diem and his brother Nhu were to be spared.

SO MUCH FOR THE RECORD as it appears in the "Pentagon Papers." Now the question is this: "What right did anyone have to be shocked by these alleged revelations?" The answer? "No right whatsoever." Not only were the central facts set out in 1961 in the New Yorker magazine, but the essential scenario was included in a best-selling novel in 1965!

Robert Shaplen of the New Yorker has long been considered one of the most perceptive analysts of Asian politics. Indeed, if one wishes to get filled in on Asian events over the past decade, he would be advised to read Shaplen's New Yorker pieces before turning to the scholarly journals.

In regard to the Diem Coup, Shaplen was right on top of the scene -- the only thing he omitted from his coverage (which can be found in his 1965 book, "The Lost Revolution," Chapter 6: "The Untold Story Of The 1963 Coup" was Col. Concin's name! The phone call from Diem to Lodge is there in paraphrase; all the "Pentagon Papers" provided was the text.

TURNING FROM nonfiction to fiction, I suggest you get from the library Morris L. West's "The Ambassador," which has as its protagonist an American ambassador to Saigon who stage-manages a coup against a Catholic dictator.

West begins with the statement that "Those who seek to identify the actors in this drama with real personages, living or dead, will find themselves betrayed into anomalies." He is right -- Ambassador Maxwell Gordon Amberley has nothing in common with Henry Cabot Lodge, and C.I.A.-man Harry Yaffa does not resemble Lou Concin. President Cung is patently Diem, though Nhu is omitted from the script.

But once we leave the novelist to his prerogative of developing his own characters for his own purpose, we discover the whole story of the anti-Diem conspiracy including the generals' commitment to the ambassador that they would not kill the President, the fact that Diem had taken refuge in Cholon with a rich Chinese friend, and, most interestingly, that one of the plotting generals (in fact, General Ton That Dinh) was outraged by the murder of Diem.

So what should we do now? Send for the grand jury? Why not try a different tack and just leave Daniel Ellsberg and his bogus revelations to the judgement of history?

STATINTL

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Vietnam Ousts Americans

BY FLORA LEWIS

NEW YORK—While attention is focused on Vietnam's one-man electoral circus, American volunteers working on village development programs have been quietly forced out of the country.

It is another reflection of growing anti-Americanism in South Vietnam, less and less concealed as troops are withdrawn and U.S. influence wanes.

State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey revealed how far it had gone when he said last week that the special alert confining GIs to their bases was to head off anti-American incidents during elections to the National Assembly. American spokesmen in Saigon made it appear that the alert was to prepare troops against possible Viet Cong attacks, but McCloskey was more candid. It isn't the Communists U.S. officials are worried about, he indicated.

*

The ouster of the volunteers is a foretaste of the bitter problems that are going to arise as the United States dawdles its way from Vietnam. They are the members of the International Voluntary Service team, young specialists in agriculture or education who have been helping Vietnamese villagers. The volunteers are paid \$80 a month, plus a meager allowance providing a living standard equal to the villagers'.

IVS was founded in 1953, a private, nonpolitical organization which later served as a model for the Peace Corps. Its first teams went to South Vietnam in 1957.

Until the 1968 Tet offensive, when two IVS men were caught in Hue and disappeared during Viet Cong occupation of the city, there were normally about 180 IVS people stationed around the countryside. Their number dwindled after that.

"It was harder and harder to find places where even Vietnamese speaking, apolitical development workers could get the confidence of the local people," says John Schafer, now posted at IVS headquarters in Washington.

And yet the IVS had a reputation for idealism, independence and selfless work in such things as helping raise rice and banana production with better methods.

Their latest two-year contract expires this month and has not been renewed. President Nguyen Van Thieu instructed his cabinet not to negotiate any further agreements with IVS, and the 31 volunteers remaining in the country have been

non-Americans. They also have to go.

Some of the volunteers, according to private reports from Saigon, feel Thieu was anxious to get rid of them before the presidential elections Oct. 3. Their close knowledge of the country, their language ability, their involvement with local people would have put them in a position to see just how the balloting was really conducted.

But Schafer thinks the problem is much deeper and more enduring. It was a former IVS worker, Don Luce, who led two visiting congressmen to the "tiger cages" in the prison on Con Son island. It was Ron Moreau, an IVS worker, who tipped American reporters to the South Vietnamese army's use of terrified villagers at Ba Chuc as human minesweepers. True, it wasn't Moreau's business to save lives, he was only supposed to teach children, but after trying vainly to get Vietnamese and American officials to intervene, he turned to the press.

Anyone who has traveled about Vietnam has met numbers of local officials, farmers, teachers who speak with overwhelming gratitude for the young volunteers. Civil servants in Saigon are enthusiastic.

But Thieu is not, and neither it seems is U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Nobody has questioned the value of the work IVS has done, but its workers haven't always pretended to be blind and mute and their disclosures have at times been embarrassing to top authority.

*

Nonetheless, IVS has also come under fire from Vietnamese leftists as a CIA front, because of its link to the American AID program. The Saigon newspaper Tin Sang recently published a long attack charging that the IVS role was to fool the people into believing American policy aims to help Vietnamese peasants.

As Hugh Manke, IVS director in South Vietnam, wrote in a recent letter, "It's a bad time to be a foreigner in Vietnam."

It isn't going to get better until all Americans are withdrawn. And the longer that takes, the poorer the chances that any U.S. programs, even those which are purely humanitarian, can succeed. The United States has a moral debt of reconstruction and rehabilitation aid to a country it devastated so widely in order to "save" it. The way things are going, even the attempt to pay this debt may fail, the ultimate humiliation of America's Vietnam experi-

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Defeating Nobody, Winning What?

By ABE ZALDAN
Knight Newspapers Columnist

IF PRESIDENT Thieu must finally run unopposed for reelection in Vietnam, it won't be because the United States wants it that way. But the lesson of Vietnam may be that it is even harder to prop up a government's image than it is to save the government itself.



Zaldan

According to a CIA report leaked by *The New York Times* to William Buckley's *National Review* through *The New Republic*, the United States invoked a good 20 to 30 contingency plans prepared by Rand Corp. under the general heading of "How to hold an uncontested election with the whole world watching."

So far none of the plans has worked.

ONE OF Rand's scenarios went like this:

Thieu announces he will run for office again, guaranteeing the American people a free election.

A newspaper reader in Emporia, Kans., writes a letter to the editor saying that's OK with him, but why doesn't Thieu also guarantee the Viets a free election?

Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh reads the letter, gets to thinking, and withdraws from the race.

Vice President Ky reads the letter and says, "Count me out, too."

Ambassador Bunker reads the letter and confers with Thieu, pledging U.S. neutrality in the election if Thieu agrees to run against Vice President Agnew instead.

Thieu maintains that since he and Agnew are both down on the press, there would be no clear-cut issue in the campaign.

Thieu rules out Agnew.

AGNEW increases world tension by announcing a goodwill mission to South Vietnam.

Despondent, Dunker cables President Nixon and asks for his intervention in the worsening crisis.

Nixon startles the world by announcing that he, too, is going to Saigon.

The President tells Thieu to convince the world of his good faith by entering the New Hampshire primary.

Thieu closes down four Saigon newspapers who report Nixon's offer.

The President resorts to Contingency Plan B by offering to fly, at the government's expense, all of New Hampshire's voters to Saigon for the election.

Thieu balks, claiming the Viets have a right to self-determination. "I will not be a party to a farce," Thieu rages.

The South Vietnam supreme court rules Nixon must leave the country.

PLAYING for time, Nixon asks the CIA to create an opponent acceptable to Thieu.

The CIA runs a background investigation on Harold Stassen and taps him for the role.

Stassen politely refuses, saying he is booked up through 1980.

In despair, Nixon flies home, claiming Vietnamization is working on schedule.

The CIA, resorting to May Day Contingency Plan C, makes final preparations to stage a coup against Mayor Lindsay in New York on the day of the Viet elections in order to divert the world's attention from Saigon.

It's a long shot, but New Yorkers are a tough bunch who are normally conditioned to anything. Let us pray that the rest of the world will be equal to the occasion.


AROUND THE WORLD

I. ANDRONOV

PROVING GROUND

FOR THE GUAM

DOCTRINE



CAMBODIA is a comparatively recent victim of American imperialist aggression in Indo-China—U.S. forces invaded it only last year. The political prologue, it may be said, was the Guam doctrine—the new course in Asia proclaimed by President Nixon two years ago at the U.S. air force base in Guam. As put by Nixon himself, the point of this doctrine is that the United States must play a substantial role in Asia but would like the problem of war and the responsibility for it to be assumed in ever greater degree by the Asian countries themselves. In the opinion of many Asian public leaders and publications the veiled meaning of this is that Washington wants to "pit Asians against Asians," that is, to have its war in Asia fought by others in the selfish interests of the U.S. ruling element. The tempestuous events of the

last eighteen months in the once tranquil country of Cambodia offer a classic example of how this is worked in practice.

YANKEES IN PNOM PENH

Washington makes no secret now of its massive bomb strikes against vast areas of Cambodia, but all its other military operations against Cambodia's patriotic forces are palinstakingly camouflaged by its official representatives in the Cambodian capital. This summer, for instance, quite a few groups of American servicemen were flown into Pnom Penh from Saigon, but in each case they were dressed as civilians. Thus "camouflaged," the visitors were then deposited in various parts of the country by U.S. Embassy helicopters. This operation, directed by the Pentagon and the CIA, is kept secret from American and world public opinion. What is more, it is conducted in defiance of the ban imposed by the U.S. Congress on American land operations in Cambodia. But in Pnom Penh itself, it is widely known that the Pentagon's "special forces" units—the notorious Green Berets—systematically make raids deep into the interior of guerilla areas. Very often they disguise themselves as insurgents. The Green Berets carry out sabotage and terrorist missions in the guerilla areas and pick targets for U.S. bombers.

American army planes can be seen daily in the Pnom Penh airport though their presence is partly concealed: the identification marks on some of the planes have been painted over. Last January guerillas blew up a few American planes in the airport and since then the building has remained half in ruins. The surviving part is roofless and its windows are gaping holes. The wind blows through it freely and the floor is strewn with rubble and plaster. But out on the airfield American military transports and sharp-nosed fighters again come and go.

The road from the airport to the capital is blocked off every three hundred metres by empty petrol barrels, so that no car can speed past. Near these roadblocks are stationed groups of soldiers equipped with American quick-firing rifles and field telephones, and wearing American green-tropical uniforms and helmets.

In the city there are coils of barbed wire everywhere. The barbed wire is strung on poles right on the sidewalks in front of all government buildings—whether a post office or a ministry. The more important the office, the more wire there is in front of it. First place is taken by the Defence Ministry: the street it stands on is covered with rows of it, and at its walls are piles of sandbags behind which soldiers stand, by ready to man machine-guns. There are also machine-gun nests at the gates of nearly all government offices. From time to time people calling at them are carefully searched at gun-point. At the press centre a representative of the military command cautions journalists that it is risky to take photographs in the streets—a nervous soldier may open fire without warning. A state of emergency has been declared in the capital, for guerilla units have surrounded it and by night approach its suburbs. No one may enter the city after sunset; all roads are blocked by government soldiers who huddle fearfully around the American M-113 armoured cars placed at their disposal.

Artillery batteries have been mounted even in the centre of the city, on the Mekong embankment, their guns trained on the opposite bank from which guerillas sometimes open up fire with mortars and mobile rocket launchers. From time to time they even blow up a munitions dump right in the city or shower hand grenades on picked targets, such as the Saigon mission. After one such attack the South Vietnam ambassador landed in hospital. A guerilla attack on the arsenal in June caused an explosion of such force that the flames rose 120 metres and the surrounding streets were showered with shell and mine fragments mixed with stone and rubble.

From a white four-storey building on the corner of one of the Pnom Penh boulevards and Avenue Mao Tse-tung, near the Mekong embankment, hangs the American flag. This is the American Embassy building and the Americans occupying it are jestingly called "the Yankees from Mao Street." Recently, though, the street was renamed—either at the request of the American diplomats or because of the change in the political climate of the Cambodian capital.

The American Embassy in Pnom

continued

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A CIA Paper

"...Although this entire series of discussions was 'off the record', the subject of discussion for this particular meeting was especially sensitive and subject to the previously announced restrictions."

—C. Douglas Dillon

By The Africa Research Group

The Central Intelligence Agency is one of the few governmental agencies whose public image has actually improved as a result of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Despite disclosures of "The Agency's" role in assassinations, sabotage, and coup d'etats consciously intended to subvert international law, America's secret agency has actually emerged in some quarters with the veneration due prophets, or at least the respect due its suggested efficiency and accuracy.

Virtually every newspaper editor, not to mention Daniel Ellsberg himself, has heaped praise on the CIA for the accuracy of its estimates detailing the U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Time and again, the Agency's "level headed professionalism" has been contrasted with the escalation-overkill orientation of the Pentagon or the President's advisors. The editor of the Christian Science Monitor even called upon policy makers to consult the CIA more, calling it a "remarkably accurate source of information." But such backhanded praise for conspirators confuses public understanding of the important and closely integrated role which the CIA plays in advancing the Pax Americana on a global scale.

For many, the Pentagon Papers provided a first peek into the inner sanctum of foreign policy making. As the government's attempt to suppress the study illustrates, the people are not supposed to have access to the real plans of their government. On close inspection, what emerges is not an "invisible government" but an indivisible system in which each agency offers its own specialized input, and is delegated its own slice of responsibility. Coordinated inter-departmental agencies work out the division of imperial labor. There are disagreements and bureaucratic

rivalries, to be sure, but once the decisions are reached at the top they are carried out with the monolithic tone of state power.

The intelligence community now plays an expanded and critical role in creating and administering the real stuff of American foreign policy. CIA Director Richard Helms presides over a U.S. Intelligence Board which links the secret services of all government agencies, including the FBI. In the White House, Henry Kissinger presides over an expanded National Security Council structure which further centralizes covert foreign policy planning. It is here that the contingency plans are cooked up and the "options" so carefully worked out. It is in these closed chambers and strangelovian "situation rooms" that plans affecting the lives of millions are formulated for subsequent execution by a myriad of U.S. controlled agencies and agents.

Increasingly, these schemes rely on covert tactics whose full meaning is seldom perceived by the people affected — be they Americans, or people of foreign countries. The old empires, with their colonial administrators and civilizing mission have given way to the more subtle craftsman of intervention. Their manipulations take place in the front rooms of neo-colonial institutions and the parlors of dependent third world elites. In this world of realpolitik, appearances are often purposely deceptive and political stances intentionally misleading. The U.S. aggression in Vietnam, lest anyone forget, began as a covert involvement largely engineered by the CIA. Similar covert interventions now underway elsewhere in the world may be fueling tomorrow's Vietnams.

It is for this reason that the Africa Research Group, an independent radical research collective, is now making public major excerpts from a document which offers an informed insider's view of the secret workings of the American intelligence apparatus abroad. Never intended for publication, it was made available to the Africa Research Group. We will publish the entire text in October, 1971.*

CIA manipulations.

Richard Bissell, the man who led the Council discussion that night, was well equipped to talk about the CIA. A one-time Yale professor and currently an executive of the United Aircraft Corporation, Bissell served as the CIA's Deputy Director until he "resigned" in the wake of the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba. The blue-ribbon group to which he spoke included a number of intelligence experts including Robert Amory, Jr., another former Deputy Director, and the late CIA chief, Allen Dulles, long considered the grand old man of American espionage. Their presence was important enough an occasion for international banker Douglas Dillon to

*The complete text of the document will be available for \$1 in late October from Africa Research Group, P.O. Box 213, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142.

30 AUG 1971



BOB CONSIDINE

Democracy—Vietnam Style

The strangulation of democracy in the South Vietnamese presidential race may be explained, in part, by an interview Vice President Ky gave the Hearst Task Force several years ago in Saigon.

Ky said in substance that it would take time, a matter of years, for the Vietnamese peoples and officials to understand the odd ideology we had been trying to impose upon them.

Democracy was alien to most of them traditionally, hard to understand for peoples who had known Mandarin rule, a thousand years of Chinese domination, a century of callous French colonialism, and years of harsh Japanese occupation.

WHEN AND IF the democratization penetrated, the dashing premier continued, the Americans should not expect it to be precisely like the American brand — any more than the Americans are like the Vietnamese.

Ky didn't regard this probable outcome with alarm. He said that his own studies of democracy had convinced him that it could take many forms within the over-all boundaries of the system. Specifically, he said, "France and Britain are democracies, but they are not your democracy. We, too, will be different."

IT WILL BE SURPRISING if the rate of the pullout of U.S. and the other troops we are paying to fight in Vietnam — South Korean, Thai, Filipinos, etc. — does not perceptively quicken. President Nixon now has an "out" he could not have anticipated a few weeks ago.

Before President Thieu arranged things so that he would run only against a friend of his named President Thieu, a step up in the pullout would have been interpreted around the world as a clear admission that the U.S. was letting down a brave ally. There would have been misgivings among brave allies — Britain, let's say, or Costa Rica.

More immediately, Mr. Nixon now has something to say to the families of those who died or were hurt in Indochina. President Johnson once told us that he didn't want to be remembered as a president who had let his predecessors down by running out on the field "like a scared rabbit." Mr. Nixon, on the other hand, can say in view of the Thieu takeover, "to hell with it," and most of the world and the American people will nod agreement. Besides, such an

attitude would mean an earlier return of the POWs.

WHAT I STARTED OUT TO STATE, however, is that there's reason to believe President Thieu sees no real wrong in doing what he's doing. He, too, is in the relative kindergarten of the kind of government we hoped Vietnam would adopt. Given the same position of power, it is highly likely that his two top critics — Vice President Ky and Gen. Big Minh — would act identically.

In our daft and naive way, we cannot understand why everybody in the world cannot or will not live and think as we do. I once asked UPI's Henry Shapiro, the most durable American correspondent in Moscow, why Khrushchev demoted Marshal Zhukov to the Kremlin woodwork immediately after the Marshal had saved him from probably execution by Malenkov, Bulganin, Molotov, Shepilov and Kaganovich.


Henry, who knows the Russian mind, looked at me as if I was a nut. "Don't you understand?" he asked. "Khrushchev banished Zhukov because he figured that if Zhukov was powerful enough to save him he was powerful enough to destroy him."

No thought of gratitude, American democratic style.

THE WHITE HOUSE and the State Department must have put tremendous pressure upon Thieu to reconsider his rejection of Ky's right to run. There must have been many supplications, also, to Big Minh not to throw in the towel, and to Ky to accept his proffered reprieve, though he would have little chance of winning. But, as of now, it's a Thieu-party system. Ky and Minh, united, might unseat Thieu. But that merging would be difficult.

Minh, who headed the CIA-backed coup which overthrew and then murdered President Diem, is now a dove. Ky is a hawk who cannot understand why the greatest military power in the history of the world, the U.S. of A., does not simply blot out North Vietnam. Still, their common hatred of Thieu could bring them together. As a fine correspondent once said, when asked about the architectural period and design of Thieu's massive and handsome palace in Saigon, "It's early Coup D'Etat."

27 AUG 1971



Untold story



HERE will be no history of the Vietnam war, secret or otherwise, unless we have probed deeply into what the government in Hanoi has been doing and saying since the Geneva accords of 1954. So far we have hardly scratched the surface.

To bill the book version of "The Pentagon Papers" as "The Secret History of the Vietnam War" can be dismissed as harmless promotional puff. It surely can't be an earnest claim. If there is any such pretension, it represents a gross abuse of the article "the".

No responsible scholar has tried to tell the full story of World War II without tapping all available German and Japanese as well as Allied sources.

When historian James MacGregor Burns worked up his volume of Franklin Roosevelt's biography dealing with the great war, he spent many weeks in the Soviet Union, delving into Russian archives.

Against this kind of background, it is amazing to note that we have in this country a good many self-styled sophisticates who talk and act as if we know just about all there is to know about the Vietnam war.

Do we? We don't even know the whole of the American part of the story, since much of it lies locked in Lyndon Johnson's files in Texas, and in the rich State Department lode.

ND what kind of storehouse of history have our Vietnamese allies in Saigon been piling up since 1954?

Beyond all this, clearly some crucial parts of the story were buried with the late North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh. Other main elements are still held secret in Hanoi's files — perhaps barred forever from our eyes.

Still, North Vietnam's role in the war need not be a total mystery to us. Both Hanoi and the so-called National Liberation Front (political arm of the Viet Cong) often have published extremely candid statements of their purposes and activities relative to South Vietnam.

Then there are the thousands of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong documents taken by allied sources over the years.

For a long time, it has been fashionable in some circles to ridicule "captured documents" as if they were either valueless or some sort of CIA plant designed to mislead us.

Several thousand of these, however, are deemed to be of sufficient importance to have been microfilmed and cataloged by U.S. scholars. They are available at Cornell University and at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Unhappily, only a very few have thus far been translated into English. But they are there.

The late Bernard Fall, a scholar on Vietnam widely respected by many of the most vehement anti-war critics, once said that Douglas Pike, U.S. Foreign Service officer attached to the USIA, saw more Viet Cong documents than anyone on earth but members of the NLF themselves.

It is interesting, therefore, to contrast Pike's attitudes with those of the American sophisticates who think the Vietnam story is already told.

In the preface to his book, "War, Peace and the Viet Cong," he wrote:

"Living in Vietnam for eight years has contributed nothing to my enlightenment."

"The story of Vietnam has not been told, not even its beginnings. Perhaps it must be told from somewhere else . . . My greatest despair is that the story may never be told the way it was. Even as I write, I must admit that my strongest feeling toward Vietnam remains puzzlement."

To gauge from the cocksure judgments of congressional committee "experts" and others who spend from a few weeks to a few months in Vietnam, Pike's brand of humility is not quickly acquired.

Critics in America never have been a humble lot. But seldom before have so many been so confident about things they knew so little of. Hopefully the full Vietnam story will be told some day. By then the instant-history boys will be making snap judgments in some new field.

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Saigon: farce to fiasco

Such a shoo-in is South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu that there is seemingly no way he can "win" in the Oct. 3 presidential election.

The decision of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky not to run as the only opposition candidate turns a farce into a fiasco.

Not only is it a disaster for a U.S. policy that went from unrealistic to unworkable, it adds fuel to Saigon's worse political crisis in five years.

BOTH KY and the other withdrawn candidate, General Duong Van Minh, have enough weaknesses to make them unlikely saviors of South Vietnam, but they are right in charging Thieu has enough political machinery and muscle to make their chances against him nil.

In fact, as things stand about the only way Thieu could make the election believable would be to step down to let others run the voting and then manage to lose it. That seems unlikely to happen.

There really should be few Americans tears about the failure of our plan for "free and democratic" elections (with Thieu winning, of course)

in a country and area where elections most often confirm political adjustments made in other ways.

Better, in fact, to think of the other, hopefully non-violent ways.

What may come to some minds is the old half-joking theory that the way the U.S. may finally get out of Vietnam is to have the CIA back a neutralist coup. The new neutralist regime would then ask the Americans to leave quickly, we would graciously comply, and they would form a coalition government with the Communists.

Since coups can get bloody and out of hand, few would advocate any such alternative. But the point remains that some tough political adjustments are ahead for Saigon, even if Thieu rides out the current crisis and the election process.

EVENTUALLY, THE Vietnamese must work out their own political future. It may be troubled and not to our liking, but history and the current situation suggest there is little we can do there to really help the Vietnamese people or our own Vietnam image in the world.

U.S. Worked Hard To Make Viet Election A 2-Man Race

By MICHAEL PARKS

Sun Staff Correspondent

Saigon—With the South Vietnamese political situation still unsettled, the United States has substantially increased its efforts to see that there is a contested presidential election in October.

The American Embassy here has dropped all pretense of non-involvement, pledging only neutrality and impartiality now.

Talks With Ky

Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, who said today he has decided not to campaign actively for the presidency, said he had been strongly urged by the American ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, to remain in the race.

Mr. Bunker earlier tried and failed to persuade Gen. Duong

Van Minh, a popular opposition candidate, not to withdraw. General Minh quit the race Friday, saying the election was being rigged.

Vietnamese political sources reported that Ambassador Bunker helped mastermind the Saturday Supreme Court ruling that placed Mr. Ky back on the ballot and gave President Nguyen Van Thieu at least nominal opposition in the October 3 election.

Mr. Ky met with advisers and political and religious factions yesterday to see if he had enough support for a strong race.

It was earlier reported that Mr. Ky's decision would depend to some degree on whether he got the support of the An Quang Buddhists, the Associated Press said. These Buddhists had been supporting General Minh.

The United States is mustering its rapidly waning influence here to produce a contested election, something the Nixon administration feels it needs as much as the Saigon government does.

And the deepening American weakness and lack of development of South Vietnamese politics.

American support has been shown to be a necessary catalyst; some Vietnamese say the United States has actually been the prime mover in the last few days.

Vice President Ky, asked yesterday whether he knew of all the recent American activities, replied, "No—and I don't want to."

Until last week, American officials tried hard to maintain a public hands-off posture regarding the elections, avoiding anything that might be construed as U.S. involvement. But the known American activities of the past week have changed this. They included:

1. Separate conferences between Ambassador Bunker and President Thieu and then Ambassador Bunker and General Minh Thursday evening following Mr. Bunker's return that morning from Washington. Observers were surprised at how quickly Mr. Bunker scheduled the talks.

The lack of American guarantees of honest elections and Mr. Bunker's suggestion he should run to enhance his stature as an opposition leader left General Minh "furious," aides said.

There were also hints last night that his anger was prompted by an American attempt to bribe or blackmail him to remain in the race. Whatever was said by the ambassador, it cemented and, according to Minh aides, speeded the general's decision to quit.

The maneuver to place Mr. Ky back on the ballot despite the resulting embarrassment to President Thieu reportedly was decided at the President's meeting with Mr. Bunker.

2. Another meeting between President Thieu and Ambassador Bunker Friday. Senator Robert J. Dole (R., Kan.), the Republican national chairman, was present for most of it.

Senator Dole later said he had told Mr. Thieu that the withdrawal of General Minh would provoke much criticism in the United States and endanger continued American military and economic aid. An independent Saigon paper commented later, "Senator Dole's statement can only be taken as a threat because of his close ties with President Nixon."

Meeting With Ky

3. A meeting Saturday between Ambassador Bunker and Mr. Ky at which Mr. Bunker strongly urged the vice president to remain in the race.

Mr. Ky then postponed a press conference at which he was to have announced his withdrawal. Yesterday morning, he said he was still undecided, but would make up his mind by Tuesday.

4. Meetings by political officers from the American Embassy with a wide range of Vietnamese, particularly opposition leaders, in an effort to apply indirect pressure first on General Minh and then on Mr. Ky to remain in the race.

The Vice President and Ambassador Bunker met again for 40 minutes yesterday afternoon at Mr. Ky's house at Tan Son Nhut air base outside Saigon.

In addition, an embassy official conferred with the Supreme Court's chief justice late Friday

while the court was in the midst of its deliberations on restoring Mr. Ky to the ballot. The embassy described the visit as "information gathering."

Activity Intense

Activity was intense Friday and Saturday at the embassy, a large, heavily fortified, six-story downtown building nicknamed the Big House for its penitentiary-modern style.

Other diplomats, watching the American comings and goings with fascination, described the public activities as "only the tip of the iceberg" in the increased U.S. involvement in the election.

The number of meetings between embassy officials and Vietnamese politicians is not known, nor are the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, which has been monitoring the election closely.

Although Ambassador Bunker's meetings were disclosed, details of his talks were not. Even at the Embassy, the substance of his talks is kept secret except at the highest level.

The situation is not new to Ambassador Bunker, who four years ago helped persuade then General Thieu and Marshal Ky, then premier, to run on the same ticket.

Kennedy's role in Indochina

By Richard E. Ward

Fourth of a series on the Pentagon papers

If only John F. Kennedy had lived, certain writers have asserted, the U.S. never would have become bogged down in a major war in Southeast Asia.

The Pentagon papers are unkind to that myth, for the documents clearly show that the Kennedy administration set the stage for the escalation in Vietnam by its successor. In effect, Lyndon Johnson carried out a program germinated by the Kennedy administration, some of whose chief figures contemplated as early as 1961 the massive use of U.S. ground forces and the bombing of North Vietnam.

The Kennedy administration took office just a month after the formation of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam in December 1960. The NLF quickly gained wide support throughout the South and the U.S.-sponsored regime of Ngo Dinh Diem was soon on the defensive militarily and politically. From 1961, there was a steady escalation in U.S. interventionary activities. Espionage missions against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were stepped up and the first regular American ground troops were sent to the South as "advisors" to the Saigon armed forces which were being expanded by the U.S. By mid-1963, the White House concluded that its aim of victory in Vietnam would not be possible under the Diem regime and the U.S. gave the green light for a coup in Saigon.

As the number of U.S. personnel in Indochina approached 20,000—an almost 20-fold increase in less than three years—the Kennedy administration came under increasing domestic criticism. In response, it stated the U.S. military presence in Vietnam had reached its peak and would be concluded by 1965. While that was what the public heard, the Pentagon papers reveal that most top administration officials were aware that the commitment of the first complement of U.S. troops implied a larger American combat role in the future.

The President's personal military advisor, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, recommended the use of U.S. forces on a limited scale in early November 1961, following a visit to South Vietnam. Taylor himself discounted the possibility that a major war would result from the use of American troops, which he suggested could be sent to

"flood relief." In a report to Kenn... wrote: "The risks of backing into a major Asian war by way of SVN are present but are not impressive. NVN is extremely vulnerable to conventional bombing, a weakness which should be exploited diplomatically in convincing Hanoi to lay off SVN."

In a report of Nov. 8, 1961, endorsing the Taylor recommendations, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara spelled out the implications of a military victory with the use of U.S. troops: "The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction... by a warning... to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam."

"If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping (sic) may intervene directly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe that we can assume that the maximum U.S. forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia will not exceed 6 divisions, or about 205,000 men."

Although the Kennedy administration never actually made the decision to send the forces for fighting a full-scale war, its strategy (continued by the Johnson administration) foresaw their use and its actions laid the necessary groundwork for the subsequent escalation. One of these preparatory steps deemed necessary by Washington was the elimination of the Diem regime.

U.S. responsibility for the elimination of Diem was no less than for his installation in Saigon. Both roles have always been officially disclaimed by Washington, although there has been sufficient evidence of the facts for anyone who wanted to draw the correct conclusions. Of course details were missing. Some of them have been supplied in the Pentagon report.

The published communications between Washington and the U.S. embassy in Saigon show that the U.S. gave the plotters full assurances that the U.S. desired a coup. The U.S. furnished the generals with plans of Saigon military installations and at the time of the coup a CIA liaison man was in the generals' command post. White House officials and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge were aware that Diem was likely to be assassinated and made no serious effort to save him, despite all his past services to the U.S.

The published documents and narratives concentrate primarily on the U.S. role in Diem's downfall, but provide less details on what is perhaps a more important question—the reason why the U.S. prompted the coup. Yet there seems to be enough evidence to say that the primary reason was not the regime's unpopularity at home and abroad, but rather because with the increase in U.S. troops in Vietnam Washington wanted a greater degree of control over the Saigon administration than Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu were willing to grant.

STATINTL

M - 846,132

S - 1,407,549

AUG 16 1971

Windfall for Historians

To the Editor:

There are two happy by-products of the decision of The Times to publish the Pentagon papers: the action of the Kennedy Presidential Library in greatly expanding access to scholars and President Nixon's request for the declassification of the bulk of World War II documents.

Regardless of the number of memoirs and "inside accounts," historians and other scholars can never be satisfied without access to the original documents. With them they can at least come a little closer to something that approximates truth. The importance of the actual text is well illustrated by The Times' publication of the cable sent to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon on Aug. 24, 1963. The newly arrived diplomat had asked for guidelines in his dealings with the generals' plot to overthrow President Ngo Dinh Diem.

Roger Hilsman, one of the drafters of this cable, wrote in 1967 in "To Move a Nation" that "a basically accurate version" had been revealed by A. M. Schlesinger Jr. in 1963 in "A Thousand Days." In that volume Mr. Schlesinger digested in five sentences a cable that exceeded 2,000 words and his key sentence said, "We would take no part in any action." Mr. Hilsman devoted a chapter to the same document, going further than Mr. Schlesinger in a summary line, "We could take no part in any planning or action."

The Pentagon analyst says that the cable served as "the initial American sanction for the coup." Readers of the text will now find that it called for "immediate action" on a number of fronts and assured Mr. Lodge that "we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives." Mr. Lodge subsequently agreed to the assignment of a C.I.A. colonel as liaison with the plotters and the C.I.A. was authorized to assist in "tactical planning" of the coup.

Historians who dismissed as journalistic speculation the reports of American complicity in the coup and who accepted the authoritative Schlesinger and Hilsman volumes can now rewrite their histories. Documents can be faked, but generally they are more reliable than memoirs or the accounts of those whose politics brought them special access.

WILLIAM L. NEUMANN

Professor of History
 Goucher College
 Baltimore, Aug. 4, 1971

The Prophetic Fiction of Graham Greene

On Reading the
Pentagon Papers

by Eugene G. Windchey

Though the Pentagon Papers hurt the Democrats as a party more than they do the Republicans, they chiefly benefit the war critics of both parties, and that is a major reason why the Nixon administration has reacted so strongly against the disclosures. Now the critics can buttress their case with piles of official documents that, secretly, have been agreeing with them all along. It is the government's supporters who have been misled, not its antagonists. From almost anybody's point of view, this makes our national leaders look like a pack of knaves, if not fools. It took a retired official to state the fact plainly. Publication of the Pentagon Papers, said Walt W. Rostow, "did not just hurt President Johnson. It encouraged the widespread notion that, well, you can't believe a President."

The critics have always said that the United States

EUGENE G. WINDCHEY has spent four years investigating the Tonkin Gulf incidents. His book, Tonkin Gulf, will be published on August 27 by Doubleday.

was not stopping aggression in Vietnam but was interfering in Vietnamese internal affairs. Thanks to Daniel Ellsberg, that now is more evident than before. Far from supporting the Geneva settlement, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered it a "disaster" and postponed the reunification of Vietnam by free elections--because it had no confidence in the outcome of free elections. A team of American agents launched anti-Communist activities in Vietnam even before the Geneva Conference ended; later they tried to ruin the municipal bus system in Hanoi by pouring contaminants into the fuel supply.

On its own initiative, Washington encouraged and financed what it hoped would be a permanent, non-Communist government in southern Vietnam. In the private councils of officialdom, there was little cant about giving the "South Vietnamese people" an opportunity to determine their future. It was fully realized that, left to themselves, the southern Vietnamese would choose the wrong future. Nearly a decade passed, and

the US Ambassador to Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, advised the State Department (on October 25, 1963) that South Vietnam was still "not ready" for "a democratic election." Thus the ideals of democracy and self-determination were subordinated to the demands of anti-Communism. (In the most authoritative secret documents, we find the American goal stated as an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam. Yet even some insiders managed to miss the point. In his memoranda, Professor Rostow kept saying that the American aim was to restore the Geneva settlement.) There can be little doubt that historians will pinpoint the American rejection of the Geneva settlement as the basic cause of a second war in Indochina.

As for the nature of the Communist-led insurgency in South Vietnam, which flared in the late 1950s, the critics repeatedly said that it had great popular support and that North Vietnamese help, though available, was probably not needed by the Viet Cong. That is why the critics have scoffed at recurrent plans for "Vietnamization." Now the Pentagon Papers reveal that the official policymakers themselves were not sure about the importance of North Vietnam's role in the war--though they undertook to devastate that country. According to official records, the insurgency in South Vietnam began largely on its own, in response to Ngo Dinh Diem's repression. In 1959 Hanoi decided that it had better assert control of the increasingly successful rebellion. But two years later American intelligence estimated that 80-90 percent of the Viet Cong had been recruited locally, and reported little evidence of the guerrillas' relying on external supplies.

For years US strategy called for defeating the Viet Cong in the South, on their home ground, with Vietnamese troops. That strategy did not work. In the spring of 1964, American officials were ordered to go out and get enough evidence of North Vietnamese help to the Viet Cong so that "escalation" of the war could be justified if escalation became necessary.

Nobody waited for the evidence to come in. Wash-

FROM HIMALAYAS TO GIs

Tracing the Drug Trail to Vietnam

By PETER ARNETT
and BERNARD GAVZER
Associated Press

SAIGON—America's GI heroin users are at the Vietnam end of an intricately organized dope pipeline that begins in the poppy fields of the Himalayas and is tolerated, and sometimes aided, by government officials and soldiers of three nations on its journey to the streets of Saigon.

Alarmed by widespread use of drugs among American servicemen, the United States is putting on vast pressure to curb the traffic, but finds itself bucking a way of life that has endured for a century.

An Associated Press investigation of how drugs move through Southeast Asia produces these major findings:

o A Chinese "mafia" dominates the drug traffic. It operates a complex family-style network out of a dozen Asian cities, paying off all the way: to the military rebels whose caravans gather the opium gum grown by Meo farmers, to the Lao soldiers who guard the secluded heroin refineries along mountain streams, through customs checkpoints and roadblocks in Thailand; to fishing boat owners and truck drivers in Indochinese villages, and finally to some South Vietnamese generals who allow the traffic to continue right under their noses in Saigon.

o Though the opium trade in the Orient is a hundred years old, U.S. attention has centered on it in the past year only because of the spreading use of heroin among young soldiers in Vietnam. American officials in Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand say on the record the traffic is being suppressed, but many despair of making a serious dent in the business soon because it is one thing to know the system and quite another to break through the layers of protection and obtain names and evidence.

o The narcotics traffic is so deeply woven into the social, political, and economic fabric of Southeast Asia that it is a sort of cottage industry upon which many people depend for livelihoods. It is not generally conceived of here as wrong to deal in drugs.

o On mainly concerned with supplying smoking opium and a relatively poor grade of smoking heroin, the Southeast Asian narcotics traffic has evolved in the last year or so into a semisophisticated racket that some officials say is ready to expand and follow the GIs home to the United States if Mideast and European sources of heroin there dry up.

150,000 Doses a Week?

o The flow to GIs in Vietnam is appreciable by any standards. Col. Lee Doc Huong, head of narcotics investigation for South Vietnam said on the basis of seizure that it could readily be 50 kilograms a week, about 150,000 doses.

To measure the networks within Southeast Asia's drug traffic, we journeyed around the world, from the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in Washington, to Interpol, the international police agency, in Paris, and to narcotics bureaus and study centers in Saigon, Bangkok, Hong Kong and Vientiane.

We traced the 100-year-old drug routes in the "Golden Triangle"—the key Southeast Asian cultivation center where Burma, Laos and Thailand meet in a checkerboard of misty mountains inhabited by bandit gangs.

Supply Plentiful

We went where opium is grown, where it is processed and where it is used. We watched American GIs smoking heroin in Saigon while the peddlers and bar girls they purchased it from danced around them in constant attendance, always proffering more at \$5 a barrel—one third of a gram, pure.

While the war is fought in eastern Laos, the dope pipeline begins in peace on the green hillsides of Burmese, Lao and Thai villages. In these places the Meo families developed the opium crop. A typical family might have as much as two acres of opium in a year.

When the opium is harvested it stops being a family enterprise—a cottage industry of sorts. Chinese traders collect the production, paying the equivalent of from \$20 to \$40 per kilo, or 2.2 pounds. Prices for the drug rise astronomically along

the route; a kilo of heroin selling in Saigon for \$10,000 from an investment of only \$350 in the raw opium needed to produce it.

Mules Employed

The trek from the remote villages goes through mountains and valleys, along bidden paths and ancient roadways, all leading to the 21 processing plants near the borders of Thailand and Laos.

Huge caravans of up to 300 pack mules are sometimes used. In the assembly of these mighty caravans, the major opium dealers become involved. They are the Chu Chow Chinese, the shrewd, successful businessmen who came from a small, harsh region—in their case the Fukien coast of China—and fanned out as families to all the neighboring nations of Asia.

Official assistance is required along the transportation route, and that is where the next payoffs are made: to customs officials, local military garrisons and police.

Then the Payoffs

Major payoffs are made at the next stage of the traffic: the farmhouse-sized processing plants tucked discreetly along streams and on hillsides. Here the raw opium is refined into morphine blocks and low-grade purple heroin favored by Asian addicts, or the top grade H4 heroin used exclusively by the Americans. The payoffs at the processing plants are for protection by troops.

A senior Lao general, Ouane Rathikone, named in a special report to the U.S. Congress as being involved in the opium business, "protected" two heroin refineries at Ban Houei Sai with Lao troops loyal to him, according to informants in Vientiane. Rathikone has retired but faces no charges.

The next big payoffs come in moving the finished heroin product by truck through many roadblocks sprinkled on Thailand's highways to the coast, or by plane to Vientiane. American intelligence reports repeatedly have charged the Royal Lao Air Force with carrying opium and heroin from Ban Houei Sai, and from a new airstrip in the Shan states at Pong in Laos.

Travelers Also Used

From the Thai coast the drugs move by landing and to Vietnam. From Vientiane the heroin

moves by plane through the southern Lao town of Pakse to Saigon and Nha Trang.

The U.S. Embassy in Saigon has incriminating dossiers on many South Vietnamese officials, and recently sent 78 of them to President Nguyen Van Thieu for action. American officials with access to these files said they were compiled by the CIA and include corruption charges against six senior officers in the military.

The charges are of a type that would mean certain court-martial for a general officer in the American army. As with so many other things in Vietnam, the Western model cannot automatically be substituted for the Asian reality. Patronage, political necessity, old alliances formed in war or commerce all play a role.

Police Criticized

The chief of police, Gen. Tran Thanh Phong, has total police power. Yet, American investigators complain that when peddlers incriminate dealers there is no followup of American complaints to Phong.

Vietnamese Air Force planes, according to the best-informed Americans, fly to Pakse in southern Laos and return with dope.

"But how do you nail the Vietnamese Air Force?" one American investigator complained. "The retailers say they bought it from a pilot, and if we arrest him the Air Force bombs the police headquarters, and there is nothing we can do about it."

In Vietnam, the main effort by U.S. military authorities is to persuade GIs to avoid the drug, and to treat and rehabilitate those already hooked. Estimates of users range from 5 percent to 15 percent, the high figure representing some 37,500 soldiers.

U.S. officials also are pressuring the Vietnamese to crack down on peddlers to make it harder for GIs to get heroin.

Outside Vietnam, where American leverage is weaker, governments have been asked to crack down on the traffic, but American agents expect few results. The Lao National Assembly is soon expected to pass a bill outlawing opium growing and smoking, but both Thailand and Vietnam have had similar laws for years with little effect.

WASHINGTON STAD
11 AUG 1971

STUDENT SLAIN

Viet Cong Is Defiant At Sentence of Death

By KEYES BEECH
Chicago Daily News Service

SAIGON--A 21-year-old Viet Cong shouted "down with the government" today as he was sentenced to death for the murder of a Saigon student leader.

✓ Nguyen Van Phan readily told a military court he shot and killed Le Khac Sinh Nhut, a Saigon university law student and anti-Communist student leader, on June 28.

✓ Phan said he committed no crime because Nhut was in the pay of the government and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Nguyen Van Ngan, 19, driver of the motorcycle on which Phan made his getaway, was sentenced to hard labor for life

while a third youth, Nguyen Van Hong, 21, was given 15 years. A woman accomplice to whom Phan gave the murder weapon was given five years.

Ngan, who was shot in the leg by police as he sped away from the murder scene, appeared in court on a stretcher with his leg in a cast.

The unrepentant Phan, who said he has been a Communist since he was 16, told the court he visited the Saigon University law school campus several times to get acquainted with the layout and identify his victim.

He apologized for accidentally wounding two other students after killing Nhut. He also apologized for dropping a grenade as he escaped and wounding several others.

STATINTL

CIA's murderous role outrages the Filipinos

By WILLIAM J. POMEROY

LONDON

Publication of the Pentagon Papers that has blasted a gaping hole in the credibility of a string of American administrations has set off a secondary explosion in the Philippines, where the role of the puppet Magsaysay administration in aiding the American aggression in Vietnam has been exposed.

One of the main reports in the Papers is that by Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, in which he discusses in detail the actions taken by the CIA from before the Geneva Agreement of 1954 onward to promote suppressive counter-guerrilla warfare in Vietnam and Laos and to build up Ngo Dinh Diem as the American instrument to frustrate the Agreement. Lansdale was well-known before that in the Philippines, since he was the CIA agent who masterminded many aspects of the anti-Huk suppression campaign in the country and who groomed Ramon Magsaysay for the presidency and ran his election campaign.

In a number of the actions detailed by Lansdale in his report Filipinos who were part of the Magsaysay apparatus and with whom Lansdale had worked in the Philippines played a leading part. Magsaysay himself as honorary president, backed the setting up of an outfit initially called the Freedom Company, "a non-profit Philippine corporation," which had the assignment of recruiting Filipinos who had participated in the anti-Huk suppression for similar service in Vietnam and Laos.

After Freedom Company was organized in November 1954, it was apparently felt that its name did not sufficiently disguise its operations, so it was changed to Eastern Construction Company. (The CIA has created a maze of such "corporations" around the world, through which its espionage and subversive activities are carried on.)

As the Lansdale report states, "The head of Eastern Construction is Prisco 'Johnny' San Juan, former National Commander, Philippines Veterans Legion, and for-

mer close staff assistant to President Magsaysay (serving as Presidential Complaints and Action Commissioner directly under the President)." San Juan went on to a political career and is now a congressman from Rizal province.

Lansdale praised the almost untapped potential of Eastern Construction for unconventional warfare "which was its original mission." He wrote that "this cadre can be expanded into a wide range of counter-Communist activities, having sufficient stature in the Philippines to be able to draw on a very large segment of its trained, experienced and well-motivated manpower pool." After a few years, "It now furnishes about 500 trained, experienced Filipino technicians to the Governments of Vietnam and Laos, under the auspices of MAAG (MAP) and USOM (ICA) activities."

MAAG are the initials for Military Assistance Advisory Group, and MAP for Military Assistance Program in Vietnam; USOM stands for United States Operation Mission, and ICA for International Cooperation Administration.

The Freedom-Eastern Construction outfit was also assigned the task of running a training camp for anti-Communist Vietnamese para-military units in a hidden valley on the Clark Air Base reservation in the Philippines.

In addition the Magsaysay government agreed to operate a psychological warfare counter-guerrilla school called the Security Training Center, located at Fort McKinley on the rim of Manila. This, as the Pentagon Papers mentions, was secretly sponsored and financed by the CIA. This trained "anti-subversion" personnel for all of Southeast Asia.

Another Filipino-linked scheme

was the so-called Operation Brotherhood, which came about following a visit in 1954 to see Lansdale in Saigon by Oscar Arellano, a Filipino close to Magsaysay who was then vice president for Asia of the International Junior Chamber of Commerce (Jaycees). Arellano came away from this visit to advocate the setting up of Operation Brotherhood, which was played up in the Philippines at the time as a semi-religious altruistic medical mission.

However, as Lansdale explains it, it was "capable of considerable expansion in socio-economic medical operations to support counter-guerrilla actions," and he says that "Washington responded warmly to the idea." According to Lansdale, the Saigon Military Mission that he then headed would "monitor the operation quietly in the background" and that "it has a measure of CIA control."

Oscar Arellano, following the publication of the Pentagon Papers issued a defensive statement claiming that "OB has always been a presidential program since the administration of President Magsaysay. OB's mission is the propagation of the conviction that all men are brothers, created by a Supreme Divinity to whom He gave His image and likeness and imbued with His spirit."

A third Filipino operation was headed by Col. Napoleon Valeriano, who was given the job of training a Presidential Guard Battalion for Ngo Dinh Diem, after having done the same for Magsaysay. Valeriano was selected, says Lansdale, for his "fine record against the Communist Huks." In the Philippines, Valeriano had commanded the most brutal and notorious of all anti-Huk units, called the "Skull Unit."

A Good Investment

CIA Gets 'A' on Tests

By Holmes Alexander

WASHINGTON — Among the many things one can find in the Pentagon Papers is a high degree of competence on the part of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in at least three fields. While President Kennedy's reputation suffers from the revelations, the CIA comes through with flying colors — the skill and bones variety.

Back in 1963, the Kennedy Administration decided to bring down the loyal-to-the-USA Ngo Dinh Diem regime because it was known to be corrupt and not to have popular support in South Vietnam. Kennedy naturally turned to the CIA as his executioner.

The CIA did not stage a coup, but it did the next best thing. It kept track of the Vietnamese generals who were conspiring against Diem. The CIA agent on the spot was a certain Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, an old acquaintance of several of the Saigon generals, and he was in close touch with Washington. President Kennedy wanted "plausibility of denial" about U.S. involvement in the upcoming coup. The CIA performed its delicately deceitful role with ruthless precision.

With instructions from JFK, the CIA provided the anti-Diem conspirators with information on the faction that would succeed him.

On October 5, 1963, when President Kennedy wanted to dispatch instructions "with closest security" to the Saigon embassy, he sent them via CIA channels. President Kennedy furthermore ordered that all cloak-and-dagger reports be sent back to him on the same CIA circuit. The coup came off as planned, and the Diem government was replaced by a military junta. (The Diem brothers lost their lives only because they did not accept Ambassador Lodge's invitation of sanctuary at his embassy.)

While overall instructions from the White House were sometimes ambiguous, according to the published documents, the CIA spooks did their dirty work very well.

As the Vietnamese War was stepped up by the Johnson administration, the CIA took a hard look at the bombing campaign in a report of March 16, 1966, and found that:

"Although the movement of men and supplies in North Vietnam has been hampered and made somewhat more costly (by our bombing), the Communists have been able to increase the flow of supplies and manpower to South Vietnam." The CIA saw the bombing as a failure before others higher up in the administration realized this.

The Pentagon Papers were

certainly not leaked in order to make the CIA look good, but these documents do have that effect. In the James Bond world of kill and conspire (an unnatural and un-American way of life) and in the world of military studies, the agency gets A on most of the tests.

The Pentagon Papers show that the CIA recruited a number of secret armies in Southeast Asia, including an army of Meo tribesmen in Laos. This army was to assist the Royal Laotian Army against the Communists. The secret force has had its ups and downs on the battlefield. Recently, it again was able to capture the strategic Plain of Jars with the help of the U.S. Air Force.

Pravda, in an editorial of 18 July, inadvertently gave the CIA a plug by mentioning the success of the Meo army in Laos. At this writing, the Communists are on the run and are talking peace for a change in Laos. It looks as though the rag-tag army of primitive tribesmen is living up to expectations.

If we accept it as a grisly necessity of world politics, the Central Intelligence Agency, despite its failures, is a good investment and is worth its funding of about \$500-million a year. How do we know? If CIA were not doing a good job, Pravda wouldn't bother to denounce it so hysterically.

STATINTL

3 AUG 1971

USED CIA EXPENSE FUNDS

Ex-Army Spy Tells of
Viet Draft Bribing

BY THOMAS J. FOLEY

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—A former undercover Army intelligence agent told lawmakers Monday that he used an unlimited CIA expense account to bribe a Saigon draft board and keep an invaluable South Vietnamese youth acting as an interpreter in his spy ring.

The testimony by K. Barton Osborn, 26, described his 13 months in Da Nang, supposedly as a civilian assigned to help in the Vietnam pacification program but actually setting up a spy ring.

From the expense funds—with no accounting necessary—Osborn said he was able to retain his South Vietnamese interpreter who was about to be drafted. Osborn said the youth gave the money to the draft review board in Saigon and stayed out of the army.

The agent, at the time a private first class trained

at Ft. Holabird, Md., testified before the House government operations subcommittee, which is studying U.S. aid programs in South Vietnam.

Osborn, now a graduate student at American University in Washington, D.C., repeated testimony he had given before anti-war groups about witnessing torture and assassination of Viet Cong suspects by U.S. soldiers.

In appearing under oath before the House group, Osborn and Michael J. Uhl, another former intelligence agent, became the first Vietnam veterans to testify before a congressional committee about atrocities they themselves had witnessed.

They told how they had seen U.S. military personnel push suspected Viet Cong out of helicopters to intimidate other prisoners and get them to talk.

They also said that members of an interrogation group at the Da Nang Marine base accidentally killed one prisoner when,

trying to force him to talk, they went too far and punctured his eardrum and brain with a pointed piece of wood.

Osborn testified that his interpreter, a Chinese woman, was shot through the neck by a U.S. Army captain, whom he did not identify, as she was on her way to lunch. He said he believed the captain shot the woman because of his "complete disdain" for Orientals.

"When I asked him why he did it, he said the woman was only a slope anyway and that it didn't matter," Osborn testified.

Viet Cong suspects, Osborn said, were turned over to groups called "provisional reconnaissance units," which were primarily Vietnamese personnel with U.S. advisers. They were part of the Phoenix program which was designed to root out the Viet Cong infrastructure and which Osborn characterized as a "sterile depersonalized murder program."

He said suspects often were turned over to the units for interrogation without investigation or verification of charges. Once in the interrogation process, Osborn testified, "They all die." He said he never saw a suspect who ever lived.

For the first time, Os-

born revealed details of the training and operations of Army intelligence.

He said he operated a 50-man spy ring out of a counter-insurgency unit in the Marine Corps base outside Da Nang. He said the marines never knew he was an Army private first class and that it took him six weeks to win their confidence so they would use information he gave them of Viet Cong activities in the I Corps area.

Osborn said he was paid once a month by an administrative captain who passed the money under the table during lunch at the Navy officers' club in Da Nang.

But, he said, he had an unlimited expense account from the CIA to set up the spy ring for ferreting out Viet Cong suspects in the I Corps area.

8 AUG 1971

PHOENIX PROGRAM DETAILS

'Sterile, Depersonalized Murder' Plan

STATINTL

By MARY McGROCKY

Star Staff Writer

In 1968, when he was 21, K. Barton Osborn, a reddish-haired young man with long sideburns and a quick mind, was a big operator, James Bond style, in DaNang, South Vietnam.

He was only a PFC, but 50 Vietnamese agents were in his network, and he had no superior officers to report to, and nobody questioned him. He used a cover name and had four separate sets of papers identifying him as a civilian with the Department of the Army, a GS-9 with AID, an infantry lieutenant and a sergeant, E-5.

He got his pay from an Army captain, wearing civilian clothes who passed it to him under the table at a Navy Officers Club.

He had been trained at intelligence school in "illegal but condoned" methods of undercover work at Fort Holabird, and he never heard of the Geneva Convention and the treatment of civilians which he still confuses with the Geneva Accords, which in 1954 were supposed to end the Vietnam war.

His agents fingered villages and villagers for extinction, the former by B-52 strikes and artillery fire, the latter by death, often after torture.

A major at the C.I.A. operation headquarters in DaNang provided him with unlimited funds for "incentive gifts" to his agents—cigarettes, whiskey, and for his principal agent—whom he was subsequently instructed to eliminate with extreme prejudice (he refused)—a motorcycle.

The major at the C.I.A. was the coordinator for the Phoenix program, a grisly operation which the House subcommittee on Foreign Government Operations is desperately trying to uncover and stop.

According to Ambassador William J. Colby, until recently in charge of the parent program, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, run jointly by the U.S. and South Vietnam, the purpose of the exercise is "to provide permanent protection to the villagers.

Permanent protection of a sort has been conferred on 20,578 Vietnamese. At least it is permanent. 20,578 have been killed under the program. This year, through May, the State Department admitted reluctantly, 3,650 have died. One is reminded of the official report of My Lai—in which it was recounted that the "civilians had been assisted to safety."

Osborn, who is now a student at American University, says that Phoenix is nothing but "a sterile, depersonalized murder program."

Abuses Admitted

Colby, testifying before the committee on July 19, cautiously conceded "unjustifiable abuses," since corrected by the two governments. Osborn and a fellow rebuttal witness, former 1st Lt. Michael J. Uhl, say the program has been "intensified" under Vietnamization.

Colby was categorical about one thing: Americans play only a supporting minor role in the bloody business. They help with the "collection of information against V.C. suspects, with the filling out of dossiers, and "working but techniques" for the handling of them.

"The American," Colby said emphatically, "would not be the man who reached out and grabbed the fellow."

But the Americans, according to Osborn, gave the orders and not only grabbed the fellow, but pulled the trigger.

A Marine first lieutenant gave the order to push a Vietnamese detainee, beaten and bound, out the door of a helicopter flying over DaNang. This was what was called "an airborne interrogation."

"This happened, not once, as an aberration," Osborn said, "but twice."

He watched a Vietnamese woman starved to death in a cage at a Marine interrogation center. When he inquired about her, he was told "she had died of malnutrition."

"They Were Embarrassed"

He saw a prisoner who had had a knife driven into his ear — they hit the brain too soon

and killed him. "They were embarrassed," he said.

Osborn's Chinese interpreter, a woman, was shot, casually, in the back of the neck by an Army captain, who yearned to be an agent handler, and thought the woman was "dangerous." The incident was not reported. "She was only a slope," the captain said afterwards.

As for the process of detention, interrogation, trial and disposition described in detail by Ambassador Colby, neither Osborn nor Uhl had ever seen it happen.

"I never knew of a detainee to leave the interrogation center," said Osborn. "The majority were tortured to death."

He never tried to tell a superior officer. He knew they didn't want to know of the atrocities occurring in the field.

Congress hasn't wanted to know either. Uhl and Osborn told their stories to an ill-attended meeting called by the Commission for the Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes last winter. They told them again to Rep. Ron Dellums "informal" hearings on atrocities right after the Vietnam Veterans Against the War held their encampment.

The hearings before Rep. William E. Moorhead's subcommittee were the first legitimate forum granted them. If Moorhead and the other indignant doves — among them Ogden Reid, R-N.Y., and Paul J. McCloskey, R-Calif. — try to go higher and call the commanding officers, they will run into jurisdictional problems with the House Armed Services Committee. If they call AID and State Department officials they will be told that they knew nothing of such abuses and that besides, atrocity is not the "official policy" of the U.S. — in sharp distinction to "the other side." Reid says that it's hard to tell the difference, really, between their terror and ours.

U.S. Defense Department to pay?

Big rewards offered for Viet Cong 'bosses'

STATINTL

By Daniel Southerland
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Saigon

The Saigon government's failure to capture many high-level members of the Viet Cong political underground is one of the main reasons for a new high-rewards system being set up here.

Rewards systems have existed here in the past, but none has matched this one. The payoff could now go as high as the piaster equivalent of nearly \$11,000 for information leading to the capture of a given high-ranking member of the Viet Cong "infrastructure."

The new rewards project will be part of the Saigon government's Phung Hoang, or "Phoenix," program which is aimed at destroying the Viet Cong political and administrative apparatus. The controversial Phoenix program has strong U.S. backing, and it is understood that funds for the new "high-value rewards" program are to come from the U.S. Department of Defense.

The new program is expected to start within the next few weeks, with pilot projects in one province in each of South Vietnam's four military regions. If successful on this basis, it will be expanded nationwide to all 44 provinces.

'Phantom government'

Lists of the "most wanted" members of the Viet Cong "phantom government" in the four selected provinces have already been drawn up for approval by Saigon. Only 10 high-ranking Viet Cong political cadre are to be "targeted" in each province.

The rewards have to be high, officials say, because a person who gives information leading to the arrest of a high-level Viet Cong cadre might be forced to leave his home and reestablish himself and his family at another location because of possible reprisals from the Viet Cong. The rewards will range from one million to three million piasters (\$3,636 to \$10,909).

Phoenix operations have been a disappointment to many officials and military men because they have failed thus far to result in the capture of anything more than a very small percentage of the highest-level members of the Viet Cong political underground.

But officials here resent the charge which has been leveled by several U.S. congressmen that Phoenix is an "assassination program" directed at civilians. They say that most members of the Viet Cong "infrastructure," such as administrative cadre or tax collectors, while classified as civilians because of their functions, usually carry weapons. But the officials say that such persons are much more valuable to the government if they are captured, not killed.

Bounties to increase

Under the new rewards system, bounties paid to military or police units for the capture of an individual are to be increased, and the amount to be paid for the capture of a man is to be twice that paid for a "kill."

"When they target a man, they always try to capture him because of the information he might have," said one official.

Ambassador William E. Colby, former head of the U.S. side of the "pacification" program in South Vietnam, recently told a congressional subcommittee that 69,932 persons had been counted as killed, captured, or defecting to the Saigon government in Phoenix operations from 1968 to May of this year. The figure includes 20,587 listed as killed.

But Mr. Colby maintained that assassination is not an aim of the program.

"In the course of normal military operations or police actions to apprehend them, however, members of the infrastructure have been killed as members of military units or while fighting off arrests," Mr. Colby said.

According to a news report from Washington, a still-classified General Accounting Office report says that \$80 million in U.S. funds have been devoted to the Phoenix program in the past three years, mostly from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Several hundred American military personnel are engaged as advisers to the program, but the number is decreasing.

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

The Theory and Fallacies of

STATINTL

Counterinsurgency

EQBAL AHMAD

From the beginning, the core of the tragedy in Southeast Asia has been the inability of Western political leaders, and particularly American political leaders, to grasp the nature of insurgency in areas formerly under colonial rule, or the limitations of counterinsurgency to quell it. Accordingly, The Nation is devoting almost this entire issue to Egbal Ahmad's essay on the subject. In somewhat different form it will be a chapter in his forthcoming Reaction and Revolution in the Third World (Pantheon). Mr. Ahmad is a Fellow of the Adlai Stevenson Institute in Chicago.

To write on counterinsurgency one must first explain what the so-called "insurgencies" really are. In the United States that may be difficult because for the most part the social scientists who write on revolutionary warfare have been proponents of counterinsurgency. As a result, the biases of incumbents are built into the structure, images and language of contemporary Western, especially American, literature on the subject. We have come to accept ideologically contrived concepts and words as objective descriptions.

One could take innumerable examples—terrorism, subversion, pacification, urbanization, protective reaction, defensive interdiction, etc.—and expose the realities behind these words and phrases. The term counterinsurgency is itself an excellent example. Like all coinages in this area, it is value-laden and misleading. In fact, counterinsurgency is not at all directed against insurgency, which Webster defines as "a revolt against a government, not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution; and not recognized as belligerency." The truth is, the Congress and the country would be in uproar if the government were to claim that U.S. counterinsurgency capabilities could conceivably be available to its clients for putting down "revolts not reaching the proportions of an organized revolution." The truth is the opposite: counterinsurgency is a multifaceted assault against organized revolutions. The euphemism is not used by accident, nor from ignorance. It serves to conceal the reality of a foreign policy dedicated to combating revolutions abroad; it helps to relegate revolutionaries to the status of outlaws. The reduction of a revolution to mere insurgency is also an implicit denial of its legitimacy. In this article, counterinsurgency and counterrevolution are used interchangeably.

Analytically, counterinsurgency may be discussed in terms of two primary models—the conventional-establishment and the liberal-reformist; and two ancillary models—the punitive-militarist and the technological-attributive. I term these latter ancillary because they develop after the fact—from actual involvement in counterrevolution, and from interplay between the conventional and liberal institutions and individuals so involved. The models, though identifiable in terms of the intensity and

scope of their application at given times, and in terms of the agencies and individuals favoring them, are operationally integrated in the field. I outline them here:

Although monolithic in its goal of suppressing revolutions, the theory and practice of counterinsurgency reflects the pluralism of the Western societies to which most of its practitioners and all of its theoreticians belong. A pluralistic, bargaining political culture induces an institutionalized compulsion to compromise. Within a defined boundary, there can be something for everyone. Hence, the actual strategy and tactics of counterinsurgency reflect compromise, no one blueprint being applied in its original, unadulterated form. This give-and-take contributes to a most fateful phenomenon of counterrevolutionary involvement: groups and individuals continue to feel that their particular prescriptions were never administered in full dosage and at the right intervals. They show a tendency toward self-justification, a craving to continue with and improve their formulas for success. Severe critics of specific "blunders" and "miscalculations," they still persist in seeing "light at the end of the tunnel." I shall return to this in discussing the Doctrine of Permanent Counterinsurgency.

Set Battles; 'Liberal' Routine

We might view the conventional-establishment approach as constituting the common denominator of the assumptions and objectives shared by all incumbents; viz., an *a priori* hostility toward revolution, the view that its origins are conspiratorial, a managerial attitude toward it as a problem, and a technocratic-military approach to its solution. In strategy and tactics, this approach prefers conventional ground and air operations, requiring large deployments of troops, search-and-destroy missions (also called "mop-up operations"), the tactics of "encirclement" and "attrition"—which involve, on the one hand, large military fortifications (bases, enclaves) connected by "mobile" battalions (in Vietnam, helicopter-borne troops and air cavalry); and, on the other hand, massive displacement of civilian population and the creation of free-fire zones. The conventionalists also evince deep longings for set battles, and would multiply the occasions by forcing, surprising or luring the guerrillas into conventional showdowns. The results of these pressures are bombings (e.g., North Vietnam) or invasion of enemy "sanctuaries" across the frontiers of conflict (e.g., Cambodia) and the tactic of offering an occasional bait in the hope of luring the enemy to a concentrated attack (e.g., Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh).

If the conventional-establishment attitudes constitute the lowest common denominator of counterrevolution, the liberal-reformists are the chief exponents of its doctrine, and the most sophisticated programmers of its practice. They provide the core of the policies specifically associated

STATINTL

CIA Has Secret Army Of 100,000, Panel Told

By SAUL FRIEDMAN
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Central Intelligence Agency has built clandestine armies numbering 100,000 in Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia, an expert on Southeast Asia told a congressional panel Tuesday.

"It's the CIA's foreign legion," said Fred Branfman, a former member of the International Volunteer Services and a free-lance reporter in Laos.

The armies, controlled and paid for by the CIA, Branfman said, include native tribesmen, Thais, Nationalist Chinese and other Asians. Their job is to harass the population and troops in Communist-controlled areas of Indochina, except North Vietnam. Presumably they would continue their fighting with American supplies and money after American forces are withdrawn, he said.

BRANFMAN'S charges were the closest thing to hard news at the opening of a three-day seminar on the Pentagon papers, sponsored by 17 members of Congress. The generally repetitive discussion showed that the leak of the Pentagon papers themselves is a difficult act to follow.

Rep. John Dow (D., N.Y.), chairman of the three-day event, said that Daniel Ellsberg would join the group today. Ellsberg, one of the authors of the 47-volume study, has acknowledged passing portions of the docu-



Rep. Dow

... heads panel

ment to the press, for which he has been indicted by a federal grand jury.

Only one author of the Pentagon papers, Melvin Gurtov of Santa Monica, appeared at the conference Tuesday. But he added little to what is already known.

GURTOV, WHO last month was forced to resign as a researcher at the Rand Corp. because of his anti-war sentiment and his association with Ellsberg, told the panel that almost no one in government had read the Pentagon papers, including the man who commissioned them, former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, until they were published in the press.

He noted, in response to a question, that the Pentagon study shows the intelligence analysts of the CIA, but not the field operatives, "in a good light."

The CIA analysts, he said,

questioned basic assumptions, like the theory that if Vietnam fell to the Communists the rest of Southeast Asia would fall like dominoes. They also criticized the effectiveness of American bombing, Gurtov said.

"But when their reports, like others, challenged basic assumptions," Gurtov said, "they were ignored."

Branfman, talking about the CIA's role in Southeast Asia, said it "exercises functional control of military operations in Laos" and other Southeast Asian countries outside of Vietnam. In Laos it is conducting a campaign of "terrorism" in Communist held areas.

NGO VINH Long, a South Vietnamese now studying at Harvard, said the Pentagon papers disclose that American war planners had no understanding of the Vietnamese people, their aspirations, problems, and nationalism.

"For them the Vietnamese didn't exist except as Communists or anti-Communists," he said.

And he suggested that administrative overtures to mainland China in hopes it would help impose a settlement of the war on North Vietnam indicates that the United States still does not understand that any settlement "must come with the Vietnamese people," by which he meant the Communists and the Saigon regime.

Trau Van Dinh, former South Vietnamese ambassa-

dor to the United States, traced American involvement in his country from May 1854, when Marines landed there to free an imprisoned French missionary.

"I DON'T plead for Americans to understand the Vietnamese," he said. "Americans should understand America first. In 1945, when we thought we won our independence by defeating the Japanese, we believed in this country and that it would help us. Ho Chi Minh had faith in America. But we didn't understand about your Indian wars, and the suppression of the revolts in the Philippines.

"In the past years we have been trying to find out what America is all about, and so far we don't know."

Others at the conference included Anthony Russo, a former Rand employee now facing contempt charges for refusing to testify about the leak of the Pentagon papers; Noam Chomsky, a linguist whose books on American policies helped convert Ellsberg, and David Truong, whose father ran second in the South Vietnamese presidential elections in 1967 and subsequently was imprisoned.

THE MONTAGNARDS, tribal hill people of Vietnam, are the center of a continuing controversy.

American pressure on Saigon to rectify what it calls injustices in relocating the Montagnards has been applauded by some Vietnamese politicians, labeled as outright interference by others.

In the last decade, an estimated 65% of the 1,407 Montagnard hamlets have been moved hastily, abruptly, rudely.

America deserves part of the blame. U.S. advisers and logistical support were involved in many of the gunpoint moves.

The basic reason for the moves was to get Montagnards out of Communist-dominated areas.

A complicating factor has been Montagnard fear that their traditional lands were being stolen while they were dumped into new homes that seemed little more than concentration camps.

The focus of critical attention is Pleiku Province in the Central Highlands, bordering the Communist redoubt in northeastern Cambodia.

In the resettlement village of Plei Kotu (also known as Le Co or Plei De Groi) near Pleiku about 250 out of 2,000 transplanted Montagnards died last winter.

In Vietnam there are more than 20 Montagnard tribes with different languages and customs, totalling some 600,000 to one million people.

U.S. Special Forces and the C.I.A. tried to organize the Montagnards against the Communists. Fortified villages were developed. The Special Forces have now left Vietnam, but U.S. Army Rangers are carrying on the work.

The basic answer to Montagnard sheltering of the Viet Cong---a common charge---has been to uproot Montagnard hamlets from V.C. territory.

In terms of crops, it is best to move Montagnards in the winter, after their harvest. But the 2,000 who were transported to Plei Kotu from V.C. areas last Dec. 18-28 were put on a windy ridgeline without adequate protection from the weather.

It is estimated that Montagnards inhabit or use only 20-30% of the highlands, which comprise half of South Vietnam.

Their lands are generally the best areas: Stream bottoms and lower slopes of rugged hills and some plateau plains.

But in between the areas occupied by the Montagnards there is room for Vietnamese settlement. The World Bank, for example, says the area around Pleiku has a great potential for raising cattle.

Only time can show whether or not the Vietnamese will be content to settle between good Montagnard lands. Orders from Saigon will be only as good as the intentions of officials.

The Montagnards have had years of bad experiences with Saigon officialdom. The outlook is for more of the same.

JUL 27 1971

E - 50,927

S - 52,421

Supports Nixon Trip

To the Editor:

Your July 17 editorial "No Good Purpose" leaves me totally mystified.

Under the incessant attacks of the doves and the defeatists in this country our armed forces have deteriorated in morale and materiel to a degree which will make us a second rate power in a very short time.

Only recently were you lauding Senator Case as a good citizen when in reality the man virtually does nothing for Jersey but continues to undermine the security of this country by his incessant attacks on the executive branch, without any party loyalty whatever.

You continue to publish columns by this man von Hoffman, who recently had two articles related to the Pentagon papers, who left me shellshocked by their vicious attacking our government institutions. Mao could not have done him any better.

You join me in the huge and cry about government secrecy again in your editorial while condoning the theft of government property (by employees who had no hesitation to feed at the trough) under the guise of patriotism.

The New York Times has editorially done its level best to push public opinion in this country in the direction of intervention in Vietnam, and then when the Camelot crowd disappeared moved in the opposite direction. Yet if the Pentagon papers prove anything then it is the fact that five successive presidents viewed the Southeast Asia situation alike even if their countermeasures did not reflect a uniform desire to intervene directly.

A great deal was made by the doves of the assassination of a triple agent by the CIA, yet a pre-Johnson government condoned and participated in the assassination of President Diem.

If you put all the problems pointed out above in perspective then you should realize that any attempt to windup the Vietnam war by a bugout must include an attempt to reconcile China and the United States. It is perfectly true that in all likelihood the Communists someday will attempt to destroy this country (witness the furious armament program undertaken by the Russians), but with our proven inability to counteract Communist strategic moves with our own (by example destroy Communist insurgency movements, partly called liberation wars, with counter insurgency moves), our only real alternatives are an atomic attack or peaceful coexistence. While the Russians escape any serious criticisms of their brutal occupation of Finnish Karelia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia, Bessarabia, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, the doves want to give everybody refrigerators and cars and unlimited freedom to trample everything to death which makes a democracy worthwhile having.

No, I do not think Mr. Nixon had much choice in this matter. The thing has to be tried, no matter how apprehensive a lot of people may be. It is quite obvious to anyone who wants to see that only another Pearl Harbor, will bring the incessant grandstanding in the Senate and by the peace groups to a halt. There are those who believe that communism (perhaps rather red fascism) and human dignity in the western sense, can survive side by side. Nothing will convince them otherwise until the buttons are pushed. So for whatever time it may buy, whatever fringe benefits it may provide, Mr. Nixon deserves our support in this matter.

JOHN R. SOLBERGER,
Franklin

Vietnam:

This 'Phoenix' Is a Bird Of Death

When a top American pacification official heard that Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh had charged his political rival, President Nguyen Van Thieu, with using the Phoenix counter-insurgency program to suppress political opposition, he laughed. "If that's what Big Minh thinks," the American said derisively, "he doesn't know the Phoenix program, because it isn't good enough to do that."

That is only partly true. The Phoenix program may not be good enough to carry out its basic mission of rooting out the Communist underground in South Vietnam, but it does have powers that William E. Colby, the former chief of the American pacification effort in Saigon, was called upon to defend last week at a hearing before the House Foreign Operations subcommittee in Washington.

Operation Phoenix (in Vietnamese, Phuong Hoang, the mythical bird that brings tidings of peace) was founded by the Central Intelligence Agency in late 1967, when it was decided that killing enemy troops would not win the war so long as the Vietcong political organization, or infrastructure, remained intact.

Basically, the program is designed to identify specific members of the infrastructure and either persuade them to defect to the Government or capture them for trial and imprisonment. And if they resist the special police and troops used for Operation Phoenix, Mr. Colby explained, they can be—and often are—killed.

So far, more than 20,000 people have been killed under the Phoenix program, including at least 1,600 so far this year. Publicly, these have all been Vietcong, who were specifically "targeted" for capture and who resisted; in many cases, however, officials admit privately,

"They just put a name on a dead body and call it one V.C. neutralized."

For example, the classified Phoenix catalogue of Vietcong agents killed lists an inordinate number of "nurses." One pacification aide in the Mekong Delta region explained bitterly that this was a convenient way for province officials to account for the women killed in raids on suspected Vietcong hideouts.

This problem is made worse, many Americans feel, by the quota system for "Vietcong neutralizations" that is imposed on the Phoenix program. In 1970, the target was 1,800 "eliminations" a month, or 21,600 for the year. The Phoenix operatives made the quota with a respectable margin: 22,341 killed, captured or "rallied" in 1970. "The Vietnamese will match any quota you give them," an American official said when he looked at these figures.

Who are these statistics? So far as the dead are concerned, it is impossible to know for sure. They are supposed to be the enemy tax collectors, the political cadre and propaganda teams, the spies and the communications agents who make up the enemy underground.

The Americans acknowledge that, inevitably, some of the dead were also in no way connected with the Vietcong, but were merely the personal enemies of a province chief or some other influential official. Others, like many of the "nurses," were probably wives or children caught in the crossfire. Such deaths are part of the "unjustifiable abuses" that Mr. Colby acknowledged in his testimony.

Among the Vietnamese, the principal criticism of the Phoenix program is coming from those opposition members of the National Assembly's lower house who will run for re-election late next month. Like General Minh, their objections are not based on the killings so much as on the program's ability to jail any person without evidence or without his being charged—and then to imprison that person for up to two years without a trial.

The power to do this rests with a province's Security Council, composed of the province chief, his deputy for security, the province's top police officers and other ranking officials, all ap-

The C.I.A., which operates in

Vietnam under the sobriquet of Office of the Special Assistant (O.S.A.), turned the main responsibility for Operation Phoenix over to the South Vietnamese early in 1968, once the basic organization had been complete.

But each province has two O.S.A. officers to advise the provincial Phoenix program, to arrange special air transportation and, like everything else in Vietnam, to pay for the special mercenary troops, called P.R.U. (Provincial Reconnaissance Units), who carry out most of the Phoenix raids.

The Vietnamese side of Operation Phoenix is run by the secret police, called the Police Special Branch, which is entirely distinct from the regular national police.

The provincial P.S.B. Phoenix branch runs special Phoenix interrogation and operations centers in each district, which usually have a young American Army lieutenant as an adviser. This permits the C.I.A. to say that it has no agents below the province level, but the district advisers push the total American involvement in the program to more than 300 agents, officers and advisers.

From the district headquarters, a kind of floating Vietnamese informant and agent net spreads out into the villages and hamlets. Not surprisingly, the P.S.B. refuses to say how many Vietnamese work for the Phoenix program.

At high-level United States insistence, an "inventory" of all those imprisoned under the Phoenix program is being conducted. American officials contend they do not know how many such prisoners there are, for they are scattered in jails and interrogation centers all over the country. The purpose of the inventory, they say, is to weed out the real Vietcong suspects from those who were framed or otherwise imprisoned unnecessarily.

Like the official who scoffed at General Minh's charge, few Americans believe that the Phoenix program is very effective. Under it, nearly 60,000 persons have been killed, captured or have defected, but the United States Embassy's continuing studies show that the enemy's political organization is intact in most of the country.

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.

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S - 578,254

As We See It

Buckley 'Fake' Papers

An Indefensible Deceit

IN ALL earnestness and for what he seems to consider an exemplary cause, columnist William Buckley has told an outrageous and, to us, indefensible lie.

Because of his own deviousness, however, we are not quite sure of the extent of his deliberate fraud upon his readers, or how many lies are involved. In either case the logic of his self-defense escapes us.

Buckley, who is the editor of National Review magazine, published in the magazine's last issue "highly classified documents" which were purported to be more secret papers on the Vietnam war. The weight of the "documents" was heavily from the viewpoints of the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Wednesday evening, after having his hand called by numerous sources, Buckley announced the whole thing was an enormous hoax, and said that the articles and documents had been dreamed up "*ex nihilo*, (from nothing) in the offices of National Review."

The purpose, Buckley said, was to show that the Pentagon and the CIA were not the fools some of the Pentagon papers reports have indicated.

At this point is where we have trouble following Buckley's logic. If the papers were a fraud, then obviously they would prove nothing about the CIA and the Pentagon.

But the evidence is that the National Review "documents" were not all fraud.

Some of them were clearly picked up from the genuine Pentagon papers and documents, almost word for word.

Thus, such a hoax was totally pointless, at least in defending the CIA. It was remarkable to this newspaper, in reading those Pentagon papers given to us as well as those printed by the New York Times, how often the CIA's predictions and analyses turned out to be right on target.

Its role in the war was certainly secret and not in keeping with what Americans had been told. The CIA conducted the covert war in North Vietnam before the United States put combat troops in South Vietnam in 1965. It masterminded the war in Laos and ran its own air force. But when it came to telling Presidents Kennedy and Johnson what was actually happening and what was likely to happen if the United States followed a certain course, the CIA emerged as the only agency with little or no egg on its face.

What Buckley has done, then, and for what purpose, almost defies analysis. He lied when he first said the "documents" were genuine, because some of them are absolute fakes, and he lied when he said they were created "*ex nihilo*" in his magazine's offices, since some of them weren't.

In either case he has failed to serve any worthy purpose, and in the process has damaged his credibility and that of his magazine. His views must be taken with a grain of salt or, as Buckley would say, *cum grano salis*.

22 JUL 1971

STATINTL

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT:

Kennedy's Private War

Ralph L. Stavins

The article that follows is part of *The Planning of the Vietnam War*, a study by members of the Institute of Policy Studies in Washington, including Richard J. Barnet, Marcus Raskin, and Ralph Stavins.* In their introduction to the study, the authors write:

"In early 1970, Marcus Raskin conceived the idea of a study that would explain how the Vietnam disaster happened by analyzing the planning of the war. A group of investigators directed by Ralph Stavins concentrated on finding out who did the actual planning that led to the decisions to bomb North Vietnam, to introduce over a half-million troops into South Vietnam, to defoliate and destroy vast areas of Indochina, and to create millions of refugees in the area.

"Ralph Stavins, assisted by Cante Pian, John Berkowitz, George Pipkin, and Brian Eden, conducted more than 300 interviews in the course of this study. Among those interviewed were many Presidential advisers to Kennedy and Johnson, generals and admirals, middle level bureaucrats who occupied strategic positions in the national security bureaucracy, and officials, military and civilian, who carried out the policy in the field in Vietnam.

"A number of informants backed up their oral statements with documents in their possession, including informal minutes of meetings, as well as portions of the official documentary record now known as the 'Pentagon Papers.' Our information is drawn not only from the Department of Defense, but also from the White House, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency."

The study is being published in two volumes. The first, which includes the article below, will be published early in August. The second will appear in May, 1972.

*The study is the responsibility of its authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute, its trustees, or fellows.

At the end of March, 1961, the CIA circulated a National Intelligence Estimate on the situation in South Vietnam. This paper advised Kennedy that Diem was a tyrant who was confronted with two sources of discontent, the non-Communist loyal opposition and the Viet Cong. The two problems were closely connected. Of the spreading Viet Cong network the CIA noted:

Local recruits and sympathetic or intimidated villagers have enhanced Viet Cong control and influence over increasing areas of the countryside. For example, more than one-half of the entire rural region south and southwest of Saigon, as well as some areas to the north, are under considerable Communist control. Some of these areas are in effect denied to all government authority not immediately backed by substantial armed force. The Viet Cong's strength encircles Saigon and has recently begun to move closer in the city.

The people were not opposing these recent advances by the Viet Cong; if anything, they seemed to be supporting them. The failure to rally the people against the Viet Cong was laid to Diem's dictatorial rule:

There has been an increasing disposition within official circles and the army to question Diem's ability to lead in this period. Many feel that he is unable to rally the people in the fight against the Communists because of his reliance on virtual one-man rule, his tolerance of corruption extending even to his immediate entourage, and his refusal to relax a rigid system of public controls.

The CIA referred to the attempted coup against Diem that had been led by

General ~~_____~~ in November, 1960, and concluded that another coup was likely. In spite of the gains by the Viet Cong, they predicted that the next attempt to overthrow Diem would originate with the army and the non-Communist opposition.

The Communists would like to initiate and control a coup against Diem, and their armed and subversive operations including united front efforts are directed toward this purpose. It is more likely, however, that any coup attempt which occurs over the next year or so will originate among non-Communist elements, perhaps a combination of disgruntled civilian officials and oppositionists and army elements, broader than those involved in the November attempt.

In view of the broadly based opposition to Diem's regime and his virtual reliance on one-man rule, it was unlikely that he would initiate any reform measures that would sap the strength of the revolutionaries. Whether reform was conceived as widening the political base of the regime, which Diem would not agree to, or whether it was to consist of an intensified counter-insurgency program, something the people would not support, it had become painfully clear to Washington that reform was not the path to victory. But victory was the goal, and Kennedy called upon Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to draw up the victory plans. On April 20, 1961, Kennedy asked Gilpatric to:

- a) Appraise the current status and future prospects of the Communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.
- b) Recommend a series of actions (military, political, and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which will prevent Communist domination of that country.

CIA 104 Lansdale, Edward
Sec 4.01.2 The Planning of
the Vietnam War

U.S. AIDES ACCUSED ON VIETNAM VOTE

House Unit Hears 2 Charge
Bids to Influence Election

By FELIX BRADY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21

Congressional investigators heard testimony today that United States officials in Saigon were seeking to influence next October's national election in favor of President Nguyen Van Thieu and that the balloting would be a "mockery" of the democratic process.

Two former employees of the Agency for International Development told a House Government Operations subcommittee that they had resigned because they believed United States personnel and facilities were being used improperly.

The witnesses, Theodore R. Jacquency and Richard S. Winslow Jr., identified the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Information Agency and the American-financed Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program as the sources of funds, equipment and personnel that were contributing to the election effort.

The men denounced United States financing of the South Vietnamese police, intelligence and prison systems, which they said were being used by the Saigon Government to silence its political opposition and non-Communist advocates of peace and neutrality.

'More Feared, More Hated'

Mr. Jacquency, who said he recently completed an 18-month agency tour at Danang, told the panel that "no single entity, including the feared and hated Vietcong, is more feared or more hated than the South Vietnam secret police."

The men testified under oath, charging widespread corruption among high Vietnamese military and civilian officials "in all ministries." Mr. Jacquency also said that political persecution resulted in an estimated 20,000 to 100,000 political prisoners.

Mr. Jacquency told an A.I.D. contract costing 400,000 to build 283 new isolation cells at the prison on Con Son, which received wide publicity for its "tiger cages" a year ago. The witness said:

"Political prisoners are now being transferred from prisons on the mainland to Con Son island, apparently to make them less accessible during the election campaign. 'In every province in Vietnam there is a province interrogation center with a reputation for using torture to interrogate people accused of Vietcong affiliations. They have a C.I.A. counterpart relationship, and in some case have a relationship with the A.I.D. police adviser.'"

Describes Alleged Torture

Mr. Jacquency said that an old man—a friend of his—had been accused of Vietcong connections and had wanted to confess to avoid torture, "but was tortured horribly anyway, simply because it was standard operating procedure to torture prisoners."

He said that two American officials had told him that the old man had been given the "rock-and-roll" treatment in "large quantities of rice and water were forced down a prisoner's throat and then a smooth stone is rubbed over his belly producing days of intense pain and continual vomiting."

Before the two witnesses took the stand, John E. Reinhardt, assistant director of United States Information Agency, was cross-examined by the subcommittee chairman, William S. Moorhead of Pennsylvania, and by Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California.

STATINTL

USIA Accused Of Aiding Thieu

By Tim O'Brien

Washington Post Staff Writer

Two members of a House subcommittee accused the U.S. Information Agency yesterday of aiding incumbents in Vietnam elections by supplying political poll results only to the South Vietnamese government, excluding challengers and potential challengers from access to the information.

Rep. William S. Moorhead, (D-Pa.), chairman of a Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, said \$133 million has been spent on information services in South Vietnam, of which the United States has supplied 90 per cent.

"In my own personal view," he said, "what it boils down to is that we have helped the Saigon regime build a massive propaganda machine."

John E. Reinhardt, assistant USIA director for East Asia, admitted that the agency's poll results are classified for official use only, for one year. He said that although the polls could be of limited value to incumbent candidates, they are not taken for partisan political purposes.

Reinhardt also said the USIA has issued orders that its facilities and personnel may not be used to influence the outcome of forthcoming Vietnam elections. The polling itself, he said, was stopped in February.

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif.) said giving poll results to government officials and withholding them from challengers is "a political boon to the government in power."

Moorhead termed the expenditure of U.S. funds for polling "a waste and possible misapplication of money."

The subcommittee also heard testimony from two former AID officials in Vietnam who resigned because of alleged misuse of AID polls. Theodore Jacqueney, who now heads a new group that seeks "fair elections" in South Vietnam, said he resigned "because I felt that U.S. policy in Vietnam supported President

CORDS, a pacification and development program administered by AID in South Vietnam. He said results of the poll—which quizzed Vietnamese on such subjects as government leadership and candidate preferences—"were for the eyes of Thieu supporters only."

In addition to the polls, Jacqueney said, the U.S.I.A. and Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office lent vast "political propaganda services" to the Saigon government, "at a time when that government is denying freedom of the press to many Vietnamese nationalists."

Jacqueney charged that "despite declarations of U.S. impartiality, U.S. resources have been diverted to assist President Thieu's campaign."

He recommended a full congressional investigation of U.S. involvement in South Vietnam elections along with an inquiry into the Thieu regime's policy with respect to the right of others to "disseminate their views freely."

Meanwhile, Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) introduced legislation to "once and for all put an end" to what he said was U.S. financing of mercenary forces from Thailand fighting in Laos.

On June 7 the State Department admitted that the United States was supporting Thai forces in Laos but described them as volunteers.

Symington's amendment would ban the use of American funds to support any member of a local military force in Laos who is not a citizen or national of Laos. He claimed the Nixon administration has found a loophole in legislation adopted by Congress last year which was designed to prevent U.S. backing for Thai operations in Laos.

The legislation barred the use of Defense Department funds, but Symington charged that the administration avoided this sticture by using money available to the CIA.

The Senate Rules Committee approved a special \$100,000 amendment to the Vietnam War Act of 1964, which would require the origins of the Vietnam war.

U.S. Aide Defends Pacification Program In Vietnam Despite Killings of Civilians

By WILLIAM BELAKH Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 19—

The former head of the Ameri-South Vietnam acknowledged today that the agency's anti-subversion program had resulted in "occasional" political assassinations and the killing of civilians suspected of being Vietcong agents.

But the official, William E. Colby, told the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee that the benefits derived from the program—Operation Phoenix—in uprooting Vietcong intelligence apparatus "more than overcome these occasional abuses."

In prepared testimony, Mr. Colby gave the number of people killed under Operation Phoenix since 1963 at 20,587, of whom 3,560 were killed from January through May this year. For earlier periods the number of deaths were put at 2,589 for 1963, at 6,187 in 1969 and at 8,191 last year.

Two Republican Representatives, Ogden R. Reid of Westchester and Paul H. McCloskey of California, charged that Operation Phoenix had been responsible for "indiscriminate killings" of civilians and the imprisonment of thousands of others in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Mr. Reid contended that "it is far from an ideal program even in a war situation." He said that "no court anywhere would uphold the practice of imprisoning a civilian — Vietcong or otherwise—without a trial, denying him right to counsel and without acquainting him with the nature of the charges against him."



The New York Times

William E. Colby

Mr. Colby said the United States should continue its support of Operation Phoenix as "an essential part of the war effort" whose effectiveness had been proved in "neutralizing" the Vietcong underground.

Not an Ideal Program

"It is not an ideal program," Mr. Colby said, "but there are some other things that are not ideal that we are associated with in Vietnam. The Phoenix program is not a program of assassination. In the course of normal military operations of police actions to apprehend them, however, VCI [Vietcong infrastructure] are killed as members of military units or while fighting off arrest."

Asked by Mr. Reid whether "unjustifiable abuses," such as assassinations, had been brought to his personal attention, Mr. Colby replied affirmatively. He said that "in collaboration with the Vietnamese authorities, we put a stop to this nonsense."

South Vietnam in 1937 and 1968 was in a "wild and unstable period and a lot of things were done that should not have been done," Mr. Colby said. "We have been trying to get it stopped with some measure of success," he declared.

A former senior official of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Colby resigned his post in March, 1968, to join the staff of the executive office of the President. He was promptly assigned to Saigon as deputy to Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, who was then head of the United States Military Assistance Command and director of the pacification and development program.

Formerly in Diplomatic Service

Mr. Colby served during World War II in the Office of Strategic Services. He was twice parachuted behind German lines—once in France to disrupt communications and later in Norway to blow up a vital railroad line. After the war he held United States Embassy posts in Stockholm, Rome and Saigon before joining the Central Intelligence Agency.

The main thrust of his argument today was that operation Phoenix was "entirely a South Vietnamese program" although originated by the Central Intelligence Agency and supported since its inception by United States military and a few

civilian personnel and trained by funds from the Defense Department, Agency for International Development and the C.I.A.

The United States role in Operation Phoenix, he said, is entirely advisory except for the use of military personnel in preparation of dossiers against suspected Vietcong agents and leaders and employment of troops to run them to ground. After capture, the prisoners are turned over to South Vietnamese authorities, he said.

When Mr. Reid and Mr. McCloskey pressed their complaints, Mr. Colby argued with quiet persistence that Operation Phoenix was "designed to protect the Vietnamese people from terrorism and political, paramilitary, economic and subversive pressure from the Communist clandestine organization Vietnam."

STATINTL

20 JUL 1971

Thieu Slaps Back at Minh On '63 Coup

By Peter A. Jay

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, July 19—President Thieu brought his reelection campaign to life today as he branded his chief rival, Gen. Doung Van (Big) Minh, a "coward" for Minh's recent accounts of his role in South Vietnam's 1963 coup.

Thieu's charge brought into sharp and immediate focus an "official" question that has recently become, oddly, the first deeply emotional issue to divide him publicly from Minh: On whose hands is the blood of Ngo Dinh Diem?

Minh, who led the coup that deposed Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and resulted in their assassination, said a week ago in an interview with The Washington Post that he had not wanted the takeover to end in murder.

He added the tardiness of Thieu, then a colonel, in carrying out his role in the coup may have contributed to the death of the brothers Ngo.

The interview was widely reported in the Saigon press. Interest in the coup, always a subject of fascinated speculation among Vietnamese, had been fanned by the publication of the secret Pentagon papers—and Minh's attempt to shackle Thieu to the ghost of Diem has been treated here with as much attention as President Nixon's China speech.

Today, Thieu called local reporters and correspondents from three American newspapers to a special two-hour meeting to give his own account of Nov. 1, 1963—South Vietnam's National Day and the date of the overthrow of Diem.

He met the journalists, not at the presidential palace, but at the mess hall of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff—for he said he wanted to speak not as president but as "plain Col. Thieu."

Minh, Gen. Tran Van Don and others plotted Diem's death, Thieu said, after promising that assassination would not be considered. He strongly suggested that

Van Nhung, Minh's bodyguard and one of the officers who arrested Diem and Nhu, was the triggerman.

Nhung was killed three months later in a counter-coup, the first of several, that deposed Minh and sent him into a four-year exile in Bangkok.

The exact circumstances of the assassination have remained a mystery.

The event now has important political implications for several reasons.

Pawns of Americans

First of all, the Pentagon papers portray the generals who led the coup as the pawns of the Americans—a label no Vietnamese politician will willingly accept.

Minh, in his interview with The Washington Post, sought to disassociate himself from the Americans. In flat contradiction of the Pentagon papers, he said he barely knew Lt. Col. Lucien Conein—the Central Intelligence Agency's contact man with the leaders of the plot.

Secondly, though the Ngos were roundly despised, after nearly eight years their assassination is seen by many Vietnamese as an unnecessarily brutal, bloody business.

Minh said last week that Thieu, as the commander of the South Vietnamese 5th Division, was assigned the key coup role of storming Saigon's Gia Long Palace to capture Diem and Nhu.

He chose Thieu, Minh said, because Thieu was a Catholic like the Ngos and he believed Thieu would deal less savagely with the deposed president than a Buddhist officer.

But Thieu was late in arriving, Minh said, and gave the Ngos time to escape for several hours. He said if they had been captured immediately their safety would have been assured.

This version of the coup Thieu angrily denied.

Other Objectives

According to the president, he was not assigned originally to the palace operation at all, but was given four other objectives in Saigon.

By the time he accomplished them, on the night of Nov. 1, the troops assigned to storm the palace had not appeared, so Minh asked him to take over the assault.

He did so, and entered the palace with his troops early on

the morning of Nov. 2, about 12 hours after Diem and Nhu had escaped through an underground passage.

"It was cowardly for Minh to blame me," he said. "I was only a colonel. Those who did it ought to accept the responsibility—the chairman of the junta should be responsible."

On the morning of the second, he said, he received word that Diem and Nhu were dead and went to the armored personnel carrier where they were lying. "I saluted the bodies," he said, "and I went back to Bien Hoa" where his division had its headquarters.

Vietnamese are often emotional when they talk about the day of the coup, and Thieu was no exception.

Casually dressed in a blue bush coat and matching pants, he joked easily with the reporters he had summoned to hear his story—until he began to tell it. Then his voice rose, his face flushed and he gesticulated with his hands.

Similarly, in an interview a week ago Minh talked soberly about such topics as the political campaign, the war, corruption and the Paris peace talks—but when the conversation turned to the coup he became electrified, sitting up in his chair and rattling off details at a great rate.

Thieu's Request

Today, Thieu, who has not held a press conference since the end of the Laotian military operations early in the spring, asked reporters at the outset of the session: "Whatever I say, please print it correctly, for it is very important."

In agreeing to participate in the coup, Thieu said, he exacted assurances from Minh on four points: that the new government would be strongly anti-Communist, that it would be supported by the United States, that it would be basically military, and that Diem's life would be spared.

Thieu said he urged the leaders of the coup to consider keeping Diem as the figurehead president of a military regime after getting rid of Nhu. If that was unacceptable, he said, he thought the deposed president should have been tried and exiled.

"The revolution of 1963 will have meaning only if we can defeat the Communists," he said. "Otherwise it was nothing but a bloodbath."

Lansdale's Secret War

They were America's first Vietnam warriors—a small team of Central Intelligence Agency operatives called the Saigon Military Mission, headed by the legendary Col. Edward Lansdale, and sent into Vietnam in the chaotic, eleventh-hour summer of 1954 to try to stave off a Communist take-over. How they did it was revealed last week in a diary kept by some of the SMM agents and excerpted by The New York Times among its final selections from the Pentagon's secret study of the war. Undated, unsigned, the diary chronicles one year of CIA operations in North and South Vietnam—operations plainly in violation of the spirit if not the letter of the Geneva agreements, which the U.S. had pledged not to disturb—and provides a revealing glimpse of the earliest covert moves that led ultimately to massive, open U.S. involvement in the war.

It was fearfully late to be establishing a U.S. mission. Ho Chi Minh was rushing to consolidate control in the north, and so wobbly was Premier Ngo Dinh Diem's original government in the south, the diary relates, that high-level officials in Washington already considered Vietnam probably lost. "We admitted that prospects were gloomy," the diary states, "but were positive that there was still a fighting chance."

Lansdale was certainly the man to take it. A tough Air Force career officer turned CIA agent, Lansdale had become the foremost American counter insurgency expert helping the Philippines' Ramon Magsaysay crush the Communist Hukbalahap rebellion two years before—and reportedly was the model for Colonel Hillandale in "The Ugly American." He threw SMM—and his own prestige—behind Diem, and sent a crack American paramilitary team to Hanoi to try to slow the Communist take-over.

The northern team was led, ironically, by U.S. Army Major Lucien Conein—the same CIA agent who, nine years later, was to sit in on the planning and execution of the South Vietnamese Army generals' overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem. This time, using the refugee evacuation program as a cover, Conein and his men worked furiously to recruit a team of North Vietnamese insurgents

(code-named Binh), "exfiltrate" them for training at a secret U.S. base, and smuggle them, with supplies and ammunition, back into the north before the Vietminh seized Hanoi.

They were also engaged in psychological warfare—and sabotage. According to the diary, one leaflet circulated in Hanoi, ostensibly announcing Vietminh plans for such programs as monetary reform, so demoralized the populace that the value of Vietminh currency fell by half and refugee applications to move south tripled in a single day. But when Hanoi finally fell in October, Conein and his men very nearly fell with it. On their last raid, the team attempted to wreck Hanoi's bus system by pouring a contaminant into its oil supply. "The team," the diary relates, "had a bad moment . . . in an enclosed storage room. Fumes from the contaminant came close to knocking them out. Dizzy and weak-kneed, they masked their faces with handkerchiefs and completed the job."

Tricks: SMM was up to the same kind of paramilitary, psy-war tricks in the south—including recruiting another team of Tonkin-bound insurgents code-named Hao, and publishing an almanac filled with calamitous astrological forecasts for the north. But Lansdale's biggest headache seems to have been keeping the man he had backed in power. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Nguyen Van Hinh made no secret of his eagerness to overthrow Diem, and it apparently took all of Lansdale's considerable wiles to keep him from doing it. He managed to stave off one coup by dispatching Hinh's two key aides on a junket to the Philippines, and he developed his own spy-lines to the general. "Our chief," the diary relates, "... was a friend of both Hinh's wife and his favorite mistress (the mistress was a pupil in a small English class conducted for mistresses of important personages at their request . . .)." Within a month, Hinh had departed for France, spurred on his way in no small measure by Lansdale's operations.

The diary's conclusions ring with pride in a job well done. "We had smuggled into Vietnam about eight and a half tons of supplies," it relates. "Our Binh and our northern Hao teams were in place, completely equipped. It had taken a tremendous amount of hard work . . ." Later, Lansdale had an opportunity to see where it all had led. When he returned to Vietnam in 1965, the man he had backed was dead, the South Vietnamese Army was all but inoperable—and the U.S. had begun the infusion of half a million fighting men.

U.S. at MILWAUKEE

By CONRAD KOLOROWSKI

STATINTL

Set the date!

In Congress, Sens. McGovern, Mansfield and others have already expressed themselves in favor of the proposals as a way out of the war. On Tuesday, Sen. Mansfield again expressed his belief that the proposals may "contain light for a final peace settlement . . . as I see it, the time to find out is now." (Daily World, July 14).

Sens. Walter Mondale (D-Minn) and Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo) -- a newcomer among the peace forces in the Senate--introduced a resolution which states that "The highest urgency of this Administration shall be to pursue promptly, with good faith and with all resources at its disposal, the current proposal" of the PRG.

In a "Guest Privilege" article in Life (July 13), Leslie H. Gelb and Morton H. Halperin, who worked on preparation of the secret Pentagon report, view the PRG proposals as an opportunity to end U.S. aggression in Indochina.

The PRG proposals have the endorsement of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice which at its recent Milwaukee conference worked out a program of stepped-up activity leading to a People's Moratorium on October 13.

The issue was discussed at the National Committee meeting of the Communist Party of the U.S., held on July 9-11. General Secretary Gus Hall, in a statement issued July 11, said: "Nixon brazenly slams the door against peace proposals which can mean ending the war and bringing all the troops home this year. He is letting the corrupt Saigon puppet Thieu Government and the CIA call the shots and prolong the killing."

"This reveals the fact that Nixon has no intention of ending the aggression, and all his talk is only a crude election maneuver. And that is another crime against the people."

Calling for action, Hall's statement concluded: "During the days of decision, the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell defiance of the will of the people must be repudiated by every meeting and voice of Americans. That voice must be heard by every Congressman and Senator, for them to act for peace."

(Daily World, July 14)



Congress must act!

Yesterday, Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist Party, called on the Congress to act swiftly on the 7-point peace proposals advanced by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam. We publish below, as a guest editorial, Hall's statement:

Nixon's arrogant refusal to give serious consideration to Mrs. Binh's 7-point peace proposal is a cold-blooded disregard for the lives of American GIs and Vietnamese in Southeast Asia. This is his answer to the recent Teamster Convention which declared, "There is nothing in Indochina worth one more drop of blood."

This is Nixon's defiance of the growing majority of American people who have declared, "This war is immoral and unjust" and that the president must "set the date" for total withdrawal of U.S. forces in this year and the Vietnamese must have the right to resolve their problems. He is adding another bloody chapter of deceit and trickery to the Pentagon papers.

Nixon brazenly slams the door against peace proposals which can mean ending the war and bringing all the troops home this year. He is letting the corrupt Saigon puppet Thieu government and the CIA call the shots and prolong the killing.

This reveals the fact that Nixon has no intention of ending the aggression, and all his talk is only a crude election maneuver. And that is another crime against the people.

During the days of decision, the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell defiance of the will of the people must be repudiated by every meeting and voice of Americans. That voice must be heard by every Congressman and Senator for them to act for peace.

When the Administration betrays the people then the Congress must act for the people — and open the door for the 7-point proposal for peace, and set the date for U.S. total withdrawal.

The expressed will of the American people can reverse the course of this country from endless war, racism and repression to a program for the needs of the people and peace.

Big Minh Assails CIA Agent

SAIGON — (CDN) — Retired Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh, who led the Nov. 1, 1963, coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem, says that an hour after the coup got under way he returned to his of-

fice and found an American CIA agent sitting on his desk.

He identified the agent as Lt. Col. Lucien Concin, named in the Pentagon Papers as the contact man between the American Embassy and Vietnamese generals in the plot to overthrow the Diem regime.

"I was very unhappy about this and I ordered him out," Minh said. Later, he said, he asked how Concin had got into his office and was told that Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don, then chief of staff of the South Vietnamese army, had let him in.

NOW A PRESIDENTIAL candidate in the Oct. 3 elections, Minh was interviewed at his home here where he raises chickens, quail and orchids.

Obviously upset by the disclosures of the Pentagon Papers, Minh accused Concin of making "false reports" to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge when he said he had met personally with Minh.

Minh said he knew who Concin

was, had met him socially, but flatly denied that he had ever discussed the coup plot with Concin or any other American.

He acknowledged, however, that Concin was in frequent contact with Gen. Don in the intrigue-charged days leading up to the overthrow of the Diem regime. Don is now traveling abroad.

ACCORDING TO the Pentagon Papers, Lodge reported that Concin, whom he described as virtually indispensable, had a face-to-face 70-minute meeting with Minh at Minh's headquarters Oct. 5.

At that meeting, Lodge reported, Minh told Concin that the "easiest" way to effect a change of government was to kill Diem's brother and righthand man, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, and keep the president in office.

Minh heatedly denied that such a meeting ever took place. A big lie," he said.

Concin, known to friends and

colleagues as Lou, was a controversial figure inside the CIA and out.

A HARD DRINKING, rough-and-tumble man with a flair for clandestine operations, he served with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in World War II and worked with the French Resistance until Germany's collapse.

After that he and other selected OSS agents turned up in Indochina to work with Ho Chi Minh against the Japanese.

A man who did not take well to conventional discipline, Concin was frequently in hot water with his superiors because of his free-wheeling operations.

Despite the success of the U. S.-backed coup against Diem, Concin fell from grace under Lodge's successor as ambassador, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. Taylor subsequently ordered him out of the country.

"I'D LIKE TO help Lou," the CIA station chief remarked at the time, "but he is a hard man to help."

After retiring from the CIA, Concin, who was married to a Vietnamese, returned to Saigon as a businessman, apparently counting on his Vietnamese contacts to help him. But the venture failed and Concin returned to the United States earlier this year after reportedly losing \$25,000 on his investment.

Minh said that neither Concin nor any of the other generals knew the over-all plan for the coup against Diem. For security reasons, he said, he kept the plan to himself, assigning each general to a specific task.

He said that none of the generals who took part in the coup, including himself, bore any ill will against Diem although many of them hated his brother, Nhu.

CIA Lied On Coup, Minh Says

SAIGON, July 10—Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh, head of the coup that toppled the South Vietnamese government in 1963 and now a presidential candidate, said today that the United States Central Intelligence Agency's reporting of the coup preparations was seriously inaccurate.

✓ Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, the CIA's contact man with the generals who carried out the coup, "sent many false reports to U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in 1963," Minh said.

The secret Pentagon study recently published in the United States names Conein, who is now retired, as the American embassy's main link to Minh and his co-conspirators in the tense weeks before President Ngo Dinh Diem was deposed and subsequently assassinated.

"I never discussed the coup with Conein," Minh said in an interview at his Saigon villa. He said he knew Conein only slightly, as a close friend of Gen. (and coup participant) Tran Van Don, and was aware he worked for the CIA.

Minh described as a "big lie" Conein's report, relayed by Lodge to Washington in a cable contained in the Pentagon study, of a conversation he had with the general on Oct. 5, 1963, a month before the coup.

Conein reported, according to Lodge's cable, that Minh told him there were three ways of getting rid of Diem and his unpopular brother Ngo Dinh Nhu—and the easiest way was assassination.

"No one wanted them killed, I assure you," Minh said. "There was no bad feeling toward the president, but there were officers at the lower echelons who had grudges against Mr. Nhu and his secret police."

(Reached at his home in suburban McLean Conein refused to comment on Minh's charge. "For security reasons," he said, "I have no comment—neither on the Pentagon pap-

ers nor on Big Minh. He is a friend of mine, as is Tran Van Don and President Thieu."

(Conein, who retired from the CIA in July, 1963, maintains a private business office in Saigon. He said he bases his refusal to comment on the Pentagon documents and Minh's claims on an oath of security he took upon his retirement from the intelligence agency.)

It was out of concern for the safety of the Ngo brothers, Minh said, that he assigned command of the units used to besiege the presidential palace to two Catholic officers.

Diem and Nhu were members of South Vietnam's Catholic minority, and bitterly resented by Buddhists for the repressive tactics of their regime. Minh, a Buddhist, said he feared that Buddhist officers "might do something rash."

One of the Catholic officers assigned to storm the palace was Col. Nguyen Van Thieu, then a divisional commander and now the president whom Minh is seeking to defeat in the October election.

Because Thieu was late in bringing his troops to the palace, Minh said, Diem and Nhu were able to escape. They were captured the next day and assassinated — something Minh said would not have happened had they been taken into custody at the palace, according to plan.

In the midst of the coup, Minh said, he went into his office at the headquarters of the Joint General Staff and found Conein sitting on his desk. "I was very angry and told him to get out," he said. "It was a top secret officer." He did not say whether or not Conein actually left.

Late in the afternoon on Nov. 1, the day of the coup, Minh recalled that Lodge telephoned the general's headquarters and asked that Diem and Nhu be given safe conduct out of the country. "We agreed," he said.

The call was apparently just before Diem, in the last conversation of his life with an American, telephoned Lodge at the embassy.

"I have a report that those in charge of the current activity offer you and your brother safe conduct out of the country," Lodge told Diem, according to a transcript of the conversation contained in the Pentagon study. The offer, if actually made, was never ac-

"If we had wanted to kill Diem and Nhu all we had to do was to tell the people where they were," Minh said today. Most Vietnamese hated the Ngos, he said, and would certainly have murdered them given the opportunity.

At the headquarters of the Joint General Staff, he said, the leaders of the coup had prepared a room for the president and his brother where they could "rest" until they were deported. But they were dead by the time they reached the headquarters.

Conein's reporting, Minh said, could not have been comprehensive because it was based on information received from Tran Van Don. "Even Tran Van Don didn't know my whole plan," Minh recalled today. In fact, he said, "No one except me" knew all the details of the coup in advance.

STATINTL

The World at Weekend

By CONRAD KOMOROWSKI

New deceptions

The Nixon Administration's rejection of the new peace proposals presented at the Paris talks, together with the additions presented by Le Due Tho, follows the pattern of policy Nixon has been pursuing.

The seven points presented by Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, representative of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (PRG), at the Paris talks, contained concessions. Le Due Tho, member of the Political Bureau of the Vietnam Workers' Party, added more, particularly by separating withdrawal of U.S. troops and the return of U.S. prisoners of war independently of a political settlement.

All that Nixon needs to do to start the peace machinery moving is to set a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops.

Ever since the PRG proposals were made last week, the Nixon Administration has squirmed feverishly in attempts to evade the pressure of public opinion for acceptance of the proposals.

Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said that withdrawal of U.S. troops could be carried out by the end of this year, but that billions of dollars of war materiel would have to be left behind.

Le Due Tho said on Tuesday of this week (Laird made his statement last Friday) that he had read Laird's statement. He continued: "The return of materiel will be costly, but I think the primary thing is American troops' lives and not finances, money. Moreover, the U.S. is a rich country; it has enough money to do that. And the expenditures for the return of war materiel to the United States cannot be a pretext to delay the departure of American troops. I think that human lives are the most precious things" (New York Times, July 7).

Laird and Nixon apparently do not think so. At the Paris talks on July 8, U.S. Ambassador David K. Bruce repeated that the United States is ready to negotiate a time for withdrawal but also said it cannot be settled until other matters are first disposed of.

In brief, the Nixon Administration is blocking progress. This is because it seeks to negotiate only from a position of strength, which means, in essence, to dictate the terms. It means also that it continues to support the corrupt and hated clique U.S. imperialism put in power in the Saigon regime.

It means that, despite all the talk about self-determination for the Vietnamese people, Washington continues to refuse to allow them to settle their own problems by themselves.

Immediately after Mme. Binh's proposals reached

the White House, Nixon's press secretary Ronald Ziegler, said: "We will accept no arrangement that will turn the 17 million people of South Vietnam over to the Communists."

The charge of "Communist domination" is a lie. But the Pentagon report contains many examples of domination by U.S. imperialism against the will and the interests of the people of South Vietnam, including its role in blocking the 1956 election.

In July 1954, also, the United States made a commitment in the words of Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith: "The United States reiterates its traditional position that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this."

But already at that time there was in Saigon a secret CIA team headed by Col. Edward G. Lansdale conspiring to prevent the Vietnamese from determining their own future.

Coming closer to the present, Gen. Duong Van ("Big") Minh has charged that "the United States helped President Thieu set up a government machinery, a civilian administration and a military apparatus in urban areas and the countryside" and that he is using all this for his own election (New York Times, July 6). Minh wants the United States to stop letting him do this.

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AUG 10 1971

\$1.7-Billion of War Funds Unaccounted For in Audit

Congressional Agency Unable to Learn How Most of \$2.1-Billion Authorized for Pacification in 1970 Was Used

By YAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9—The General Accounting Office, the Congressional watchdog agency, has reported that it is unable to determine how \$1.7-billion of \$2.1-billion authorized for the pacification program in South Vietnam was spent or committed during the three-year period ended July 30, 1970.

The office made its report in a 160-page survey entitled "Background Information on United States Participation in Pacification and Development Programs in Vietnam," sent to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird and several Congressional committees on July 1.

The General Accounting Office auditors, who made their survey in Vietnam, said that the specific obligations of the pacification program that they were able to find accounted for only \$339.2-million of the total of \$2.1-billion authorized for the fiscal years 1968, 1969 and 1970.

And, they said, \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million had been spent for purposes that they had not been able to determine, which was taken to mean that the money was spent for projects other than those for which it had originally been designated.

The United States agency responsible for the over-all pacification in Vietnam is called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, or CORDS. Its responsibilities include the care of refugees and other war victims. Operation Phoenix, which is designed to eliminate the Vietcong sub-

versive apparatus, also comes under the agency.

The funds for CORDS come principally from the Defense Department although the Central Intelligence Agency and the Agency for International Development contribute to them.

The accounting office survey said that the \$65.5-million of the \$339.2-million of the obligated money "was not used in CORDS and was subsequently used by the contributing agencies for other purposes."

It said it could "not determine" what these purposes were.

In fiscal language, obligations are the commitment or actual expenditure of authorized funds.

The survey has offered no conclusions as to the discrepancy between the funds authorized for CORDS and those actually obligated.

But in the section on "village self-help" programs, one of the CORDS operations, the document listed "misappropriation of funds" among the problems facing the agency. The report said, however, that from a political viewpoint the village program "has experienced a degree of success."

The survey said that "we have learned that internal audits and inspection had generally not been conducted" by CORDS.

It noted that while there are 12 "auditing groups within the executive branch for CORDS review," only two of them "had performed reviews" since the formation of CORDS in 1968.

"We also found that many of the responsible officials in the directorates were unaware of amounts obligated under their programs and in some instances did not know the amounts in their budgets," the survey said of the Saigon agency.

The survey added that "in the three fiscal years ending on June 30, 1970, CORDS received \$1.7-billion."

"We obtained obligations about \$339.2-million," it reported.

But the accounting office said that "we were unable to obtain obligations for \$1.7-billion of the \$2.1-billion."

It reported that the Defense Department had contributed 86 per cent of this total. The Central Intelligence Agency provided 5 per cent and the Agency for International Development 9 per cent. The C. I. A., however, has refunded some of the

money spent by A. I. D. on its behalf on unspecified covert projects.

The accounting office said that the bulk of the CORDS authorization was budgeted for "hardware" and military and auxiliary equipment for South Vietnamese military organizations.

Under Operation Phoenix, CORDS is increasing the South Vietnamese national police from 100,000 to 120,000 men this year.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900030001-2

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JOURNAL

JUL 10 1971

PAGE 24,360

Keep the spy types in line

Perhaps the least shocking of the disclosures of the Pentagon papers is the extent to which the United States dabbles behind the scenes in spy-thriller type activities.

The papers show clearly the role the U.S. played in the overthrow of South Vietnamese President Diem. One only unusual aspect of the affair is that many of the details have been made public. Normally, the Central Intelligence Agency keeps its funds well covered.

The Green Berets took a public beating, for example, over the slaying of a Vietnamese, who was described as a double agent. But the CIA, which was accused of being behind the plot, managed to escape with an implied, but not proved, role in the affair.

The disquieting aspect of such activities is the danger that the men who plan and approve them may become hardened to their methods. A guy who doesn't blink at ordering an enemy agent rubbed out, or a government toppled, just might become confused about his proper position in relation to domestic issues. If assassination is an acceptable method for implementing U.S. foreign policy, then why isn't it a perfectly decent approach for taking care of domestic opposition?

Testifying this week before a congressional committee, Atty. Gen. John Mitchell indicated that the U.S. is willing to use whatever means are handy to dry up narcotics traffic.

Mitchell said that the government knows the identities of a number of top Asian officials who are trafficking in narcotics, including some Hanoi and South Vietnamese military leaders.

How will the U.S. deal with them, a senator asked. Said Mitchell: "... steps are being taken in some of these countries to eliminate their participation..." in narcotics distribution.

Sen. Edmund Muskie then asked Mitchell if there are plans to eliminate their roles in government, as well as drug trafficking.

"We anticipate we will be able to do

this to the extent our country has jurisdiction or other means of persuasion," Mitchell replied, drawing chuckles from the senators.

The U.S. certainly shouldn't hesitate to apply whatever pressure is necessary to stop the flow of narcotics to servicemen abroad, and to the mainland. The fact that Asians view drugs in a substantially different light than Western nations shouldn't prevent us from insisting that countries we are aiding must respect and cooperate in our efforts to halt the narcotics traffic insofar as it involves Americans.

Even so, we feel a lot more than a little queasy when the attorney general of the United States talks slyly about "other means of persuasion." And when senators chuckle openly over the implication that we're not above a back-alley approach to getting our way, we're more than queasy. We're downright overrid.

In Mitchell's case, the statement to the committee fits in with many of his other remarks about the rights of society being more important than individual rights, and too much codding of criminals, and accusing dissenters of acting like Marx, etc.

This nation is rooted in the belief that nothing is more important than individual rights. Absolutely nothing. And that means that sometimes society as a whole must suffer to assure the preservation of what the Declaration of Independence calls inalienable rights.

Other nations may not play by the same set of rules. In some, individual liberty isn't even considered a practical concept. But in the United States it is more than a concept, it is the gut issue of survival. Every action -- at home or abroad -- that compromises our commitment to that position weakens the nation, not strengthens it as some in our leadership seem to believe.

So senators chuckle when the attorney general hints that the end justifies the means. But when they do, they risk chuckling our freedoms -- and theirs -- into nothingness.

NEW YORK, N.Y.
NEWS

M - 2,129,909
S - 2,948,786

JUL 8 1971

Dum-Dum Bullets in Vietnam

Saigon, July 7 (Special)—The Central Intelligence Agency in 1965 supplied South Vietnamese guerrillas with outlawed dum-dum bullets, some of them packaged in popular American candy containers, reliable sources disclosed today.

The soft-nosed bullets were assembled in Okinawa and shipped to the sprawling CIA warehouse in Saigon, where they were parcelled out to locally recruited guerrillas engaged in counter-insurgency operations against the Viet Cong. Sources said the dum-dum, which expands upon hitting an object, was supplied through the CIA until at least 1966, when distribution ceased.

—Joseph Fried

House of Representatives

WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1971

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

Rev. James Clark Brown, the First Congregational Church, San Francisco, Calif., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray.

Let us remember the words of our Lord Jesus Christ when He said: "Those unto whom much has been given, of them will much be required."

O God, mighty, merciful, mysterious, before whose judgments nations and individuals rise and fall, inspire the leaders and people of this land that we may more faithfully know and do Thy holy will. O God, there is a hunger in our land; a hunger for moral heroes; for men and women whose passion is to bring into being the kind of world where every privilege and dignity which is enjoyed by the few may be made available to be enjoyed by all people. To that end, direct, comfort, and guide Members of the Congress.

"O Thou, whose Spirit first fashioned life,
Intending all creation Thy love to share,

Use us, O God, to do Thy work
Until the earth be fair."

Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

THE REVEREND JAMES CLARK BROWN, OUR CHAPLAIN FOR TODAY

(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I am proud today that our opening prayer has been given by an Oklahoman whom I have known for many years, a young man who grew up in Okmulgee County in the city of Henryetta, and who once served here in the House of Representatives as one of the staff rendering faithful service to this country.

Today James Clark Brown is minister of the First Congregational Church of San Francisco, and carrying on there a great ministry.

Many Washingtonians will remember him as the pastor for a number of years of the Cleveland Park Congregational Church here in Washington, D.C. With his wife, Verne, and their lovely children, David Edmund and Edith Louise, he is doing a great work in the State of California.

Again I say I am proud and pleased that that he could be with us today in a place he has always loved, to lead the House of Representatives in today's devotions.

A SALUTE TO WADE LUCAS

(Mr. HENDERSON asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, scarcely a day goes by without our national news media publicizing a conflict between Indians and civil authorities over the title to Federal property, alleged violations of legal or moral commitments or other basic differences of opinion.

It is refreshing to know that on Saturday of this week, Mr. Wade Lucas, a constituent of mine will be visiting Niagara Falls, N.Y., as a guest of the Tuscarora Indians. While there, he will be made an honorary chief and, with the authority of Gov. Robert Scott of North Carolina, will sign a formal peace treaty with the Tuscarora Indian Nation.

I might add that Wade Lucas, unlike so many "Honorary Chiefs" we see at campaign time, is not a politician running for office and seeking to court favor with Indian voters. Instead, Wade is a retired newspaperman with no aim or purpose in mind other than to cement a personal and official friendship with these Indians which dates back to Memorial Day more than 8 years ago when he visited the Tonawanda Reservation in an official capacity as public information officer for the State of North Carolina under the administration of Gov. Terry Sanford.

The Tuscarora Indians of the Tonawanda Reservation are a lot like many other Americans of all races and creeds throughout our Nation. They respond warmly to a genuine show of friendship and interest. Wade Lucas' longtime personal friendship with them is the kind of "people to people" relationship which will solve our international differences if they are ever to be solved.

INTRODUCTION OF LEGISLATION INCREASING FEDERAL SHARE OF EMPLOYEES' HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased today to introduce a bill calling for increasing the Government's share of the Federal employees' health benefits program.

Under the present cost-sharing system, the Federal Government pays 40 percent of the basic cost of the health insurance of Federal employees.

This 40-percent figure was reached only last year. The House of Representatives had passed legislation calling for increasing the Government share to 50 percent, but after considerable pressure from the administration, including the threat of a Presidential veto, House-Senate conferees agreed to a reduced figure.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the attitude of the administration may have changed in the course of the past year. On February 18 of this year, President Nixon called for private employers to provide 65 percent of the cost of basic health insurance coverage for employees as of July 1, 1973, and 75 percent of the total cost 3 years later.

The President based this appeal on the need to spread health insurance coverage to more of the Nation's citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I fully agree with the President on this matter.

Further, I believe it to be fully consistent and proper for the Federal Government to lead the way for the private sector in meeting the President's goal of 75 percent of the costs for employees' medical insurance.

I hope that the Retirement, Insurance, and Health Benefits Subcommittee, which I chair, will hold hearings on this important legislation in the very near future, and I am hopeful of administration support for this proposal, which incorporates the President's own suggestions.

DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO FURNISH TO THE HOUSE CERTAIN INFORMATION RESPECTING U.S. OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I call up House Resolution 492 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 492

Resolved, That the Secretary of State, to the extent not incompatible with the public interest, is directed to furnish to the House of Representatives, not later than fifteen days following the adoption of this resolution, any documents containing policy instructions or guidelines given to the United States Ambassador in Laos for the purpose of his administration of those operations controlled or directed by the country team in Laos, between January 1, 1964, and June 21, 1971, particularly with regard to—

- (1) covert Central Intelligence Agency operations in Laos;
- (2) Thai and other foreign armed forces operations in Laos;

H 6377

DENVER, COLO.
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S - 344,155

Minh Tells of CIA Contact



GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
Presidential Candidate.

By KEYES BEECH
(C) 1971, Denver Post-Chicago Daily News

SAIGON—Retired Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh, who led the Nov. 1, 1963, coup against president Ngo Dinh Diem, said Saturday that an hour after the coup got under way he returned to his office and found an American CIA agent sitting on his desk.

He identified the agent as Lt. Col. Lucien Conein, named in the Pentagon papers as the contact man between the American Embassy and Vietnamese generals in the plot to overthrow the Diem regime.

"I was very unhappy about this and I ordered him out," Minh said. Later, he said, he asked how Conein had got into his office and was told that Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don, then chief of staff of the South Vietnamese army, had let him in.

Now a presidential candidate in the Oct. 3 elections, Minh was interviewed at his home where he raises chickens, quail and orchids.

Obviously upset by the disclosures of the Pentagon papers, Minh accused Conein of making "false reports" to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge when he said he had met personally with Minh.

Minh said he knew who Conein was, had met him socially, but flatly denied that he had ever discussed the coup plot with Conein or any other American. He acknowledged, however, that Conein was in frequent contact with Gen. Don in the intrigue-charged days leading up to the overthrow of the Diem regime. Don is now traveling abroad.

According to the Pentagon

papers, Lodge reported that Conein, whom he described as virtually indispensable, had a face-to-face 70-minute meeting with Minh at Minh's headquarters Oct. 5.

At that meeting, Lodge reported, Minh told Conein that the "easiest" way to effect a change of government was to kill Diem's brother and right hand man, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, and keep the president in office.

Minh heatedly denied that such a meeting ever took place. "A big lie," he said.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

CHRONICLE

JUL

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EditorialsDeGaulle Warned
Against a Bog

IF WE PINPOINT the decision that really changed the United States role in Indochina from one of advice to one of intervention, it will be clear that this was President John F. Kennedy's decision and that he made it on May 11, 1961.

The Pentagon Papers prove beyond question that that month ten years ago was the critical time in the development of a war of which, even yet, we cannot see the end.

The decision made that day was to send 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other American military advisers to South Vietnam, also to start up a campaign of clandestine warfare against North Vietnam, to be conducted by CIA-trained South Vietnamese agents.

THUS, WRITES HENRICK SMITH of the New York Times, "The limited-risk gamble undertaken by General Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Mr. Kennedy."

The fateful date is notable both for what had gone before the decision and for what came soon after. John F. Kennedy was less than four months into his presidency; he was feeling his way through and around the jungles of the CIA and the Pentagon. He had taken a colossal beating at the Bay of Pigs, in Cuba, April 19, 1961, for which he accepted (but loathed having to accept) full responsibility.

Moreover, Kennedy made his moves in secret, and the deception of Congress and the people which Lyndon Johnson was later so much blamed for can certainly be made out here.

STUDENTS OF THE CATASTROPHIC Vietnam war will find an ironic and illuminating footnote to the Kennedy commitment of May 11, 1961, if they turn at this point to the memoirs of Charles deGaulle, recently published in France.

"On May 31, 1961," writes de Gaulle, "John Kennedy arrives in Paris, full of energy. . . . It is mostly about Indochina that I underline to President Kennedy how much our policies differ: he recognizes that the United States is getting ready to intervene . . . they are starting to set up the first elements of an expeditionary force under the pretext of assistance . . . John Kennedy gives me to understand that the whole business is going to be enlarged in order to set up in the Indochinese Peninsula a bulwark of resistance against the Soviets."

DE GAULLE CONTINUES: "For you, I tell him, 'an intervention in that area will be an endless task. From the moment that a nation wakes up, no foreign authority, whatever its means may be, has any chance of imposing itself. . . . The more you will involve yourselves over there against communism, the more the Communists will appear as the champions of national independence, and the more help they will receive, first of all from the despair of the people.'

"We French have experienced it. Yesterday, you Americans wanted to take our place in Indochina. Now you want to rekindle a war we have finished. I predict that you will be sucked down step by step into a bottomless military and political bog, in spite of the blood and expenditure you may lavish."

President de Gaulle concludes this chapter of his history: "Kennedy listens to me, but the outcome will show that I have not convinced him."

Minh Says U.S. Clear In '63 Plot

By George McArthur
Los Angeles Times

SAIGON, July 6 — The so-called Pentagon papers may have become a Vietnamese election issue involving President Thieu and his chief rival, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh.

While President Thieu has maintained silence on the American documents, Minh got into the act today when a local news agency distributed a rather surprising interview with the man who gained widespread popularity by leading the 1963 coup which ousted President Diem.

In the statement, Minh was quoted as saying the Americans had no advance hand in planning the coup and were unaware of its timing. An aide to Minh later confirmed that the general was quoted correctly in the statement.

It appeared obvious that Minh was attempting to maintain the position that the coup was the invention of the military junta which he headed eight years ago. This position, however, has never been accepted by anyone with the vaguest knowledge of those events and the Pentagon papers make it clear that the American embassy headed by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was involved in the plot.

CIA Go-Between

The Pentagon papers also confirm that the American go-between was an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency named Lucien Conein.

Conein, a former lieutenant colonel in the World War II Office of Strategic Services, later left the CIA and returned to South Vietnam several years ago as a private businessman. His role in the coup was widely known, and he remained on affable terms with most of the Vietnamese generals, including Big Minh.

All of this, of course, is well known to U.S. embassy personnel and has been confirmed countless times in private talks with newsmen and others.

For Big Minh to deny American participation in the coup at this late date can only be because he sees the unfolding story in terms of the October 3 presidential election.

Peace Candidate

Although Minh says he favors coexistence and not coalition with the Communists, he campaigns as a peace candidate and charges the Americans are backing Thieu. It is perhaps embarrassing to admit that the Americans similarly backed him eight years ago.

He may also be countering a barb which President Thieu threw at him last October. Thieu, who was only a colonel and lower-ranked plotter in 1963, charged that the military junta coldly ordered the execution of President Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. The junta's official version—never widely accepted—was that the brothers were shot trying to escape.

The charge rankled Big Minh, a Buddhist, because it cost him support among the still potent religious followers of Diem, a Catholic.

Minh has never publicly commented on Thieu's charges but he has been trying hard to make inroads among the Catholics who generally support Thieu both for his anti-Communist position and because he is himself a convert to Catholicism.

STATINTL

KEY TEXTS F PENTAGON'S VIETN

Following are the texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering events in the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents appear verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Report of Ho's Appeals to U.S. In '46 to Support Independence

Cablegram from an American diplomat in Hanoi, identified as Landon, to State Department, Feb. 27, 1946, as provided in the body of the Pentagon study.

Ho Chi Minh handed me 2 letters addressed to President of USA, China, Russia, and Britain identical copies of which were stated to have been forwarded to other governments named. In 2 letters to Ho Chi Minh request ~~USA~~ as one of United Nations to support idea of Annamese independence according to Philippines example, to examine the case of the Annamese, and to take steps necessary to maintenance of world peace which is being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina. He asserts that Annamese will fight until United Nations interfered in support of Annamese independence. The petition addressed to major United Nations contains:

A. Review of French relations with Japanese where French Indochina allegedly aided Japs:

B. Statement of establishment on 2

September 1945 of PENW Democratic Republic of Viet Minh:

C. Summary of French conquest of Cochinchina began 23 Sept 1945 and still incomplete:

D. Outline of accomplishments of Annamese Government in Tonkin including popular elections, abolition of undesirable taxes, expansion of education and resumption as far as possible of normal economic activities:

E. Request to 4 powers: (1) to intervene and stop the war in Indochina in order to mediate fair settlement and (2) to bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations organization. The petition ends with the statement that Annamese ask for full independence in fact and that in interim while awaiting UNO decision the Annamese will continue to fight the reestablishment of French imperialism. Letters and petition will be transmitted to Department soonest.

1952 Policy Statement by U.S. On Goals in Southeast Asia

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, early 1952; on "United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia." According to a footnote, the document defined Southeast Asia as "the area embracing Burma, Thailand, Indochina, Malaya and Indonesia."

Objective

1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, and to assist them to develop will and ability to resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.

General Considerations

2. Communist domination, by whatever means, of all Southeast Asia would

seriously endanger in the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United States security interests.

a. The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist aggression would have critical psychological, political and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission to or an alignment with communism of the rest of

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cially of Malaya and Indonesia, could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan's eventual accommodation to communism.

3. It is therefore imperative that an overt attack on Southeast Asia by the Chinese Communists be vigorously opposed. In order to pursue the military courses of action envisaged in this paper to a favorable conclusion within a reasonable period, it will be necessary to divert military strength from other areas thus reducing our military capability in those areas, with the recognized increased risks involved therein, or to increase our military forces in being, or both.

4. The danger of an overt military attack against Southeast Asia is inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China, but such an attack is less probable than continued communist efforts to achieve domination through subversion. The primary threat to Southeast Asia accordingly arises from the possibility that the situation in Indochina may deteriorate as a result of the weakening of the resolve of, or as a result of the inability of the governments of France and of the Associated States to continue to oppose the Viet Minh rebellion, the military strength of which is being steadily increased by virtue of aid furnished by the Chinese Communist regime and its allies.

5. The successful defense of Tonkin is critical to the retention in non-Communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma come under communist domination, a communist attack on Indochina, including Tonkin, might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily indefensible. The execution of

STATINTL

M - 536,108
S - 709,123

JUL 1 1971

Times, Post stories

New insight on Viet policies of Kennedy

By Morton Kondracke
and Thomas B. Ross
Sun-Times Bureau

WASHINGTON—The Kennedy and Johnson administrations in 1963 and 1961 feared that the United States might be forced out of Vietnam without victory by "pro-French" factions in Saigon seeking a "neutralist" peace.

The Washington Post, in drawing that conclusion from the top-secret Pentagon study of the war, added new details to The Sun-Times' disclosure last week of U.S. fears that South Vietnam might seek "neutralization negotiations" with Hanoi.

The Post and The New York Times resumed publication of the Pentagon papers in their Thursday editions after a Supreme Court ruling in their favor.

Their first articles contained no major new disclosures. In the two weeks that they were prevented from publishing, most of their secrets were revealed by the Sun-Times and other newspapers.

However, the Post and Times did add these fresh insights:

(1) From the available documents, the Pentagon historians declare: "No reliable inference can be drawn about how (the late President John F.) Kennedy would have behaved in 1963 and beyond had he lived."

(2) On May 11, 1961, Kennedy ordered 400 special forces troops and 100 other military advisers sent to Vietnam. Although the move was given no publicity, the Pentagon study notes that it "signaled a willingness to go beyond the 685-man limit on the size of the U.S. military mission."

Had the move been taken "openly," the study adds, it would have represented the "first formal breach" of the 1954 Geneva accords.

(3) In addition to its intimate knowledge of the plot leading to the overthrow and assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, the U.S. government gave intelligence to the plotters.

According to the Times, the Pentagon study declared that "so closely did the CIA work with the generals" who overthrew and killed Diem "that it provided them with vital intelligence about the arms and encampments of pro-Diem

forces after Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. had authorized CIA planning of the coup."

After the successful coup on Nov. 1, 1963, Washington did not immediately recognize the new government because Sec. of State Dean Rusk believed the delay would reduce the appearance of U.S. complicity and make the Saigon generals look less like puppets.

Concentrate on Kennedy years

The Times installment concentrated on the Kennedy years. The Post's focused principally on the Kennedy administration but also carried over into the first year in office of former President Lyndon B. Johnson. Both accounts conformed to disclosures in The Sun-Times during the last two weeks.

The Post, in a story written by Murray Marder, gave this account of developments during 1963 and 1964:

U.S. strategists had a double concern: that Vietnamese political opponents of American strategy to pursue the war more intensively might negotiate with North Vietnam behind the back of the United States; or that "pro-French" South Vietnamese generals would agree to a "neutralist" end of the war. The highest U.S. officials equated that with a "Communist takeover."

In these critical years before the U.S. role in the conflict had greatly escalated, the United States struggled far more to stay in the war than to get out of it, the secret documents reveal.

By 1964, what the Kennedy and Johnson administrations labeled a global "test" against Communist expansion also became an unexpected test of another kind, inside the Western alliance. The Johnson administration looked upon French President Charles de Gaulle's attempts to reassert French influence in Indochina and all Asia — especially his call for the "neutralization" of South Vietnam — as the most pernicious portion of the Gaullist plan to break out of American "hegemony" and obtain a larger world role for France.

Fear U.S. humiliation

The American reaction was to dig in deeper in South Vietnam, to avoid at all costs what U.S. strategists perceived as a new double threat of American "humiliation."

Defense Sec. Robert S. McNamara, in a March 16, 1964, memorandum to President Johnson, summarized the U.S. position on negotiations "on the basis of 'neutralization.'"

KEY VIETNAM TEXT

THE KENNEDY YEARS

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, dealing with the Administration of President John F. Kennedy up to the events that brought the overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

U.S. Ambassador's '60 Analysis Of Threats to Saigon Regime

Cablegram from Elbridge Durbrow, United States Ambassador in Saigon, to Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Sept. 16, 1960.

As indicated our 495 and 538 Diem regime confronted by two separate but related dangers. Danger from demonstrations or coup attempt in Saigon could occur earlier; likely to be predominantly non-Communist in origin but Communists can be expected to endeavor infiltrate and exploit any such attempt. Even more serious danger is gradual Viet Cong extension of control over countryside which, if current Communist progress continues, would mean loss free Viet-nam to Communists. These two dangers are related because Communist successes in rural areas embolden them to extend their activities to Saigon and because non-Communist temptation to engage in demonstrations or coup is partly motivated by sincere desire prevent Communist take-over in Viet-nam.

Essentially [word illegible] sets of measures required to meet these two dangers. For Saigon danger essentially political and psychological measures required. For countryside danger security measures as well as political, psychological and economic measures needed. However both sets measures should be carried out simultaneously and to some extent individual steps will be aimed at both dangers.

Security recommendations have been made in our 539 and other messages, including formation internal security council, centralized intelligence, etc. This message therefore deals with our political and economic recommendations. I realize some measures I am recommending are drastic and would be most [word illegible] for an ambassador to make under normal circumstances. But conditions here are by no means

normal. Diem government is in quite serious danger. Therefore, in my opinion prompt and even drastic action is called for. I am well aware that Diem has in past demonstrated astute judgment and has survived other serious crises. Possibly his judgment will prove superior to ours this time, but I believe nevertheless we have no alternative but to give him our best judgment of what we believe is required to preserve his government. While Diem obviously resented my frank talks earlier this year and will probably resent even more suggestions outlined below, he has apparently acted on some of our earlier suggestions and might act on at least some of the following:

1. I would propose have frank and friendly talk with Diem and explain our serious concern about present situation and his political position. I would tell him that, while matters I am raising deal primarily with internal affairs, I would like to talk to him frankly and try to be as helpful as I can be giving him the considered judgment of myself and some of his friends in Washington on appropriate measures to assist him in present serious situation. (Believe it best not indicate talking under instructions.) I would particularly stress desirability of actions to broaden and increase his [word illegible] support prior to 1961 presidential elections required by constitution before end April. I would propose following actions to President:

2. Psychological shock effect is required to take initiative from Communist propagandists as well as non-Communist oppositionists and convince population government taking effective measures to deal with present situation of hand. To achieve that effect following suggested:

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4. Permit National Assembly wider legislative initiative and area of genuine debate and bestow on it authority to conduct, with appropriate publicity, public investigations of any department of government with right to question officials with President himself. This step would have three-fold purpose: (A) find some mechanism for dis-

JFK stepped up role in Viet, report shows

President Kennedy transformed the "limited-risk gamble" of the Eisenhower administration into a "broad commitment" to prevent Communist domination of South Vietnam, according to The New York Times series based on the 1967-68 Pentagon study of the war.

The Times resumed publishing the fourth and fifth parts of the series today after the Supreme Court ruled in their favor yesterday.

The study also says President Kennedy knew and approved of plans for the military coup d'etat that ousted President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963.

Of the Kennedy administration's policy in Vietnam, the study says that although Kennedy resisted pressures to put American ground-combat units into the country, the president took a series of actions that significantly expanded both the U.S. military and political involvement there and for the first time put American servicemen into combat-support roles that involved them increasingly in actual fighting.

Moreover, it says, the Kennedy tactics deepened the American involvement, piecemeal, with each step minimizing public recognition that the American role was expanding.

In its article, The Times said the first U.S. commitment to Vietnam during the Kennedy administration was made secretly. This occurred on May 11, 1961, when, according to the study, Kennedy ordered 400 Special Forces troops and 100 other military advisers be sent to Vietnam.

No publicity was given to either move, The Times said.

The number of men involved was small, but the move was significant, the study says, because it "signaled a willingness to go beyond the 635-man limit on the size of the U.S. (military) mission in Saigon, which if it were done openly, would be the first formal breach of the Geneva agreement."

The U.S. had not signed the 1954 Geneva accords ending the French war with the Viet Minh, but had agreed not to undermine them.

The Pentagon study relates that Kennedy faced three main questions on Vietnam during his time in office: whether to make an irrevocable commitment to prevent a Communist victory; whether to commit ground-combat units to achieve his ends; and whether to give top priority to the military battle against the Viet Cong or to the political reforms necessary to win popular support for the Saigon government among the people.

Kennedy tactics deepened involvement

The president's response, during his 34 months in office, as the Pentagon study says, was to increase the number of American advisers from the internationally accept-

ed level of 635 under the Geneva agreement to about 16,000, to put Americans into combat situations (with a resultant increase in casualties), and to inject the U.S. into the internal South Vietnamese maneuvering that toppled the Diem regime.

Commenting on those actions, the Pentagon study says:

"The limited-risk gamble undertaken by Eisenhower had been transformed into an unlimited commitment under Kennedy."

Later, The Times says, the Pentagon study comments more cautiously that Kennedy's policies had produced a "broad commitment" to Vietnam's defense, giving priority to the military aspects of the war over political reforms.

In secretly urging the first commitment of U.S. ground troops in November, 1961, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, then Kennedy's personal military adviser, said "the risks of backing into a major Asian war" by way of South Vietnam "are present but are not impressive."

Joint chiefs recommended 235,000

The joint chiefs of staff, according to the study, reckoned that a maximum of 205,000 American ground troops would be needed to cope with the Viet Cong, and with North Vietnam and Communist China if they should intervene. The administration shied away from such a commitment.

Kennedy, during this period in 1961, according to the Pentagon study, was also troubled by Soviet-U.S. tensions over the Berlin situation, and saw the U.S. in a global power competition with the Soviet Union because of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's statement on Jan. 6, 1961, that Moscow intended to back "wars of national liberation" around the world.

Counterinsurgency against guerrilla warfare thus became a primary preoccupation of the Kennedy White House, the study says.

It continues: "Vietnam was the only place in the world where the administration faced a well-developed Communist effort to topple a pro-western government with an externally-aided pro-Communist insurgency. It was a challenge that could hardly be ignored."

Taylor reported task force essential

Taylor, in a fact-finding mission to Vietnam in October, 1961, according to the study reported to President Kennedy that a "U.S. military task force is essential."

continued

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The Series So Far: From Covert War Covert Warfare Sponsored by U.S. in '64 to Bombin

President Lyndon B. Johnson's Administration, amid his hesitation and reluctance to take final decisions, was sponsoring covert South Vietnamese warfare against North Vietnam starting in February, 1964, and drawing up plans that spring for overt war.

These activities—long before the Aug. 4, 1964, Tonkin Gulf destroyer incident that led to a Congressional vote authorizing "all necessary steps" to aid Southeast Asian countries—were described in the first installment.

The series was based on a Defense Department study, commissioned in 1967 by Secretary Robert S. McNamara to learn how American involvement in Southeast Asia developed. The study ranged from World War II until the start of peace talks in Paris in May, 1968.

There are gaps in the Pentagon study—the researchers lacked access to Presidential files—and in that part of it obtained by The Times—it lacks the chapter on diplomatic initiatives, some of which are continuing.

A Report by McNamara

The first of 13 documents published in the initial installment was a report on Dec. 21, 1963, by Secretary McNamara to President Johnson. This said "plans for covert action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested."

"They present," he went on, "a variety of sabotage and psychological operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim to select those that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk."

The "covert military operations," drawn up by the Central Intelligence Agency station and the military command in Saigon, were begun Feb. 1, 1964, as Operation Plan 34A. President Johnson's hope was that they might eventually induce North Vietnam to halt the Vietcong and Pathet Lao insurrections.

Through 1964, they included flights over North Vietnam by U-2 spy planes, the kidnapping of North Vietnamese citizens for intelligence information, commando raids from the sea to blow up rail and highway bridges and the bombardment of coastal installations by PT boats.

Before The New York Times was restrained by Federal court order from continuing with its series on the Pentagon study of the Vietnam war, it had published the first three parts. They dealt with the first years of the Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Here is a summary of those three articles and a recapitulation of some of the key documents published with them on June 13, 14 and 15:

Hired Personnel Used

They differed from relatively low-level and unsuccessful intelligence and sabotage efforts the C.I.A. had carried out earlier in North Vietnam. The 34A attacks were under the control of Gen. Paul D. Harkins, chief of the United States Military Assistance Command in Saigon, with raids performed by the South Vietnamese or their "hired personnel."

The covert war had a second major segment—air operations in Laos by 25 to 40 propeller-driven T-28 fighter-bombers. These bore Laotian Air Force markings, but were manned in part by pilots of Air America, a C.I.A.-controlled line and in part by Thai pilots under the control of Ambassador Leonard Unger.

Regular United States Air Force and Navy jet planes, code-named Yankee Team, gathered photographic intelligence for the T-28 bombing raids. The reconnaissance moved from high-altitude flights at the start of 1964 to low-altitude sorties in May; in June armed escort jets were added, bombing and strafing when the reconnaissance planes were fired on.

A third element in the covert military pressure was the patrolling by American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. Code-named De Soto patrols, the ships collected intelligence on warning radars and coastal defenses.

In a memorandum on Jan. 22, 1964, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contended that "the United States must be prepared to put aside many of the self-imposed restrictions" and to "undertake bolder actions," even to "commit U.S. forces as necessary in direct actions against North Vietnam."

Difference of Opinion

The Johnson Administration was convinced from radio interceptions that North Vietnam was directing the Vietcong despite intelligence analyses that argued "the primary sources of Communist strength in South Vietnam are indigenous" arising from social and nationalist aims.

On March 16, 1964, describing a worsening situation, Secretary McNamara urged new plans up to "graduated overt military pressure," ready on 30 days' notice for strikes against North Vietnam by the South Vietnamese Air Force and an American air commando squadron, code-named Farmgate, that operated with South Vietnamese markings.

President Johnson approved the McNamara recommendations at a National Security Council meeting March 17, 1964. On March 20, President Johnson cabled Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon: "...our planning for action against the North is on a contingency basis at present, and immediate problem in this area is to develop the strongest military and political base for possible later action."

On April 17, the Joint Chiefs approved a so-called scenario, Operation Plan 37-64, including escalation steps against North Vietnam up to air attacks and mining of ports, initially by South Vietnamese but possibly using United States aircraft.

Military action was not to begin until after a joint Congressional resolution.

On May 4, South Vietnam's

head of government, Gen. Nguyen Khanh, told Ambassador Lodge he wanted the United States to start bombing and to send in 10,000 troops.

The Pentagon study reported that at a Honolulu meeting on June 1 and 2, 1964, Secretary McNamara said "it might be necessary as the action unfolded... to deploy as many as seven divisions" of American troops.

One effort to apportion American aims in South Vietnam was attributed to a memorandum by John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense, as follows:

"70 pct.—To avoid a humiliating U.S. defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor).
"20 pct.—To keep SVN (and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands.
"10 pct.—To permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life."

One move at United States request had J. Blair Seaborn, Canadian member of the International Control Commission, pass on a warning June 18 to North Vietnam's Premier, Pham Van Dong, that escalating the warfare could bring "the greatest devastation" to North Vietnam.

Separate from the Defense Department study, which was prepared in 1967 and 1968, was a 1965 Defense Department command and control study of the Tonkin Gulf incident.

In a 34A operation, South Vietnamese naval commandos raided two North Vietnamese islands in the gulf at midnight July 30. On Aug. 2, a De Soto intelligence-gathering patrol by the destroyer Maddox wound up in a clash with North Vietnamese PT boats, which the study said apparently mistook the Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel.

On Aug. 3, President Johnson ordered the destroyer C. Turner Joy to reinforce the Maddox in the gulf. That night, two clandestine 34A bombardments were staged by South Vietnamese PT boats.


On the night of Aug. 4, Tonkin Gulf time, the two American destroyers were attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats, according to the Pentagon account.

At a national Security Council meeting on the afternoon of Aug. 4, Washington time, President Johnson ordered American reprisal air strikes, chosen by the Joint Chiefs from a 94-target list drawn up at the end of the Congressional resolution of full military support for South Vietnam.

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U.S. Supported Coup Against Diem



NGO DINH DIEM

... U.S.-backed ouster

By Don Oberdorfer

Washington Post Staff Writer

At 4:30 p.m. on November 1, 1963, a few hours before he was murdered, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam telephoned U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to determine the attitude of the American government toward the coup in progress outside his palace window.

Lodge was noncommittal. He had heard the gunfire, he said, but he did not have all the facts. "Also it is 4:30 a.m. in Washington and the U.S. government cannot possibly have a view."

"But you must have some general ideas," protested Diem. "After all, I am a Chief of State. I have tried to do my duty. I am trying to do now what duty and good sense require. I believe in duty above all."

Lodge replied that Diem had certainly done his duty, and with courage, and no one could take away from him the credit for his contributions to his country. "Now I am worried about your physical safety," the Ambassador continued. Had Diem heard that he had been offered safe conduct if he resigned the country if he resigned?

"No," answered the beleaguered but stubborn Vietnamese President.

"If I can do anything for your physical safety, please call me," Lodge said.

"I am trying to re-establish order," concluded Diem, in the last words he would say to an American. Before the evening was out, he and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had fled the Presidential Palace through a secret tunnel. The next afternoon they were captured by the insurgents in Cholon, the Chinese section of the city, and shot to death in an armored personnel carrier rumbling through the Saigon streets.

The refusal to intervene to save the tottering Diem was not a spur of the moment decision by Henry Cabot Lodge. According to a Pentagon study of United States involvement in the war, it was part of a thoroughly planned policy of the United States government, which had decided to back a coup if it appeared likely to succeed.

"Beginning in August of 1963 (two months before Diem's overthrow) we variously authorized, sanctioned and encouraged the coup efforts of the Vietnamese generals and offered full support for a successor government," the Pentagon report stated. "In October we cut off aid to Diem in a direct rebuff, giving a green light to the generals. We maintained clandestine contact with them throughout the planning and execution of the coup and sought to review their operational plans and proposed new government," the report added.

This policy, which sanctioned Diem's overthrow but not his murder, was approved at the White House. Even the substance of Lodge's statements in the final conversation with Diem—quoted in the Pentagon study—followed the guidelines of a directive dispatched to Saigon in the last days of October by McGeorge Bundy, President John F. Kennedy's assistant for national security affairs.

In that 11th hour order, the White House directed that U.S. authorities in Vietnam should not directly intervene on either side in a coup against Diem. "But, once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U.S. Government that it should succeed," the directive said.

The decision to topple Ngo Dinh Diem was one of the most important turning points in the United States struggle in Indochina—as the Pentagon study puts it, "one of the times in the history of our Vietnam involvement when we were making fundamental choices."

The study says that the basic choices were these: (1) to continue to "plod along" with an increasingly unpopular Diem, (2) to encourage or tacitly support a military coup, taking the risk that the government might crumble or accommodate with the Viet Cong and (3) to grasp the opportunity of the political instability to disengage from South Vietnam.

According to the study, the first choice was rejected because of the belief that "we could not win" with Diem and his brother Nhu. The third course, withdrawal from Vietnam, was "never seriously considered" because of the assumption that an independent, non-Communist South Vietnam was "too important a strategic interest to abandon."

"The second course was chosen mainly for the reasons the first was rejected—Vietnam was thought too important; we wanted to win; and the rebellious generals seemed to offer that prospect," the Pentagon study said.

As a consequence of the choice that was made, the United States significantly deepened its commitment to South Vietnam. By deciding to bring Diem down, the U.S. assumed a great moral responsibility to his successors and the people of the country over whom they tried to rule. There is little indication in the Pentagon study that the authors had access to many

high level documents but not all such documents—that the American decision makers realized this fateful consequence of their action. The heightened U.S. responsibility and involvement in Vietnam during the final days of the Kennedy Administration led to the commitment of American ground troops during the Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson—but ironically, Johnson was among those within the government who raised his voice against the plan to bring down Diem.

According to the Pentagon history, the then-Vice President told a high level meeting at the State Department on August 31, 1963, that he had great reservations about a coup because he had never seen "a genuine alternative" to Diem. "From both a practical and political viewpoint it would be a disaster to pull out," Johnson was quoted as saying. Instead of a coup, the United States should go back to "talking straight" to Diem's government and "once again go about winning the war," he reportedly added.

The basic picture of the United States involvement in the coup against Diem was reported in the press at the time and additional details have trickled out in the seven years since. The Pentagon study, including a chronology of events and decisions and documentation of the major steps, provides many details previously unknown. And the study shows that the U.S. role was even more direct, more calculated and more extensive than was generally believed at the time.

Beginning late in August, 1963, more than two months before the overthrow of Diem, a Central Intelligence Agency official in Saigon was in direct contact with the plotters in the Vietnam.

Continued

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Saigon students wage struggle for peace

By Dong Hostetter

After a winter and early spring of continuing antiwar activity, the South Vietnamese Student Union launched a new initiative, declaring April 4-10 a student struggle week. Rallies and other events were planned around a campaign for ratification of the People's Peace Treaty by students in Saigon and other parts of the South.

In an effort to subvert the campaign, police and provincial officials tried to keep students outside Saigon from entering the city. The Saigon authorities also tried to isolate the Student Union building and some of the dormitories housing radical students. During the whole week of the planned campaign the building was surrounded by police and barbed-wire barricades. However, despite this harassment numerous rallies were held outside the Student Union. The Saigon newspaper, *Dan Chu Moi* (New Democracy) carried the following account of one of the rallies in its April 7 issue:

"On Minh Mang street, Minh Mang student dormitory has been surrounded with barbed wire for five days. Thousands of students, intellectuals, scholars, laborers, National Assembly deputies and women from different organizations struggling for the right to live came to attend the ceremony, but they could not enter the Student Union. . . . Around 8 pm, the students carried an altar from inside the Student Union out into the street in order to join with the students from Minh Mang dormitory at the crossroads. But they were scattered by police with more than 50 tear-gas grenades. The tear gas spread out over a large area. The cars and people were caught in a traffic jam."

Message to Nixon

In the week following, the Student Union sent a letter to President Nixon. "With the support of our people and the American people," they wrote, "we have taken the responsibilities into our own hands which you can see reflected in this People's Peace Treaty. It is time for you, Mr. President, to listen to the Vietnamese and U.S. people's desire. . . .

"We ask you, as chief commander of the United States Army, to order the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from our country and to cease all military support to the present government of Saigon so that we, the people of Vietnam, can solve our own problems on the principle of self-determination of the Vietnamese people.

"We also ask you, Mr. President, to recognize and respect the People's Peace Treaty that was initiated altogether by the American and North and South Vietnamese peoples."

During and after student struggle week, the Saigon government has been trying to suppress the influence of the students. Student leaders and their friends were kidnapped off the streets, imprisoned and

tormented. One Saigon source estimates the number of students imprisoned from the signing of the People's Peace Treaty in December to just prior to the struggle week at over 200. During the struggle week over 500 students from the Minh Mang dormitory alone were arrested and disenfranchised from student elections. The "subversive activity" in which the arrested students had participated was the singing of the popular antiwar song, "I will sing to my people."

Other actions have been directed against the students. On April 12, the president of the National Student Union, Huynh Tan Mam, announced publicly that the CIA has been approaching students who had failed their examinations (which means loss of student deferment) and offering them 15,000 piasters (\$30) per month and military deferment if they continue as student undercover agents.

Failing in other attempts to silence the students, the Saigon government announced on May 21 that they would retry Huynh Tan Mam and 21 other student leaders on old charges of treason. Mam had been tried and convicted in March 1970 by a military field court, but the conviction was overturned in a surprise decision of the supreme court. The case was thrown out on two grounds. First, the military field courts were declared unconstitutional and, second, all evidence against Mam was declared invalid because it had been extracted from other students by means of torture.

Charged with treason

Since the case was reversed, the National Assembly has passed legislation which is aimed at placing the military field courts on a constitutional basis. New evidence is expected to be used against Mam this year, for he and other Saigon students have publicly signed the People's Peace Treaty, which was also signed by students of North Vietnam, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the U.S. The retrial was announced just two weeks prior to new student elections and again will be conducted by a military field court with the addition of one civilian judge.

Non-student groups have also been active in antiwar activities this spring. An alliance of 30 Saigon-based organizations called for a massive demonstration to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the death of Nhat Chi Mai, a Buddhist student who burned herself to death in protest against the war. The demonstrations were probably the largest held in recent years. They took place May 2, a week earlier than the actual anniversary, in order to coincide with American May Day activities.

Thousands of police and soldiers were on hand to contain the crowd which gathered at a large pagoda near Saigon. But demonstrators who managed to evade the police lines spread out through downtown streets in a massive peaceful demonstration. Since then, a Buddhist monk and nun and also a student have immolated themselves in separate protests against the Saigon regime and the war.

As the elections approach, antiwar groups have become the target of increased police harassment. On May 28, a total of 80 members of the Women's Committee to Defend the Right to Live were arrested though later released in an effort to forestall a planned women's demonstration.

Thieu's maneuvers

In order to further consolidate his power, Nguyen Van Thieu, president of the Saigon government, has long been trying to obtain a new electoral law which would require any potential candidate for presidential

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continued

Napalm sticks to kids

The following poem was composed collectively by a group of Air Force and Army GIs of the First Air Cavalry in Vietnam. Each verse depicts an actual event that at least one of the men participated in. It appeared in print for the first time in the first issue of "Helping Hand," a GI newspaper at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho.

*We shoot the sick, the young, the lame,
 We do our best to kill and maim,
 Because the kills all count the same,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Flying low across the trees,
 Pilots doing what they please,
 Dropping fregs on refugees,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Flying low and looking mean,
 See that family by the stream,
 Drop some nape and hear 'em scream,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*A group of gooks in the grass,
 But all the fighting's long since past,
 Crispy youngsters in a mass,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Drop some napalm on the barn,
 It won't do too much harm,
 Just burn off a leg or arm,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*CIA with guns for hire,
 Montagnards around a fire,
 Napalm makes the fire higher,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*A baby sucking on his mother's tit,
 Children cowering in a pit,
 Dow Chemical doesn't give a shit,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Eighteen kids in a "no fire zone,"
 Books under arm as they go home,
 Last in line goes home alone,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Gather kids as you fly over town,
 By tossing candy on the ground,
 Then grease 'em when they gather round,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Ox cart rolling down the road,
 Peasants with a heavy load,
 They're all V.C. when the bombs explode,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Cobms flying in the sun,
 Killing gooks is macho fun,
 If one's pregnant, it's two for one,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*There's a gook down on her knees,
 Launch some fleshettes into the breeze,
 Her arms are nailed to the trees,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*Blues out on a road recon,
 See some children with their mom,
 What the hell, let's drop the bomb,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

*They're in good shape for the
 shape they're in,
 But, God, I wonder how they can win,
 With Napalm running down their skin,
 Napalm sticks to kids.*

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War costs: School cuts

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Calif), who acquired part of the Defense Department history of the Vietnam war, thinks that only one item in the report should not be made public.

It is the names of Central Intelligence Agents who were involved in the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. The coup coincided with Diem's assassination.

Would this not prevent the Saigon courts from inquiring as to whether the CIA agents participated in the assassination and, if so, who gave them their orders? McCloskey has unwittingly opened up a can of CIA worms. ✓

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JUN 27 1971

Ralph de Toledano

Diem's Death Showed CIA Law Unto Itself

Sometimes it takes years for the news to make page one. In November of 1963, any well-informed Washington correspondent knew that the Central Intelligence Agency had been deeply involved in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, president of South Vietnam. And at the cocktail hour, in the capital's most frequent watering hole, the suspicion was frequently voiced that the CIA shared complicity in Mr. Diem's assassination. Today, almost 7½ years later, Americans can read the story over their morning coffee.

There are other CIA stories of some concern to the citizenry, but since they do not touch on the Vietnam war, they will not be found in the batch of classified papers now being pawed over by the nation's press. One such story is so incredible that I have not published it even though I checked it out just as high as you can go in this government without talking to the President. In the general letting-down of hair that has followed publication by the New York Times of the Vietnam papers, there may be some value in reciting my story — if only to use it as a peg on which to hang some questions about CIA operations.

Back in the early Fifties, the Central Intelligence Agency decided that it would be a better world if President Chiang Kai-shek, then digging in on Taiwan, would shuffle off his mortal coil. With the Generalissimo gone, all those pesky questions of Red Chinese admission to the United Nations would become moot. The Nationalist regime would collapse, and Mao Tse-tung could move into the vacuum. From the wish that President Chiang should depart this life to a decision that he be speeded on the journey was a small step.

Somewhere within the bowels of CIA headquarters, plans for the assassination of Chiang Kai-shek were made. A team was assigned to do the job and \$5 million was allocated — the money to be spent in setting up the operation in Taipei, bribing such officials as could be bribed, creating a cover, etc. I was never able to determine what non-CIA officials — if any — were informed.

But because CIA security at the time was about as watertight as a colander, the Republic of China's Intelligence picked up details of the plot even before the CIA team had unpacked its bags in Taipei. President Chiang was informed. According to my account, however, the Generalissimo refused to give the order to "take care" of the team. "Let's get their \$5 million first," he is reported to have said. The CIA team, therefore, was led down a cloak-and-dagger garden path, never getting within range of President Chiang.

By the time the money was spent, the Central Intelligence Agency had changed its mind — or had it changed by more responsible people in the United States government. The team was recalled.

When I checked out the story, the very important official who confirmed it said, "Sure it's true. CIA had a similar plan to knock off Syngman Rhee (then President of Korea) but we stopped it." In the context of the conversation, the "we" referred to the National Security Council.

That the two operations were scrubbed of course made a considerable difference to Presidents Chiang and Rhee — not to mention the course of history. But scrubbed or completed, the principle remains the same. The Central Intelligence Agency, a secret arm of the

on on itself life and death decisions which involved the integrity of this nation and which could have generated results touching on war or peace in the world.

CIA, moreover, had embarked on actions which went far beyond the all-too-liberal license it had been given by the Congress in authorizing the agency. And that has been CIA's way in less grisly areas of its endeavor. It compromised the freedom of the press in the Fifties by hiring newspapermen as "consultants," thereby scaling lips and silencing criticism. Whether or not this practice has continued is anybody's guess.

The CIA's original function was to gather Intelligence, not to interfere in world politics. There might have been some justification for its activities as one of many participants in Guatemala and in Cuba where it was involved only with the sanction of higher authority. But in the instant cases, CIA was a law unto itself. A thoughtful person might ask: Is it still?

Secrecy Label Is Used Too Often By Pentagon, Ex-Aide Testifies

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 24—A recently retired civil servant who spent many years in the Pentagon reviewing the classification of sensitive documents asserted today that only one half of 1 per cent of them contained genuine secrets that should be kept from the public.

William G. Florence told a House subcommittee investigating secrecy in Government that "the disclosure of information in at least 99½ per cent of those classified documents could not be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation."

Mr. Florence, who retired on May 31 as a senior aide in the Department of the Air Force, said that the practice of stamping papers "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential" had become "so widespread that the defense classification system is literally clogged with material bearing classification markings."

Mr. Florence estimated that "there are at least 20 million classified documents, including reproduced copies," either in circulation or in storage in the Department of Defense alone.

He testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, which is headed by Representative William S. Moorhead, Democrat of Pennsylvania, in the second day of hearings stimulated by press

disclosure of a secret Pentagon study on the war in Vietnam.

Representative Paul N. McCloskey Jr., Republican of California and a member of the subcommittee, deferred his planned testimony until he has had a chance to compare the 600 to 700 pages of the Pentagon study in his hands with the complete 47-volume project, which is scheduled to be handed to the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, on Monday.

Mr. McCloskey said today he doubted there was any information in the documents he has that should remain secret, other than the names of Central Intelligence agents involved in the coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam in 1963.

Mr. Florence, a slender man with close-cropped red hair and a diffident manner, indicated that the cumbersome classification system led to some "utterly ridiculous" practices, unnecessary costs to taxpayers of \$50-million a year, and was the cause of constant wrangles within the Pentagon.

He said that one of the service chiefs wrote a note to the other service chiefs some time ago suggesting that too many papers marked "Top Secret" were being circulated. He recommended that the use of that classification be reduced.

"Believe it or not," Mr. Florence said, "that note itself was marked 'Top Secret.'"

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Explosives cache mystery touches Detroit

The mystery that surrounds a huge explosives cache found last week in suburban Philadelphia spread to the Detroit area today with the disclosure that the man in whose home it was discovered recently worked for a Harper Woods firm.

The mystery man is George Fassnacht, 38, who lives in Fox Chase, a suburb of Philadelphia, but who had worked for the Norton International Corp., 20350 Vernier, Harper Woods, management and marketing consultants.

What Fassnacht did for this firm also is a mystery.

In fact, what Fassnacht does for a living is unknown to police. Detectives say he may be an international gun runner or an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

He travels a great deal — spending much time in Europe — but nobody will admit knowing what he does there and Fassnacht isn't talking.

What is known is that Fassnacht had a cache of explosives in his basement in Fox Chase so huge it could have blown a hole 90 feet deep and "as big as a football stadium," according to police there.

There were more than 200 guns — automatic and semiautomatic — mostly of foreign makes, thousands of rounds of ammunition, a variety of high explosives including plastic bombs, other types of bombs and rockets complete with warheads.

What also is known is that Fassnacht was located by Interpol, an international police agency, at the request of Philadelphia police. They found him in The Hague, Netherlands.

He flew home voluntarily yesterday and was arrested as he stepped from a jet at Philadelphia International Airport.

He was quickly arraigned before a Philadelphia magistrate on a charge of illegally possessing explosives and freed on \$2,500 bond.

Pretrial examination was set for Aug. 9.

Beyond saying that he worked for the Philadelphia police department in 1967, Fassnacht and his attorney had nothing to say.

After his arraignment, he refused to answer any questions dealing with his present employment or activities or about what he had been doing since 1967, whether he had worked for the CIA or where he had traveled.

He would not admit that explosives had been found in his home.

His attorney, A. Charles Peruto, said he refused to answer questions because the answers "have to do with national security and certain clearances have to be obtained first."

In Detroit, The Detroit News contacted the Norton International Corp. and a man who identified himself as Paul Van Hee, Norton president, came on the phone.

This conversation followed:

Q. Can you tell me what your company does?

A. We are management and marketing consultants.

Q. Is George Fassnacht there?

A. George Fassnacht doesn't work for the company anymore. He finished the job he was hired to do and, at the end of his job, his relationship with the company ended. That was the agreement.

Q. When did he leave the company?

A. I can't remember exactly.

Q. Do you mean last week or a year ago?

A. Fairly recently, a few weeks ago.

Q. What did he do for your company?

A. George did a satisfactory job for a year or so and then left. That was the agreement.

Q. Did his work deal with guns?

A. I see no point in going into his relationship with the company. I had absolutely no knowledge of what George did before he came with us or that he was a gun collector.

Q. Is your company a front for the CIA?

A. No, no, no, not at all.

Q. It would be very helpful if you could tell us what George Fassnacht did for your company and whether his work dealt with guns. Can't you give us this information?

A. I don't think it would be useful.

The firm could not be found in the Wayne County assumed names file, as required by law for all corporations.

In Philadelphia, not even Fassnacht's wife, Janet, seemed to know what her husband did for a living.

"I've no idea what he does," she said.

She said she visited him in Europe periodically for a month or so.

Philadelphia police said Fassnacht had been in Europe for the last three years but they didn't explain how they knew this.

So, how did he work for the Norton International Corp. in Harper Woods?

"Maybe he did the work in Europe," said a Philadelphia detective.

The cache of explosives was found by accident last week after two roach exterminators, Harry Brandt and John McGettigan, went to the home of two aunts of Mrs. Fassnacht near the Fassnacht's home in Fox Chase.

The aunts, Marie and Katherine Tobin, had been having trouble with insects.

While rummaging around in the basement of the Tobin home, Brandt and McGettigan came upon some dynamite and went to warn the women that they had dangerous explosives in their basement.

"Oh," one of the women said, "that stuff belongs to a friend. He brought it over here three years ago. We'll tell him to come and get it."

Nothing happened immediately but, as time went on, Brandt and McGettigan worried about the explosives. Finally, they notified police and detectives went to the Tobin home and found the dynamite.

The next step was to look in Fassnacht's home and there police found the cache.

"Any spark or any short circuit near this huge cache could have blown the whole thing sky high," a detective said.

Newsman were curious as to why Fassnacht was freed on such low bail — only \$2,500 — when he was charged with possessing such a huge cache of explosives.

Assistant District Attorney James Bryant said he agreed on the bail declaring "He's what I consider a man in danger of not showing up."

Peruto, Fassnacht's attorney, said the low bail was "commensurate with my client's background and with the charge against him."

Peruto claimed various government agencies were "leaking" information about Fassnacht for "their own aggrandizement" and are "making mountains out of molehills."

"My client is a man with a good reputation but in one week it has been smashed down to turn him into a man who is a menace," he said.

Fassnacht was in custody only about 45 minutes while he was arraigned, fingerprinted and questioned.

Police admitted that they had not taken Fassnacht's passport from him and that it is still valid.

E - 111,336

JUN 24 1971

Thursday
with
John Briggs



Last Train Out of Vietnam

THAT BIG blockbuster news story which Rep. Paul M. McCloskey, Jr., R-Calif., promised to break yesterday, concerning U.S. participation in the 1963 overthrow of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times instead.

Evidently Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, after stopping in Boston with his trunkful of documents to plant a story in the Boston Globe, feared there might be heat in Washington and decided to go on to Chicago instead of doubling back.

And in any case the hot news disclosed by the Sun-Times had been around for years. A column by Bob Considine on that aspect of South Vietnam is dated Oct. 11, 1966.

LOOKING BACK, the package offered by Diem appears an irresistible bargain today. Diem had been elected in a free election and had set up a constitution most Americans could live with. He was personally honest and had fought the Communists right down to the wire.

He pledged that he would not need U.S. troops or airmen after Dec. 31, 1965 if we'd leave our weapons behind. He felt it degrading and, in the long run, weakening for his country to be so dependent on outside aid.

Diem admittedly could be touchy and difficult. His sharp-tongued sister-in-law wasn't always an asset. An even greater handicap was the view, expressed with particular cogency, as Prof. John P. Roche reminds us, by David Halberstam in the New York Times, that the Diem regime wasn't "democratic."

THAT VIEW of the case tended to show the administration of America's first Roman Catholic President in the unfortunate light of backing a Catholic dictatorship which trod underfoot the rights of "minorities" such as the Buddhist group headed by Thich Tri Quang.

This, remember, was still in the early days, before U.S. newsmen, captured and held for ransom, had had a chance to sample Buddhist hospitality at first hand.

Whether or not it was the State Department, or the CIA, which actually planned and executed the coup d'etat against Diem, it seems beyond question that U.S. officials knew about it in advance. In the last hours of Diem's life, Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge urged him repeatedly by phone to seek asylum then and there in the U.S. Embassy.

DIEM REFUSED. He assured Lodge he would somehow find a way to break out of the net being woven around him by the Viet Cong, the Buddhists, the Kennedy Administration and the New York Times.

The takeover group gave Lodge their solemn assurance that Diem would be given safe passage out of the country. He wasn't given safe passage out of the room. Both he and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were gunned down. Mme. Nhu escaped only because she happened to be away on a lecture tour.

WITH DIEM'S downfall our last real hope of retrieving the situation in South Vietnam went down the drain. Thich Tri Quang resumed his costly mischief-making until, seven governments later, fellow-Buddhist Nguyen Cao Ky pulled the rug from under him.

There still remained just half a chance, however, and it was this to which Barry Goldwater tried to alert his fellow citizens in the 1964 campaign. It was then already known—and had been reported in the Allen-Goldsmith column and U.S. News and World Report, among other places—that the Russians were planning to install long-range rockets in North Vietnam which could hit U.S. bases from launching sites 200 miles away. Goldwater urged that we hit the Reds hard, with everything we had, before they had a chance to hit us even harder.

What Goldwater and other "extremists" of that time feared was what in fact took place—gradual escalation, always too little and too late, in the end tying up massive amounts of manpower and material and producing frightful casualties but without commensurate military results, never enough to administer the knockout blow, merely enough to stiffen the enemy's will to resist.

WILL THOSE who called Goldwater an "extremist" in 1964 have the grace to eat their words? It doesn't look so. Prof. Roche, an insider in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, already is pointing out that, even if President Johnson knew plans were being made to bomb North Vietnam as he criticized Goldwater's extremism, it didn't necessarily mean the plans would be carried out.

In others words, Goldwater is still an extremist, right or wrong.

That is the worst of being Cassandra. Even when you are right, you get flung off the Tarpeian Rock like everyone else.

So what else is new, McCloskey?

JUN 24 1971

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McNamara Lost Faith in Bombing

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WASHINGTON — Barely a year after the sustained U.S. bombing of North Vietnam began, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara had lost faith that it would achieve its objectives.

The Pentagon analyst who wrote a study entitled "The Air War in North Vietnam" said it was "a colossal misjudgment" to think that the bombing would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits.

Previously published portions of the Pentagon Papers revealed the planning that led up to the opening of the bombing campaign — code named Operation Rolling Thunder — in March, 1965.

New documents made available to Knight Newspapers trace in great detail McNamara's growing disillusionment with the policy he had recommended.

By the summer of 1966, a ferocious struggle had developed within the councils of government over the bombing.

The struggle pitted McNamara and many of his civilian advisers, often supported by the CIA, against the generals and admirals in the war zone and on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The military leaders consistently recommended more and heavier bombing, the documents show. Toward the end, in 1968, the chiefs, while conceding that the air raids had been ineffective, blamed it on political constraints that had prevented them from attacking key targets.

Just three weeks before President Johnson ordered a partial bombing halt and announced he would not seek re-election, on March 31, 1968, a memorandum from

the Joint Chiefs sought permission to attack Hanoi and the port of Haiphong.

McNamara, on the other hand, had been resisting the escalation of Rolling Thunder for nearly two years before the bombing halt, the report shows.

In January, 1966, when he first recommended Rolling Thunder to President Johnson, McNamara thought it would not have to last more than six months.

In July, 1965, realizing that the bombing was falling short of its goals, McNamara urged that the raids be stepped up and expanded to cover most of Vietnam.

Another Increase

In March, 1966, he proposed another step-up to take in North Vietnamese petroleum supplies.

This was "the last major escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary McNamara," the Pentagon analyst reports.

In October, 1966, McNamara returned from an inspection trip to Vietnam with a gloomy report to the President.

In a memorandum dated Oct. 14, he recommended a leveling off of the U.S. effort and an effort to find a diplomatic solution.

"Pulling back from his previous positions, he now recommended that the President level off the bombing at current levels and seek other means of achieving our objectives," the analyst said.

Electronic Barrier

Instead of escalating the bombing, McNamara suggested a billion dollar barrier be built across the northern border of South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail

The barrier fences, electronic sensors, mines, artillery, aircraft and troops would choke off the infiltration of men and supplies from the north, which the bombing had failed to achieve, McNamara felt.

In addition, McNamara recommended a reduction or pause in the bombing in an effort to get peace negotiations started.

The military leaders argued strongly against McNamara's approach.

A sharp dissenting memorandum signed by Gen. Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the chiefs "Do not concur in your recommendation that there should be no increase in level of bombing effort or that, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against North Vietnam."

Renewed Evidence

"Far from inducing negotiations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North Vietnamese leaders and our allies as renewed evidence of lack of U.S. determination to press the war to a successful conclusion," the chiefs argued.

"The bombing campaign is one of the two trump cards in the hands of the President (the other being the presence of U.S. troops in South Vietnam). It should not be given up without an end to NVN (North Vietnamese) aggression in SVN (South Vietnam)," the chiefs said.

McNamara won that round and the bombing was not escalated that fall. The struggle was resumed early in 1967. However, the President eventually yielded to military pressure to intensify Rolling Thunder.

Running Battle

The Pentagon analyst summarized it this way: "During the first seven months of 1967, a running battle was fought within the Johnson Administration between the advocates of a greatly expanded air campaign against Vietnam . . . and the disillusioned doves who urged relaxation, if not complete suspension of the bombing . . .

"The hawks of course were primarily the military, but in war time their power and influence with an incumbent administration is disproportionate."

"McNamara," the study went on, "led the attempt to de-escalate the bombing." The President and the State Department, it said, were "treading the uncertain middle ground."

The battle raged throughout the spring.

On May 19, 1967, McNamara gave Johnson a memorandum proposing, among other things, that the U.S. persuade the Saigon government, as soon as the September elections were over, to "seek a political settlement with the non-Communist members of the NLF (the Viet Cong-controlled National Liberation Front) — to explore a cease-fire and reach an accommodation with the non-Communist South Vietnamese, who are under the Viet Cong banner and, if necessary, to accept their individual participation in the national government."

The chiefs were in "ardent opposition to anything other than significant escalation to the war," the Pentagon analyst said. And the President did not accept McNamara's proposals.

"The JCS (Joint Chiefs) literally bombarded the secretary with memoranda" urging more rather than less bombing, the study says.

Gen. Wheeler, on May 24, said a partial or complete succession of air strikes would allow North Vietnam to recoup its losses, expand its stockpiles and continue to support the war from a sanctuary.

Wheeler compared McNamara's ideas to "an aerial Dien Bien Phu" referring to the famous defeat (of the French) at the hands of the Communists in 1954.

In June, Johnson rejected either escalation or de-escalation, but in August, under pressure from the military and the hawks in Congress he authorized a "selective intensification of the

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JUN 23 1971

How JFK and aides helped topple Diem

EXCLUSIVE

By Morton Kondracke and
Thomas B. Ross

Sun-Times Bureau

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WASHINGTON — The late President John F. Kennedy and his leading advisers were intimately involved in the maneuvering that led to the downfall of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, top-secret State Department and Pentagon documents revealed Tuesday.

The documents show that Kennedy decided at a National Security Council meeting on Sept. 17, 1963, to put "escalatory pressure" on Diem to get rid of his brother-in-law Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of the secret police.

The documents also recommended action against any Diem moves to counter his generals or negotiate with North Vietnam.

The NSC also recommended that Robert S. McNamara and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam.

They reported back on Oct. 2 and from that point, the documents indicate, there was a growing consensus at the top of the administration that it would not be possible to get rid of Nhu without also getting rid of Diem.

The coup came on Nov. 1, and Diem, who had been installed in power by the United States in 1954, was assassinated. The President and his leading advisers disavowed any connection with his bloody end. But two months earlier, Roger Hilsman, assistant secretary of state for the Far East, had recommended in an Aug. 30 memo to Sec. of State Dean Rusk:

"Unconditional surrender should be the terms for the Ngo family. . . . Diem should be treated as the generals wish."

The Aug. 30 memo and another by Hilsman dated Sept. 16 — both declassified by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 but until now tightly held — were turned over to The Sun-Times by the Citizens Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam.

The other documents are included in the top-secret Pentagon history of the war. They reveal a battle over Diem's fate, with the State Department urging his ouster and the Pentagon insisting that the United States stick with him.

One important voice raised for possible disengagement was that of the President's

brother, the late Robert F. Kennedy.

Hilsman's first memo, prepared for an Aug. 31 NSC meeting, warned that Diem might move to open "neutralization negotiations" with North Vietnam.

If North Vietnam threatened to intervene on Diem's side, Hilsman recommended, the United States should "let it be known unequivocally that we shall hit the DRV (North Vietnam) with all that is necessary to force it to desist."

If Diem chose to make a last stand — a "Gottterdammerung" (Twilight of the Gods) — Hilsman urged his superiors to "encourage the coup group to fight the battle to the end and to destroy the Palace if necessary to gain victory."

The Hilsman memos and the Pentagon documents illuminate a period of increasing U.S. dissatisfaction with Diem and his brother-in-law that began May 8 and ended with the Nov. 1 coup.

On May 8, government forces fired on Buddhist celebrators in Hue, and there ensued what became known as the Buddhist crisis, in which several priests and nuns burned themselves to death in the streets of major Vietnamese cities.

The self-immolations were reported throughout the world, bringing down increasing criticism on the Diem regime — and on the U.S. government for supporting it. The Buddhists became the rallying point for all non-Communist opposition to Diem and Nhu.

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28 JUN 1971

Diem Ouster Documents

Printed

The Chicago Sun-Times today disclosed two memos it said were written in 1963 by State Department aide Roger Hilsman outlining methods by which the United States could encourage and assist a coup against Ngo Dinh Diem, then president of South Vietnam.

The Sun-Times said it had obtained the State Department documents from the Citizens Commission of Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam. It said the documents had been declassified in 1963, but had been "tightly held" by the government.

The paper also said it has obtained some other documents derived from a secret Pentagon study of how the U.S. role in Vietnam escalated. It said the materials are similar to those obtained by the Boston Globe and Washington Post.

The Sun-Times story was written by Morton Kondracke and Thomas B. Ross.

The documents show that President John F. Kennedy decided at a National Security Council meeting in September 1963 to put "escalatory pressure" on Diem to get rid of his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, chief of the secret police, the paper said. The Hilsman memos were written just before that meeting, it said.

Neutralization Seen

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brother-in-law that began May 8 and ended with the Nov. 1 coup in which Diem and Nhu were assassinated.

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Pagodas Hit

On Aug. 21, nine days before Hilsman's first memo, government forces under the direction of Nhu and Diem attacked major Buddhist pagodas in Hue and Saigon, killing any monks who resisted.

Leading generals reported to U.S. officials that they feared Diem and Nhu might institute a purge within the military—and perhaps seek an accommodation with North Vietnam.

From the end of August until early October, the secret Pentagon study and Hilsman's second memo reveal, the United States struggled to decide how to keep Diem as president but get rid of Nhu, the paper reported.

Seek New Leaders

A conclusion of the Sept. 17 NSC meeting, for example, was that the best of all possible worlds would be for Diem to stay in power with Nhu out of the picture. After it was determined that Nhu's special forces and not the Army had been responsible for the attacks on the pagodas, the documents make it clear that there was unanimous agreement among Kennedy and his advisers that pressure should be applied on Diem to purge Nhu.

The documents indicate that it was also decided at the NSC meeting to identify and begin cultivating alternative leadership—believed to mean the generals.

The decision was made formal after two alternatives were debated at the Sept. 17 NSC meeting—"escalatory pressure" and "reconciliation," the latter

status quo under Diem and Nhu. The alternatives had been laid out the day before in Hilsman's second memo.

"My own judgment," Hilsman declared, "is that the 'reconciliation track' will not work. I think Nhu has already decided on an adventure. I think he feels that the progress already made in the war and the U.S. material on hand gives him freedom to launch on a course that has a minimum and a maximum goal."

"The minimum goal would be sharply to reduce the American presence . . . and to avoid any meaningful concessions that would go against his mandarin, 'personalist' vision of the future of Vietnam."

His "maximum goal, I would think, would be a deal with North Vietnam for a truce in the war, a complete removal of the U.S. presence and a 'neutralist' or 'Titoist' but still separate South Vietnam."

The "escalatory pressure" track, as it was explained at the Sept. 17 NSC meeting, called for the withdrawal of Agency for International Development support for the Diem regime, the removal of support for Nhu's CIA-backed Special Forces, and an order to Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge to remain aloof from Diem.

Provide Plane

Hilsman's Aug. 30 memo recommended that, if Diem chose to leave the country with his family as pressures against him grew, the United States provide him with a plane but only if he agreed to go to France or another European country.

Hilsman warned that Diem might appeal to French President Charles De Gaulle "for political support for neutralization of Vietnam." Hilsman urged resistance to any such arrangement, adding: "We should point out publicly that Vietnam cannot be effectively neutralized unless the Communists are removed from control of North Vietnam."

... started in South Vietnam, we can point to the obvious refusal of South Vietnam to accept a

STATINTL

'Vacuum Hoover'

STATINTL

Harriet Van Horne

There seems little doubt that one of the touchier issues of the '72 campaign will be, "When is the President going to set a withdrawal date for J. Edgar Hoover?"

With his splendid talent for riding with the hounds and hiding with the fox, it is expected that Mr. Nixon will seek to appease all factions. At the outset, he will make one thing perfectly clear: that he regards the 76-year-old FBI chief as a national treasure, so valuable that he may shortly be retired to a permanent niche in the National Gallery. But on the other hand, the President will state that Hoover is so vigorous and so vital to the nation's security that it would be an act of treason to remove him from office.

Remembering the rationale behind most presidential decisions one can imagine that the White House staff would regard the foregoing as ideal strategy. The President would be throwing a bone to everybody and fully satisfying nobody. What else can the White House do when there's no politically perfect solution? The President will be damned by the far right, the great stoneheads, if he fires Hoover and damned by the eggheads if he doesn't.

By now Mr. Nixon must also be aware that the young people of America are bitterly opposed to the ethics and techniques of the FBI. A popular button on many campuses this month says simply "Vacuum Hoover!"

But because the youth vote may tip the balance in the '72 election, the President may be forced to withdraw Hoover from combat before he withdraws our troops from Southeast Asia.

If Attorney General John Mitchell again serves as Mr. Nixon's campaign guide dog — sniffing the air with the keen nose that led him to Clement Haynsworth and Harrold Carswell — the President may be forced to solve the Hoover dilemma in some dramatic and unprecedented fashion.

For example: J. Edgar Hoover as honorary Vice President of the United States. A kind of

alter-Agnew, if you will. Or Hoover might become the first man to sit on the Supreme Court without the qualifying law degree.

Given the Administration's arbitrary approach to the Constitution, there's no limit to the worlds J. Edgar Hoover might still conquer. He could become proconsul in Saigon, replacing Thieu, Ky and the CIA. Thinking even higher, the President might appoint Hoover national racing commissioner. He'd soon have complete dossiers on every thoroughbred and drayhorse in America. Any bangtail with Trojan Horse potential would be hoofprinted and kept under surveillance.

The spiky question of J. Edgar's retirement was debated on the Public Broadcasting System's valuable program, "The Advocate." In the course of the hour, one ominous issue rarely faced up to was regarded with candor.

That is: How come Hoover wields so much power? The answer, according to several who testified on the program, is that the FBI chief has, with great cunning, made himself the most feared man in Washington by compiling secret dossiers on practically everybody. That much of the material in the dossiers is "garbage" — unevaluated hearsay, crank gossip and such — is beside the point.

There are many men in Washington — men of integrity and wisdom — who would like to see Hoover removed and his bureau purged of secret files. But many a good man has a youthful indiscretion in his background. If he lifts a hand against Hoover, he is immediately haunted by the question, "What has the FBI got on me?"

In truth, much that the FBI has may be totally false and totally irrelevant. Contrary to all laws — including the basic laws of decency — Hoover's men indulge in the lowest kind of spying. They look into man's bank account, tax returns and credit rating. (And nobody, ap-

parently, ever says "No — and get out of here!" to a snoopy FBI man.) They quiz neighbors and discharged employees. The FBI has weapons of intimidation that should be outlawed — and, in most cases, are — in a civilized society.

So great is Hoover's power that some Washington bureaucrats say he'll be in office — presumably stuffed — long after he's dead. If we are to believe his admirers, that possibility is many decades in the future.

Efrem Zimbalist Jr., the star of TV's FBI show, was asked on "The Advocate" how Hoover was feeling these days.

"Absolutely wonderful," he beamed, "Vigorous, dynamic. His annual physical checkup showed that he's in better physical condition than he's been since 1938."

Another defender, attorney Edward P. Morgan, said on the air that Hoover should be retained in office because he was such a "remarkable physical physical specimen."

So maybe we've been rash in our thinking. What we have at the head of the FBI is a biological miracle. By some magic he has reversed the normal process of aging. If he's more vigorous at 76 than he was at 33, shouldn't he now befriend to all mankind and divulge his secret?

This perfect health unto eternity suggests another possible job for Hoover, should the President ultimately bow to popular demand and retire him. That is, surgeon-general. Or maybe director of the National Institute of Health. Whatever that robust, ageless Hoover will continue to run it from atop his marble pedestal.

Ousted Saigon Leader Asserts He Clashed Often With Taylor

By HENRY GINIGER
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 16--Gen. Nguyen Khanh, who led the Government of South Vietnam and was commander of its armed forces in 1964, said here today that he was in constant conflict during that period with the United States Ambassador, Maxwell D. Taylor.

The Ambassador's reports on him and other South Vietnamese leaders form part of the data from a Pentagon study published earlier this week by The New York Times.

General Khanh, when apprised of the material published Monday, recounted in an interview his own version of the events that led to his virtual exile from South Vietnam in February, 1965. The general made it clear that the ouster had been brought about at the instigation of Ambassador Taylor after the general opposed bringing in more American troops, favoring instead a political agreement among the opposing Vietnamese forces.

Implies U. S. Intervention

When read the text of the message Ambassador Taylor's mission sent to Washington in August, 1964, warning of the possibility that the Khanh Government might not last beyond the end of the year, the military leader smiled and said:

"There were five coups against me. Coups cannot be carried out in Saigon without the intervention of certain persons."

General Khanh said he was against the "Americanization" of the war and felt a political settlement was possible only among the Vietnamese themselves.

Hinting that he had been in contact with the National Liberation Front — the Vietcong organization—he said that the organization had been ready to talk of a settlement "and still is."

He recalled that in a speech in February, 1965, he announced that peace was possible by the end of the year.

His ouster came a few days later and he indicated that he felt it had come about because of his attitude on these two points.

Another major conflict that apparently contributed to the ouster resulted from the action of the so-called "Young Turks" in dissolving the High National Council, an embryonic legislature. Ambassador Taylor berated

initiative, according to the account sent to Washington from Saigon on Dec. 24, 1964.

'But I Backed It'

"I did not instigate this action but I backed it," General Khanh recounted. "The council had gone beyond its attributions. How can one talk of a military coup when it was the army that had named the council in the first place?"

General Khanh recalled that he received a telegram saying that Ambassador Taylor, who had been a general in the United States Army, wished to see him at a certain time.

"He was convoking me as if he were MacArthur on occupation in Japan," the general said indignantly. "I told him that I would receive him."

According to the Khanh account, Ambassador Taylor, who was accompanied by Alexis Johnson, his deputy, demanded that General Khanh disavow his officers' action. The general refused, he recalled, and answered that he had agreed with what they had done. He said he had told Ambassador Taylor that he would no longer receive him.

"I told him that he might be a good general but was certainly a bad ambassador," the former South Vietnamese leader went on. "Later the Young Turks came to me crying with rage at the treatment they had gotten from Taylor."

Acknowledges Instability

The general also was indignant about references in the reports to intrigues by him and other generals. He acknowledged that the political situation in South Vietnam was not very stable then. General Khanh himself held a number of posts while exercising power. But the general said that some of the confusion had arisen from a lack of coherence in American policy.

"The State Department, the Pentagon and the C.I.A. were all working at cross purposes," he asserted. There was also some question in his mind as to where the decision-making center was, he said.

"Who's in charge, Washington or the embassy in Saigon?" I once asked MacNamara," General Khanh said, "he answered 'Washington'." The general indicated that he had not been convinced.

Sees Role for Himself

The general said he thought he could still play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, explaining that he had kept a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, explaining that he had kept some influence in the army. But he asserted that peace could not gain by the present Saigon Government.

"The present team," he said, "represents the Americanization of the war. It must go. It is very difficult to carry out Vietnamization with people who symbolize foreign intervention. It is very difficult for a Saigon Government to call itself national when there are foreign troops occupying the country."

When General Khanh was ousted from the army command early in 1965, he was sent abroad as roving ambassador. He settled in Paris in 1968 and now lives quietly in a house in suburban Chaville with his wife and five children.

He was dismissed from the army rolls after having been accused of taking unauthorized funds with him when he left Saigon. He denied that he had taken money not his own and insisted that to the contrary, Saigon owed him \$20,000, for funds he had spent on his mission. As far as he knows his diplomatic appointment was never terminated.

"On paper, I am still roving ambassador," he said.

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ORLANDO, FLA.

SENTINEL JUN 17 1971

M - 114,984

S - 148,907

Lyndon Johnson 'Didn't Level' With Americans About Vietnam

WAS CONGRESS tricked into passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964? Have the people been deceived about Vietnam?

Not all the facts are at hand. The Pentagon study ordered by Robert S. McNamara in 1967 is a jigsaw puzzle with some of the pieces not yet in place.

Nevertheless, the study points to extralegal if not illegal military actions by the administration.

And as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and chief executive of the nation at the time, Lyndon B. Johnson cannot sidestep responsibility.

* * *

IF WE'RE to believe the purloined documents now being printed by The New York Times, here is what happened before, during and after the key Aug. 7, 1964, resolution that triggered the bombing of North Vietnam and led to the buildup of U. S. ground forces:

Johnson and his closest intimates — Secretary of State Dean Rusk, assistant secretary William P. Bundy, Pentagon political officer John T. McNaughton, McNamara and others — devised a secret plan they called 34-A.

Plan 34-A included "clandestine" U.S. military attacks against North Vietnam, some by Thai pilots flying U.S. fighter bombers,

others by a dummy civilian air unit operated by the Central Intelligence Agency in planes flown by CIA pilots.

* * *

BOMBING AND strafing of the Communist north and of Red troops in Laos preceded and possibly helped provoke the attack by Hanoi's PT boats on two U. S. naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin.

The resolution presented to Congress had already been drafted; the "retaliatory" bombing targets were selected four months earlier, in May 1964.



Lyndon Johnson

Johnson said nothing about all this when he asked Congress to strengthen his hand by permitting the bombing of the north.

And unless the former president has some persuasive explanations in hand, he appears to have far exceeded the authority of his office, and to have hoodwinked the American people.

All the while Johnson, the biggest hawk of them all, was running as a dove candidate and trying to make GOP rival Barry Goldwater appear to be the trigger-happy one.

* * *

AS GOLDWATER pointed out in the wake of The Times disclosures, Johnson "didn't level with the people," although Goldwater added the people probably would have backed their president on Vietnam had they not been lied to.

What struck us about the report is that it vindicates the intelligence estimates as generally reliable and the advice of high military leaders as cautious and accurate. The villains of the piece seem to be Johnson and his highhanded and arrogant advisers.

* * *

NO WONDER LBJ decided against seeking reelection!

The nation should now rally behind President Richard M. Nixon, who has demonstrated his sincere interest in disengaging the United States and getting the GIs home.

It is indeed time to get out of Vietnam, but we must not be stampeded into acting so hastily as to endanger our troops or compromise the repatriation of our prisoners of war still held by Hanoi.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents accompanying the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam war, covering the opening of the sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam in the first half of 1965. Except where excerpting is indicated, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Letter From Rostow Favoring Commitment of Troops by U.S.

Personal letter from Walt W. Rostow, chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, to Secretary McNamara, Nov. 16, 1964, "Military Dispositions and Political Signals."

Following on our conversation of last night I am concerned that too much thought is being given to the actual damage we do in the North, not enough thought to the signal we wish to send.

The signal consists of three parts:

a) damage to the North is now to be inflicted because they are violating the 1954 and 1962 accords;

b) we are ready and able to go much further than our initial act of damage;

c) we are ready and able to meet any level of escalation they might mount in response, if they are so minded.

Four points follow.

1. I am convinced that we should not go forward into the next stage without a US ground force commitment of some kind:

a. The withdrawal of those ground forces could be a critically important part of our diplomatic bargaining position. Ground forces can sit during a conference more easily than we can maintain a series of mounting air and naval pressures.

b. We must make clear that counter escalation by the Communists will run directly into US strength on the ground; and, therefore the possibility of radically extending their position on the ground at the cost of air and naval damage alone, is ruled out.

c. There is a marginal possibility that in attacking the airfield they were thinking two moves ahead; namely, they might be planning a pre-emptive ground force response to an expected US retaliation for the Bien Hoa attack.

2. The first critical military action against North Vietnam should be designed merely to install the principle that they will, from the present forward, be vulnerable to retaliation in the north for continued violations of the 1954 and 1962 Accords. In other words, we would signal a shift from the prin-

spense. This means that the initial use of force in the north should be as limited and as unsanguinary as possible. It is the installation of the principle that we are initially interested in, not tit for tat.

3. But our force dispositions to accompany an initial retaliatory move against the north should send three further signals lucidly:

a. that we are putting in place a capacity subsequently to step up direct and naval pressure on the north, if that should be required;

b. that we are prepared to face down any form of escalation North Vietnam might mount on the ground; and

c. that we are putting forces into place to exact retaliation directly against Communist China, if Peiping should join in an escalatory response from Hanoi. The latter could take the form of increased aircraft on Formosa plus, perhaps, a carrier force sitting off China distinguished from the force in the South China Sea.

4. The launching of this track, almost certainly, will require the President to explain to our own people and to the world our intentions and objectives. This will also be perhaps the most persuasive form of communication with Ho and Mao. In addition, I am inclined to think the most direct communication we can mount (perhaps via Vientiane and Warsaw) is desirable, as opposed to the use of cut-outs. They should feel they now confront an LBJ who has made up his mind. Contrary to an anxiety expressed at an earlier stage, I believe it quite possible to communicate the limits as well as the seriousness of our intentions without raising seriously the fear in Hanoi that we intend at our initiative to attack immediately in the Red River Delta, in China, or seek any other objective than the re-installation of the 1954 and 1962 accords.

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Memorandum

Nov. 23, 1964
to the Chairman

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1. We
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appreciation of the view in Hanoi and
Peiping of the Southeast Asia problem.
I agree almost completely with SNIE
10-3-64 of October 9. Here are the critical passages:

"While they will seek to exploit and encourage the deteriorating situation in Saigon, they probably will avoid actions that would in their view unduly increase the chances of a major US response against North Vietnam (DRV) or Communist China. We are almost certain that both Hanoi and Peiping are anxious not to become involved in the kind of war in which the great weight of superior US weaponry could be brought against them. Even if Hanoi and Peiping estimated that the US would not use nuclear weapons against them, they could not be sure of this. . . .

"In the face of new US pressures against the DRV, further actions by Hanoi and Peiping would be based to a considerable extent on their estimate of US intentions, i.e., whether the US was actually determined to increase its pressures as necessary. Their estimates on this point are probably uncertain, but we believe that fear of provoking severe measures by the US would lead them to temper their responses with a good deal of caution. . . .

"If despite Communist efforts, the US attacks continued, Hanoi's leaders would have to ask themselves whether it was not better to suspend their support of Viet Cong military action rather than suffer the destruction of their major military facilities and the industrial sector of their economy. In the belief that the US has not decided to turn its favor in South Vietnam, they might

KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIETNAM

Following are texts of key documents from the Pentagon's history of the Vietnam war, covering events of August, 1964, to February, 1965, the period in which the bombing of North Vietnam was planned. Except where excerpting is specified, the documents are printed verbatim, with only unmistakable typographical errors corrected.

Rusk Cable to Embassy in Laos On Search and Rescue Flights

Cablegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the United States Embassy in Vientiane, Laos, Aug. 26, 1964. A copy of this message was sent to the Commander in Chief, Pacific.

We agree with your assessment of importance SAR operations that Air America pilots can play critically important role, and SAR efforts should not discriminate between rescuing Americans, Thais and Lao. You are also hereby granted as requested discretionary authority to use AA pilots in T-28's for SAR operations when you consider this indispensable rpt indispensable to success of operation and with understanding that you will seek advance Washington authorization wherever situation permits.

At same time, we believe time has come to review scope and control arrangements for T-28 operations extending into future. Such a review is especially indicated view fact that these operations more or less automatically impose demands for use of US personnel in SAR operations. Moreover, increased AA capability clearly means possibilities of loss somewhat increased, and each loss with accompanying SAR operations involves chance of escalation from one action to another in ways that may not

be desirable in wider picture. On other side, we naturally recognize T-28 operations are vital both for their military and psychological effects in Laos and as negotiating card in support of Souvanna's position. Request your view whether balance of above factors would call for some reduction in scale of operations and-or dropping of some of better-defended targets. (Possible extension T-28 operations to Panhandle would be separate issue and will be covered by septel.)

On central problem our understanding is that Thai pilots fly missions strictly controlled by your Air Command Center with [word illegible] in effective control, but that this not true of Lao pilots. We have impression latter not really under any kind of firm control.

Request your evaluation and recommendations as to future scope T-28 operations and your comments as to whether our impressions present control structure correct and whether steps could be taken to tighten this.

and that such preconditionference. Que: ritorial gains vided they c practice bro equilibrium no longer n Lao withdra tion to 14-n fact though curred to So is also touc to Butler (Souvanna a PDJ withdr evitably ins gains, and arrangemen present fa division. I were to be best be don

it might be used by Souvanna as bargaining counter in obtaining satisfaction on his other condition that he attend conference as head of Laotian Government. Remaining condition would be cease-fire. While under present conditions cease-fire might not be of net advantage

to Souvanna—we are thinking primarily of T-28 operations—Pathet Lao would no doubt insist on it. If so, Souvanna could press for effective ICC policing of cease-fire. Latter could be of importance in upcoming period.

3. Above is written with thought in mind that Polish proposals [one word illegible] effectively collapsed and that pressures continue for Geneva [word illegible] conference and will no doubt be intensified by current crisis brought on by DRV naval attacks. Conference on Laos might be useful safety valve for these generalized pressures while at same time providing some deterrent to escalation of hostilities on that part of the "front." We would insist that conference be limited to Laos and believe that it could in fact be so limited, if necessary by our withdrawing from the conference room if any other subject brought up, as we did in 1961-62. Side discussions on other topics could not be avoided but we see no great difficulty with this; venue for informal corridor discussion with PL, DRV, and Chicom could be valuable at this juncture.

4. In considering this course of action, key initial question is of course whether Souvanna himself is prepared to drop his withdrawal precondition and whether, if he did, he could maintain himself in power in Vientiane. We gather that answer to first question is probably yes but we are much more dubious about

Rusk Query to Vientiane Embassy On Desirability of Laos Cease-Fire

Cablegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the United States Embassy in Laos, Aug. 7, 1964. Copies were also sent, with a request for comment, to the American missions in London, Paris, Saigon, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Moscow, Phnompenh and Hong Kong, and to the Pacific command and the mission at the United Nations.

1. As pointed out in your 219, our objective in Laos is to stabilize the situation again, if possible within framework of the 1962 Geneva settlement. Essential to stabilization would be establishment of military equilibrium. Moreover, we have some concern

that recent RLG successes and reported low PL morale may lead to some escalation from Communist side, which we do not now wish to have to deal with.

2. Until now, Souvanna's and our position would require Pathet Lao withdrawal from areas seized in PDJ since May 15

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KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam December, 1968, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except where the documents are printed verbatim, typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate resources to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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tion substant-
tially in recent months. General Hark-
ins still hopes these areas may be made
reasonably secure by the latter half of
next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an
exception to the trend of Viet Cong suc-
cess may be provided by the possible
adherence to the government of the
Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which
total three million people and control
key areas along the Cambodian border.
The Hoa Hao have already made some
sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are
expected to do so at the end of this
month. However, it is not clear that
their influence will be more than neu-
tralized by these agreements, or that
they will in fact really pitch in on the
government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment
from North Vietnam continues using
(a) land corridors through Laos and
Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River water-
ways from Cambodia; (c) some possible
entry from the sea and the tip of the
Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500
Viet Cong cadres entered South Viet-
nam from Laos in the first nine months
of 1963. The Mekong route (and also
the possible sea entry) is apparently
used for heavier weapons and ammu-
nition and raw materials which have
been turning up in increasing numbers
in the south and of which we have
captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we re-
viewed in Saigon various plans pro-
viding for cross-border operations into
Laos. On the scale proposed, I am
quite clear that these would not be
politically acceptable or even militarily
feasible. We need to conduct an im-
mediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos
and Cambodian border, and this we are
preparing on an urgent basis.

1. Summary. The situation is very
disturbing. Current trends, unless re-
versed in the next 2-3 months, will lead
to neutralization at best and more likely
to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest
source of concern. It is indecisive and
drifting. Although Minh states that he,
rather than the Committee of Generals,
is making decisions, it is not clear that
this is actually so. In any event, neither
he nor the Committee are experienced
in political administration and so far
they show little talent for it. There is no
clear concept on how to re-shape or
conduct the strategic hamlet program;
the Province Chiefs, most of whom are
new and inexperienced, are receiving
little or no direction because the gen-
erals are so preoccupied with essentially
political affairs. A specific example of
the present situation is that General
[name illegible] is spending little or no
time commanding III Corps, which is in
the vital zone around Saigon and needs
full-time direction. I made these points
as strongly as possible to Minh, Don,
Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second
major weakness. It lacks leadership, has
been poorly informed, and is not work-
ing to a common plan. A recent example
of confusion has been conflicting USOM
and military recommendations both to
the Government of Vietnam and to
Washington on the size of the military
budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually
no official contact with Harkins. Lodge
sends in reports with major military
implications, without showing them to
Harkins, and does not show Harkins
important incoming traffic. My impres-
sion is that Lodge simply does not know
how to conduct a coordinated adminis-
tration. This has caused serious problems
to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

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DAILY WORLD
11 JUN 1977

2 rightwingers zapped badly in N.J. votes

NEWARK, June 10—Anthony (Tony) Imperiale, ultra-right leader in the North Ward, was dumped by the electorate of his home district this week in his bid for election to the Essex County Democratic Committee.

Joseph Ceres, 27, a political newcomer, won handily by almost three to one, over the self-styled law-and-order candidate, Imperiale, who, as a Republican, was unable to vote for himself.

In another election, in Plainfield, N.J., another right-winger went down to defeat. Former Green Beret Robert Marasco, who recently admitted killing a Vietnamese "spy" in a Vietnam CIA murder scandal, lost a four-man race for the Republican nomination to the City Council. Plainfield is his home town.

28 MAY 1971

Congressmen tag Ky as drug pusher

By TIM WIEBIELE

WASHINGTON, May 27—Two U.S. Congressmen revealed today that President Nixon's allies in Saigon, including vice-dictator Nguyen Cao Ky, are drug pushers who have hooked 30,000 to 40,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam on heroin.

Also implicated in the dope pushing racket is "Air America," the Central Intelligence Agency's air supply wing. The report declares that CIA planes have been used to fly dope into Vietnam.

Rep. Thomas E. Morgan, (D-Ill), and Rep. Robert H. Steele, (R-Conn), were the two Congressmen who released a 46-page report titled "The World Heroin Problem," at a press conference today.

The report contains findings of a 21-day trip the two took through Southeast Asia on which they found rampant drug addiction of "epidemic" proportions among U.S. troops.

They reported that drug pushers in Saigon "are so blatant that several attempts were made to sell heroin to members of the study mission as they walked the streets of Saigon accompanied by a uniformed member of the United States Army."

Withdrawal "only solution"

They warned that unless the "Allies" curb the soaring traffic in heroin "the only solution is to withdraw all American servicemen from Southeast Asia."

"We are not optimistic," they said, "that the government is either willing or able "to curb the drug traffic."

The report states that heroin is smuggled into Vietnam aboard aircraft of the Laotian and South Vietnamese air forces, and in rented and commercial aircraft.

"Heroin," it added, "has also been smuggled in Air America aircraft although there is no evidence that any official of the U.S. agency has ever been involved in the smuggling of heroin into South Vietnam."

"The U.S. agency," which the two House members found themselves unable to identify by name, is the CIA.

Both House members have been supporters of President Nixon's war policies, but today Rep. Steele told reporters, "The bleak prognosis is that thousands upon thousands of junkie Johnnys will come marching home hooked on heroin."

The report declares, "It is assumed by the U.S. military that this activity reaches high levels of command, to include politicians, both in Laos and in South Vietnam. In Thailand a former diplomat and member of one of the most respected Thai families is reputed to be one of the key figures in the opium, morphine base and heroin operations in that country and throughout southeast Asia.

"There have also been reports that Vice-President Ky is implicated in the current heroin traffic."

Deaths zooming

Drug addiction in some U.S. units in Vietnam has reached 25 percent, the report continues. Between August and December, 1970, 90 deaths were suspected to have been drug-related. Autopsies confirmed 59 were from heroin overdose.

Last January, the rate shot up: 17 for that month alone were drug deaths and in February it rose again to 19.

"Figures for March and April are not yet available, but if this trend continues, over 200 young Americans will die of heroin addiction in 1971," the report warns.

Most of the opium is grown in Laos, but the major exporter of the drug to Vietnam and the U.S. is Thailand, the staunchest anti-Communist ally of the U.S. in Southeast Asia.

Heroin from Thailand, says the report, "is smuggled to the U.S. by couriers on commercial or military aircraft. Some is mailed to the U.S. by U.S. military personnel using both commercial and military postal services."

The disastrous impact of this drug flow from Indochina to the U.S. is reflected in the estimated 250,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., the report states. One half of these are in New York City, where 1,154 persons died from drug overdose in 1970, and one half of these fatalities were below the age of 23. In the nation's capital, heroin addiction rose from 10,400 in 1970 to 15,830 at present, a 60 percent increase.

"Five years ago," the report says, "the heroin problem was restricted to the ghetto areas of our major cities. Now it is spreading to the suburbs and is found among the children of the wealthy and well-to-do as well as among the poor."

The report charges the U.S. military command supplied U.S. Saigon ambassador Ellsworth Bunker "with the names of high-ranking Vietnamese officials it suspects of involvement in the heroin trade." To date, Bunker has remained silent on the subject.

DENVER, COLO.
ROCKY MT. NEWS

MAY 24 1977
M - 192,279
S - 209,887

Drug charges anger S. Vietnamese

By PAUL VOGLE

London Express Writer

SAIGON -- South Vietnamese, officials and citizens alike, are incensed at the charges by two American congressmen that their officials are responsible for the current drug abuse epidemic among U.S. servicemen here.

The officials are angry because the two legislators, Rep. Robert H. Steele, R-Conn., a former CIA agent, and Rep. Morgan Murphy, D-Ill., revealed that the United States has threatened to cut off aid from Vietnam if the Saigon regime does not in turn cut off the supply of marijuana and opium to American GIs in South Vietnam.

They are further angered because they have begun a drug cleanup before the report of Steele and Murphy was publicized.

Furthermore, the government here even outlawed marijuana

three months ago for the first time in the nation's history. In addition more than 100 customs officials have been removed or reassigned in a move which the government claims was taken on its own initiative to solve the problem.

Three parliamentarians are involved in press reports that they helped smuggle drugs into the country. During the past week not a day has gone by without the authorities seizing sizable amounts of narcotics in the Saigon area itself.

To the man in the street the report by the two U.S. lawmakers is deplorable. Typical

of comments from street vendors, soldiers and taxi drivers is the one made by a South Vietnamese army captain in response to a query on the subject.

"We never had a problem until the Americans arrived. I have been in line units and in training centers for my army and have never seen it as a problem among the Republic of Vietnam army troops.

"They brought the problem with them and now they are blaming us Vietnamese. It (the drugs) has always been available here, but only a small minority of our discouraged people used it. If it had not been for the GIs we would have no problems."

South Vietnam's economy minister, Pham Kim Ngoc, is going on a tour this week which will take him to Cambodia and Washington.

STATINTL

Green Beret Claims Role In Plot to Oust Sihanouk

NORFOLK, Va., May 22 (AP)—A Green Beret officer says he took part in a secret mission in 1967 designed to aid in the overthrow of Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot reported in its Sunday editions.

Capt. John McCarthy, 28, who said today he will resign his Army commission in August, said the clandestine operation in Cambodia was directed from South Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agency, the paper reported.

The mission was known as "Operation Cherry," the paper said, and involved McCarthy, working under cover, and members of the Khmer Serai, a society of Cambodians working to oust Sihanouk.

The Pentagon today denied any knowledge of "Operation Cherry."

McCarthy served two years in a federal prison for the murder of a Cambodian mercenary before his conviction was overturned by a military court of appeals. Reached at home in Arizona Saturday, he



CAPT. JOHN MCCARTHY JR.
... alleges CIA operation

refused to elaborate on the newspaper article.

Asked if it was far-fetched to say Cambodians may have been hired for "Operation Cherry," McCarthy said, "No." But he refused further comment. He is now stationed at Ft. Huachuca, Ariz.

Sihanouk was ousted by a Cambodian army coup in March 1970, about a month before American South Vietnamese troops entered the country to hit Communist supply bases.

The U.S. government has consistently denied having anything to do with Sihanouk's downfall.

McCarthy said he is leaving the Army because the government had suppressed defense evidence at his trial.

"I have come to the conclusion that loyalty, silence and faith were to no avail," the Virginian-Pilot quoted him as saying.

19 MAY 1971

An Extraordinary Diary

Books

FORTY DAYS WITH THE ENEMY

By Richard Dudman
(Liveright, 182 pp., \$5.95)

Reviewed by Stanley Karnow

The reviewer, a Washington Post staff writer, is a fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government and the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University.

Richard Dudman, a lean, perceptive, honest reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, has written a lean, perceptive, honest account of an extraordinary experience—his captivity by the Communists in Cambodia. From its title to its epilogue, his book is refreshingly free of pretentious analyses and grandiose generalizations. And yet, more than all the academic studies and polemical treatises, it provides most profound insights into the nature of those "gooks" who have held the United States at bay in Indochina for years.

Dudman, Elizabeth Pond of the Christian Science Monitor and Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International were covering the Allied "Inursion" into Cambodia in the spring of 1970 when they found themselves out off in what, in the days of conventional wars, would have been called no-man's-land. They were lucky. The Vietcong guerrilla who pointed his AK-47 at them asked questions instead of shooting. And with that, they began 40 days of living and, above all, talking with the enemy.

By no means was it an easy experience. They were prisoners, not guests, who only gradually allayed the suspicion of the Communists that they were CIA agents. At the outset, they were forced to run a gauntlet of angry villagers and Dudman, recalling the massive execution of civilians in Hue during the 1969 Tet offensive, anticipated the same fate for himself and his colleagues. Later, the danger came from American helicopters and bomber aircraft above them as they moved from place to place with their captors.

As he relates these adventures, Dudman also describes the guerrillas who guarded and escorted the three American correspondents during their captivity. These guerrillas, he makes clear, are skilled professional soldiers. They are familiar with weapons and

plan their tactics carefully. They can identify U.S. aircraft and their flight patterns. They can move quickly through the jungle and, conforming to guerrilla warfare theories, they have cultivated peasant support so that they can navigate like "fish in water." Most significantly, Dudman submits, the Communist guerrillas displayed a kind of Boy Scout devotion to their cause.

The most articulate and highest-ranking of his captors, whom Dudman calls Anh Hai, was a "chubby-checked Vietnamese with gray brush-cut hair and an alert, intelligent expression." Hai's commentaries on the struggle against "oppression and colonialism" are standard Communist stereotypes. But the key to Hai—and to the other guerrillas Dudman encountered—is that he believes his rhetoric with an almost religious fervor. And he has lived by what he believes.

Starting as a 19-year-old peasant, Anh Hai had fought for a quarter-century—first against the Japanese, then against the French and now against the United States and its allies. Revolutionary nationalism had become his way of life and, more important, his faith. He could be duplicated in the thousands of Vietnamese Communists who show up in the "body counts" of enemy dead issued regularly by the U.S. Military Command in Saigon. But he is also somewhere among those thousands of enemy troops who keep fighting in defiance of the graphs and flip-charts and statistics that should have wiped out every Communist three times over.

In other words, a characteristic of the enemy that has eluded Americans is the intensity of his dedication. This is a characteristic that could not be "quantified" and so it was tragically ignored, especially by upper-echelon U.S. strategists. Apparently reluctant to seem subjective, Dudman understates this quality as he observed it in his Communist captors. Plainly, though, their conduct earned his respect.

Dudman emphasizes, too, that the Communists scrupulously avoided putting pressure on the three American journalists during their captivity. "We were never coerced or even asked to write or say anything we considered untrue, nor were we asked to sign anything formulated by anyone else," he states categorically.

This statement is worth underlining, since he and his colleagues have come under attack since their release by such commentators as Brig. Gen. S. L. A. Marshall. In his syndicated column last summer, Marshall seemed to question the patriotism of the three journalists for, among other things, regarding themselves as objective observers of their Communist captors. A U.S. reporter, Marshall asserted, must be "an American first, a correspondent second."

One of the weaknesses of American reporting from Indochina over the years has been the tendency of U.S. correspondents to operate according to Marshall's dictum—even though they would have vociferously denied doing so. Despite themselves, however, most U.S. journalists in Vietnam were compelled to function as Americans first, for the simple reason that they were almost totally depend-



Richard Dudman: "From its title to its epilogue, his book is refreshingly free of pretentious analyses and grandiose generalizations."

ent on the U.S. military and diplomatic establishment for transportation, lodging in the provinces and news. The number of American reporters with contacts inside the Saigon government was small. None was able to recount the war from the viewpoint of the enemy—except, of course, to rely on "captured documents." To a large extent, Dudman has been able to fill that gap. He is fortunate to be alive to do so.

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MAY 14 1971

Phoenix program cited

McCloskey charges U.S. Viet violations

By Richard L. Strout

Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey Jr. (R) of California charges that United States forces in Vietnam are systematically cooperating with South Vietnamese intelligence agencies in the so-called "Phoenix" (pacification) program which includes torture and assassination contrary to America's public professions under the Geneva conventions.

Mr. McCloskey, an ex-marine intends to running on an antiwar ticket against President Nixon, says he has written the latter five letters which have not been acknowledged. The latest specifically deals with his allegations of current, widespread atrocities in Vietnam.

The young first-term congressman traveled recently with Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D) of California to the war zones and comes back with specific photostated U.S. military documents which he charges contradict official declarations that U.S. bombings are not causing refugees to leave villages in war zones on a mass basis.

Mr. McCloskey's charges, which border on the sensational, obviously open up a new phase of his double effort, either to persuade President Nixon to accede to fixing a date for all-out U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, or, by organizing opposition in the Republican primaries, to nominate an antiwar candidate—himself.

Violations charged

Mr. McCloskey charges that the military and diplomatic officials who briefed him withheld pertinent facts or deliberately sought to deceive him and Representative Waldie. Also, that U.S. professions in a letter of Dec. 7, 1970, to the International Red Cross at Geneva by Ambassador Idar Rimestad, accepting as part of America's "residual responsibility" that of working with the Vietnam Government so as to safeguard civilian prisoners under Article 3 of the Geneva convention, are being systematically violated.

Mr. McCloskey previously put in the Congressional Record, April 22, by Mr. Waldie showing an elaborate

structure under Phoenix (native name, "Phung Hoang") to suppress subversion in so-called pacified areas. The rationale of the program as explained in Army manuals is that the Communist Viet Cong infrastructure is an "inherent part of the war effort" and hence illegal. The instruction manual issued to guide Army personnel says at one point (May 18, 1970):

"Thus they [U.S. troops] are specifically unauthorized to engage in assassinations. . . ."

At another point the instructions say that military personnel who find the type of police activities "repugnant" can be reassigned without prejudice.

Messrs. McCloskey and Waldie said they were astonished to discover that at the critical point in the interrogation process of native suspects brought in from Vietnamese villages, the job of collaborating with local Vietnamese officials passed from the regular military to U.S. civilians in the Central Intelligence Agency.

The so-called Province Interrogation Center is the most sensitive part of the Phoenix program. A U.S. Army manual explains that persons "reasonably believed to endanger the national security" are taken into custody, without normal judicial procedure. The U.S. manual explains that this "emergency political detention [is] necessitated by the need of the State to survive. There is no defined burden of proof as utilized by the courts."

At the province detention center the two congressmen discovered that arrested suspects are subject to interrogation which may last up to 45 days. They assert that the CIA operates the interrogation center under a cover title, "Pacification Security Coordination Division."

Guarded statement

Mr. McCloskey said it was widely reported, and that he believed, that South Vietnamese apply torture to secure confessions at these centers.

In a guarded statement, April 22, Mr. Waldie said that he got evidence in only one instance of "abuses"; the testimony of one American adviser that he had seen a blindfolded detainee being taken into an interrogator.

Mr. McCloskey told a reporter that a rubber house does not leave physical evidence after it is used. At another point the congressmen heard that a rubber hose had been found on the desk of the district intelligence officer.

As to bombing refugees, Mr. McCloskey charges that after being briefed at a six-hour official U.S. session to the effect that mass refugee evacuation is not due to U.S. bombing, he and Mr. Waldie talked independently through translators to representatives of eight villages. They predominantly testified that they had left home after it was destroyed by U.S. bombing.

Letters To The Editor

"The Vietnamese Could Settle Their War at the Ballot Box"

The "profound contradiction" that The Washington Post observes (editorial, "American Interest in Re-Electing President Thieu, April 23) between "Vietnamization" of the war and self-determination for the Vietnamese is precisely the reason the Vietnam Elections Project supports the resolution proposed by Senator Stevenson requiring the United States to cease support for the election efforts of any South Vietnamese political faction, and establishing a Congressional Commission to monitor U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese elections. Supporters of the Stevenson resolution—Senators Mansfield, McGovern, Hughes, Church, Kennedy, and Muskie, all leading spokesmen for rapid withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam—realize that withdrawal alone will not end this war.

Peace could come if the U.S. lets the Vietnamese people settle their war. Few Vietnamese believe that peace is possible without a government dedicated to seeking a compromise political arrangement. Popular election of Vietnamese leaders who reflect the overwhelming desire of the Vietnamese people for peace could bring this war to a rapid conclusion. Relatively fair elections could happen in Vietnam: in last year's Vietnamese Senatorial election a "peace" slate came in first.

Senators Stevenson and Church are urging public notice of some of the specifics of U.S. involvement in the Vietnamese election. For example, Stevenson has publicized a New York Times report (Feb. 2, 1971): "... national surveys of Vietnamese public opinion ... prepared and analyzed by the U.S. Mission ... are being used to assist President Thieu in his re-election efforts ..." Senator Church has investigated how the U.S. Information Agency—JUSPAO operation in Vietnam is "now engaged in a massive campaign," to sell the Thieu government to the Vietnamese electorate.

In April, 1971, both The Post and the Times reported the enormous investment of U.S. funds and advisory support in the South Vietnamese government's police apparatus—which is frequently used for the arrest and detention of the South Vietnamese non-Communist opposition. U.S. expenditures for the National Police alone have increased 25 per cent over 1970 to provide \$27.3 million for 1971—a figure which excludes the special police assistance funded by the CIA. Yet Vietnamese are convinced that Vietnam's prisons hold more non-Communist nationalist opponents of the regime than affiliates of the Communist National Liberation Front.

Official U.S. statements of exaggerated praise for Vietnam's military leaders—such as President Johnson's inflated praise of Nguyen Cao Ky at Honolulu in 1966 and President Nixon's statement that Nguyen Van Thieu was "one of the five or six greatest statesmen in the world today"—are bitterly resented by many Vietnamese

as evidence of U.S. political support for the Thieu government and its repression of opposition. Most Vietnamese feel powerless to affect their government. In Vietnam, newspapers are regularly closed down by the government. Non-Communist political associations are refused permission to organize. Non-Communist political leaders who oppose the current regime or propose a compromise peace are jailed, put in house confinement, or exiled.

The Post editorial correctly observes that the White House-appointed Commission which "observed" the 1967 Vietnamese election "gave the performance a clean bill of health," although most Vietnamese and many informed Americans believe the 1967 election was fundamentally fraudulent. It is precisely a repetition of this "performance" that the Stevenson resolution seeks to prevent. The 1967 commission of 22 dignitaries, who spoke no Vietnamese and were not supported by a Vietnamese-speaking staff, spent four days in Vietnam, seeing what the Vietnamese government and the Embassy-MACV good-news factory chose to show them. The commission's report was heavily influenced by commission chairman and former U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge, who described the elections as "wholesome." And President Thieu has invited new U.S. "observers" in 1971.

Certainly Senator Stevenson's proposal has dangers—the wrong commission members and staff could legitimize a fraudulent election. For this reason, Senator Stevenson takes care to state that "nothing" in his resolution "shall be construed as creating any commitment of military assistance" no matter what government is elected in October.

Important differences exist between the 1967 commission and Stevenson's. Concealing electoral fraud from the Stevenson Commission would be difficult. The Stevenson Commission would be composed of senators and representatives and would not be subject to White House control. It would employ a staff of Vietnamese-speaking specialists with knowledge and experience in reporting Vietnamese political affairs. Its staff would be in Vietnam months before the election, and would report to Congress regularly.

If this commission performs well, it could accomplish four things:

1. The presence of the commission staff in Vietnam would affirm to the Vietnamese the American desire for free elections stated in the Stevenson resolution, and it could encourage political participation of Vietnamese who seek a compromise peace. Many such politicians are now reluctant to risk political action because they believe that U.S. support makes the re-election of

2. The commission could monitor the activities of the official American community in Saigon and their possible involvement in the election campaign. The commission's ability to reveal possible U.S. support for a candidate or interest in the elections makes extensive U.S. involvement less likely.

3. The commission staff, and international attention to the Vietnamese electoral process, can thus reduce undetected electoral machinations. It cannot end irregularities altogether, but it can deter blatant disregard of basic rights of opposition candidates.

4. Finally, as Senator Stevenson notes, "by lessening the advantage which even the appearance of U.S. support gives to the existing regime, this resolution may encourage the present government of Vietnam to heed the desire of the people for peace and reconciliation. It could create the climate in which a negotiated settlement is possible, and in which all American forces could be withdrawn more quickly than might otherwise be possible."

What will the United States leave in Vietnam? A military dictatorship; fraudulent elections; an election campaign where opposition leaders cannot organize and speak and print their views openly — is this the objective for which so many Americans and Vietnamese have been killed and maimed?

If the U.S. refused to make resources available to the government of South Vietnam which could be diverted to the Thieu government's political campaign, imposing an undesired military government and an unwanted war on the Vietnamese people would be made difficult. If the U.S. actively opposed the subversion of the elections and made its position known in Vietnam, Vietnamese majority sentiments could not be successfully suppressed.

The Vietnam Elections Project urges The Washington Post to support the Stevenson resolution. Speedy passage is essential if Congress is to place the commission staff in Vietnam in time to do its job. This proposal could extricate the U.S. from Vietnam quagmire and leave behind the hope of something decent and honorable.

THEODORE JACQUENEY,

Coordinator, Vietnam Elections Project,

Washington.

At the same time, we are continuing our search for better methods of maximizing the receipt of farm income from the market. After all, some 60 percent of farm income comes from commodities that are not price supported and have not been supported in the past. Moreover, the major supported commodities are now selling well above loan levels. It seems to us that the brightest future for agriculture lies in actions that stimulate new energy in the market system.

As I think about the challenges that confront American agriculture, it occurs to me that farmers must by nature be incurable optimists. Like everyone else, they are concerned about the great questions of war and peace, about the economy and education and crime and all the other issues that face our society. But in addition, the agricultural community also has its own special problems to worry about, including such uncertain factors as the weather, the condition of volatile markets and even the direction of government policies in this country and abroad. Their vocation, moreover, requires them not only to be good farmers, but also to be good scientists, skilled engineers, and able businessmen.

All of these challenges have been successfully met by American farmers. In that process, they have achieved a remarkable record of production, setting a brisk pace for the rest of our economy. And they have also provided a continuing source of moral and spiritual strength, giving shape and substance to our national character.

I was reminded of the remarkable spirit of American agriculture the other day when I came upon an old map of the United States. And on this map, there was a huge blank area in the center of the country—stretching from the Rockies to the Appalachians—which was simply designated by the words "The Great American Desert." That area—what we now call the heartland of America—was an unproductive region until it was touched by the genius of the American farmer. But then—within a very short time—the land was changed. And the place which once was called "The Great American Desert" soon became known as "The Breadbasket of the World."

This miraculous transformation has been followed by further miracles. Each passing generation has seen a new agricultural revolution in America—and in recent years American farmers have helped to stimulate similar advances among farmers overseas.

And so we approach Salute to Agriculture Day in a spirit of gratitude and with a sense of obligation to the farmers of this country. Though only a small group of farm representatives will be with us at the White House next Friday night, I feel that every farmer and rancher in America, his wife and his family, will be with us in spirit.

What we will be saying on that occasion is simply this: Agriculture was our first industry. For most of our history it was our largest industry. And today it continues to hold an honored place in our society, a keystone not only for our economic strength but for our entire way of life.

TACTICS OF RADICAL DEMONSTRATORS

(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker, the tactics being engaged in by the radical demonstrators now operating in Washington are foreign to America, and I feel sure the American people roundly condemn them.

The attempts the radicals are making to shut down the Nation's Capital stand

in sharp contrast with the peaceful peace march of April 4, when upward of 175,000 persons made their point without infringing on the rights of others.

To try to block traffic and keep others from getting to their jobs is an action which cannot be tolerated. Such tactics are counter-productive.

I congratulate the authorities for handling the situation as skillfully as they have. Law-abiding citizens owe them a debt of gratitude.

HEARINGS FOR VIETNAM VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, on Friday, April 23, Congressman FINDLEY and I jointly chaired informal hearings at which members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War presented testimony.

These hearings were called when it became clear that the schedule of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Foreign Affairs Committee would prevent the subcommittee from continuing its hearings on the prisoner of war problem. On Tuesday, April 20, one member of the Vietnam Veterans had testified at those hearings but time had prevented further testimony from other members of the group.

Congressman FINDLEY and I, both members of that subcommittee, felt that members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War should have an opportunity to present their views to the Members of Congress. Accordingly, we arranged for informal hearings the following Friday and arranged for a transcript of those hearings to be made, not at public expense.

Mr. Speaker, both Congressman FINDLEY and I were most impressed by the demeanor and the sincerity of these men, all of who have served on active duty in Vietnam. Much of what they said will be, I am sure, of considerable interest to other Members of Congress and some of the charges they made are shocking and bear further investigation. I would like, therefore, to include the full transcript of these hearings in the Record at this point.

The transcript follows:

PROCEEDINGS

Mr. BINGHAM. Good morning. I'd like to open the proceedings because it is traditional to have a member of the majority party preside at hearings. But I want to explain that the hearing today is under joint chairmanship. Mr. Findley and I will be conducting the session jointly, and we hope to be joined by other members of Congress as this hearing proceeds.

I might just give a little background on this hearing today. On Tuesday afternoon, at a session of the subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which Mr. Findley and I are both members, testimony was presented having to do with the prisoner-of-war issue. The request was made at that time for an opportunity to continue with that hearing.

And so in order to give an opportunity for others to testify who had not had the

chance to speak at the hearing on Tuesday, we have set up this hearing on an informal basis. We will continue to hear witnesses whose names we have been given on the subject of the prisoners of war or other matters, stressing that we are particularly interested in practical information. We want this hearing to be as informative to us and to our colleagues as possible.

A transcript will be made of these proceedings and, as soon as it can be compiled, we will see that it is inserted in the Congressional Record.

We propose that each witness have eight minutes to make an initial statement, and then we'll keep our questioning within an eight minute period. It may not run that long. We would like to have each of you identify yourselves, your name and address, and also what your position was in Vietnam. We'd like for you to be as specific as possible about statements that you make, with dates and locations and so forth.

Mr. FINDLEY. I'd like to add that even though this is not a subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee the proceeding here today is undertaken with the knowledge and the approval of the Committee's leadership. The Chairman approved the use of this room for this purpose.

I'd also like to say that I would hope that witness would confine themselves to what they have observed first hand. We feel an obligation to make it possible for everybody who wishes to have an opportunity to speak.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Rottmann, you gave us some rather extensive and very provocative testimony on Tuesday. I understand that you want to make an opening statement.

LT. LARRY ROTTMANN

Lieutenant ROTTMANN. Yes, sir. I've been selected by the group to make just a short, opening statement on behalf of the group, at which time I will give my short bit of testimony.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would you again, for the record, state your full name and address and your affiliation.

Lieutenant ROTTMANN. Yes, my name is Larry Rottmann. I'm from Feres, New Mexico. I was a first lieutenant in the United States Army from Friday, August 13, 1965 until March 26, 1968. I am a full time volunteer veterans coordinator in New Mexico and Arizona.

I want to express on behalf of all the veterans here in Washington our deep gratitude to Mr. Bingham and Mr. Findley for allowing these hearings to take place and for helping us and assisting us when we testified the other day. It's most appreciated, this kind of reception.

We also appreciate the personal support and the visits of both gentlemen to our encampment. That's the kind of support that we think is very important and very relevant and we really believe in eyeball to eyeball contact, and there was a considerable amount of it at that time.

I would like to also on behalf of the veterans wish Mr. Bingham a happy birthday. I believe his birthday is tomorrow. He's 39, if the information I received is correct, and we also hope that with the birthday on the 24th for Mr. Bingham will come a new birthday for a new moral and political awareness and consciousness here on the Hill.

With that introduction I'll move directly into my testimony. And the first few people who will be testifying this morning will be talking directly to the question of military censorship and the way military news is manipulated, if it is agreeable with the Congressmen. This is to give you some idea of the scope of the problem of getting the correct and right amount of information to you. This will be the first three or four people. And then we'll move into a broader kind

SOUTH VIETNAM

The Tran Ngoc Chau Affair

In early 1970, the Thieu regime convicted a prominent South Vietnamese congressman, Tran Ngoc Chau, and jailed him. Technically, Chau's offense was having contact with a brother who was a North Vietnamese spy (despite the fact that Chau was trying to get his brother to defect to the South Vietnamese side). Actually, Chau's offense was that he challenged President Thieu politically.

There is nothing new in the persecution of political dissidents in South Vietnam. But there is something new in the American Embassy's virtual support for repression of a dynamic and effective anti-Communist leader of national stature, one who had worked closely with the Americans.

Judged by traditional American standards, the Chau case is an unhappy precedent in this period of American withdrawal from Vietnam. It suggests that going along with Thieu is more important than justice.

Chau is now in a cell in Saigon's Chi Hoa prison. There Thieu wants him to remain, and there he remains, despite two Supreme Court rulings to the contrary. A mandarin turned democrat; an idealist turned unsuccessful martyr; a former Viet Minh turned Diem loyalist turned disillusioned admirer of American virtues; a passionate nationalist; an honest, proud, stubborn, sentimental person, Chau is a quintessential—and forgotten—man in the middle.

In one sense the case of Deputy Chau is by now a dead issue. It is six months since the definitive Supreme Court ruling that Chau should be freed. And Chau continues to languish in Chi Hoa, unremembered. Even his bid for political martyrdom has fizzled. Yet the Chau affair does live on, for it effectively charts the evolving political landscape.

In brief, Chau was convicted and jailed not for being a former Viet Minh (which he was), or pro-Communist (which he was not), but for not informing on his brother, who Chau knew was a spy.

many South Vietnamese with brothers on "the other side," Deputy Chau was the one prosecuted because he crossed Nguyen Van Thieu politically—and because he was weak enough for Thieu to crush as an example to other, more powerful rivals.

Several legal and political issues arose in the course of the Chau affair as it stretched out over 1969 and 1970. The legal issues, as defined by the South Vietnamese Supreme Court, involved violation of Chau's parliamentary immunity; unconstitutional jurisdiction over a civilian case by a politically malleable, no-appeal military field court; and President Thieu's disregard of Supreme Court decisions.

Politically, the outcome of the Chau case confirmed, for the present, Thieu's supremacy in Saigon. But perhaps more significantly, it revealed the U.S. preference for stability over legality in South Vietnam.

Chau's rise

Characteristically, for he is an independent man, Tran Ngoc Chau quit the Viet Minh in 1949. By then he had become disenchanted with the Communist take-over of the Viet Minh resistance, and with Communist murder of competing nationalists. He began making a name for himself in the early 1960s, when he was appointed province chief of Kienhoa in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam. In this period, just prior to and after the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem, South Vietnam was in chaos, with the government losing one district and one battalion a week. Kienhoa had been a longtime Viet Minh-Viet Cong stronghold, yet Chau increased government control in the provinces from 15 percent to 57 percent of the population, according to a cautious American estimate at the time.

He did not accomplish this feat by military victories. Instead, he buttressed the existing leadership of the religious groups—Buddhist, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Catholic—as the only strong social structures apart from the South Vietnamese Army and the National Liberation Front. Simultaneously, Chau provided channels for the population to improve its lot. He allowed villagers to bring complaints directly to him, and then

acted immediately to rectify injustices. He experimented, too, with a prototype of what would become the Revolutionary Development cadres—the paramilitary defense, intelligence, and pacification workers in villages and hamlets.

His ideas caught on, and Revolutionary Development, funded and sponsored by the American CIA, was established as a national program. At the end of 1968, Chau was appointed national training director. (Contrary to some news reports, this job, plus the routine contact he had as a province chief, was Chau's only association with the CIA. He was never an American intelligence agent.)

At the training center Chau soon found himself in conflict with the powerful CIA. In vain Chau wished the Americans to be less obtrusive than they were. In vain he wished the RD village teams to emphasize redress of villagers' grievances rather than intelligence gathering. Within six months, the arguments became so acute that Chau resigned as director of training.

Not unnaturally, Chau's discontent with heavy-handed American influence in Vietnam, and with the government of the flamboyant Premier Ky, led him into politics. In 1967 he ran for deputy to the Lower House from Kienhoa, collecting one of the largest votes received by any elected deputy.

The future looked hopeful. Nguyen Van Thieu, with whom Chau had been friendly in earlier days when they were both junior army officers under Diem, had by now supplanted Nguyen Cao Ky as top man in Saigon. Chau expected improvements, and he counted himself basically pro-government.

Thieu and Chau began to fall out sometime during 1968. The Tet offensive and its aftermath prompted Chau to think about a political settlement to the war. Specifically, Chau was one of the first to suspect that the Tet offensive would prove to be the last straw for the United States, and he felt that Washington would henceforth try to disengage from Vietnam.

He believed that the United States would now be interested only in containing the military and political situation long enough to withdraw without the appearance of defeat. But he was convinced that the kind of short-

One for Thieu

There's a boomlet for the notion that it's not the US government but a new Saigon government that can get us out of Vietnam with minimum risk and least damage to American prestige. So we must make sure that this fall's elections in Vietnam are free, or perhaps tilted slightly to favor candidates who will, on taking office, negotiate with the North. Writing in *The New York Times* of April 20, Chester L. Cooper, formerly with the CIA and the White House and now director of the Institute for Defense Analyses, advances this view: "A highly motivated, popular, non-Communist successor to Thieu who would seek to end the fighting through bilateral negotiations or de facto arrangements would represent a truly 'Vietnamized' solution to the war." Mr. Cooper hopes that "Washington planners are examining the implications and consequences of this salubrious contingency." With the same thought in mind, four former AID officers who resigned their jobs in Vietnam have set up in Washington, DC, a "Vietnam Elections Project," the purpose of which is to persuade Congress to create a commission to monitor the elections, so that the "true" feelings of the Vietnamese people (for peace, not Thieu) can be expressed.

The intentions of these advocates are honorable—in principle, free elections are better than fraudulent elections—but they seem to us to be putting their money, or their hopes, on the wrong horse. How the US defines its national interests in Indochina is up to the US—not any government in Saigon. Moreover, the question of who runs South Vietnam has been answered for at least nine years by a series of power coups; "elections" have been and are likely to be no more than government-run plebiscites. We may like that fact or not like it, but our preference is irrelevant to the choice we must make. That choice is not whether Thieu would be better than Ky or Ky better than Big Minh or whether elections have been rigged or not, but when the United States will cut loose. An announced decision by Mr. Nixon to withdraw by a specified time, and completely, would not only set in motion the machinery for prompt release of POWs, but would quickly bring to a boil the real internal forces, both in the North and in the South, permitting some Vietnamese solution to be worked out. To debate what kind of an election we want, or which candidate is best, perpetuates our paralyzing preoccupation with Vietnamese politics.

Those Federal Sneaks

Harriet Van Horn

By instinct and tradition, Americans hate a sneak. Nobody is ever very surprised to learn that the words "sneak" and "snake" have descended to us from a single old Teutonic root "Sniken" — meaning to crawl or creep.

Given our instinct, — plus what's left of our traditions — the sweetest news this chilly spring is the sudden visibility of the whole creepy, crawly, shifty, shabby, underhanded apparatus of official U. S. sneakery.

"They sent forth spies, which should feign themselves just men," says the Bible. And our government has followed suit, especially in the feigning of just — or even rational — motives. There appears to be not only an FBI agent behind every mailbox but a frantically busy "Red squad" in every village and town.

The good folk whose bumper stickers implore you to "Support Your Local Police" are now finding the police supporting them. Local constabularies are now receiving special funds to recruit and pay secret informers.

But soon the informer may be running for cover. According to Frank Donner's splendid piece on surveillance in a recent New York Review of Books, the indignant citizens who pilfered the files of the FBI office in Media, Pa., will soon be relasing the names of FBI informers. That agent lurking behind your mailbox may shortly be lurking behind a palm tree in some banana republic, and glad of the job. Sneaks, when exposed, are rarely praised by neighbors for their gallant actions.

Incredible as it seems, no less than 20 federal agencies are now engaged in spying on all of us, including, one supposes, whole legions of spies who don't know they're being spied on. It could all be dismissed as a rollicking game — were it not so sinister.

The agencies now stuffing their data banks with thresome facts about you and me include: the FBI, the Army, the CIA, the Secret Service, Internal Revenue, the Intelligence Division of the Post Office, the Civil Service and the National Security Agency. In nine cases out of 10, such sur-

but it goes on and will continue to go on until little citizens demand that it be topped.

Considering the paranoia, not to say sheer lunacy, that prevails in this spy network, you would have to be blind and dumb and living in a hollow tree to escape being watched by a creature the FBI calls an "Informant" and decent people still call a sneak.

If you've led a busy, useful life and you've not made it to the Agitator Index, the Suspected Subversive File or the Persons of Interest List, well, you must be doing something wrong. And you are clearly remiss in one of your prime duties as a citizen, which is to give J. Edgar Hoover's agents something to do.

It isn't necessary to be a Black Panther or a peace marcher to be classed as "suspicious" by the FBI. "Political intelligence indiscriminately sweeps into its net the mild dissenters along with those drawn to violence," Donner tells us. "Thus peaceful, moderate, lawful organizations — from the NAACP to the Fellowship of Reconciliation — become intelligence targets on the theory that they are linked to communism or subversion."

Equating dissent with subversion has always been the custom of the radical right, and of all mindless reactionaries. To deny the right to dissent is to deny the need for social change. And that, of course, is what too many government agencies are as their highest duty.

One of the more distasteful aspects of the FBI's surveillance program is its corruption — no other word will do — of young students. Bureau agents now are authorized to recruit informers from junior colleges, youngsters 18 and 19. These junior agents are classed as PSI (Potential Security Informant) or PRI (Potential Racial Informer).

Time was when I thought we were living in a PPS (Potential Police State). Now I know it's simply a PS, and has been for some time.

Horrrifying as it is to realize how our free democratic society is being brought through the growing power of a domestic spy network, it is perhaps more abili-

ing to discover what the CIA is up to all around the world.

On television a few years ago, Sen. Wayne Morse blamed the "credibility charm" in American opinion on the evil work of the CIA. On the Dick Cavett Show we heard Capt. Robert Marasco of the Green Berets tell in detail how he murdered a "triple agent" in Vietnam. He committed this murder, he said, because the CIA had ordered him to do so. "But why?" persisted Cavett and guest Brian Boderd. "Because he was my agent," came the answer.

Capt. Marasco also charged in the course of this appalling interview, that the CIA had arranged the auto accident, that very nearly killed him last year. Why? Well, maybe because he was no longer their agent. And he knew too much. Could there be any more terrifying commentary on the state of the union in this year 1971?

CIA gets the Treaty

Thirty-five people marched and one rode horseback to Langley, Virginia, Wednesday to take the People's Peace Treaty to the CIA.

It had been arranged that a representative of CIA would come out to meet with the group if no attempt was made to enter the grounds or "touch" the fence. (It might be electrified, one of the demonstration coordinators said.)

The CIA made sure that it would have up to the minute information on the protest by sending at least 5 cars to drive back and forth past the Friends Meeting House in Langley where the small group was forming. A photographer was positioned on a hill overlooking the march route.

The demonstrators were stopped about a hundred feet from the gate. They stood quietly, holding a large NLF flag and an upside-down US flag until a man came out who identified himself as Joseph Goodwin, assistant to the director of the CIA.

Goodwin asked by one of the demonstrators (who said he was a former military intelligence agent) why an organization such as the CIA was needed in a "free society".

Goodwin suggested that this be taken up with the legislative and executive branches of the government.

Then the man from the CIA, the first US agency to become involved in Vietnam after the French left, and which is still a kind of leading edge of the American military and paramilitary actions against the Vietnamese people, stood stiffly and blank-faced while the People's Treaty was read aloud.

When asked if he would sign it he blankly intoned that he was "not authorized to sign a peace treaty." The demonstrators paid him no further attention and shortly he turned and walked back through the gate while the people's representatives moved up one by one to put their signatures to the treaty.

As they left, the marchers attempted to hand leaflets and copies of the treaty to CIA employees driving home. Few accepted them.

On May 3 and 4, North Virginia Mayday will engage in non-violent civil disobedience to block the Virginia side of the 14th St. bridge. People wanting information can reach them at 321-7790.

STATINTL

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Congress, furthermore, should be able to direct the President to bring hostilities in a particular theater to an end either immediately or within the confines of a specified schedule. Why should the power to declare or to recognize war not connote the power to call for the end of a conflict? The President has no inherent power to direct that a conflict be continued until it is "won"—in the sense that American objectives are fulfilled.

Nor would the presence of a treaty obligation inhibit Congress in the exercise of its authority. Treaties along with statutes are the "law of the land", but a treaty may be abrogated by legislative enactment.¹ The President may have the power to use military force to effectuate the obligations of an existing treaty, but his authority is clearly subject to legislative restriction.²

COMMANDER'S AUTHORITY IS NOT ALWAYS EXCLUSIVE

No war, declared or otherwise, may be maintained without Congressional support. There must be provision for men and materiel. Congress may necessarily use its appropriation power in the control of military involvements and commitments. It may say that certain funds are to be used for urban renewal rather than for armament, and the President must comply with the instruction. It may forbid the use of an appropriation for a particular item of materiel, and the President could not violate the instruction even though he thought it unwise. It follows that Congress may say in so many words that its appropriations are not to be used for operations in specified nations or for operations in a particular theater beyond a designated date.

The decision to make and to sustain declared or undeclared wars is one properly referable to the popular will and to the legislature as the agent of the popular will. The President may direct operations as commander in chief, and Congress may not ordain or establish a rival. The commander's authority, however, does not connote exclusive power to determine the extent and duration of operations.

A conclusion that this authority is lodged in the President free from legislative control is inconsistent with the nature of popular government, and a power so maintained in the face of Congressional inhibition could be challenged as illegitimate.

FOOTNOTES

¹ See, e.g., 50 App. U.S.C. § 462(b), prescribing a sentence of up to five years for burning or mutilating draft cards.

² This resolution, adopted August 7, 1964, because of information about attacks against attacks on American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, gave the President the authority "to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression".

³ The ultimate form of this proposal is embodied in the Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 and reads as follows: "[Federal funds are not to be used] to finance the introduction of United States ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisors to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."

⁴ The purpose of this proposal, which assumed several forms in the 91st Congress, was to set a date for the termination of the involvement of American forces in Vietnam.

⁵ *McCulloch v. Maryland*, 4 Wheat, 316 (1819).

⁶ The Federalist No. 69 (Hamilton) states that the Presidential power is less substantial than the power of the British Crown because it does not include the power to "declare war" or to "raise armies". The Federalist No. 71 (Hamilton) emphasizes the need for unitary command of operations, as justification for the power.

⁷ See CORWIN, *THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS* 200-211 (4th ed. 1957).

⁸ See 1 MORRISON AND COMMAGER, *THE*

GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 373-374, 383-389 (3d ed., New York, Oxford, 1942).

⁹ HARRING, *A HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA*, 420-432 (1961), 429-432 (Haiti), 461-466 (Nicaragua), 478-478 (Panama).

¹⁰ See *The Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated*, 540-542 (G.P.O., 1937).

¹¹ Corwin, *op. cit.* note 7, at 200-201. Congress declared that "by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States". Morrison and Commager, *op. cit.* Note 8, at 592.

¹² In the *Prize Cases*, 2 Black 635 (1863), the Court recognized a right of "prize and capture" appropriate under the laws of war, saying: "As a civil war is never publicly proclaimed, *ex nomine*, against insurgents, its actual existence is a fact in our domestic history which the court is bound to notice and to know." In *Texas v. White*, 7 Wall. 700 (1869), the Court held that Texas had never truly left the Union, and that the acts of its legislature in attempting secession were "absolutely null".

¹³ See 2 WARREN, *THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY* 485-487 (1929), *Case of Jefferson Davis*, 7 Fed. Cas. 63 (No. 3621d.). Davis was never brought to trial on the charges against him.

¹⁴ Corwin, *op. cit.* note 7, at 223-234.

¹⁵ There is merit in Mr. Deutsch's suggestion that a declaration of war may be omitted because Congress does not want to indicate total commitment. As to North Korea and North Vietnam, moreover, there are theoretical problems because the United States does not recognize the existence of either as a separate nation.

¹⁶ Corwin, *op. cit.* note 7, at 171, 184-193, 201-204.

¹⁷ *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1953). The Court gave substantial attention to the failure of Congress to include seizure authority in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, in spite of suggestions, and to the President's failure to make use of the methods provided in the act for avoiding strikes.

¹⁸ It has been suggested that the administration has made use of legalism and subterfuge in trying to assist the Cambodian government, while maintaining apparent compliance with the restrictions on American ground forces and advisers. See Dudman, *U.S. Deception in Cambodia*, St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 23, 1971, at 1-C. As to the use of American troops in Laos, see TRIM, February 22, 1971, page 24.

¹⁹ *The Constitution of the United States of America, Revised and Annotated* (G.P.O., 1963), at 470-473; *Whitney v. Robertson*, 124 U.S. 190 (1883).

²⁰ It is going too far to assert that the President is necessarily bound to use military force in support of another nation pursuant to a treaty obligation. Surely he has the authority to consider the situation as it is presented at the time decision is necessary. Might he not conclude that available forces are inadequate in view of other commitments, or that conditions had changed since the adoption of the treaty so that intervention would not be in the national interest, or that the use of force should be considered by Congress?

THE QUESTIONS OF MY LAI 4

HON. EDWIN B. FORSYTHE

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 23, 1971

Mr. FORSYTHE. Mr. Speaker, one of my constituents, Mr. Fred Jago, has given a great deal of thought—as have many

Americans—to the killings at My Lai and the sentencing of Lt. William Calley.

These tragic incidents have deepened the concern of many citizens of this Nation about the Indochina war and our role in it. Brought vividly to the attention of all Americans, they have shown the bloody waste that this war has brought.

Mr. Jago has written a well-documented statement concerning the Calley incident and the ravages of war. His statement follows:

THE QUESTIONS OF MY LAI 4

On 29 March 1971, a military court-martial found Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. guilty of the premeditated murder of 22 Vietnamese civilians on 16 March 1969 in an attack on the hamlet of My Lai 4. The verdict brings disgrace to the young officer and shame to our nation, our government, our army and our people. But more than that, the Calley trial has raised painful questions regarding the true and final responsibility for crimes of war.

As individual citizens or as a nation, we cannot condone what occurred at My Lai. But neither can we, in good conscience, permit just six superior officers to judge this as an isolated incident, the guilt and responsibility for which rests solely with Lieutenant Calley, when in fact the complete details and ultimate responsibility may never be justly determined.

War is the most repugnant act that mankind can inflict upon itself. It has spawned brutality and atrocities since the beginning of time, particularly with regard to innocent populations. Defenseless civilians have fallen prey to warring armies under the guise of reprisal for "aiding and abetting the enemy" or as object lessons for those who might be contemplating such aid. During the history of this great nation, our people and our government have contributed to or participated in many acts far more brutal than those for which Lieutenant Calley stands convicted.

Wholesale slaughter, for example, is no stranger to America. In 1637, while this country was still in its colonial childhood, Governor Vance sent orders from Boston that the Pequot Indians were to be exterminated. Captain John Mason, in obedience to these orders, attacked the Pequot fort at what is now Groton, Connecticut and annihilated over 1,000 men, women and children. Captain Mason was applauded for his efforts.

In July, 1675, it was customary for uniformed armies to face each other on a field of honor, fire back and forth, rank upon rank, until the defeated army retired. But a drastic change was in the making. The colonists were exposed to the tactics of the true guerilla. The Indian, much like the Viet Cong of our times, slipped in and out of the vast wilderness to attack when ever they felt they had the advantage, then melted away again. Colonists had been horrified by the brutality of these raids and a unit under Captain Samuel Mosely responded in kind. After a fierce engagement with the Wampanongs at Swansea, Massachusetts, a young lieutenant took the first Indian scalps of the war and sent the grisly trophies to Boston. Scalping and mutilation of the enemy soon became an accepted after-action occurrence.

After the defeat of Metacombet, son of the famed Massasoit, one Captain Benjamin Church ordered the chief beheaded and quartered. Metacombet's head was sent to Plymouth, where it was displayed on a gibbet for 20 years as a reminder to other tribes. A hand was sent to Boston, while the rest of the body was left to rot because the Plymouth authorities would not permit it to be buried. Far from being accused of any wrong doing, Captain Church was hailed as a military hero.

In 1779, the father of our country, George

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

APR 2 8 1977
M - 237,967
S - 566,377

BUD COLLINS

The expert...Mrs. Hicks

John Kerry has been getting entirely too much publicity, telling us what a burden it was slaughtering Vietnamese, and how it bothered — and still bothers—our gang over in Nam.

Fortunately one of our very own, none other than the Southeast Asia authority from South Boston—Louise Day Hicks—has just come back from Vietnam to rebut such nonsense as the weekend in Washington and the carryings-on of Kerry and other "negative activists."

As forthrightly refreshing as ever, she has returned from the VIP briefings in Saigon with new insights: "... the disgrace of this war is not in our being in Vietnam, but rather in those who oppose our boys while they are there."

Take that, John Kerry!

Thoroughly Modern Mrs. Hicks, taking a few days off from Congress to see what is really going on in Vietnam, developed the most up-to-date outlook on the situation since L. Baines Johnson. It was a worthwhile trip because, contrary to what you're heard, she is able to tell us that troop morale is high and most of the grunts "are convinced that the place to stop tyrannical Communist brutality is Vietnam and not America's shores."

Take that, Fulbright, McGovern, McCloskey and the rest of you "instant experts"! And look out — because Mrs. Hicks says the troops told her "they would take care of matters in Vietnam if I would take care of Congress with its instant experts."

This is the kind of straight talk we

Bud Collins is a Globe Staff columnist.



need to hear in the midst of all the peacemongering and chicken talk of withdrawal by people like John Kerry. It blended nicely with the statement the same day, Sunday, by two men dug up in Pleiku by the CIA or somebody else on our side. Introduced as North Vietnamese defectors, Bui Nogoc Chieu and Ha Xuan Phang, said there is an anti-war campaign "deep in the hearts and minds" of their countrymen. They said North Vietnam is tired of the war, and Ha Xuan Phang remarked that Hanoi government has a credibility gap between itself and the people.

Now wait a minute. Just because they've won the war are they supposed to be stealing our rhetoric, too? "Credibility Gap" is a copyrighted American knock, and if the North Vietnamese begin using it, that should make us mad enough to reescalate.

The war itself was not all that Mrs. Hicks puts in proper perspective. She learned why there is a GI drug problem: "American boys lean on drugs because they haven't been able to depend on support of people back home ... the task of defending freedom is never easy, but when this is compounded by nihilistic apathy at home, the boys turn to drugs to maintain their morale."

Take that, you nihilists!

In her role of congresswoman moonlighting as Asian troubleshooter, Mrs. Hicks has performed a valuable service to all of us—including Mr. Nixon, President moonlighting as Quaker. Neither will be swayed by the shrill cries of Kerry and the rest of the "negative activists."

As a reward for completing her mission successfully, I suggest the President appoint Mrs. Hicks ambassador to South Vietnam where she can deal with the problems first hand. All of us would sleep sounder with Louise in Saigon.

STATINTL

THE WAR COMES HOME



WE ARE
RIGHT SMACK
IN THE MIDDLE OF
A HEROIN EPIDEMIC

This lethal powder—the “white death”—has spread to all levels of American society, with the syringe becoming as much a part of suburbia as the Saturday afternoon barbecue. There are half a million addicts walking the streets right now. They will spend \$15 million today feeding their habit. They'll get more than half this money from crimes they'll commit in the big cities. One of every four of these addicts is a teenager, and for the 18-35 age group, heroin overdoses have become a major cause of death.

This is terrifying. But it isn't news. Every time you turn on the TV or pick up the newspaper you hear about heroin. Senators rise regularly to read grim statistics into the Congressional Record. President Nixon himself has spoken somberly about the way heroin is stalking our streets with “pandemic virulence.”

But all this talk isn't going to change things. Neither is sending Henry Kissinger to Turkey to see what can be done about the Middle East opium field. And the President probably knows it. The heroin problem is going to get worse, with more young people becoming addicted and dying, until the U.S. gets out of Southeast Asia. Heroin and the War are connected with a horrible symbiosis.

In its May issue, Ramparts magazine tells the shocking story of the New Opium War:

- how clandestine CIA involvement in the parapolitics of Southeast Asia has allowed this area to produce 80% of the world's opium, replacing the Middle East as the major source of heroin.
- how a U.S.-sponsored network of anti-communists—Meo tribesmen in Laos, nationalist Chinese guerrillas and Burmese border police—participate in the opium harvest, in its processing into heroin and transportation to checkpoints throughout Indochina and finally to the U.S.
- how the major figures in South Vietnam's government—from Diem and Madame Nhu in the past to Nguyen Cao Ky today—have profited from the heroin traffic with tacit American support.
- how Saigon has become a major stop along this new heroin route, with up to 20% of some American GI platoons coming home addicts and at least one soldier a day dying from overdoses.

“The New Opium War” is another example of how the war comes home, wrapped in lies and distortions and ringing chaos with it. It is also another page in Ramparts coverage of the ever-deepening U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. We began in 1966 (before opposition to the war was fashionable) with the expose of the joint efforts of Michigan State University and the CIA to set up the Diem regime. We will continue until the killing is over.

25 April 1971

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Are S. Viets Ready?

STATINTL

"We just need a little more time to train them better," is a U.S. advisers reply.

QUANG TRI, Vietnam — It was just another day and another job for the jeep driver, who had driven the major up the dusty, winding road from Quang Tri to meet the congressmen at the fire support base near the DMZ.

The jeep driver was from North Carolina and bored with the Army, but he liked the look of Vietnam better than he had thought he would ("It's kinda like the hills of eastern Kentucky," he said) and he knew there were worse jobs than driving a jeep.

"It isn't much of a place to celebrate your birthday, but I'm glad to be alive," said the jeep driver, a Spec. 4 named Jackson Wright who will be 21 on May 7. "You'd be surprised at the number of guys who don't come back."

WRIGHT'S counterpart in age and rank is Nguyen Than Nhat, a 21-year-old staff sergeant in the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) who killed two Viet Cong while protecting a supply center on March 7.

Nhat is an interpreter by trade and was only four years old when his family came down from the north in the great refugee exodus of 1954. He was married seven months ago and is not eager for a frontline post.

"I don't want to fight," he says. "But I've got to kill the Communists or they will kill me."

The issue is personal for Nhat, not ideological. He had friends who were killed in cold blood during the Tet uprising in 1968 and he has seen the pictures of the victims massacred by the Viet Cong at Hue.

The kill-or-be-killed attitude which he expresses is

Pioneer Press Washington Bureau reporter Lou Cannon recently visited Vietnam and Laos in the company of two antiwar congressmen, Reps. Paul McCloskey, R-Calif., and Jerome Waldie, D-Calif.

By LOU CANNON

Pioneer Press Washington Bureau
(FIRST OF A SERIES OF THREE ARTICLES)

the legacy of a generation of warfare in Vietnam, and it is expressed almost casually by both sides.

ONCE UPON A TIME, perhaps as recently as the mid-Sixties, opinion surveys in Vietnam showed that a minority of the population was strongly committed either for or against the Communists.

That situation has markedly changed now, in the view of an experienced foreign service officer who has spent nearly a decade in the country and speaks fluent Vietnamese.

While this officer is generally sympathetic to the American intervention, he points out that one result has been to create military and civilian officials at district, province, village and hamlet levels who are intimately involved with the American effort. Most Vietnamese and many Americans, including the foreign service officer, believe that these officials will be marked for extinction if the Hanoi regime prevails.

On the other side, Communists are clearly marked for indefinite imprisonment, if not extinction, by the South Vietnamese government.

The controversial Phung Hoang (Phoenix)

program set up by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for wiping out the Viet Cong shadow government may or may not be an improvement over its Vietnamese predecessors. But it clearly provides the framework — as Rep. Jerome Waldie pointed out after an investigation here — for widescale political repression after the Americans withdrew.

NO AMERICAN at any level whom I talked to in five northern provinces or in Saigon expressed the slightest doubt that the United States was on the path to total withdrawal, although opinions vary as widely on the timing of withdrawal as they do at home.

More interestingly, no one in any extended conversation seemed to have a firm idea of what would happen when the United States does withdraw, though enlisted men and lower level officers are decidedly more pessimistic than the Saigon brass about the success of Vietnamization.

"The South Vietnamese can do it," says George Jacobson, the No. 2 U.S. civilian adviser in Vietnam. "We just need a little more time to train

Out in the provinces, however, many of the ci-

vilians cautiously express a viewpoint closer to that of war critic McCloskey, who asked Jacobson at the same briefing: "If the South Vietnamese troops are as good as you say they are, why can't we leave?"

It is the view of some of the lower level advisers, none of whom are anxious to be quoted about it, that the ARVN and the local regional and people's forces are better than they ever have been before but still are not good enough to withstand the North Vietnamese Army.

"The North Vietnamese are the heirs to this country's revolutionary tradition and will never give up," explains one adviser. "It's questionable whether the South Vietnamese have a will to fight that matches their training, and if they don't there's not much we can do about it."

THIS LACK of confidence by American military men in their South Vietnamese allies is reciprocated by an increasing unwillingness of some local leaders to accept U.S. advice.

"The Vietnamese don't seek our advice anymore than (Chicago) Mayor Daley would ask the advice of a visiting Frenchman," complained a military district adviser in one northern province.

The adviser, however, is encouraged by this tendency, for he views it as a sign that the Vietnamese, at last, may be coming to a realization that the United States is leaving whether they like it or not.

The Pioneer Press: The American Effort and Lam Sou.

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The nature of U.S. imperialism

*"THE ENEMY: What Every American
Should Know About Imperialism,"*
by Felix Greene, Random House, 1971,
\$8.95 (Vintage paperback, \$1.95).

In "The Enemy," the well-known English writer and filmmaker, Felix Greene, makes an almost surgical dissection of the anatomy of imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism, its aims and methods. He also has some original things to say about its cure—amputation by revolution.

Written with a complete absence of jargon, but calling things by their right names, Greene has produced a very readable, highly instructive book for the non-specialist, one which the "specialist" will have great difficulty in refuting; a book that should be a "must" for lecturers and discussion groups.

A point which he hammers away at is that U.S. imperialism—as British imperialism in its day—is as brutal an exploiter, as inveterate an enemy of its own people as those it oppresses and exploits overseas, even if the methods used are different. He shows convincingly that everything in America from erosion to pollution to bad housing and racism and every ill in between, springs from U.S. imperialism as the highest form of capitalism.

It is perhaps fitting that I am writing this review from Peoples China. Greene notes in his "Personal Preface" that twice in his life he had been "deeply shaken" in his personal and political thinking:

"The first time was when I went to China in 1957. As a writer and journalist I thought I was fairly well informed about the world, that I had a reasonably good idea of what was going on in China. I found when I arrived there that I had merely accepted the prevailing Western view and the supposed horrors of its communist rule. . . . I was appalled both at the extent of my ignorance and to realize how Western-bound my thinking had been. . . ." The second time he was "deeply shaken" was after he started digging into the material for the present book. "I 'assumed' I knew about imperialism. . . . But it was only while doing the reading and detailed research for this book that the full implications of imperialism struck home. . . ."

"Face of capitalism"

A brief preliminary section deals with "The Face of Capitalism"—and an ugly face it is, as Greene presents it. The ruthless destruction of natural resources in the greedy search for profits; hundreds of millions of acres of cropland from which the topsoil has disappeared forever (Greene points out that it took nature from 300 to 1000 years to create one inch of topsoil in which plantlife can live); of 2 million acres of giant redwoods along the Pacific Coast, with three hundred thousand acres left; 85% of wild life and 80% of forests killed off; almost every river and lake polluted and facing the fate of Lake Erie, "now almost without fish life due to the huge quantities of sewage dumped into it from Detroit and other cities."

As for medical care after 25 years of "unparalleled prosperity," Greene produces evidence that: (1) Half of all U.S. children under 15 have never visited a dentist; (2) 11 million children between

attention; (3) two million children have untreated hearing defects; (4) Nearly 3 million children have untreated speech disorders; (5) Untreated emotional disturbances affect some 4,600,000 children; (6) 2 million children have untreated orthopedic problems.

I read this section one evening after having visited the Huang Ku K'ang Peoples Commune, about 15 miles southwest of Peking, comprising 7000 households and 34,000 people. The head of the Revolutionary Committee which manages the Commune told me that members had planted 3 million trees. He showed me the canal that members had dug towards the outskirts of Peking from where they diverted treated sewage waste to fertilize their fields. The entire sewage waste from Peking and other cities was used this way, I learned. We visited the Commune's 25-bed hospital with two women doctors trained in Western-style medicine in charge, but assisted by another 200 "barefoot doctors," with a knowledge of traditional Chinese medicine, topped off by an intensive short-training course in diagnosis and treatment of common ailments. They served commune members through clinics attached to each of the 11 production brigades or in the members' own homes. The slightest ailment of any of the 34,000 received instant treatment.

Small wonder that China was a catalyst for Greene during his six visits, after living 30 years in the United States. In China, especially since Chairman Mao's line won out in the Cultural Revolution, the slogan "Serve The People" is the guideline for the whole country. It is still an extremely poor country by any Western standards, but what there is is shared equally and people are moving ahead together. The emphasis is on "us and ours" and not on "me and mine." That this is a universal attitude is one of the major gains of the Cultural Revolution. The present generation makes conscious sacrifices for the future. To permit erosion, or not to fight against pollution, is considered an impermissible crime against future generations, against the country's patrimony.


In tracing the history of British imperialism, Greene points out that to create the empire over which "the sun never set," Britain fought 28 colonial wars between 1814 and 1906. "There were only 15 years in that century when Britain was not engaged in some bloody military struggle," he points out. "So much for 'Pax Britannica!'"

The United States went in for imperialism for the same reason as the British. Productive capacity, in accordance with the law of surplus value, exceeded the purchasing power of the home market. Outside markets were needed. Cheap sources of raw materials were needed; cheap labor power also. Above all, surplus capital, swelling the bank accounts from the surplus value sweated out of the hides of American workers, brought greater profits, "super-profits" when invested abroad on terms which an imperialist power could dictate. The export of capital, that most lucrative of all exports, could be indulged in without physical possession of the target countries.

With professional skill and in great detail, Greene traces the process. "Colonialism is not the only form of imperialism" he

24 APR 1971

STATINTL



CIA Approves War Protest on Langley Grounds

A northern Virginia anti-war group has been given permission to demonstrate on the grounds of the Central Intelligence Agency next Wednesday.

Richard Pollock, a spokesman for Northern Virginia Mayday, said the demonstration is planned to protest the CIA's "chief role in the execution of American genocidal and biocidal missions in Southeast Asia."

CIA has given Northern Virginia Mayday authority to demonstrate on a selected section of its physical grounds in Langley, Va., Pollock said. Demonstrators will leaflet cars entering and leaving the grounds.

Plans call for them to rally at the Quaker meeting house, 6410 Georgetown Pike at 2 P.M. before shifting to the demonstration site at 3:30 P.M.

Dinner Club which delivers a dinner to her every weekday at noon. She likes the food and eats well. Mrs. Burkard is quite concerned about the discontinuance of this service.

XI. Mr. and Mrs. August Sparing live in their own home, they are in their 80's. Mrs. Sparing suffered a cracked pelvis recently and can not move without using a walker. Mr. Sparing is ill and quite feeble. They are afraid that the meals will be discontinued, each feels that the one good meal a day is the only thing they really have to look forward to each day.

XII. Emma is 79 years old, a permanent fixture of downtown Helena. Every one knows and loves her. She has never had a Social Security card, she lives in an old shack with no water or indoor plumbing. Emma walked in for dinner one day shortly after we started the dinner club. She enjoyed the meals and the games, she goes to the Drop-in Center because she enjoys the people and warmth. Last year she was missed for two days from the drop-in center and daily dinner club. Everyone was concerned when we couldn't locate her at home. At that time we were having a blizzard with weather below 30° and 54 inches of snow. She has a habit of walking out to the cemetery—Her story was soon told on radio and television and the Lewis and Clark Search and Rescue Unit decided to hunt the drifts along the roadside. Her neighbor went to the store and heard all the commotion about Emma. She said Emma was in bed at her home for she had come to her three nights before with a bad fever. She had no radio or television so she had not heard of our concern. We forget many of our Senior Citizens do not have radio's or televisions. We feel we have made Helena more aware of what can happen to a person living alone in our city.

XIII. When this program first started we did an intensive house to house survey to invite the older people to come. We found Henry, 96 years old living on the third floor of an old railroad rooming house. He had a small gas heated stove to cook from. The first year he didn't miss a day, he walked down and seemed interested in everyone. He had a bad cough in the winter and it was hard for him to eat, so we got him to the doctor. With the daily meals he functioned very well. One day we missed him at dinner and an aide went to check on him. He had fallen, he is almost blind. He was taken to the hospital then to a convalescent home. He had made many friends so had many visitors. He died last fall, he had found friends who cared through the dinner club.

XIV. We still have Nellie on our take out list. She has a meal everyday, she lives alone in a low income apartment house in downtown Helena. One day when the aide took a meal to her, she found her on the floor cold and very hurt. An ambulance was called and she was taken to a hospital with a broken hip. She remembers falling and doesn't know if she was there more than one night, but she knew that the aide would be there with the noon meal on Monday. She is out of the hospital and enjoys her meal very much.

XV. Mary Faucette lives in back of her upholstery shop and was very self supporting. One day a meal was taken to her and she didn't answer the aides knock, but the aide could see Mary on the bed. Finally the aide got in to find Mary unconscious. She had taken an overdose of pills. After she got out of the hospital she was fine for a few months. One day the aide found her on the floor, she said she had been there since the evening before. She broke her arm and hip, but is back at home with a nurse that comes in once a week and a homemaker from Welfare. Mary is in her own home now and we take her meals in as we did before.

XVI. Goldie lives in an old apartment house. She has a lovely apartment inside, she had a small stove and no refrigerator so she didn't eat correctly. She used a cane and could hardly get around, but she had been a

lady of means and had nothing left when her husband died. She collected her Social Security and sat in her apartment with her leg getting worse with arthritis. We took in her meals and soon talked her in to trying to get out and come to the dinner club. She did this and soon threw away her cane. She heard of the Foster Grandparent Program and started working again. She never missed a day and has been able to make enough to bring her up to living standards. She is happy and healthy and joins in with all the Senior programs that she can.

XVII. A month ago one of the Urban Renewal workers came into the City Annex Dinner Club and told us he had found an elderly lady in a room across the street, she had moved back into an apartment that had been condemned. She was sick in bed and had arthritis in her legs, also no food or heat. We take her dinners and one aide takes her meals on the weekends. She talked someone into putting in a gas heater and hot plate to cook on. We hope to get her moved into a better place, but she says she wants to be close to the action. She says she will come to dinner soon. She is up now and can use her crutches.

XVIII. Mae was found when we first started taking meals in. She is an Indian lady that owned a little restaurant in Boulder, Montana. She became ill and the doctor diagnosed it as diabetes and advised her to watch her diet. She disregarded the doctor's advice. She lost one leg and was in the hospital long enough to use up the money from the sale of her business, home and car. When she came out of the hospital, she was put on welfare and watched closely by her doctor to see that she ate correctly. She was old enough to get social security.

She lived in a run-down low-income apartment. Eventually she lost her other leg, and became dependent on others. We often got her out of the apartment in the wheel chair, down to the daily dinner club where she could enjoy the people and dinners. She enjoys playing cards and got along fine for a while, but within the next four months she lost an eye and this made it difficult to do any fancy work, read or watch television. Mae moved from one apartment to another as each one was too hard for her to get around.

One move she made she had to have furniture and through the Director and the VISTA enough living room and bedroom furniture was found so she could be comfortable. In the past three months Mae has moved to Stewart Homes, a low-income housing project, where she has a ramp for her wheel chair and she hopes to be able to enjoy the lawns, trees and being out of doors.

She is on welfare and gets food stamps, but this is not enough for her to buy fresh fruits, vegetables, meat, etc., so she can maintain her diabetic diet. We have been delivering her meals free for the past two years trying to help her be on her own.

COMMUNITY SERVICES COUNCIL, SALT LAKE AREA.

Salt Lake City, Utah, April 9, 1971.
Senator CHARLES H. PERCY,
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The Title IV nutrition project being conducted in Salt Lake City, Utah, makes use of the public school cafeteria facilities for serving noon meals to the elderly.

Two hundred fifty-one persons participate in the program in an average month. Last year 526 individuals were served during the year.

We are presently working with the Salt Lake City School District and the Salt Lake County Department of Social Services to determine the means for continuing the program upon termination of federal funding. No workable solution has been arrived at to date.

If the project is not continued, there will be many lost souls who have come to depend on the program, not only for meals, but also for the social contact and the educational and enrichment activities provided after lunch in the schools. We know that many of the older people would simply sit at home until personally urged to join another senior citizens' group and be provided with transportation. No other program for the elderly in this area emphasizes the nutritional aspect as does this Project.

Cordially,

FREDERICK E. KEEFER,
Director, Adult Nutrition Activity Program.

SOUTH COUNTY SENIOR CENTER, INC.,
Edmonds, Wash., April 6, 1971.
Senator CHARLES H. PERCY,
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: Your active interest in the problems of the retired person is appreciated not only by myself and the senior citizens I represent, but by the others who attended the NCOA meeting last week.

I attended your press conference at the Statler-Hilton because I knew hot lunch and nutritional programs were to be emphasized. I have directed the South County hot lunch and health services program funded by O.E.O. through the Emergency Food and Medical Services for the past two years. This program is due to be eliminated this year.

I concur with the intention of the administration that Title IV Research and Demonstration monies and Emergency Food and Medical monies were not to be considered on-going programs and a cut in both funding levels is to be expected.

My point now is that both programs served their purpose well in bringing to light the crying need and absolute value of such hot meal services. Efforts should be directed towards the establishment of an on-going meals program with funding that does not diminish or run out with time.

My next point refers to the added importance of a hot meal program as it becomes a part of a total multi-purpose concept, such as I have demonstrated in my Center. Direct health services, health and nutrition education, employment services, transportation assistance, information and referral, continuing educational opportunities, outreach services to those confined to home, utilization of senior citizen talent for service to the community, social and recreational opportunities are all components of a broad picture in which each program enhances the other and increases the value to the senior citizen.

The 600 lunches we serve per week throughout the County reach both rural and urban areas. I have found no better way to encourage the lonely, isolated poor and deprived senior citizens to avail themselves of help than through an invitation to share a hot meal with others. They soon participate in these other programs which are available and friends are made and life once more becomes enjoyable and meaningful instead of the previous day-to-day lack-luster existence.

I hope and pray that the importance of nutrition and health programs for senior citizens is recognized and that we will see the implementation of new programs. With your efforts involved I know that a greater potential of possibilities will exist.

Sincerely,

(Mrs.) SALLY WREN,
Director.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, no episode in our Vietnam experience more clearly illustrates the emptiness of our claim to be supporting self-determination

April 22, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—Extensions of Remarks

The National Secretaries' Association—International—in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce originated the idea for Secretaries Week. The theme again will be, "Better Secretaries Mean Better Business."

Special committees are established throughout NSA to formulate programs to make Secretaries Week ever more meaningful to secretaries and to the business community. In keeping with the professional objective of the association, chapters of NSA sponsor special educational activities such as seminars, workshops, and study groups available to members and nonmembers alike. Additional recognition is gained for the secretarial profession during the week through public appearances of NSA members at meetings of civic, educational, and professional groups, as well as through open meetings for all secretaries.

This then, for the 20th consecutive year, is Secretaries Week. Nineteen hundred and seventy-one—a time for secretaries to look back on past accomplishments and ahead to future progress.

TWO POEMS BY MARILYN KRANTZ

HON. JOSHUA EILBERG

OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 21, 1971

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, the poet's role frequently is to give expression to those sentiments many of us share, but with a style, precision, and talent for language that many of us do not command.

Mrs. Marilyn Krantz, who is the editor of the Northeast and Feltonville Weekly which serves part of my northeast Philadelphia district, is such a gifted poet.

Her poem "Not on a Silver Platter" describes what it has taken to build that tiny but indomitable state, Israel, on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean. The poem has been widely read in Philadelphia-area synagogues and before meetings of Philadelphia organizations. Mrs. Krantz says that she hopes the poem expresses Israel's worthiness of our continued support and the continued respect of peoples and nations all over the world. I think it does.

A second poem by Mrs. Krantz, "John F. Kennedy . . . His Message to the World," evokes the memory of our fallen President and acknowledges this Nation and this people's continuing debt to him. This poem won first prize in the poetry contest of the Philadelphia Regional Writers' Conference in June 1964.

With the unanimous consent of my colleagues, I place these two poems on the Record:

NOT ON A SILVER PLATTER
(By Marilyn Krantz)

Israel was not handed over
On a silver platter,
Yet isn't this the truth of all
Things that really matter?

The State of Israel has come
To the Jewish nation
On a platter beset with both
Sorrow and Elation.

Not one ounce of silver's in it,
Nor a single drop of gold,
Yet its value (beyond measure)
Only History can unfold.

It is made of fallen heroes . . .
Of wives' and mothers' tears . . .
Of the Maccabean spirit
Which dates back two thousand years . . .

Of a People's dauntless struggle
To uphold man's dignity . . .
Of willingness to live or die
For Peace, as the need may be . . .

Of moral strength and courage
Voiced in songs both sad and gay . . .
Of stubborn perseverance
Shining forth 'mid skies of gray.

It's blend of countless heartbreaks
And endless hours of toil . . .
Of blood and sweat, prayers and sighs,
All mingled with the soil . . .

Of many busy, vital hands
Moving in harmony:
Planning, working, building the land,
Fighting to keep it free . . .

Molded, too, from that same spirit
Which gave birth to Herzl's notion
Of a Jewish homeland—
And engraved with God's devotion.

No, Israel was not handed over
On a silver platter,
Yet isn't this the truth of all
Things that really matter!

JOHN F. KENNEDY . . . HIS MESSAGE TO THE
WORLD

He stood erect, with youthful smile—
Wise far beyond his years;
His words instilled in young and old
The strength to conquer fears.

He gave his heart and soul to aid
Mankind in time of strife,
And then, as if 'twas not enough,
He gave his only life!

Whisked from our arms, he left his mark
Upon the Nation's heart;
Heaven wept, also—tears and rain
Could scarce be told apart.

Of what great magnitude, his love,
That from lands far-and-wide
Came leaders, shedding differences
To stand, bowed, side by side!

All grieved alike, despite their creed
Or color of their skin;
He proved in death, his theme in life:
That all men are akin.

His voice, through stilled, can yet be heard
In freedom's vibrant song,
Echoing hope's eternal plea
That Right shall conquer Wrong.

For, like the sun which disappears
Behind the clouds at night,
Great men are never really gone
But only out of sight.

THE REVEREND FATHER JOSEPH F.
THORNING

HON. GOODLOE E. BYRON

OF MARYLAND

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 21, 1971

Mr. BYRON. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the House of Representatives on the occasion of Pan American Day was honored to be led in prayer by one of the most distinguished constituents of Maryland's Sixth District, the Reverend Father Joseph F. Thorning, of St. Joseph's-on-Carrollton Manor, Md. This marked

the 28th annual appearance of Father Thorning before the House on Pan American Day.

Father Thorning, known as the Padre of the Americas, has been a personal friend for many years as well as a friend of both my parents. Father Thorning is one of America's eminent scholars in Latin American affairs and is known throughout the hemisphere and in Europe for his efforts on behalf of brotherhood and international understanding in the Americas. I commend his efforts as an example that others should try to emulate. I personally hope that he will return each year for many years to join the House of Representatives in marking Pan American Day.

VIETNAM

SPEECH OF

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 20, 1971

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rooney of New York). Under previous order of the House the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE) is recognized for 60 minutes.

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous material.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, during the Easter vacation my colleague from California, PAUL McCloskey, and I visited Vietnam and visited Laos, and a series of reports will be forthcoming from that visit. Tonight will be the first report, involving a program that is a part of Vietnamization, as is apparently the case, a program designed, in my view, to suppress political dissent in that country at a time when the war is over, as well as the program that is presently in existence in Vietnam during this war period. It is a program that is called the Phung Hoang program, otherwise known as the Phoenix program.

My first introduction to the program occurred upon the initial briefing that was provided Congressman McCloskey and I in Saigon by the CORDS people.

At that time they were giving what they called "neutralization" figures. They reported that in Military Region One in 1971 we had "neutralized" 5,380 members of the Vietcong infrastructure and political dissenters in that country.

The breakdown of the neutralization figures is as follows: "Kills," 2,000. They are obviously "neutralized," the briefing officer said, when they are killed. I suspect that is a fair assessment.

Rallied, 17,000. These are the Chieu Hoi ralliers to the flag of South Vietnam, as they become "neutralized" when they rally.

Sentenced, 1,680. These are people that were sentenced to more than 1 year for their offenses as being identified as part of the Vietcong infrastructure.

Captured, 4,000 people. These are not considered to be "neutralized" because they received sentences of less than 1 year and were not determined to be a

HONOLULU, H.I.

ADVERTISER

APR 23 1971

M - 70,135-

Vietnam 'alternatives'

More reasonable relations with China may now be one of the United States' hopeful foreign policy goals, but our continuing dilemma remains Vietnam.

For more than a decade the U.S. has suffered from a tendency to delude itself over what is possible and likely in that country.

Although most Americans are weary and want to end our involvement, there remain differences in outlook of those on the scene. Articles on this page by two correspondents—one a veteran hawk and the other younger and less positive—make the point.

AT ANY RATE, it's obvious that even under the most optimistically dovish timetable for getting out, American forces will be in South Vietnam in strength through this year. It could be much longer.

That gives special importance to South Vietnam's upcoming presidential election in October; it will pick the government the U.S. will continue to back.

For varying reasons, most observers feel that President Nguyen Van Thieu is certain to be re-elected, barring some unexpected basic change in conditions such as a military coup.

BUT AT THE same time there's a lot of concern over how the election is carried out. And with good reason because past presidential elections in South Vietnam have ranged from subtle setups to mockeries of "democracy."

Rep. Paul (Pete) McCloskey, the California Republican who is challenging President Nixon, made a couple of points about the present situation when he returned over the weekend from a fact-finding trip to Indochina. He charged:

• That through a priority U.S. program called "Phoenix," the Central Intelligence Agency plays a key role in the "preventive detention" of thousands of political prisoners who hold views contrary to those of President Thieu and the Saigon government. Presumably, McCloskey means there are many non-Communists among them.

• That the U.S. program in South Vietnam includes a "classification attitudinal survey" in which the results of a poll among 1,000 South Vietnamese a month are given only to President Thieu for political purposes.

Similar charges have been made by others, including a group of Vietnamese-speaking former American advisers who Friday opened a campaign in Washington to require "neutrality" in the coming South Vietnam Assembly election in August and the presidential contest in October.

Said a spokesman: "The South Vietnamese people believe that the coming elections will be a fraud, and that a considerable reason for that fraud will be American support for a military government. We don't think they (the South Vietnamese people) by any means favor the National Liberation Front, but they favor peace in an open and honest election."

THIS SEEMS to be the motivation behind a U.S. Senate resolution offered by Senator Adlai Stevenson III and others. They want Congress to set up safeguards, including a commission of its own members, to insure U.S. neutrality and free choice for the Vietnamese people.

That may have some attractions for concerned Americans. But it also has its dangers, including the possibility of more American self-delusion. For there are serious doubts whether "free elections" in the sense we know them are likely or possible in South Vietnam.

Four years ago other American observers went out to give their stamp of approval to elections others felt were superficially clean but clearly controlled towards a Thieu victory.

A critical congressional group might now do a better job. But in a system where Thieu appoints the province chiefs, perhaps the most powerful men in Vietnam, and the military pervades all, it's doubtful how much any Washington group could see, much less do. That's even assuming the CIA and others were truly neutral.

THERE IS A good debate whether such concepts as "self determination" and "a democratic alternative" really are viable in South Vietnam today, any more than they have been in the past.

It is unpleasant if Americans are involved in helping engineer Thieu's reelection. But it might be even more cynical if we certified voting where the results were as pre-ordained as Mayor Daley's victory in Chicago.

It may be comforting for some to talk about having the South Vietnamese people make democratic choices; some future day they may. But that is not how the outcome of this war will be decided when the various sides decide to do so.

For the U.S., the best of poor alternatives at this point is to leave at the end of the year and let the Vietnamese settle a war that we have prolonged to nobody's advantage.

PROVIDENCE, R.I.

JOURNAL

APR 20 1971

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

Activist Sees Antiwar Rise In S. Vietnam

A young activist, allegedly expelled from South Vietnam by the Central Intelligence Agency last fall for her antiwar activities, told an audience at the University of Rhode Island yesterday that opposition to the war is growing in that country.

Cynthia Fredricks told about 75 students at URI that when she was a student at the University of Saigon three years ago, the war seemed remote to Saigon citizens. However, she said, when she returned to Vietnam last fall after a three-year absence, students, workers, professional people and Vietnamese war veterans had begun speaking against the war.

She said that last June 40,000 workers held an antiwar demonstration in Saigon.

Miss Fredricks said the Vietnamese became more aware of the physical destruction of the war when they saw American planes bombing South Vietnam to save the country from communism.

No Business Like What Business?

By RUSSELL BAKER

OBSERVER

About midnight several days ago, a man appeared on the television screen in the cellar of our house to tell about a killing he had committed. Everybody else in the house had gone to bed. I mention this because the odd aspect of this whole business, looking back on it, was one watcher's personal reaction to this midnight of television and, in order to convey any sense at all of the peculiarity of the thing, I have to give you a glimpse of my personal situation.

Everybody else, then, was in bed. What is curious is that it never occurred to me to race upstairs and rouse anyone. Here was a man going on in great detail right there in our cellar about this killing he had performed, yet it seemed no more worth disturbing the house for than if it had another Phyllis Diller appearance.

It was the Dick Cavett show and it had begun, as usual, with Dick's monologue, and a promise of pleasant anesthesia as Dick read off the cast of show-biz people on hand to plug their various enterprises.

Brian Bedford came first. He is in a play in New York and seemed agreeable. Agreeability is a virtue at midnight in the cellar, at least in our house, and since there is too little of it, Brian was a welcome guest.

He and Dick kept smiling, even through one rocky passage about a suicide. One felt headache and reality slinking off in defeat; one sensed the settling of the facial muscles into a fixed, fatigued smile. That smile, the cat could have told you, was a smile seen only on the best midnights down in that cellar, a smile that said, "All is, for this brief moment, right with the world."

Brian and Dick paused while several brief films were run. Most of them argued that this or that spot on the body gave off unpleasant odors and showed expensive aerosol sprays which would make the offending flesh smell like a chemistry lab. It was ridiculous stuff but amusing in a dumb way.

Then Dick was back with his next guest. He introduced Capt. Bob Marasco. The audience applauded. Down in our cellar, the pleased smile may have shown a trace of frown. Captain Marasco? The name was vaguely familiar. Was it somebody who had just made a new Andy Warhol movie?

It was not. Dick said that Captain Marasco, who lived in Bloomfield, N.J., was a former Green Beret officer who had been charged by the Army some

time ago with murdering a Vietnamese man and then discharged from the service after the murder charge had been dropped.

A few days before his guest appearance with Dick, Bob had told The New York Times that he had, in fact, killed the Vietnamese in question, who he said was a triple espionage agent. Dick quickly filled in his audience on this background, and Bob, who had a lot of poise on camera, began to tell about the killing.

In the opening phase, I did not listen so much as I looked. That is the norm when you get a new personality on the talk shows. Bob appeared to be a tall, broad-shouldered, athletic young man. His clothing style was mod without being odd. "Carefully groomed" would be the cliché. A careful man, a methodical man. Perhaps even a finicky, fastidious man when it came to details. Very neat in his habits one would guess. A good worker.

Bob's account of the killing seemed to bear this out. He answered Dick's questions with details which a less fastidious man might have glossed over in his recitation. Yes, Bob said, Dick was right: two shots in the fellow's head. Of course, he had been pumped full of morphine before the shooting, which made it as humanitarian as you could possibly make something as awkward as killing a man, Bob volunteered.

Dick looked slightly aghast and held up a shampoo. Brief films were shown to sell consumer goods. This was not too dull, this talk with Bob. Would Dick cut it short to bring on Patsy Kelly, who was playing in "No, No, Nanette"?

Gosh, all the talk shows had somebody from "No, No, Nanette," but how many nights did anybody come up with a guest like Bob?

The show was back. Good! Dick was going to keep Bob talking. What do you do now for a living? he asked Bob. Bob smiled slightly, knowing he

was going to get a laugh, already indicating he would rather not. He said he sold life insurance. The audience laughed. Brian, who was still there, looked white and wilted, although this may just have been a faulty video tube.

Dick asked about putting the body in a mail sack and weighting it with tire irons and dumping it from a rowboat into several hundred feet of water in the China Sea, and he asked why Bob thought the body had not been found. Bob smiled the smile of a man who knew something unpleasant and said the waters were "shark-infested."

Brian asked how Bob could possibly have done it. Bob said he had what amounted to an official execution order from the C.I.A. An order to "eliminate with extreme prejudice." Everybody who worked with the C.I.A. knew what that meant, Bob said. He had done it to serve his country, to serve us in the audience, to serve me down there in my cellar. He was not telling it now for profit, was not making any money, in fact, from his story. He just wanted us to know what duty we were all exacting from our Army.

There was a station break. A brief film showed a liquid that did a terrific job of cleaning a toilet. By 1 A.M. Bob had begun to pall and when Dick went off I dozed with a yawn in search of an old movie. Later, going up to bed, there was a moment on the steps when the numbness lifted momentarily, and I marveled, for just an instant, that the TV set never turned into a cobra and bit us.

The World

Pacification:

It's Being Able to Walk Down A Road Safely

SAIGON — "Pacification will be fully realized not when we will have occupied each inch of earth but when we will have conquered all the hearts and won all the minds."

These words were written in French by Commandant A. H. Savani, head of the Bourbons Bureau, the French intelligence apparatus, during France's long bitter war with the Vietnamese. He wrote them in September, 1954.

The words have been neatly printed on a card posted on one of the partition walls that hang in the desk of a bright young American who daily works on the hamlet evaluation system (H.E.S.). This is the American method of rating security in South Vietnam which is based on American advisers' reports and, in its final stages, comes out of a computer. The young man is not without a sense of irony.

It is not unwise to remember what Commandant Savani so hoped for when one reads a long, pontifical document called the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. This means pacification, a network of programs engineered by the United States agency in Saigon called Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, or CORDS.

The programs involve a wide

range of activities, from improvement of economic conditions to administrative training to strengthening security in the hamlets. A key element is the enlargement of the national police to cope with the Vietcong.

The Saigon Government and the United States have put great stock in the pacification program as a means of spreading their influence in the country. Ambassador William Egan Colby, who heads CORDS, flew to Washington this weekend to testify before Congressional committees.

The crucial goal of pacification is to separate the South Vietnamese, psychologically and ideologically, from the Communists, to pull the South Vietnamese to the side of the Saigon Government, and to get them to keep their allegiance and trust so they will stay on that side.

But measuring this allegiance and trust is not as simple as taking the temperature of a feverish man every day and then deciding whether he is cured. There is no way of knowing the final results of pacification because the methods by which the Americans and Saigon Government officials assess their success is often neither honest nor realistic. Sometimes they cannot know but are not permitted to say this.

In too many villages and hamlets, pacification simply means more painful pressures on a people that have already been obliged to bend down too low and too long. While the plans may look perfectly drawn up by the American experts, the men in the small hamlets or villages who carry them out are often greedy bullies, or flawed and fearful people. The loveliest plan in the world cannot cure them.

The great weakness—an almost fatal one in South Vietnam where corruption now flourishes in greater variety than a decade ago—is that pacification is only as good as the

people obliged to carry it out.

If, as in one delta village, the national police collect money by threatening to arrest people as Vietcong suspects, then pacification here is an ugly joke. The people pay, for they

know that under the Phoenix Program, designed to weed out Vietcong in the civilian population, there is very little way of proving what you are not when the police point their finger.

If, for example, pacification means providing security but the old men and young boys in the Peoples' Self-Defense Forces in another village can pay to get off one night from guarding a road, then pacification here does not work. For it depends on spirit not the cash and, if in still another village, the people are forced to clear an area mined by the Vietcong in order to deprive the Vietcong of a hiding place, then the people who are frightened or hurt will feel that pacification is worse than anything else. You cannot pacify most Vietnamese, of course, by expecting them to put their lives on the line. Only soldiers accept that.

The intensified, accelerated pacification program for 1971 calls for even more organization of the people "in order to develop unity of will and action in the entire nation." It may be far too late for anyone to expect that now just as it was too late in 1953 for Commandant Savani and France to win the same hearts and the same minds.

This is a tired nation, perhaps the most tired in the world, and the Americans here, working with the Vietnamese, seem a little dimmed, a little less hopeful, too. The great and grand goals of pacification still shine brightly for some courageous, committed Americans; but there is still one small thing that four years of pacification, billions of dollars, and thousands of United States advisers have sadly enough not yet brought about:

It is being able to walk down a country road at night, or drive on a highway, without risking your life.

—GLORIA EMERSON



Associated Press

A South Vietnamese peasant waits while a soldier searches his bunker for Vietcong. The Saigon Government's pacification program is aimed at winning "hearts and minds" and separating the people from the Communists.

THE LIFE OF THE C.

By JAMES H. HARRIS

WASHINGTON.

CAN tell when he walks in the door what sort of a day it's been," says his wife, Cynthia. "Some days he has on what I call his 'Oriental look'—totally inscrutable. I know better than to ask what's happened. He'll talk when he's ready, not before, but even when he talks he's terribly discreet."

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard Helms, apparently brings his problems home from the office like any other husband—at least to hear Cynthia Helms tell it. And these days Helms's job is definitely one of the most problem-ridden in Washington.

Successive budget cuts, balance of payments restrictions, bureaucratic rivalries and press disclosures that have hurt the C.I.A.'s public image have all reduced its operations considerably. President Nixon has recently ordered a fiscal and management investigation into the intelligence "community," a task which may take longer and prove more difficult than even Nixon suspects because of the capacity of the intelligence agencies to hide in the bureaucratic thickets. Both Nixon and his principal foreign affairs adviser,

BENJAMIN WELLES covers national security affairs as a correspondent in the Washington bureau of *The Times*.

Henry Kissinger, are said to regard the community as a mixed blessing: intrinsically important to the United States but far too big and too prone to obscure differences of opinion—or, sometimes, no opinion—behind a screen of words.

Considered a cold-blooded necessity in the Cold War days, the agency now seems to many students, liberal intellectuals and Congressmen, to be undemocratic, conspiratorial, sinister. The revelations in recent years that have made the agency suspect include its activities in Southeast Asia, the Congo, Guatemala, the Bay of Pigs; the U-2 flights; its secret funding through "front" foundations of the National Student Association plus private cultural, women's and lawyers' groups, and, finally, two years ago, the Green Berets affair.

The 53-year-old Helms knows all this, better than most. As the first career intelligence officer to reach the

top since the C.I.A. was created in 1947, his goal has been to professionalize the agency and restore it to respectability. In fact, one of his chief preoccupations has been to erase the image of the Director as a man who moves in Jewish mystery, jettisoning secretly around the world to make policy with prime ministers, generals and kings, and brushing aside, on the pretext of "security," the public's vague fears and Congress's probing questions. If Helms rules an "invisible empire," as the C.I.A. has sometimes been called, he is a very visible emperor.

While he tries to keep his lunches free for work, for example, he occasionally shows up at a restaurant with a friend for lunch: a light beer, a cold plate, one eye always on the clock. He prefers the Occidental, a tourist-frequented restaurant near the White House where, if he happens to be seen, there is likely to be less gossip than if he were observed entering a private home.

He likes the company of attractive women—young or old—and they find him a charming dinner partner and a good dancer.

"He's interesting—and interested in what you're saying," said Lydia Katzenbach, wife of the former Democratic Attorney General. "He's well-read and he doesn't try to substitute flirting for conversation, that old Princeton '43 routine that some of the columnists around town use."

Some of his critics complain that he is too close to the press—even though most agree that he uses it, with rare finesse, for his own and his agency's ends. Some dislike the frequent mention of Helms and his handsome wife in the gossip columns and society pages of the nation's capital.

Yet, if he gives the appearance of incoherence—he is witty, gregarious, friendly—the reserve is there, like a high-voltage electric barrier, just beneath the surface. Helms is a mass of apparent contradictions: inwardly self-disciplined and outwardly relaxed, absorbed in the essential yet fascinated by the trivial. A former foreign correspondent, he observes much and can read people who in the first place—what gown each woman wore to a dinner and whose shoulder strap

editorials

CIA footnotes

In his first public address since he became director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) five years ago, Richard Helms defended his organization before a luncheon meeting of newspaper editors Wednesday, and said that the CIA is necessary for the survival of a democratic society. He asked the country "to take it on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service."

Helms did not attempt to clarify any foundation for that faith, although he did note that CIA intelligence played an important part in determining the American success in the 1932 Cuban missile crisis (thanks to "a number of well-placed and courageous Russians who helped us").

Elsewhere in Washington on the same day, Sen. George McGovern asked Helms to comment on published reports that South Vietnamese Vice-President Nguyen Cao Ky may be involved in the opium trade in Southeast Asia. He cited a recent article in Ramparts magazine implicating the CIA in an international opium business. The Ramparts article contended that opium production and distribution in the Fertile Triangle region of Burma, Northern Thailand, and Laos is conducted with the knowledge of the CIA, and that CIA operations there actually serve to protect opium supplies and facilitate their movement. ✓

Helms did not comment on the allegations; apparently an admonition from the director every five years that Americans must accept the CIA "on faith" should be sufficient.

There might be more to it: that Helms should offer a footnote to American diplomatic history almost ten years after the incident happened suggests a possible precedent. Perhaps, in another five years or so, the CIA director will emerge from his office once more, and renew his request for an extension of public faith in his agency. And then he might add another footnote about how the CIA almost won that Vietnam War all by itself.



NOT CONSIDERED

Bob Marasco, Green Beret

STATINTL

The Calley case has caused enormous controversy in this land and overseas. And within families, too. Frank Marasco, who is a partner in an insurance agency in Bloomfield, N.J., fired his son Bob the other day. Mrs. Marasco agreed that this was the only thing to do with their pride and joy, who was being groomed to take over the old man's end of the business. Seems he came out for Calley, whom he doesn't know, but in a most extraordinary way.

Bob Marasco, a reserve captain who served in Vietnam with the Green Berets (who, incidentally, never call themselves Green Berets) was emotionally moved by reading a new Doubleday book titled "Court Martial," a fictionalized account of the murder of a double-agent in Vietnam by Green Berets a couple of years ago. It was written by Robin Moore, who wrote the first book about the Berets, and attorney Henry Rothblatt, who has defended a number of accused servicemen in this war.

What bugged Marasco, he told us the other day, was that the authors of "Court Martial" printed classified details about his participation in the murder of the double agent that he himself had not been able to use in his own defense. He and half a dozen others were held for six weeks in solitary at Long Binh jail, then mysteriously released before their trials could start.

MARASCO CALLED MOORE after reading the book and in the course of their conversation stated that his case resembled Calley's — but he went free and Calley got life. He wanted to do something about that, even at risk of being recalled into the Army and put on trial. Moore suggested that he tell his story of The New York Times.

The Times isn't accustomed to readers calling in to confess killings. A rewrite man took what Marasco called "half the story." It must have interested somebody along the chain of command at The Times.

"They sent a young fellow over to interview me, a long-haired fellow," Marasco related. The young fellow soon had himself quite a story.

MARASCO TOLD HIM about the last days of Thai Khac Chuyen, a \$250 a month agent so trusted by the Berets and the CIA that they put him in charge of other native spies on the payroll. One of these turned in Thai Khac Chuyen, and, as

evidence, produced a picture of the man with his arm around a Vietcong general.

Confronted with the picture, the agent swore that he was faithful to the American side. He was forced to undergo a lie-detector test and also questioned while under the influence of a "truth serum."

The Berets urged the CIA to send the agent away for a year, during which time he would lose his enemy contacts. According to Marasco the CIA said it had no capability of doing that. "Elimination is the best course of action," Marasco says the CIA ruled. So the man was knocked out by morphine, shot through the head twice, admittedly by Marasco, and buried at sea in a weighted mail sack.

WHEN THE TIMES front-paged the story, Marasco's parents were shocked. The father shut the door between their offices, and fired him. The reserve officer's wife, who knew the story, stood by him. "I love him," she told the parents.

"I don't know how I'm going to pay the rent," Marasco said with a mindless laugh over a drink at "21" the other day. "But I'm content that I did the right thing. If Calley is to go to jail, so should a lot of others. Anybody who ever took part in an atrocity in this war should now step forward."

(He subsequently told Ed Newman on the TODAY show that he felt Calley symbolized every young draftee who is taught to kill in training camp, then sent to a strange land where he hears lurid stories about being surrounded by enemies, sees friends killed, becomes a nest of neuroses, is told that only "body-count" counts, is ordered to attack a suspected village, and "sadly over-reacts." He added, to Newman, "But murder? No!")

Marasco is critical of the conduct of the war in which he served and was honorably discharged.

"War is what Sherman said it was," he said. "But this one has a worse side to it, if possible. It's a war we have no intention of trying to win. We fight it defensively, not offensively. Under those terms it could last another ten years. If that's what we can expect in the future, we shouldn't fight any kind of war. Do the New York Knicks play for a tie? Of course they don't; they play to win."

He hasn't heard from his father.
Or the Army.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01

LITTLE ROCK, ARK.
GAZETTE

APR 12 1977
M - 108,821
S - 124,741

Nixon's 'Beret' Sub

Although we were constantly underestimating him in such matters, not even Lyndon Johnson, we think, would have sent a Green Beret to throw out the first ball at the Senators' opener just two days after the public admission by a former member of this "elitist" corps that the Berets served as political assassins in Vietnam, "hit" men for the "finger" men of the CIA. Richard Nixon brought it off with no more qualms or queasiness than it would take for some of us to get down our Mothersill's.

The ex-Beret — Robert Marasco — had held his peace while he was still subject to court-martial and for some time after setting up shop as a life insurance salesman in New Jersey, but says that he was moved to speak out now because of the life sentence assessed against Lieutenant William L. Calley Jr., for his role in the massacre at My Lai.

As for Marasco himself, he says there was nothing he did in Vietnam, including political executions, that he did not undertake out of the highest "patriotic" motives — like Calley. "I never wake up in the night screaming."

It is only when we read the full news service account of a personal testimony that is more boast than confession that we are enabled to discover that the South Vietnamese political figure who was "terminated with extreme prejudice" was not just the "double agent" that he supposedly was liquidated for being, but a "triple agent" working in the interests of General Duong Van (Big)

Minh, the political rival of General Thieu, whose name keeps popping up as the possible instrument of a future coalition government in South Vietnam.

Marasco's revelations thus relate not only to his fellow Beret's subbing for Nixon at the Senators' game, but, more seriously, to a stern statement by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana issued the same day in the name of the Democratic leadership, calling upon the Nixon administration not to interfere in the fall elections in South Vietnam on the side of the Thieu-Ky government. The Mansfield warning was made in connection with a resolution by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III of Illinois accusing the administration of having already done just that, and demanding that it cease and desist in future.

At the very least, let's have our military people out there refrain from killing off agents and supporters of such oppositionist political figure as are still left in that "Free World" bastion.



Jack Keefe Says

Many Brave Americans Have Died in Vietnam

Warrant Officer Bill Lassiter III was a Miami boy. He graduated from Southwest High, attended Miami-Dade Junior College. His wife, the former Beverly Davis, and their little daughter live in Arcola, Ill. Bill was one of the majority of American combat men in Vietnam who fought as good soldiers should in the bloody tragedy of war.

Last May in Cambodia, Lassiter, a helicopter pilot, received an urgent call for help from an encircled unit. He made rocket runs in the face of machine gun and small arms fire, but saw the rockets exploding against trees. Bill then made his runs lower and slower to insure of hitting bunkers. The North Viets shot him down. For that Lassiter was posthumously awarded the Silver Star, and when his tiny daughter grows up she'll see it with his Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star and other awards. Bill was a credit to his country and the service. He fought an armed enemy, matching his life against theirs, while the monstrous acts of others must be recorded in the thin hope there'll never be a repetition, let's remember gallant ones like Bill Lassiter III.

★ ★ ★

THEY called Ilse Koch "the blond beast of Belsen." Everyone experienced a sense of horror when they read of her beatings and tortures of prisoners in the Nazi death camp. That horror was climaxed when it was proved that Ilse had murdered Jews with tattoos, flayed them and had the skin made into lamp shades.

Recent statements by several returned GIs are more sickening.

"All gooks (meaning Vietnamese) are fair game. Why not? The company with the highest body count got free beer, so we killed everybody. I've known guys to dig out a dead gook's teeth with a bayonates, bore holes in them, and string the teeth around their necks."

You just can't bring yourself to believe that a young American would act like Ilse Koch. . . . It also seemed unbelievable that Lt. William Calley could throw a two-year-old baby into a ditch, and gun it to death along with screaming adults, but evidence proved he did.

★ ★ ★

HOW could you bring yourself to believe that American soldiers, bitter at their officers, could throw grenades onto cots of sleeping men and blow them to bits? In his last speech President Nixon said the majority of American soldiers in Vietnam were brave men . . . brave in battle, and helpful and kind with women and children. This is true beyond doubt, but the number of sadistic killer types and hard drug addicts is frightening beyond words.

All our soldiers in Vietnam can't be lumped together as gallant defenders of liberty and the honor of our land. Let's not accept a belief that war crimes are excusable if committed by Americans, or that murder in war and civilian life is so common we can shake it off, like rain off an oilskin.

It seems to be coming to that. People who couldn't stand seeing a dangerous dog shot to death suggest that Lt. Calley should be given a medal for what he did at My Lai. Former Green Beret Capt. Robert Marasco admitted that, in cold blood, he shot to death an unarmed,


unresisting Vietnamese triple agent. A representative of the CIA is said to have suggested that the easiest way out of a dilemma was to murder the spy, so Marasco pulled the trigger. He and several other Green Beret officers were slated for courts-martial but the CIA refused to testify and the charges were dropped. Now Capt. Marasco is a candidate for a seat in the New Jersey Assembly, and some political leaders have endorsed him as "ideal." Apparently, murder isn't murder any more.

★ ★ ★

BUT, WHILE we should not forget deeds that have muddled our flag, we must remember and praise the daring ones, like Bill Lassiter. The U.S. Command gave medals to his family, and names his squadron's helicopter pad after him, but the young man is gone, and only a warm memory of him remains . . . one of 50,000 memories in an inexcusable war. None of the offered reasons or excuses hold water. The war should have been fought by Asian boys, or Lyndon Baines Johnson, as he sent more and more American ones into the fire of Vietnam. Let's hope the world eventually forgets what we did there.

13 APR 1971

NEWSWEEK



Lieutenant Calley leaves court under guard: A symbol for all that was wrong with the war

Judgment at Fort Benning

He had been more than four months on trial and nearly two weeks awaiting judgment, and now First Lt. William Calley stood at last before the six officers of the jury, looking child-size and hot-faced and entirely too ordinary to be anybody's symbol of anything. He managed a slow, ragged salute, then gulped for air and trembled while the jury president read from a sheaf of white legal paper: "Lieutenant Calley, it is my duty ... to inform you that the court ... finds you ... guilty of premeditated murder ..." Calley's jaw went slack. His eyes fluttered. He stood rigidly through the rest of it, then forced another salute and sat down. The judgment of his brother Army officers was in: Calley had murdered at least 22 Vietnamese civilians at the hamlet called My Lai 4 just over three years ago. And so he became a symbol indeed: an outlaw soldier whose case embodied everything that was wrong with the war—and whose conviction fed the mounting pressures on President Nixon to speed it to an end.

Calley was a folk hero to some, a fall guy to others; it scarcely mattered which. The verdict, and the life sentence returned two days later, were massively unpopular, and their unpopularity made the judgment on Calley a first-magnitude political event. As argued by the Calley was a scapegoat for war crimes at far higher levels of military and civilian

authority (page 30); hawks even more clamorously argued that he was a martyr thrown to the wolves—or, rather, the doves. And both sides joined the public outcry. At the White House, clerks busily logged in an estimated 100,000 telegrams, 100 to 1 pro-Calley. Flags flapped at half-staff—spontaneously in many areas, by order of the governor in Indiana. Free-Calley resolutions dropped into hoppers in at least nine state legislatures. Draft boards quit en masse in communities scattered from Georgia to Connecticut to New Mexico. Local groups circulated pro-Calley petitions, held pro-Calley rallies, staged pro-Calley marches. Anti-war Viet vets showed their solidarity by trying to get themselves arrested. A Houston gun dealer put out a huge sign that said, FREE CALLEY OR TRY TRUMAN.

Rap: What happened in the streets was only the visible manifestation of a deep feeling that Calley got a raw deal—a psychic reaction to be placed alongside the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1970 Cambodia incursion among the traumata of an unhappy war. In a NEWSWEEK poll conducted by The Gallup Organization (page 28), Americans disapproved the verdict and the sentence by about 8 to 1. Only a relative few doubted that what happened to Calley was a crime. The far more general view was that such incidents were common—and the over-

whelming conviction was that Calley was taking the rap for his superiors.

Congress got the message; the Calley verdict, following close behind the pell-mell allied retreat from Laos, seemed to crystallize a growing bipartisan disgust with the war—and to energize efforts to force Mr. Nixon to close it down by some "time certain" deadline no later than January 1973. The President thus far has successfully resisted any such impulse. But Laos and now Calley forced him to move fast to defuse an increasingly volatile situation.

He took the unprecedented step of ordering Calley released from the Fort Benning stockade and returned to his quarters pending appeal; the move almost surely made it harder for Army reviewing authorities to sustain Calley's conviction—but it got a solid hand in the House and, as the NEWSWEEK poll indicated, an enormous vote of approval from the nation. Two days later, he moved again to damp the continuing uproar—this time dispatching staff topsider John Ehrlichman to meet the press at an on-camera briefing and announce that the President himself would personally review the case before any sentence is carried out.

And, with both Laos and the Calley case turning up the heat, Mr. Nixon rescheduled his next troop-withdrawal announcement for this week—a week earlier than he had planned. Top aides

10 APRIL 1971

Calley found guilty

By Andy Stapp

In a Ft. Benning, Ga., courtroom March 29, First Lieutenant William Calley was found guilty by a six-officer jury of the premeditated murder of 22 unarmed civilians in the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai over three years ago. It had been the longest court-martial in U.S. history. His chief counsel George Latimer reported that Calley was "absolutely crushed."

At the trial Calley had confessed and called the killings "no big thing." He said he was following orders.

Two days later he was sentenced to life at hard labor. Racist and ultra-right sentiment exploded across the country, protesting the verdict and sentence. 50,000 telegrams to the White House, 38,000 to Congress and 600 to the Pentagon denounced the jailing.

George Wallace and eight members of the Alabama legislature hurried to Calley's side at Ft. Benning. Said Wallace, "President Nixon is going to do the right thing and grant Calley clemency."

Alfred P. Chamice, national commander of the American Legion, and Herbert R. Rainwater, head of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, demanded Calley's release. Representative Don Fuqua (D-Fla.) introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives calling for Calley to address a joint session of Congress. Former Senator Herman Talmadge of Georgia stated, "I am saddened to think one could fight for his flag and then be court-martialed for apparently carrying out orders." Thomas J. Dodd (D-Conn.) commented, "I don't know how they can find a combat soldier guilty of premeditated murder." Rep. John J. Flynt (D-Ga.) added, "The verdict was a dangerous step toward destruction of morale in the Armed Forces."

Vice-President Agnew chimed in, stating that in Vietnam there are "no safe, innocuous civilians." Indiana's Gov. Edgar D. Whitcomb ordered all American flags on state buildings flown at half mast. Whitcomb felt that Calley should not be tried "for actions carried out in time of war in the defense of the nation."

Police urge Calley's freedom

The Kansas, Arkansas and Alabama state houses all urged Nixon to release Calley. William D. Dickinson (D-Ala.) asked on the floor of Congress for Calley's exoneration, and the Dallas Police circulated a "Free Calley" petition. Richard Kay, one of Calley's lawyers, warned that "God almighty will be the seventh juror," and the Georgia American Legion vowed to raise a defense fund of \$100,000.

Captain Ronald Salem, one of Calley's jurors, decided that the verdict had been too harsh. Sen. Hugh Scott (R-Pa.) denounced liberals for "giving aid and comfort to the enemy and crying the same line as Moscow, Peking."

General William Westmoreland, a target of attack himself, announced, "I feel no guilt, not in the least."

Japanese General Yamashita." "The Battle Hymn of William Calley" became the number one song in Nashville, Tennessee. Robert F. Marasco, jailed briefly as a Green Beret officer two years ago for the murder of a Vietnamese, attacked the decision as "devastating for the Army and the whole country," while Lester Maddox summed up by cheering, "Thank God for Lt. Calley."

On April 1st, Nixon bypassed Secretary of Defense Laird and ordered Admiral Thomas Moore, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to release Calley from his air-conditioned accommodations in the Ft. Benning stockade chaplain's offices and allow him to return to his private four-room quarters under light guard.

Six secretaries have been assigned by the military to help him open his fan mail. Calley may take his meals at home or at the officers' dining hall five miles away. He will keep the rank of lieutenant throughout the appeals to higher courts.

Bored socialite

Calley's background is that of a typical officer. His father was the president of a company that sold construction machinery. As Calley puts it, he "grew up in an upper middle class suburban neighborhood, bored with the country club life and socialite atmosphere."

Since he first came into notoriety, we have been given several glimpses of Calley's character. There is Calley the gourmet, dining in New York City at Sardi's, The Russian Tea Room, Right Bank and Brasserie, with Esquire magazine picking up the bill. There is Calley the philosopher, opining, "I understand Manson. I think he is the product of our society." There is Calley the satirist, relating that when he was first summoned to Washington 14 months ago to face charges, "I thought I was getting a medal or something." There is Calley the pacifist, giving the "V" sign as he flew over the ruins of My Lai in a helicopter during the pre-trial investigation last year. There is Calley the patriot, warning the country after his trial closed, "From what I've seen of the world and communism, we need a strong army."

Then there is Calley the martyr, sobbing in court for fear that he would be hung. And of course, there is Calley the Nazi officer, kicking one of his own men who wouldn't shoot and then himself firing bursts from an automatic weapon into the sobbing villagers begging him for their lives.

The North Vietnamese army newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Don, observed that Calley "was not the sole culprit in the Sonmy massacre. There have been many other bloodthirsty massacres daily committed by thousands of U.S. troops in Vietnam."

Pravda wrote that the Calley trial was "part of a whole series of machinations by the Pentagon to save from justice most of those involved in the crime."

The American Servicemen's Union stated that "while Calley is guilty and should be hung, Nixon, CIA director Helms, General Westmoreland (who sent a telegram of congratulations to Calley's unit the day after the massacre) and oil baron David Rockefeller are equally guilty."

[The People's Coalition for Peace and Justice also issued a statement on the Calley trial, which reads in part: "War crimes did not start with one Lt. Calley at Sonmy. They started with the policymakers in the Pentagon, who designed 'search and destroy' missions, 'free-fire' zones, 'straddle level' bombing and other means of genocide. War crimes started when three million GIs were trained to believe that the Vietnamese were the enemy and totally expendable. Lt. William Calley cannot be blamed for what happened at Sonmy, for there are many

STATINTL

BOISE, IDAHO

STATESMAN

APR 9 1971
D - 51,447
S - 56,087

/ A CIA-Directed Killing Acknowledged |

One of the mysteries of the Vietnam war has been solved, at least unofficially. The story adds further evidence about the nature of the war.

It ought to be told because the people have a right to know about it. In this case the telling came because of the efforts of a reporter, and not official sources.

The New York Times reporter questioned Robert F. Marasco, one of eight Green Berets who were charged in the killing of a South Vietnamese. Charges were eventually dropped. It was rumored that the man was killed because he was a "double agent" working for the Viet Cong.

✓ Marasco said that he killed the man, acting on orders from the Central Intelligence Agency. He was drugged with morphine, placed in a motorboat, shot and dumped into the South China Sea.

Thai Khac Chuyen was described as an intelligence agent, whose job was to train and direct sub-agents. He was killed after

a photo was found showing him talking to a North Vietnamese official. But Marasco said he was actually a triple agent with allegiance to a group led by the South Vietnamese Gen. Duong Van Minh which sought a coalition government.

The Times reporter was also told that hundreds were executed by South Vietnamese agents trained and financed by the CIA, and some also by American advisers. ✓

So his story confirms rumors that the CIA sponsored the killing of Vietnamese suspected of working for the enemy. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese have, of course, employed similar tactics. They don't seem to be uncommon in this kind of guerrilla war.

This kind of killing is not the same as the slaying of old men, women and children at My Lai. But there are some parallels. The usual rules of war were not observed.

BUFFALO, N.Y.
COURIER EXPRESS

M - 154,829

S - 307,693

APR 8 1971

Pacification Does Not Spell Peace

The reported start of a new phase of the "pacification" program in South Vietnam suggests one more dreary round in Washington's policy there, a policy which seems unable to learn anything, or even see anything, from past errors.

Top priority in what is called a new program, but which actually sounds like nothing more than a beefed-up effort to save the old one, is given to "neutralization" of the Viet Cong political apparatus, according to a report from Washington. Yet this is what pacification experts claimed, in Senate hearings in February, 1970, they had just about accomplished. The fact is that the pacification program has been highly controversial, even among Vietnamese, since it began during the Johnson administration, and in the 1970 hearings some doubt was voiced by program leaders themselves about whether the plan had, over-all, accomplished any real good.

The worst aspects of the old plan are all too conspicuous in the so-called new one. The emphasis on military subjugation seems clear in projects such as these: Expansion of a "people's intelligence (or spy) network" to inform military authorities of suspected enemy activity; the setting up of a quota system requiring "elimination" of 14,000 Viet Cong agents or suspected VC agents this year; distribution of 700,000 more weapons to the People's Self-Defense Force and expansion of that force to include women in combat units and children over 7 in support units. (Why

not some Junior Spy units, too?)

Maybe the intentions are good. But all the foregoing items smack to us of the old body-count syndrome which can lead to further brutalization of the South Vietnamese populace, more uprooted families, and a tighter grip on them by the Thieu-Ky junta. It could also mean a flood of spiteful accusations by one neighbor against another, all ending in an extensive new dossier system—which we presume stems from that recently used by the Pentagon against civilians in our own country.

Although the "new" pacification plan includes sections on care of veterans (who have been shamefully treated by the Saigon regime), and orphans and refugees, too, the whole operation still is under the control of the U.S. military and the CIA. These are positively the last two agencies in government which should be handling social reconstruction in South Vietnam. And we can see no relief whatever in the idea of eventually transferring this program to the hands of the Saigon militarists.

The futility and wrong-headedness of this approach are fairly reflected in President Nixon's reported view of pacification as a vital cog, dovetailing with his so-called Vietnamization plan which itself has been no howling success. Taken together, the two discredited concepts, in the larger picture, can only mean more Vietnamese killing more Vietnamese with hardly any attention given to national reconciliation or political accommodation, both of which are basic requirements for peace.

8 APR 1971

*Former Beret,
Killer of Agent,
Turns to Politics*

NEWARK, N.J., April 7 (UPI) — Robert F. Marasco, the former Green Beret captain who admitted killing a Vietnamese double agent, emerged yesterday as a potential candidate for the state assembly.

Marasco, 29, made a 10-minute appearance before the Essex County Republican screening committee Tuesday night. He was rated "impressive" by county chairman George M. Wallhauser Jr.

Marasco and seven other Green Berets were charged with the June 20, 1960, murder of agent Thai Khac Chuyen. They never came to trial because the CIA would not present witnesses.

April 7, 1971

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900030001-2

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

VETERANS' TESTIMONY ON VIETNAM—NEED FOR INVESTIGATION—CONTINUED

SPEECH OF

HON. MARK O. HATFIELD

OF OREGON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, April 5, 1971

[The following is a continuation of testimony given by honorably discharged veterans who had served in Vietnam, submitted by Mr. HATFIELD:]

THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE

Moderators

Jan Crumb, 28, SP/4, (E-4), 18th Aviation Co. (from December 1962 to October 1963).

Larry Rottmann, 25, 1st Lt., Public Information Office, 25th Infantry Division (from June 1967 to March 1968).

Veterans testifying

Ron Podlaski, 24, Sgt. (E-5) 5th Special Forces Group (from April 1968 to April 1969).

Eugene Keys, 25, SP/4, (E-4) 3/4, 25th Infantry Division (from February 1966 to February 1967).

David Chiles, 24, SP/4, (E-4) 3/4, 25th Infantry Division (from January 1968 to December 1968).

Pat Ostranga, "D" Co., February to December, 25th Infantry Division.

Mike McCusker, 29, Sgt. (E-5) Public Information Office 1st Marine Division (from 1966 to 1968).

Larry Craig, 29, SP/4, Public Information Office, 25th Infantry Division (from 1966 to 1967).

Vernon Shible, 27, SP/4, Public Information Office 25th Infantry Division (from 1966 to 1967).

Alex Primm, 26, SP/4, (E-4) Public Information Office, 1st Logistics Command, Headquarters (from September 1968 to June 1969).

MODERATOR. We feel that particularly after the actions of the last two days in Indochina, and the reaction of Senator McGovern yesterday to information which we brought out on Sunday about a Marine combat regiment operating in Laos in 1969, that we should open today's panel with someone else who has been in Laos, Ron Podlaski.

PODLASKI. My name is Ron Podlaski. I'm from New York. I was a sergeant in the United States Army Special Forces. I served in Vietnam from 1968 to 1969. My testimony will consist of cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia, using Thailand as launch-bases for Laotian targets, and our involvement in Laos and Cambodia.

MODERATOR. How many times have you been in Laos?

PODLASKI. I couldn't give you an exact figure of how many times I've been to Laos, but I spent one year in Vietnam and that entire year was devoted to running cross-border operations.

MODERATOR. Would you say a half-dozen times or more?

PODLASKI. I'd say at least that many times, not to mention the times that we attempted to get in and were not successful in infiltrating.

MODERATOR. What was the nature of your sort of group?

PODLASKI. We were running long-range reconnaissance patrols. They consisted of two Americans and four indigenous personnel. Our particular team was Chinese Nungs. We

were going into Laos, Cambodia, for intelligence reasons.

MODERATOR. Ron, would you explain what a Nung is?

PODLASKI. Well, Chinese Nungs, our particular team, they came from North Vietnam and their families had fled to the South and they were mostly Catholics. They were mercenary soldiers, is what they were. They were higher paid than the ARVN army and whoever gave them the most money, that's who they fought for.

MODERATOR. Was yours the only team going into Laos?

PODLASKI. Negative I belonged to C & C North, which was located up around Da Nang, and it was their base camp. We had FOB's in Khe Sanh, Phu Bai, Kontum. There was also C & C South, which had two or three FOB's. I'm not exactly sure. I ran missions for them, TDY, into Cambodia.

MODERATOR. An FOB is a Forward Operating Base?

PODLASKI. Right.

MODERATOR. What do you know about hatchet forces?

PODLASKI. Hatchet forces are company-size, consisting of American advisers with a majority of Vietnamese, possibly Montagnards, possibly Chinese Nungs. They would run company-size operations, cross-border.

MODERATOR. Often?

PODLASKI. My last three months in Vietnam were spent in Kontum, it was the old FOB-2 which was changed to C & C Central (Command Control Central), and they were running hatchet force operations into Laos on quite a heavy basis those last three months.

MODERATOR. Would you explain what C & C North, Central, and South is?

PODLASKI. C & C North stands for Command Control North. It consisted of Special Forces. However, we took commands from Saigon and we had nothing to do with actual special forces command in Khe Trang. We answered to Saigon.

MODERATOR. Where were these operations to take place?

PODLASKI. These operations, well, you would launch from different launch sites near the border, and you'd be infiltrated into Laos wherever they felt there was heavy troop movement. We would take pictures, tell the strength of the troops, their morale, their physical fitness, if they were young, if they were hard-core North Vietnamese or if they were just grabbing anybody, and this intelligence was supposedly fed to conventional units. They could cut these people off as they crossed the border into South Vietnam. However, I don't know of any incident where we were ever listened to. Whatever intelligence we would give to them never seemed to be followed through.

MODERATOR. Ron, the President and other members of the government have said we have never had ground forces fighting in Laos.

PODLASKI. Well, all I can say about that is that the administration has been lying. They've been lying to the President and together they've been lying to you people.

MODERATOR. Ron will be available for further questions. We'd like to go along with the combat veterans of the 25 Infantry Division, who will introduce themselves.

KEYS. My name is Sonny Keys. I was in the Third Squadron, Fourth Cavalry of the 25th Division. I'll be talking about forced relocation of civilians and a convoy of approximately fifty trucks filled with American dead, which the *Stars and Stripes* reported as "light" casualties.

CHILES. My name is David Chiles. I'm a student at Kent State and I live in Atwater, Ohio. I'm going to be discussing some opera-

tions in the Iron Triangle, the use of American soldiers as guinea pigs to give a squadron colonel a better body count, and an incident I had with some civilians in Saigon. I believe it was June or July we were sent to the Iron Triangle and we took very heavy casualties. We found these ten graves, or what we took to be graves. One day A-Troop called in and used them as body count. The next day, B-Troop called in and used the same graves as body count. So meanwhile, the people that buried these definitely called them in, so you have ten graves that are worth thirty body counts. Vietnam was a very strange war, for the simple reason that the only way your unit was judged by the number of bodies in relationship to your casualties.

One instance I remember, we joined with the 4/23 Mechanized Infantry (oh, by the way, I was with the 3/4 Cav in all of all 1967). They were dragging two Viet Cong behind their tracks, which isn't really unusual. They came in at night and we had a rendezvous. At this time two GI's went over and cut the ears off and put them across the track to dry. And then I noticed two GI's were fighting over these bodies, so I went over to take a closer look and there was a lieutenant observing this. One of them had a pair of pliers, and to my dismay, they were fighting over the rights to the gold teeth of the Viet Cong they had killed. This was kind of a status for them, to see who got the most gold teeth. As I said, we had taken very heavy casualties. I think the only thing that we found there was about fifty bags of rice. It was from New York City and Houston, Texas, is where this rice had originated from. Around September or October our colonel got this fantastic idea to start running convoys at night, from Chu Chi to Tay Ninh, then from Tay Ninh to Dau Tieng. The sole purpose of this was to be ambushed; this is a mechanized unit at night, when you can hear them miles away. His theory was, our fire power was much more superior than theirs. What he forgot to think about is three Viet Cong with RPG-2's and a well placed mine could kill ten GI's and destroy three or four trucks. Meanwhile, while all this is going on, he's sitting around in a helicopter and observing this. Now this went on for two or three months, and I think the division finally told him to get himself together, because we were just getting ripped up.

MODERATOR. I understand you have some slides.

CHILES. Yes, I'm going to show those.

MODERATOR. Could we go through the other two fellows' testimony and then come back to your slides?

LARRY ROTTMAN. Just a point of clarification. RPG-2 is a recoil-less projectile round, sort of a crude bazooka, that the VC uses, a shoulder-held weapon that will penetrate eight or ten inches of armored plate. One man can fire one projectile.

OSSTRANGA. My name's Patrick Ostranga and I am currently a student at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. I was a medic with the 25th Division, Second Battalion, Tenth Infantry, and attached to D-Company. My unit operated around Dau Tieng, which is about forty miles north of Saigon. My testimony concerns mistreatment of Vietnamese civilians, mistreatment of prisoners, and murder of Vietnamese civilians.

MODERATOR. Sonny, could you amplify a little on what you were talking about?

KEYS. The relocation of civilians? Okay. We were in an operation in Ho Bo Woods, I believe it was Cedar Hills or Junction City in January of 1967. We came across a village of women, young kids, and old men—no young men. We surrounded the village, then we forced all the civilians out to an open

7 APR 1971

PACIFICATION PUSH BEGUN IN VIETNAM

New Program, Most Costly Yet, Aimed at Vietcong's Political Apparatus

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 6—The most ambitious and costly pacification program yet planned for South Vietnam has been put into effect by Saigon and Washington.

Reportedly costing the United States considerably more than \$1-billion and Saigon an undisclosed sum, the 1971 "Community Defense and Local Development Plan" would greatly expand pacification activities, which are aimed at destroying Communist subversive forces and widening self-government and development.

The 304-page plan, a copy of which was made available to The New York Times, lists as the "top priority" for the year the "neutralization" of the entrenched Vietcong political apparatus.

Authenticity Confirmed

The authenticity of the document was confirmed by Administration sources who declined to discuss the contents because of the plan's confidential character.

Already in operation since March 1, and endorsed by the American command in Saigon, the new plan is reportedly the subject of wide controversy among United States officials, some of whom term it unrealistic and artificial.

Administration officials were unable to provide cost figures to the United States for previous pacification programs, but they said that the current plan, financed almost entirely in its military, security and civilian aspects by the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, was much more costly because of its increased scope.

Acknowledging for the first time that the Vietcong apparatus remain a

major problem in 8 of South Vietnam's 44 provinces, including four in the allegedly pacified Mekong River Delta, and that South Vietnamese forces often prefer to "accommodate, rather than resist, the enemy," the plan provides for:

Expansion of the People's Self-Defense Force—the civilian antiguerrilla combat organization in rural areas—from 500,000 to four million. Women would be enlisted in combat units and children of both sexes over the age of 7 in supporting units.

Establishment of an elaborate "people's intelligence network" to inform on enemy activities.

Elimination in the year starting last month, through killing or capture, of 14,400 Vietcong agents under expansion of the three-year-old Operation Phoenix, an intelligence-gathering program that is supported by the United States military.

Wider Social Benefits

The new pacification plan, which went into effect March 1, also seeks to complete the program of holding elections in all villages and hamlets; spur land reform by setting a goal of distributing nearly a million acres of land to farmers, and widen social benefits. This would be done by providing new assistance to 216,000 war veterans, and increasing aid to 43,002 disabled soldiers, 33,743 parents of dead servicemen, 71,005 war widows and 284,000 war orphans. In addition, the plan hopes to resettle 430,000 war refugees in new homes.

Other innovations in the 1971 pacification plan include programs for ethnic minorities and for cities where crime is increasing.

Endorsed by Abrams

Elaborated upon by the South Vietnamese Government, approved by President Nguyen Van Thieu and his Cabinet and fully endorsed by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the United States commander in Vietnam, the plan is designed to dovetail with the Nixon Administration's policy of Vietnamization, under which combat responsibilities are being gradually assumed by the South Vietnamese forces.

While the Administration here and the Saigon Government report success for pacification programs that began in 1969, some American experts question their effectiveness so far and are skeptical about the success of the new plan.

Their main criticism is that the whole pacification effort depends too much on the 8,000 United States officials and advisers in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support programs, an agency known as CORDS.

The agency, which supervises projects from Operation Phoenix to rural economic programs, is chiefly made up of Defense Department and Central Intelligence Agency employees, although it includes officials of the State Department, the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

Reports from the field indicate that CORDS officials are frequently not aware of the true state of affairs in districts and villages and that their colleagues in civilian government and the police fail to carry out their tasks.

Critics of the pacification program point to this statement in the 1971 plan:

"In some areas, the people are reluctant to associate with the Government of Vietnam for fear of retaliation by the enemy. Civil officials often become the target of enemy terrorism and assassination and thus are reluctant to perform their government tasks.

"Some police hesitate to conduct operations against the V.C. because they fear retaliation, and local security forces, under the threat of terrorism, often accommodate, rather than resist, the enemy."

The critics raise the question of what will happen if CORDS is phased out and ask whether, as an alternative, the agency may not have to be maintained in South Vietnam indefinitely.

Three Major Objectives

As expressed in the 1971 plan, the over-all concept of pacification consists of the three objectives of "local self-defense, local self-government and local self-development."

The philosophy of the program is stated as follows in the plan:

"In his efforts to achieve political control of the Republic of Vietnam, the enemy attempts to demonstrate that the Government of Vietnam is not capable of governing the country or of providing credible security to the people. His offensive operations and the resultant reaction operations by friendly forces produce adverse effects on security of the people. The most effective way of assuring security of the Vietnamese people is to keep and by neutralizing the Viet

cong infrastructure. Without the V.C.I., enemy main forces cannot obtain intelligence, manpower and food, nor will they be able to prepare the battlefield or move."

The plan emphasizes that the "strategic concept of national security" is not dependent on the presence of American forces and "paves the way for the transfer of the responsibility for security from military agencies to civilian ones."

To assist this proposed transfer and supervise the new police functions the South Vietnamese and United States Governments have turned to Sir Robert Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert.

Sir Robert, who carried out two confidential missions for President Nixon in Vietnam in 1969 and 1970, has been in Saigon since February. In an interview published in the current issue of U.S. News & World Report, Sir Robert said that Saigon's ability to counter subversion "has steadily improved all the time."

The pacification plan emphasized that among the 1971 targets is the reduction of "enemy terrorist incidents" to 6,010. The document did not report how many such incidents occurred in 1970, but said that the current target was to reduce them by 75 per cent in "secure areas" and by 50 per cent in areas "still undergoing pacification."

Statistics included in the plan showed that the military region that includes 15 provinces south of Saigon and in the Mekong Delta poses the most serious security problems.

The delta has been declared by the Saigon Government to be virtually pacified, except for U Minh Forest area, and all American troops left the area in 1969. But the plan reports serious problems with an entrenched Vietcong apparatus in the provinces of Vinhlong, Dinhhuong, Kienhoa and Anxuyen. Similar problems are reported in Binh Dinh province in the central part of the country and in Quangnam and Quangtin Provinces in the northern part, adjoining the demilitarized zone.

The plan urges that special police units be assigned to these provinces.

To deal with the Vietcong apparatus the plan provides for 700,000 weapons to be issued this year to the People's Self-Defense Forces and for the establishment of an intelligence operation reaching into all of South Vietnam's villages and hamlets. The "people's intelligence" is to be built up by building up Vietcong dossiers and blacklists, and offer rewards to informants.

April 6, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- Extensions of Remarks

12-8-0

about the actual legislative process and the actual personalities involved," Thomason said.

"The people of Georgia will have an opportunity to judge for themselves the successes and pitfalls of government in the state," he continued. "It will lead to a better understanding between the citizens of Georgia and their government and, hopefully, it will bridge the confidence gap. There will be no staged interviews and it will be objective."

Veteran TV news reporter Jim Whipkey, of WSB-TV in Atlanta, will introduce and explain each program, possibly conduct some interviews and make brief concluding statements after the live action is shown.

Thomason said the Public Broadcasting Corporation approved a grant request that will cover all expenses so that the program will cost the state nothing.

"The idea originated with John Hancey of the ETV network and myself after we both supervised a program that was done on the House internship program last session," Thomason said.

"The speaker (of the House, George L. Smith of Swainsboro) made the comment that it would be wonderful if the actual proceedings could be shown to all the people of Georgia, so we got to work on it."

Thomason said the grant application was made for "a broad, incisive program to be shown throughout the state covering all the important proceedings of the General Assembly" and had no idea whether funds would be forthcoming.

"They thought it was unique and had confidence in us, and granted us exactly what we asked for—\$32,500—and it won't cost the people of Georgia a penny," he added.

Staffing for the unique setup will be headed by WSB-TV which feels the educational programs are compatible with their regular news coverage, Thomason said.

Thomason will be legislative coordinator for both houses of the Legislature and Bill Johnson of the ETV network will be the director.

The ETV network at present handles the governor's two primary addresses to the Legislature (his State of the State and budget talks) for the commercial networks, Thomason said.

[From Southside Neighbor, Atlanta, Ga., Jan. 7, 1971]

UNIQUE PROJECT

When the 1971 session of the General Assembly gets underway Monday Jan. 11, a unique project begins in Georgia. A project which we highly recommend to southside citizens.

Monday through Friday, at 10 p.m., the Georgia Educational Television Network will carry an in-depth look at the procedures and actions of the legislature. This will provide an exceptional opportunity for citizens to become better informed on the legislative process. Each Friday evening at 10, a summary of the week's important events will be televised and this program will be rebroadcast on Sunday at 10 p.m.

Since the framers of the program wish to keep the information to the public as timely as possible, they are not predicting exactly what will be carried on the series, however, they have offered a schedule of the first week's program.

Monday, Jan. 11 the convening of the 1971 General Assembly and the swearing in of its members will be aired, as well as an initial presentation of legislation.

On Tuesday, Jan. 12, a rebroadcast of the entire inaugural ceremonies for Gov. Jimmy Carter will be carried in color.

Wednesday, Jan. 13, there will be a rebroadcast, in its entirety, of the State of the State address by the governor.

Thursday, Jan. 14, there will be coverage of the House chambers as new legislation is proposed.

And Friday, Jan. 15, the week in review will include a welcome and explanation of the series' goals by Gov. Carter, excerpts from the inauguration, State of the State address and budget message. Also there will be an interview with Lt. Gov. Lester Maddox and House Speaker George L. Smith about possible activities of the 1971 General Assembly. Color. This show will, of course, be rebroadcast Sunday, Jan. 17.

Remember the time on all of these programs is 10 p.m.

Georgians will now have an opportunity to know what the people they have elected to public office are doing, how well they are carrying out the wishes of the people and how effectively and efficiently they are operating.

If we are not informed, we will have only ourselves to blame. We strongly urge our readers to take advantage of this exceptional opportunity.

VETERANS' TESTIMONY ON VIETNAM—NEED FOR INVESTIGATION

HON. MARK O. HATFIELD

OF OREGON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Monday, April 5, 1971

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, the moral sensitivity of the Nation has been aroused by the conviction of Lt. William Calley. More clearly than before, this incident has focused the fundamental moral questions that our Nation must confront regarding our conduct in Indochina.

The Department of Defense said in its recent statement relating to the Calley conviction:

The Department of the Army has had a moral and legal obligation to adopt a continuing policy of investigating fully all substantive allegations or violations of the laws of war involving American personnel.

Every allegation of misconduct on the battlefield—regardless of the rank or position of the person purportedly responsible—must be thoroughly explored.

There has recently been brought to my attention testimony relating to the policy and conduct of American forces in Indochina which has grave and very serious implications.

The testimony is given by honorably discharged veterans who had served in Vietnam, and was conducted by Vietnam Veterans Against the War. Three days of testimony were conducted in Detroit, Mich., on January 31, February 1, and 2 of this year. This group, which represents 11,000 veterans, plans to send several thousand to Washington the week of April 19 to petition Congress for full congressional hearings.

I, of course, have no way of ascertaining the veracity of all the testimony given, and I am not in agreement with certain of the statements and judgments made by those who testified.

However, I believe that the allegations made by these Americans, who served their country in Vietnam, are so serious and so grave that they demand the full study by the appropriate committees of Congress as well as by the executive branch.

The testimony and allegations raised by the experience of these veterans includes charges regarding: the torture

and murder of suspects and prisoners of war captured by Americans and South Vietnamese forces; the wanton killing of innocent, unarmed civilians; the brutalization and rape of Vietnamese women in the villages; military policies which enabled indiscriminate bombing and the random firing of artillery into villages which resulted in the burning to death of women, children and old people; the widespread defoliation of lands of forests; the use of various types of gases; the mutilation of enemy bodies, and others.

A recurrent theme running throughout the testimony is that of institutionalized racist attitudes of the military in their training of the men who are sent to Vietnam—training which has indoctrinated them to think of all Vietnamese as "gooks" and subhuman.

Further, the thrust of the allegations made in the 3-day testimony is that such actions were the consequence of reasonable and known policy adopted by our military commanders and that the knowledge of incidents resulting from these policies was widely shared.

Several of the allegations made in this testimony would place the United States in violation of the Geneva Conventions and other international agreements relating to the conduct of war which have been ratified by our Government.

Therefore, the necessity for investigating fully these alleged actions, and all evidence that bears on our actions in Indochina and the international agreements we have ratified cannot be overstated.

Therefore, first I ask unanimous consent that the testimony presented by over 100 honorably discharged veterans in Detroit be placed in the Congressional Record.

I realize that the testimony is very lengthy, but its full force and content must be made available so that it can be read and judged on its own merits.

Second, I will transmit this testimony to the Department of Defense and the Department of State and urge, in accord with its stated policy, that the evidence and allegations it contains be fully investigated.

Third, I urge the appropriate committees of the Congress to conduct hearings on the policies governing the use of military force in Indochina and their relation to international agreements our country has ratified.

Fourth, I recommend consideration be given to forming a special commission that would investigate in full these matters and would provide a forum to assess the moral consequences of our involvement in Indochina to us as a Nation and a people.

We as a Nation must find the proper way to honestly confront the moral consequences of our actions, and to corporately turn ourselves from the thinking and the policy that has degraded our moral posture and to recognize that out of contrition and self-examination can come a genuine rebirth of the ideas we hold as a people.

The testimony that follows and the steps I have advocated are presented with this hope.

I ask unanimous consent to have the

Ex-Beret Says He Killed Agent on Orders of C.I.A.

By JOHN DARNTON

Robert F. Marasco, one of the eight Green Berets who were charged but never tried in the slaying two years ago of a South Vietnamese suspected to have been a double agent, says that he shot and killed the man on "oblique yet very, very clear orders" from the Central Intelligence Agency.

"He was my agent and it was my responsibility to eliminate him with extreme prejudice," Mr. Marasco said in an interview Friday. "Eliminate with extreme prejudice" is the Special Forces' euphemism for a killing.

The "elimination" was approved "up and down our chain of command," the former Army captain added. Although he corroborated details of the slaying, he refused to divulge the names of other persons involved.

Mr. Marasco, now 29 years old and a life insurance salesman in Bloomfield, N.J., said that he was admitting his complicity out of a sense of anger over the conviction of First Lieut. William L. Calley Jr. on charges of premeditated murder in the deaths of 22 civilians at My Lai.

His statements coincide with the publication of a novel called "Court Martial," written jointly by Robin Moore, the author of "The Green Berets," and Henry Rothblatt, the attorney who represented several of the Green Berets arrested in the alleged killing.

The novel is said to be a close rendering of the events that led to the arrest of the Berets, including Col. Robert B. Rheault, then commander of the Army's 3,000 Special Forces personnel in Vietnam. The elite corps, which specializes in counterinsurgency, is still in existence, but is now

deployed elsewhere, according to the Pentagon.

Six of the eight Berets (charges against two were held in abeyance) were to have stood trial on charges of murder and conspiracy in October, 1969. But the Army abruptly dropped the case on Sept. 29, in a decision reviewed by the Nixon Administration, on the ground that it could not elicit the cooperation of the C.I.A., which had refused to provide witnesses.

The Vietnamese agent was Thai Khac Chuyen, whose body was dropped into the South China Sea off Nha Trang, the Special Forces headquarters 180 miles north of Saigon. Despite intensive dredging, it was apparently never recovered.

Mr. Marasco corroborated the following details, all of which have previously been reported in the press with unnamed sources cited.

Mr. Chuyen's role as a double agent was discovered when a raid on a Vietcong camp turned up a photograph of him with a high-ranking North Vietnamese official. He was told he would be sent on an important mission and instead was held in solitary confinement, where he compromised himself through lie detector tests and sodium pentathol (truth serum).

He was first drugged with morphine and then killed by Mr. Marasco in a motorboat with two shots to the head from a .22-caliber pistol equipped with a silencer (which jammed between shots). His body was tossed overboard in a mail sack weighted with chains and tire rims by the three officers in the boat. This was on June 20, 1969.

A cover story was fabricated in which a Japanese-American fitting Mr. Chuyen's description was sent on an air-supported "secret mission" near the Cambodian border.

The question of what to do with Mr. Chuyen led to meetings between Green Beret officers and C.I.A. officials. The C.I.A. in Saigon finally sent a message reading "return agent

to duty" and warning of "flap potential." The message, however, arrived after his death.

Mr. Marasco said Mr. Chuyen was a "principal agent," whose function was to hire, train, pay and coordinate sub-agents on intelligence missions. He refused to give the ultimate aim of the missions and referred the question to a "fact sheet" drawn up by Mr. Moore to publicize his new novel. The "fact sheet" is based on a transcript of the "pre-trial" hearings of the case.

The "fact-sheet" stated that Mr. Chuyen had been involved



The New York Times
Robert F. Marasco

in a secret Special Forces unit known as B-57, whose goal was to pick military targets in Cambodia for a projected incursion by United States and South Vietnamese forces and to train 3,000 Cambodian troops to guard the country from Communism should Prince Norodom Sihanouk be deposed.

In reality, Mr. Marasco stated, Mr. Chuyen was a triple-agent, whose real allegiance was to an organization led by Gen. Duong Van Minh. The success of this group, which was striving for a coalition government, would have led to "Communist control" and "massive extermination," Mr. Marasco asserted.

When the charges against the Berets were dropped, the Secretary of the Army, Stanley R. Resor, said that the C.I.A. was "not directly involved in the alleged incident."

But Mr. Marasco maintains that a vaguely worded execution order was passed on to his

superior officers in Saigon by a "C.I.A. operative whose cover was a lieutenant-colonel, United States Army." He quoted the wording as: "We cannot officially sanction it, but elimination is your best course of action."

"The C.I.A. does not give written orders," Mr. Marasco said. "When someone in the C.I.A. says to you . . . 'your best course of action is elimination' that means, 'we approve it.'"

Mr. Marasco claimed there had been "hundreds" — "and I'm being conservative" — of summary executions in South Vietnam. Most, he said, were carried out by the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit, which he described as an assassination squad of Vietnamese natives "trained, financed and equipped by the C. I. A." But others were carried out by American "advisers," he said.

Mr. Marasco resigned from the Army on Oct. 14, 1969, and shortly thereafter was injured in a car collision in New Jersey that kept him on a hospital critical list for 10 days.

Because he is no longer in the Army, he is not subject to court-martial. Previously, he has made guarded statements on the killing, but has never before admitted it. He said he is receiving no money from the novel "Court Martial."

Did he regret his actions? "No," he said. "I felt that it was my duty. Anything I did in military duty in Vietnam was with the biggest patriotic motives. I never wake up in the middle of the night screaming."

STATINTL

2 APR 1971

Former Green Beret Captain Tells of Killing Triple Agent

BLOOMFIELD, N.J. (AP) — Robert F. Marasco, a former captain in the U.S. Special Forces in Vietnam, said last night he shot and killed a South Vietnamese triple agent two years ago — a slaying he and others were accused of but were never brought to trial for.

The execution was carried out at the behest of the Central Intelligence Agency and with the knowledge of "our chain of command," Marasco said.

He said he shot the man twice in the head and, with two other officers, put him into a weighted sack and dumped him from a boat into the South China Sea on June 20, 1969.

Angered by Calley Case


Marasco said he came forward now, at the risk of prosecution for murder, because of his anger over the court-martial of Lt. William L. Calley Jr.

He said he killed the agent because "of orders that were given to me — orders that I felt were legal orders."

Marasco and seven other, including the Green Beret's commander in Vietnam, Col. Robert B. Rheault, were accused by the Army of the slaying. The Army later dropped the charges, saying it did so because it was told the CIA would not permit any of its men to testify at a trial.

Marasco, now 29 and in the insurance business, left the service in October 1969.

While out of reach now of military prosecution, Marasco said, "I'm open to having the charges brought against me



CAPT. ROBERT F. MARASCO

again by civilian authority. That potential was always there. There is no statute of limitation.

"Over the last year and a half I've wanted to release this information."

He got conflicting advice from lawyers, he said, but decided to speak because of "the Calley thing."

"Not Calley himself," said Marasco, "but 'the Calley thing' — all the others who could follow him. This Calley thing should be the last one."

Neither Calley, he said, nor any other soldiers, should be made to stand trial for acts performed under orders and the necessities of duty.

The agent he killed, Thai Khac Chuyen, was discovered to be a double agent when a captured Viet Cong site yielded a photograph of Chuyen with a North Vietnamese general, Marasco said.

Later, it was determined that his true allegiance was to what Marasco identified as "the Third Force," a mostly South Vietnamese organization striving to set up a Communist-desired coalition government in Saigon, he said.

"He was my agent and it was my responsibility to eliminate him with extreme prejudice," which meant to kill Chuyen, Marasco said.

He said the execution order

operative who said: "We cannot officially sanction it, but elimination is your best course of action."

Marasco continued: "When someone in the CIA says to you, 'Your best course of action is elimination,' that means, 'we approve it.'"

The former captain said he estimated conservatively that hundreds of summary executions were carried out in South Vietnam, most of them by a Vietnamese assassination squad called the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit that was trained and financed by the CIA.

Marasco said Chuyen was first drugged with morphine and then put aboard a motorboat the night that he shot him twice in the head with a .22-caliber gun equipped with silencer. A mail tire rinas was his final shroud and he was pushed over into the sea by Marasco and two other officers, Marasco said.

Executing Chuyen, he said, was a job that had to be done. He said he was extremely resentful that he ever was charged with the slaying.

"Maybe our people have learned this Calley thing should be the last one," he said, "and that's why I'm telling this now."

"My decision was based on my principles, my love for my country, for what it stands for and for what it was built for."

Follow The Leader

We are on the brink of believing -- no, of suspecting -- that most politicians hear. They may not always hear, or heed, the still small voice of conscience or reason, but in time they hear their constituents. Hubert Humphrey has heard. On March 1 he put his name to a Senate resolution calling for total US troop withdrawal from Indochina by the end of this year. He didn't brag about it, he didn't even announce it to the press, but he did it, and it is not a switch to be scorned. If politicians never changed course, never accommodated themselves to changing tides, we would have to despair of representative government.

Unfortunately, such adaptability is not one of Mr. Nixon's characteristics. He is made of stiffer stuff. He appreciates, as he told Howard K. Smith in the ABC interview, that "politically, there is a great temptation" to set a deadline for withdrawal. But the Presidency is above politics. Richard Nixon will not yield, he will not "throw in the towel," he will not "bug out." He will do what's necessary to keep Thieu-Ky or a reasonable facsimile in power, through continued application of dollars, training, weapons and "logistics support," the latter entailing the active presence in Vietnam for some time to come of a quarter of a million or so Army, Air Force, Navy and CIA personnel.

But Mr. Gallup tells us that the public isn't happy with that scenario. Seventy-two percent of those polled this January said they wanted all US troops home before the end of the year. (Four months earlier, 55 percent took the same position.) The Democrats are listening. They read that message more attentively than they do dozens of antiwar editorials in Mr. Agnew's unfavorite newspapers. We aren't saying that a majority of Democrats in Congress have caught up with public opinion, only that they're beginning to close the gap. Thus, meeting in caucus last month, Democratic senators pledged themselves to work for an end to the war by "no later than" December 31, 1972. The policy committee of the Democratic National Committee on March 24 went further, accepting Governor Harriman's call for withdrawal by the end of 1971. Earlier this month in the House, five Democrats -- Spark M. Matsunaga (Hawaii), William R. Anderson (Tenn.), Jonathan Bingham (NY), Sam Gibbons (Fla.) and Edward P. Boland (Mass.) announced that on March 17 they would

submit to the House Democratic caucus a resolution similar to Governor Harriman's. They didn't, because no quorum could be assembled on March 17, and also because they were persuaded by Carl Albert, Hale Boggs and Thomas Morgan to hold off until "a language acceptable to all" could be worked out. Their resolution is now scheduled for a hearing on March 31. In part it calls upon the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House to "take prompt legislative action on the Vietnam Disengagement Act and other such legislation. . . ." The Disengagement Act specifies a December '71 withdrawal deadline. In addition the resolution forbids spending any money in Vietnam after May 1, 1971, except to guarantee the safe withdrawal of troops and the release of prisoners. Representative Matsunaga reports that he has 50 sure supporters, 48 near certain supporters and 16 leaning favorably. If the resolution can't win a majority, a likely compromise is disengagement no later than the end of this congressional term, which is what the Senate Democratic caucus favors.

So there's some movement at the top. But what can be done to rouse the lawmakers, especially the Democrats, to a greater sense of urgency? Might the news from Laos stir them to shake a leg? The South Vietnamese have demonstrated how neatly a withdrawal of 22,000 men can be managed. Jack Foisie of the *Los Angeles Times* reported last week from the Laotian border that "the embattled remnants" of the South Vietnamese armored column "made an orderly withdrawal," and that the tanks "held their spacing like professionals" -- and they were being shot at! "Obviously," Mr. Foisie wrote, the soldiers "were relieved to be out of the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos." But they were also "cheered by having outsmarted the North Vietnamese who were reported to have placed a massive roadblock astride Highway 9 about three miles inside Laos. The South Vietnamese had pulled an end-around play . . . Three times they crossed the meandering Xe Pone river to get back to the Highway 9 border-crossing point. They had found shallow fords which the enemy had evidently ignored."

Note that this is not a "retreat," that according to the Defense Department the retiring troops "acquitted themselves very well." Put simply: they prudently decided it wasn't worth staying. No one yells "bug-out"; Mr. Laird described the Laotian operation as "going forward according to plan." A South Vietnamese briefing officer commented that "tactically we may say [that] the withdrawal of South Vietnamese forces was perfect." That suggests that if the President were to put his mind to it, he too could devise a timetable for honorable disengagement (not retreat), and one that could be carried out in an even more "perfect" fashion, for our departing troops would be cheered on, not fired on. What are we waiting for? If the South Vietnamese can do it, why can't we?

SAN DIEGO, CAL.
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MAR 3 1 1971

Calley case ridiculed by Jane Fonda

The trial and conviction of Army Lt. William Calley was like "putting Cpl. Schultz on trial at Nuremberg for the crimes of Joseph Goebbels or Heinrich Himmler," actress Jane Fonda said here yesterday.

She spoke yesterday at a rally at San Diego State College sponsored by the People's Peace Party, members of the Radical Action Tribe and the Woman's Study Group at the college.

Lieutenant described

Miss Fonda described Calley as a "powerless little fellow following orders" and said, "you can't convict him without convicting Nixon, Johnson, McNamara, the Pentagon and the CIA."

Her appearance was preceded by several speakers including Robert Scheer, former editor of Ramparts magazine and the Peace and Freedom Party candidate last year for senator.

He said Calley "at least had the guts to face the people he killed" and said there is a certain hypocrisy when pilots fly over North Vietnam and "because of highly sophisticated instrumentation kill civilians on the ground with no sense of guilt."

Crowd dwindles

When the rally started, about 3,500 persons were in the Greek Bowl, but by the time Miss Fonda began her talk the crowd had dwindled to about 2,000 spectators.

The actress told the crowd that President Nixon would have the American public believe that the atrocities committed at My Lai were an isolated incident in the Indochina war.

She said that at a peace conference in January at Detroit, 130 veterans of the Vietnam war testified about war crimes they had committed or witnessed.

Pentagon, April 10

Call for national women's

anti-war march

"Women have been the most oppressed by this...We ask women around the world to take action against the war..."

--Vietnamese women in Saigon
February, 1971

We are going to the Pentagon on April 10 to serve notice on our enemies that women are moving against them. Our urgency and our fury at the expansion of the Indochinese war and our rage at the repression of our black and brown sisters and brothers needs expression right now.

Women have not yet come together nationally as women to show our collective force and to demonstrate against the Pentagon's wars at home and abroad and to defend the right of all people to live.

We will speak to women in high schools and campuses, in offices on lunch hours, we will meet women in unions before their union meetings start. We will talk to women on the streets, to our mothers after they see the evening news, to women in supermarkets.

The child care centers we struggle to create here are the same as those being bombed out of existence in Vietnam; the racism of the U.S. which sends Asian ground troops to die for U.S. policies, under U.S. direction and with U.S. military support, is the same racism which denies Third World people in America the right to live.

We see that the U.S. has not stopped the Indochinese people from fighting for and building a new society. We know that the real power is in the hands of the Indochinese people. We have learned to hate those who count on creating aliena-

tion and despair among us as the fuel for their deadly power. The enemy is not abstract--Nixon, Mitchell, Laird, the CIA, the Pentagon--they are responsible. They use whatever terror and force they see as necessary to suppress people's struggles. The Pentagon's machinery becomes most active and visible whenever people get together to take control over their own lives.

Every woman and each group will come to the march with its own experiences but together we will demonstrate our growth, our love, our anger. Each raised fist, each demand to free political prisoners, each NLF and Pathet Lao banner, each picture of those who have given us inspiration and courage--Madame Binh, Ericka Huggins, Lolita Lebron, each shrill war cry will add to this march against death. This march is for the right to live. ALL PEOPLE'S RIGHT!!

How I Got My First Hint of Laos Mission

Third of a Series

By JOE MCGINNIS

After three days I went north. It was not as easy as it should have been. The Army captain who was supposed to be getting me to Da Nang said, "Hey, I've got an idea. What about the Delta? Have you ever thought of going to the Delta?"

"Yes," I said. "But right now I want to go to Da Nang."

"The Delta's terrific," he said. "Easy to move around in. All the roads are safe."

"Later," I said. "Right now I want to go to Da Nang."

"Well, I'm afraid I can't help you. Our people up there say they can't accommodate you for at least a week. Besides, all personnel flights to that area have been temporarily suspended."

THIS WAS the first clue I had that Laos was about to be invaded.

If there is one thing to remember as a journalist in Vietnam it is: Anytime the Army makes something hard for you to do, it is undoubtedly worth doing. I called some people who told me all about the invasion.

Then I went immediately to the offices of Air Vietnam.

Not many people are aware that Vietnam has a real airline. This is because for years we have seen the place only as a television prop. Actually, it is a whole country, with cities and beaches and stores that sell fresh fruit. It is hard to realize this unless, you come here, because otherwise you think of it only as a place where your nephew Johnny is likely to get killed. Johnny doesn't see it as a country either, of course. He sees it only as one big booty trap which is about to explode, unless it exploded last week, in which case nephew Johnny probably doesn't see anything at all.

But the people who live in Vietnam — they are called Vietnamese — consider it a country — a dangerous country; perhaps not as pretty a country as they remember from their childhood in their country, nevertheless. And

Joe McGinniss, author of the best-selling book, "The Selling of the President," is in Vietnam on special assignment for Knight Newspapers. This is the third in a series of his reports.

as a matter of fact, the only country they have.

THAT IS ONE advantage Americans have over Vietnamese. We make a lot of mistakes and mess up the country, well, what the hell, we've always got Bolivia, or Uganda, or someplace else where we can try again. The Vietnamese don't have that luxury. They have to live with our mistakes. Unless they die from them.

Anyway, Air Vietnam is a real airline and it flies to more locations within the country on a regularly scheduled basis than any organization except the CIA. To fly to Da Nang, Air Vietnam even has a 727 jet.

The ticket office was very hot, with lots of lizards on the wall. There were about 75 people in the office and all of them were crowded around one booth — the booth that said Touraine. Touraine is the traditional Vietnamese name for Da Nang. It seemed as if half the population of Da Nang had flown south to visit relatives at Tet and none had bought a round trip ticket. They all had to get back tomorrow and there was going to be only one flight.

Like many other things in Vietnam, however, it only looked like chaos on the surface. Actually, there was a system. The system was you pushed your way to the front of the crowd and threw your identification card on a table. Then a girl behind the table put your card on the bottom of a pile. If there were more seats on the plane than there were cards in the pile you got to Da Nang.

ONE OF THE great advantages of being Vietnamese in Vietnam is that you are small and can more easily wiggle to the front of crowds. There are disadvantages, of course, but I'll get to those later. I had been burned down by the Americans and your chickens sto-

len by President Thieu's army and your grandfather's howls extracted by the Viet Cong.

I gave up pushing, finally, and flipped my card over the top of the crowd. Luckily, it landed on the table.

There was one other American in the place. He wore a crewcut and a white, short-sleeved shirt and had six pencils in the breast pocket of the shirt. He worked for the Philco Corp. which is another of the companies making money out of the war. He was one of those people in their 20s who apparently had decided, the day they graduated from college, that the only way to get ahead in the world was to immediately start acting 46 years old.

The Philco man shook his head in disgust. "Normally," he said, "we have a girl who does this sort of thing for us. But she's Vietnamese, you know, and she took off somewhere for Tet."

THE CROWD gave another surge and the Philco man was pushed further toward the rear. He was perspiring badly and seemed very worried about having someone steal his briefcase from his hand.

"I can't understand it," he said. "I can't understand it. These people have absolutely no concept of what it means to stand in line."

After two hours we both got seats on the plane. The fare was 4700 piasters for the one-hour, five-minute flight. That is \$17 at the official rate of exchange, twelve dollars at the black market rate.

The Da Nang passengers assembled the next day at the Air Vietnam bus station in downtown Saigon. I sat on a bench between two Vietnamese helicopter pilots named Vo and Ngo. Both had been students at the University of Saigon. Ngo said he

had joined the Air Force because he felt everyone must fight the VC in order to bring lasting peace; Vo said he joined because he thought flying helicopters would be fun.

THEY EACH HAD spent a year in the United States; first learning English, then learning to fly at Fort Hood in Texas. They said there were about 1,000 Vietnamese helicopter pilots being trained at Fort Hood, Texas was beautiful, Ngo said, but he was glad he had got home for Tet. They were en route to a base in Da Nang and expected to fly their first combat missions the next day. They said they expected to be scared but they thought they would remember what to do.

"At night," Vo said, "we went to the town and drank beer."

"Did you ever go to Mexico?"

"Once," he said, and grinned. "But often to Laredo. Very much fun in Laredo."

Both of them wanted to return to the United States someday because Vietnam was too poor. But first they would kill many VC. The bus for the airport came then and I did not see them again.

AT THE AIRPORT I saw Sgt. Franklin Killebrew of Augusta, Ga., returning to his unit near Da Nang after two weeks at home. His job was to lead a reconnaissance squad into the woods for four or five days at a time, looking for enemy. He did not understand why, if the war was supposed to be ending, he had to do this job.

"I told the captain no more. No more. Those boys in my squad are like my family. I don't want any more of them get killed. From now

Continued

ARMY BLUES

STATINTL

A BUREAUCRACY ADRIPT

EDWARD F. SHERMAN

Mr. Sherman, assistant professor of law at Indiana University School of Law, has written extensively on military justice. He had been an Army officer, and has served as counsel in a number of free-speech cases involving the military.

The American military is today an institution in crisis, beset by critics on the outside and by dissension and scandal within. Rocked by adverse publicity about internal graft, breakdown of morale among the troops, and war atrocities, it has countered with a public relations campaign designed to project a new image. But behind the sparkle of press releases is the reality that the limited changes made thus far, although worth while, are unlikely to cure the malaise.

The truth is that the armed forces comprise a bureaucracy adrift from its traditional moorings, unsure of its present role, apprehensive as to its future, and defensive about its recent past. We seem to be witnessing one of those infrequent occasions when a powerful institution finds itself unable to cope with the times; the situation resembles that of American capitalism after the 1929 crash or the Catholic Church before the papacy of John XXIII. When an institution reaches that point it must either resign itself to continued crisis or undertake fundamental change.

Vietnam, of course, has had much to do with the military's current problems, but they cannot be explained simply by the fact that, as some claim, the military has been made the scapegoat for the war. The trouble goes much deeper, and, though it may have arisen during the war in Vietnam, it is not likely to disappear with the de-escalation or termination of that conflict.

First, the military is experiencing an inability to recruit, train and utilize its men so serious as to threaten its very survival. The tensions and animosities raised by the administration of the draft laws during an unpopular war that does not require the services of all the country's young men have inevitably had their effect. Second, a breakdown has occurred in the dedication, efficiency and moral fiber of some career personnel, and that is always an omen of bureaucratic decay. And finally, the military's record during the years of Vietnam, in everything from the treatment of its own people to the conduct of battlefield operations, has raised doubt as to the compatibility of a number of its practices with contemporary democratic social values. The way in which these problems are resolved will have a profound effect upon the structure of the military, and indeed, of our democratic state.

Difficulty with its personnel is today the military's most serious problem. AWOL and desertion rates have tripled in the period of Vietnam; they are down slightly since the beginning of troop withdrawals, but are still far above prewar levels. A serviceman now goes AWOL every three minutes, the annual total being 250,000 AWOLs and desertions, on average. Established groups in both Europe and the Far East assist GIs desiring to desert, and the command in Vietnam is

increasingly disturbed by the desertions of men on leave in Hong Kong and other Asian cities. But far more significant than overseas desertions is the rise of AWOLs from American bases, a practice so prevalent that many units are chronically under strength.

Courts-martial have risen dramatically during the war, both for military offenses (such as AWOL and disobedience) and for civilian crimes (such as homicide, larceny and drug offenses). Charges related to anti-war dissent have also boosted the court-martial statistics. As a result, some 20,000 servicemen are now incarcerated in military brigs, stockades and prisons. Military confinement facilities are frequently substandard and sometimes close to scandalous. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the average age of the prisoners is 19 and that only 5 per cent of them have committed acts which would be crimes under civilian law.

Racial tension and turmoil continue. Blacks complain bitterly of discrimination in assignments, promotions and military justice, and their dissatisfaction has not been appreciably lessened by 1969 Pentagon directives aimed at curbing such inequities and permitting blacks some cultural identity. Although about 13 per cent of enlisted men are black, Negroes constitute only 3.2 per cent of commissioned officers in the Army, 1.7 per cent in the Air Force, 1.2 per cent in the Marine Corps, and less than 1 per cent in the Navy. The services are entirely integrated, but racial traditions persist: most of the stewards and other Navy personnel who serve the officers on board ship are blacks or Orientals and, even at West Point, the dining hall "mess boys" are blacks and Latins.

A disproportionate number of career officers and non-commissioned officers are white Southerners, and blacks claim that they ignore Pentagon directives about race. Also, a great many military installations are in the South, and blacks do not enjoy serving at posts surrounded by communities that continue to discriminate in housing and other accommodations. The Department of Defense has not used its power to force integration in most Southern states by placing Jim Crow facilities "off-limits" (by contrast, when 440 black GIs held a "Call for Justice" meeting at the University of Heidelberg on July 4, 1970, the commanding general finally took "off-limits" action against some German landlords who practice discrimination).

Racial riots and violence, often resulting in injuries and sometimes in death, are common on military installations. Posts in Germany have been literally torn apart by clashes between black and white American soldiers. "Fragging" (tossing a hand grenade into a vehicle or room) has occurred so often in Vietnam—frequently against soldiers or officers of the other race—that it is now referred to as a separate type of crime. Although black and white servicemen work side by side, the races mix less and less at other times, and racial symbols—from "KKK" scrawled on NCO club walls to the elaborate and time-consuming "liberation handshake" used by most black servicemen—indicate a high degree of racial separatism.

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MISSION OVER

Green Berets Saying Goodby to Themselves

BY GEORGE McARTHUR

Times Staff Writer

NHA TRANG, South Vietnam—The faded Green Berets, possibly the only American soldiers who liked this war, made their formal farewells Wednesday. There were a few half-hidden tears as the band played but no regrets.

Col. Michael Healy, a rumpled, deep-throated soldier, stood beneath a drizzling rain and said the final words:

"Our job is done. We can withdraw from the battlefield with our heads high and pride in the gallant officers and men of the 5th Special Forces Group."

It was a brief moment in history, a footnote perhaps, and the words were appropriate. The rhetoric would have sounded false in other units which have long since lost most of their identity in Vietnam. But the Green Berets, battered though they were, played their own game to the end.

Dignitaries Absent

Though U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and military commander Gen. Creighton W. Abrams were invited to the final parade at Green Beret headquarters, neither attended. It didn't matter to the close-knit band of sturdy men talking about such places as Loc Ninh, Bu Dop or Lang Vei. It was as if the Green Berets were saying goodbye to themselves.

They were on their good behavior, though some admitted hangovers from a private party Tuesday. The small, white-painted compound, the nearest military camp in South Vietnam, was spotless. A camouflage cargo parachute was spread over a bit of grass where drinks were served. There was pink champagne and succulent lobster lifted Wednesday morning from the South China Sea by Navy helicopter. There were even big dolphins carved in ice by a Green Beret rifleman.

It was a far cry from the John Wayne days when small teams of Special Forces troopers recruited motley bands of Montagnards to defend remote camps along the borders.

Hazardous Duty

Through those lean years every Green Beret in almost 100 such camps knew he probably could be overrun—if the enemy wanted to pay the price. At places like Bu Prung, shelled and besieged for 45 days, life literally depended on the flick of an eyelash. The Green Berets, who seldom numbered more than about 1,500 men in Vietnam, left 700 dead, mostly in camps like that.

Unlike most Army units, the Green Berets remember such things as vivid, only-yesterday experiences. Their memory is active since nobody much pays any attention to a Special Forces type on his first tour. They keep coming back and a few have served eight and even nine years in Vietnam.

Sgt. 1 C. Antonio J. Coelho, a 44-year-old who has been a Green Beret since their earliest days, is more or less typical. He resigned from the Army a few years ago but came back "because I missed these so-and-so's."

A stocky short-spoken man, Coelho stood at attention with the staff Wednesday to get the last medal which will be presented at a Special Forces formation in Vietnam. It was the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest combat medal, given Coelho for two rescue missions only last August. Twice he led helicopter teams through hails of fire to save both American and Vietnamese soldiers.

The Vietnamese were members of the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups which are the pride of the Green Berets. Though they are frequently called mercenaries, the CIDGs are mainly Montagnard or ethnic Cambodian peoples who choose the Special Forces rather than face the South Vietnamese draft.

The Green Berets formed fierce attachments to the CIDGs, mainly to the simple, sturdy tribesman of the highlands. Almost every Green Beret sports one or more of the hand-hammered copper and bronze bracelets the Montagnards give away as tokens of esteem (along

with lots of rice wine which they also ladle out liberally at ceremonial events).

Saigon Conflict

"We took them out of jinked and put them into uniforms and now they are elite forces," Col. Healy says. "It does something to you to remember the old days and then see some of them now wearing officers' shoulder boards. They are no longer social outcasts, they are part of the country."

In those early days Healy referred to, the Green Berets got into trouble siding with the Montagnards in their fights with the Saigon government. The conflict sometimes had humanitarian aspects.

In those mixed up days the Central Intelligence Agency was actually paying the salaries of the CIDG troops and the money came down through the Green Berets to be distributed by the South Vietnamese officers who were nominally in command. The South Vietnamese would frequently pocket much of the money. One Special Forces captain, who was unable to get his counterpart to cooperate in properly paying the troops, used a blunt solution.

One month on payday he called the camp together and explained what had been happening. Then he put the money—about \$5,000 worth of Vietnamese piasters—in a gasoline-soaked pit and burned it all. Next month, with the camp near mutiny, the South Vietnamese captain agreed to set up a reasonable accounting system.

The loyalty of the Green Berets for the CIDGs, whom they affectionately call "Yards," a shortening of the French pronunciation for Montagnards, is evident in other ways. Of the nine Medals of Honor won by Green Berets in Vietnam (four posthumously), four were won by men risking their lives to save their CIDG comrades.

Large Command
At the peak of Special Forces strength in South Vietnam, the CIDG forces

STATINTL

Continued

18 FEB 1971

On "Last Chance for Peace in Vietnam"

My friend Bob Komer shows evidence of qualifying for the title of champion of the unwarranted optimists—witness his letter of Feb. 11 commenting on my piece "Last Chance for Peace in Vietnam." Komer presents us with the happy news that "the real experts see even an unending Vietnamized war costing no more than \$2-\$3 billion for a few years yet". This would insure maintaining, feeding, paying, and equipping (with U.S. weapons) more than one million soldiers and 200,000 para-military and police at an annual rate of around \$2,000 per man. A pretty good bargain in any war.

Of course, this "expert" estimate doesn't take into consideration the cost of infrastructure weapon replacement lost in battle (especially helicopters and planes); nor such matters as the cost of refugee camps, road and bridge repair, U.S. air and sea transport of supplies, and all of the other costs of a continuing war which the U.S. taxpayer must pay.

Actually, my estimate of \$8 billion dollars is probably low, especially in view of the likelihood that U.S. strategic and tactical air support would continue even after U.S. troops were withdrawn. Komer's assertion that the price in 1971 "with all those Americans still there will probably be little over \$8 billion in all" is such a magical bit of cost accounting as not to merit further discussion.

ARTHUR M. COX.

Washington.

Having recently worked in Vietnam in the U.S. pacification program, I would like to comment on the letter from former Ambassador Robert W. Komer (Feb. 11) concerning Arthur Cox's guest column.

First, we certainly did back Thieu "with strong support" in 1967, although U.S. personnel obviously did not intervene overtly. To ensure Thieu's victory, lower- and middle-level Vietnamese officials, on orders from above, engaged in a wide variety of ballot-stuffing techniques, as is known by any Vietnamese-speaking U.S. advisor who takes the trouble to ask around. State Department officials used no effective leverage to prevent such dishonesty, but rather condoned whatever relatively discreet methods were necessary to assure the election of their friend.

Second, Mr. Komer's claim that we are not intervening on Thieu's behalf now is sim-

ply wrong. A few days before I resigned in November, I was told to supervise a U.S.-sponsored survey which, among other things, would help determine the people's attitudes towards the personalities and issues in the upcoming Vietnamese presidential campaign. The U.S. official now in charge of this kind of survey for all of Vietnam told me that the survey's items on the presidency had originated in a meeting between President Thieu and Ambassador William Colby, Mr. Komer's successor. These items, the official said, were designed specifically to tell President Thieu, for his own political benefit, what issues concerned the people most and which potential opposition candidates were the most popular in each of Vietnam's 44 provinces and 6 autonomous cities. Such cooperation at the highest levels falls within my definition of "support" and indeed "intervention," and is consistent with Ambassador Bunker's well-known personal attachment to President Thieu.

Third, President Thieu, like his American counterpart, is for "peace" and "negotiation" only in so far as these words mean "complete victory." The Vietnamese countryside is littered with officially-sponsored slogans such as "Coalition with the Communists is suicide" and "Not one square inch of our land for the Communists." Since Thieu is utterly opposed to sharing any power whatsoever with the Communists, there is really nothing to be negotiated. Of course, we cannot be sure of what someone like Gen. Minh would do, but his election to the presidency certainly could not lessen the chances of a negotiated political settlement.

Finally, it is hard to know for sure what the true balance of military power is in Indochina. Perhaps Mr. Komer is right in feeling that military victory for the U.S. and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces is just around the corner. Let us remember, though, that in late 1967 and January 1968, it was Mr. Komer who repeatedly assured us that the Communists were beaten and that they no longer had the capability of launching any significant assaults on the "pacified" nation of South Vietnam. Then came the famous "Tet Offensive." Since that time, I have relied on sources other than Mr. Komer for my information on Vietnam. I recommend that others do the same.

RICHARD WINSLOW,

Former U.S. pacification advisor, Vietnam.

Washington.

18 FEB 1971 STATINTL

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Indochina: the second decade

By Richard E. Ward

Measured by the U.S. commitment of combat "advisors" followed by full-scale aggression of ground, air and naval forces, the war in Vietnam—now extended by the U.S. to all of Indochina—has recently entered its second decade. Yet the U.S. is further from military success than ever before.

To understand why tiny Vietnam, with an economic output barely one-thousandth that of the U.S., is successfully resisting the onslaught of the greatest imperial power that ever existed, it is necessary to comprehend the origins of the struggle in Vietnam.

An historical excursion here must be relatively brief and it can only provide a bare outline of what led to this titanic struggle and only a brief glimpse of the forces shaping present realities that make victory certain for the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

It was not until World War II that the histories of Vietnam and the U.S. converged. At the onset of World War II, Vietnam, a country whose culture and national consciousness had been shaped by millennial popular struggles against foreign invaders, was entering its ninth decade of resistance to French colonialism, and was reaching the point when national liberation would soon be a reality. Since 1930, the Vietnamese fight for national independence and freedom was led by the Indochinese Communist party (which became the Workers party in 1950), whose inspiration was Ho Chi Minh, guide of the Vietnamese people through some of their darkest hours and greatest exploits until his death in 1969.

Ho Chi Minh taught that a small country could win and maintain its independence against a large colonial power only if the whole people were united in a common struggle, that they must be prepared for armed struggle which must be preceded by and combined with political struggle; that the people must be prepared for protracted resistance and that their fight must not be based on a narrow nationalism but be part of the worldwide popular struggle against imperialism. These are only a few of the precepts of Ho Chi Minh which have proved themselves in practice and have enabled the Vietnamese to defeat the French. They are still reducing to impotence all the technology of U.S. imperialism.

The lessons of Ho Chi Minh combined the historical drive for freedom of the Vietnamese with an understanding of contemporary political life in Vietnam and the world. By eschewing a narrow nationalism the Vietnamese struggle won the admiration of the popular and democratic forces around the world, including the people of colonial France and the U.S. Despite all the lies, first from Paris and now from Washington, the French and in turn the American people have understood that the Vietnamese have been fighting for democracy and justice in the truest sense of these principles:

Vietnam always won independence in 1945

The Vietnamese overthrew colonialism and its feudal collaborators in their August Revolution of 1945. Following a nationwide insurrection throughout the whole country, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was founded and its administration was established.

The leaders of the DRV made every possible effort short of sacrificing their newly won independence, to reach a peaceful settlement with France in 1945-46. But the French, blind to the Vietnamese devotion to freedom, began an effort at reconquest of their former colony that ended in 1954 at Dienbienphu, the greatest military defeat in French history.

Paris began its war against Vietnam not only because it assumed it had superior military strength but also because it feared that the example of Vietnamese independence would inspire the peoples of other French colonies to seek their independence too. Actually, it was the long, successful Vietnamese resistance that provided the real inspiration, demonstrating that a colonial nation could defeat the larger and stronger army of the colonizers.

Six weeks after France signed the Geneva Agreements with Vietnam, Algeria was aflame in revolt. Many soldiers who went on to struggle for Algerian independence had earlier fought for France in Vietnam in the French Foreign Legion. Some of these Algerians had been taken prisoner by the Vietnamese, but instead of taking revenge, the Vietnamese helped them understand that their country, like Vietnam, was equally a victim of colonialism. Prisoners that understood this were released and returned to their homeland long before the conflict with France was concluded.

It is a little-known fact that Washington has been an implacable enemy of the Vietnamese revolution since 1945. Shortly after taking office, President Harry S. Truman made the decision that the U.S. would support French efforts to reconquer Indochina, a step that President Roosevelt had refrained from taking. At the time, this decision was secret and for several years Washington, while providing material and political support to France, publicly professed to be neutral in the Franco-Vietnamese conflict.

The U.S. position on Vietnam in 1945 and in the years immediately following World War II led the U.S. step by step to increase its aid to France and then to intervene directly in Vietnam. These were not "erroneous" decisions but conscious actions aimed at crushing the revolution in Vietnam.

The U.S. fought against fascism during World War II, but from the standpoint of U.S. history, World War II was also a war of imperialist rivalry. After the war, the U.S. was indisputably the strongest imperialist nation; the forces of revolution were on the march and the U.S. set about to check these revolutionary forces.

Washington's counterrevolutionary strategy

Washington's strategy was not without logic: the U.S. directly aided the counterrevolutionary forces in China, Korea and Europe, disguising its imperialist aims with an anti-communist ideology that posed as the champion of freedom. The second element of U.S. imperial strategy was to restore the strength of capitalism in the European countries. When all the documents are published, it will be crystal clear that there were explicit agreements providing that in return for U.S. aid the European powers were to police the third world and stop the revolution there. In any event, there is sufficient

STATINTL

Mylai trials don't tarnish the brass

By Rod Such

It is now three years since U.S. soldiers murdered the 500 residents of Songmy village, South Vietnam.

Eyewitness after eyewitness has told—after the Army found it impossible to suppress news of the massacre any longer—of the carnage, the rape, the murder of babies.

And three years later, the Army and the press still refer to the "alleged" killings, while all but 5 of the original 26 soldiers charged with responsibility for the massacre have so far been acquitted.

Charges against most were dismissed for lack of "sufficient evidence." Two persons who were actually brought to trial have been found not guilty. Only one trial, that of Lt. William Calley, is in progress at this writing. It is now uncertain whether pre-trial investigations of four officers will result in court-martials.

What happened in Songmy on March 16, 1968, is known to all. Members of Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Brigade of the Americal Division, U.S. Army, after receiving orders the night before to "leave nothing in the village walking, crawling or growing," entered Mylai hamlet (one of nine hamlets in Songmy) and slaughtered everything that lived. Old men, women, children and infants, unresisting and unarmed, were killed.

Just about all those GIs who have testified said this was the case. In the court-martial of Lt. Calley at Ft. Benning, Ga., for instance, former Pfc. Paul D. Meadlo took the witness stand Jan. 11 and told how he and Calley, his platoon leader, murdered more than 100 Vietnamese civilians.

Capt. Ernest Medina, the company commander, was directly responsible for giving the orders to his company to destroy Mylai, several witnesses in the court-martials have testified. He also took part in the killings.

Higher officers involved

While Medina was leading the assault on the ground, however, three higher-ranking officers were hovering above in helicopters. They were Lt. Col. Frank A. Barker Jr., commander of the 20th Infantry, Maj. Gen. Samuel Koster, commanding general of the Americal division and Oran K. Henderson, commander of the 11th Brigade.

All three high-ranking officers observed what was going on and were officially responsible. What has happened to them?

Barker was killed in a helicopter crash. Henderson is still the subject of a pre-trial investigation seeking to determine if he suppressed information and attempted to cover up the atrocity.

On Jan. 29, the Army dismissed all court-martial charges against Koster, who had become the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point upon returning from Vietnam. Lt. Gen. Jonathan O. Seaman announced that while there had been "some evidence" indicating Koster knew of the killings of at least 20 Vietnamese civilians (he was only 2000 feet above the hamlet at the time), an investigation had determined Koster was not guilty of "intentional abrogation of responsibilities."

The dismissal of charges brought protests from Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.) and Robert MacCrate, a Wall Street lawyer who served as a special civilian counsel to an investigatory panel headed by Gen. William C. Westmoreland. The panel was created on Nov. 24, 1969, specifically to probe whether the military brass had covered up the slaughter.

A "whitewash"

MacCrate called Koster's acquittal "a serious disservice to the Army" that had "effectively cut off the orderly progress of the inquiry up the chain of command." Rep. Stratton, part of a four-member Armed Services subcommittee inquiry into Mylai, was more precise. He termed the Army's action "a military whitewash" and added that if the Army "is either unwilling or unable to produce the facts and to punish the guilty in this case, then I am inclined to feel that we need some tribunal which will be higher and separate from the ordinary military-controlled court-martial proceedings."

Among other things his committee discovered in the course of its inquiry was that all documents relating to Mylai had been stripped from the Americal division files.

The Peers panel was brought into existence to spare the Nixon administration the political embarrassment of having the late Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.)—a notorious "hawk"—chair an inquiry into Mylai at a time when the nation's conscience was outraged. But the Peers panel was hardly more "dovish." Peers, himself, had worked with the CIA and as a commander of the 4th U.S. division in Vietnam he turned a village area in Pleiku into a free-fire zone in early 1968 after forcing over 8000 Vietnamese from their homes.

Similarly, Gen. Seaman, who made the announcement of Koster's acquittal, was a commander in Vietnam from October 1965 to March 1967. The National Committee for a Citizen's Commission of Inquiry in its hearings last December heard testimony from former servicemen who said they witnessed tortures and killings of Vietnamese civilians during "Operation Johnson City" and "Operation Cedar Fall," both of which were made under Gen. Seaman's command.

"A man directly implicated in war crimes," the Citizen's Commission charged Jan. 29, "has dropped charges against a fellow general who is likewise deeply implicated."

War criminals

On Jan. 8, Telford Taylor, the former chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, declared in a television interview that Gen. William C. Westmoreland, former commander of U.S. forces in Indochina, could be convicted as a war criminal if the same standards applied to Nazi and Japanese war criminals were applied to U.S. war policies in Vietnam.

Taylor, now a professor of law at Columbia University and author of the recent book, "Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy," said he based his conclusions on standards set by a U.S. Army commission which convicted and hanged Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita after World War II for atrocities his troops committed during Japanese occupation of the Philippines. The Yamashita conviction was upheld by the U.S. supreme court.

Taylor also intimated that former President Lyndon B. Johnson, as commander-in-chief, could also be tried under the Yamashita precedent and that if war crimes standards established at Nuremberg were applied to U.S. government civilian policymakers, they, too, could come to the same end as Yamashita.

"The American people," Taylor said, "cannot face their own past and cannot face the principles that they laid down and applied to Germans and Japanese unless they're willing to have the principles work the other way, too."

JAN 26 1971

MY LAI CHARGES DROPPED

Lawyer Says CIA Fearful

By KEN BOSWELL

The Central Intelligence Agency's fear of publicity has been credited with the dropping of charges against members of the U.S. Army by one of the men's attorneys.

But federal sources -- with the exception of the CIA itself -- have denied any involvement in the case.

Atlanta attorney Charles L. Weltner said Monday that dismissal of murder charges against his client, Sgt. Esquivel Torres, and three other enlisted men came after the attorney obtained subpoenas for three CIA agents to appear in Torres' court-martial.

Charges against Torres, Pvt. Max D. Hutson, Pvt. Gerald A. Smith and Pvt. Robert W. T'Souyas -- all in connection with the alleged My Lai massacre -- were dismissed Friday by Lt. Gen. Albert O. Connor, commander of the Third Army at Ft. McPherson.



CHARLES WELTNER
Lashes Out at CIA

"I would find it difficult to assume that he (Gen. Connor) decided (to dismiss the charges) without the help of someone in the stratosphere up in Washington," Weltner said Monday.

SEVERAL calls to the nation's capital produced no confirmation of Weltner's charges.

"We never make public statements," said Joseph Goodwin from his Washington CIA office. "We never comment to published reports."

"As the silent service of government, we can't very well talk publicly," Goodwin explained as he referred a reporter to the Department of Justice.

But the Department of Justice denied any inside knowledge of the My Lai incident.

"That's an Army case," a department spokesman told a reporter. "... I think you oughta check with DOD (Department of Defense)."

"This is the first I had heard of that," said Lt. Col.

Harry Heath, a Department of the Army spokesman.

"THE BASIS for dismissal as stated by Gen. Connor did not include any reference of any kind to prospective witnesses such as the CIA," Heath said.

Heath, asked if someone higher in authority than Gen. Connor may have been involved in the decision to dismiss the charges, replied:

"I can categorically deny this. Gen. Connor was charged with the disposition of these cases, and as the convening authority and as commanding general of the Third U.S. Army, the decisions he reached were independent decisions made on the best information and advice available to him at his headquarters."

Heath suggested that a reporter contact officials at Ft. McPherson for further confirmation that Connor acted alone in dismissing the charges.

"That (CIA subpoenas) had nothing to do with it," said a spokesman at Ft. McPherson, who also denied the possibility that higher-ranking officers may have been involved.

"THE DECISION (to drop charges) was made before the Department of the Army ever found out about it," he said.

The My Lai case dismissals were not the first time attorneys have claimed a victory through the CIA's determination to stay out of public view.

In 1969, eight members of the Army's Special forces -- including Capt. Budge Williams of Athens, Ga. -- were charged in connection with the death of a Vietnamese national.

Attorneys got nowhere when they contended that the dead man was a dangerous double

agent whose death order came from the CIA.

But, when one adamant attorney won permission to bring CIA records into the case, the charges against all of the Green Berets were quickly dropped.

WELTNER said he received authorization to subpoena a three CIA men shortly before the charges against Torres were dismissed.

The three agents were James B. May, senior province adviser in Quang Ngai; Robert Ramsdell, a contractual employee and operating head of the committee controlling Operation Phoenix in the My Lai area; and Capt. Clarence J. Dawkins, who was the liaison officer between Operation Phoenix and the Americal Division.

Weltner said he told Army officials that he hoped to show that the CIA had created a "systematic program" for the elimination of "an indeterminate number... in the thousands -- of Vietnamese civilians" who were suspected of working with the Viet Cong.

The territory around My Lai was "a place that contained a vast number of Viet Cong infiltrators," many of whom were named on a CIA "black list," Weltner contended.

Vietnam: How Nixon Plans to Win the War



FOR SEVERAL MONTHS NOW the war in Indochina has been in a cryptic phase. On the one hand, there is no apparent slackening in the Nixon Administration's determination to "win" in Vietnam; on the other, in the cities of Vietnam the most important peace push in years has gathered strength, with the forbearance—perhaps even the blessing—of White House strategists.

On September 21, a rich landowner and prominent anti-Communist member of the South Vietnamese Assembly, Ngo Cong Duc, made a dramatic proposal for peace which has become the central document of the new peace coalition. The basic demands of the vast majority of the Vietnamese people, said Duc, are "the withdrawal of all American and foreign troops from South Vietnam . . . [and] an immediate cessation of the war, in order to permit the Vietnamese to work out their problems themselves." Duc emphasized that his supporters were opposed to the "communization" of South Vietnam but were willing to take their chances with the Communists rather than allow their country to be obliterated by an endless war. Duc called for the Paris peace talks to include a delegation of non-Communist forces, with the idea that the enlarged conference could establish a neutralist government in South Vietnam which could hold free elections. (In Saigon, Duc's proposal was publicly acclaimed

by his active supporters—the Buddhist movement, the students and faculty of the universities, the war victims, the women's movement, even moderate Catholics.)

One of the most intriguing developments of the new political situation is that these peace forces appear to be coalescing for the first time around former General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh"), who in 1963, apparently as the CIA's protégé, overthrew Diem in the first generals' coup. Minh recently announced his candidacy for the 1971 elections, while Thieu has indicated that he will not run again. Even more intriguing is that the Duc proposal and Minh's candidacy seem to have the tacit approval of the NLF and the DRV, while in the U.S. the Duc statement has been praised by Reinie Davis of the Chicago Conspiracy as "the way to end the war."

This unusual convergence of forces in part reflects a transitional stage in the struggle, a jockeying for positions in anticipation of the next phase. Evidently the NLF is confident of its political strength for any contest in which the contenders are Vietnamese, with the U.S. troops and B-52s reasonably withdrawn from the scene. But what can explain the Nixon Administration's own willingness to encourage such developments, particularly when there is no evidence that there has been any abandonment in Washington of the

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Safety-Security Director At BGSU Guards, Understands Ex-Classmates

'70 Graduate Urges
His Staff To Get To
Know Students, Too

By NED BELL
Blades Staff Writer

BOWLING GREEN, O. — A year ago, James E. Saddoris was a student at Bowling Green State University. Although he is a member of the over-30 set (33), he had little trouble communicating with his classmates. Today, he is director of safety and security for the university and still is able to communicate with many of the 14,000 students.

"I like to eat lunch with the students," he said, and one of his main concerns is getting his security officers — he still calls them policemen — to talk with students and get to know them.

Mr. Saddoris has been a policeman most of his working life. A 1954 graduate of Whitmer High School, Toledo, he was a state highway patrolman 5½ years and a police adviser for the Central Intelligence Agency in Vietnam 1 year.

In 1965, he decided that "if I

wanted to get anywhere, I was going to have to go to college."

Worked As Night Guard

While earning a bachelor of science degree in education, Mr. Saddoris worked nights as an industrial security guard in the Toledo area.

He was graduated last June and is now charged with the responsibility of protecting lives and property of many of his former classmates. Many are still classmates, because the security director is continuing his education towards a master's degree in public administration.

While the function of a security officer on a college campus is the same as a police officer in any city, Mr. Saddoris said he would like to give his department a low profile.

"I think the department ought to advance a low-profile type of law enforcement," he said. One large step toward the lowering of the profile would be to take the uniforms off the security guards and dress them in blazers.

That idea was advanced by students conducting a public relations campaign for the security force as a class project.

Weapons Still Needed

Mr. Saddoris said he likes the idea.

"I think it would allow the officers to mix well with the students. But they would still have to carry their weapons. A gun in the hands of a profes-

sional is just like a scalpel in the hands of a surgeon, or a book in the hands of a professor."

He also is considering the changing of the reference to his officers as police in favor of public safety officer.

But the lowering of the law enforcement profile is not enough, the director said. He said he also would like to raise the qualifications of his officers to require four years of college education or the equivalent in experience.

The standard now is two years of college or the equivalent.

"Our officers must be responsive to the needs of the students. We are a public service agency, and we are not here to repress their desires.

To Prevent Interruption

"They (students) are here for an education, and we want to see that they can get it without interruption," he said.

Security officers also must have 160 hours of police training. There are 11 officers on the force, two police women, and four female dispatchers, in addition to Mr. Saddoris and his assistant, William Steinfurth.

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Crisis in U.S. war policy

By Richard E. Ward

A U.S. secretary of defense does not visit Indochina for pleasure or a picnic. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird went to Indochina last week because of the serious crises confronting "Vietnamization" and U.S. policies in Cambodia and Laos.

Contrary to the official optimism about "Vietnamization" and other U.S. operations, the picture in Indochina has never been gloomier for Washington. In essence, this is the situation confronting the Nixon administration:

"Vietnamization" is more than a failure; it is now being understood in the U.S. for what it is: merely a word to deceive Americans into believing that the administration was withdrawing and disengaging from Vietnam. To make the deception credible, it was necessary to withdraw some U.S. troops from Vietnam. Now the day of reckoning has arrived. Although troop withdrawals to date have been compensated by stepped-up air attacks, the point is approaching when further troop withdrawals will seriously impair U.S. ability to keep the puppet regimes in Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane from collapsing. Furthermore, U.S. senators and representatives are finally saying openly that they understand Vietnamization means a prolonged, if not indefinite, war in Indochina. This point was specifically stated by senators of the Foreign Relations Committee interrogating Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Defense Secretary Laird on Dec. 10 and 11, 1970. Neither of the two cabinet members could affirm that the U.S. would completely withdraw from Indochina.

Rogers caught in the mire

The situation confronting the U.S. is particularly acute in Cambodia. The administration's difficulties were exposed clearly during the Foreign Relations Committee hearing. The senators asked several times: how could the administration say that widening the war into Cambodia was a step toward peace? Rogers squirmed and engaged in subterfuge, only to mire himself deeper in his own contradictions. The administration's spokesman claimed that the Cambodian invasion and subsequent U.S.-sponsored operations in Cambodia were aiding "Vietnamization" and saving U.S. lives in Vietnam, and thus it was necessary to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into Cambodia so that more Asians could fight to save more American lives. The true picture is quite different.

Perhaps the administration once believed it could make Cambodia into a U.S. bastion for isolating the resistance in South Vietnam. But that strategy failed during the U.S. invasion of Cambodia last May and June. Not only has Cambodia failed to become a U.S. bastion but the Lon Nol regime installed by the CIA has been on the brink of military collapse since U.S. troops left, despite continuing intervention by Saigon and Thai forces and large-scale U.S. air attacks. One of Laird's main purposes in going to Indochina was to find a way to avoid a final debacle in Cambodia.

U.S. intervention in Cambodia had nothing to do with saving U.S. lives in Vietnam. The reason for lowered U.S. casualties is simply a consequence of deliberately minimizing U.S. ground combat operations in Vietnam. For at least six months, there have been no U.S. ground operations in Cambodia.

Initially, this policy was inaugurated to appease public opinion in the U.S., since casualty and death tolls have served to generate antiwar sentiment. Now it is a serious question whether the U.S. Army in Vietnam itself is an effective fighting instrument. It is no exaggeration to say that the situation borders on mutiny, as attested by reports in Newsweek, Life, the Washington Post and other publications.

In Laos, the U.S.-sponsored mercenaries were unable to mount any significant operation during the 1970-71 dry season. The U.S. answer was to attempt to find a solution in air attacks of unprecedented intensity since autumn, but with negligible results.

New U.S. strategy

Before and during Laird's visit to Indochina, the new U.S. strategy began to emerge. Bombings of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are again being utilized to salvage a rapidly deteriorating U.S. posture. Washington's scenario appears to be slightly different from that of the Johnson administration. The raids first began dramatically in November (actually there were earlier U.S. attacks on a smaller scale), apparently in a final bid to intimidate the North, to demonstrate U.S. will and to give Hanoi a chance to surrender before more systematic attacks get underway.

These attacks are now beginning on a regular basis and the administration probably is deluding itself into believing it has gained acquiescence of U.S. and world opinion for its "protective reaction strikes." Undoubtedly larger-scale attacks are in the offing before long, because the present level of attacks does not provide much military advantage and the Pentagon still believes that massive attacks against the North can produce results.

Apparently, the White House is operating under greater illusions than during the Johnson administration. When the preceding administration began its aerial attacks, the North's air defenses were in a relatively rudimentary state. Now the North's aerial defense network is the best that has ever been utilized in combat and, even more important, the people of the North are mobilized and fully prepared to defend themselves. Having been tested by the previous raids, they can be certain of the outcome of the new attacks.

The administration seems to be contemplating intensified air attacks in the South as well, thus belying the administration's claims of success in "pacification." Writing in the Jan. 16 Washington Post, Murrey Marder reports:

"A plan to shift large numbers of South Vietnamese civilians from the rugged, northern section of the country to the fertile delta area is being drafted in Saigon, U.S. officials confirmed yesterday. ... The intended project, still in a formative stage," continued Marder, "is currently designated as the South Vietnamese Land Development and Housing-Building program."

Genocidal scheme

An effort is being made to pretend that this is a Saigon project. More likely it is the latest CIA-invented "pacification" scheme. Conceivably it could involve the forced movement of as many as 1 million people. The project was announced Jan.

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16 JAN 1971

Nixon Sending British Expert on New Saigon Study

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 15 -- President Nixon is sending Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, back to South Vietnam next month for an urgent evaluation of the Saigon Government's police and public-safety programs, State Department officials said today.

Other Administration informants said that the British expert would also look into the joint American-South Vietnamese police and pacification activities, which range from efforts to wipe out the Communist political organization in the South to operation of South Vietnamese prisons with United States assistance.

State Department officials said that the proposal for Sir Robert to accept another mission in South Vietnam was made by the Saigon Government with the concurrence of the United States.

They said the request was forwarded by Ellsworth T. Bunker, the American Ambassador in Saigon, in a message to President Nixon earlier this month.

Sir Robert undertook a five-week secret mission for President Nixon last autumn -- his

second visit to South Vietnam in a year—but it was not clear for what specific reasons he and his group of British police specialists had been asked to go back after so short an interval.

There was strict secrecy here surrounding Sir Robert's trip. But the speculation in informed quarters is that both Mr. Bunker and the Administration were eager to have an up-to-date independent evaluation of the progress of pacification and related public safety efforts. It is felt such an evaluation is needed before decisions are made on additional withdrawals of American troops from South Vietnam.

Another possible reason for the mission is that the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, which is in over-all charge of pacification, is to be reorganized, effective March 1, as the Community Defense and Local Development Program.

Other informed sources said that both the Administration and Ambassador Bunker still appeared to be troubled by the relative lack of success in the destruction of the secret Communist network in South Vietnam. This has a bearing on the larger aspects of pacification and on the Vietnamization pro-

gram, under which South Vietnamese forces are gradually replacing American combat units.

The problem of the Communist organization in South Vietnam was reportedly a principal theme of the report Sir Robert presented to President Nixon at a secret conference last Oct. 13.

The New York Times last Dec. 2 reported that Sir Robert had gone to South Vietnam on a Presidential mission. The Times article said Administration officials had asserted that his report underlined the failure to eradicate the Communist network.

The next day, however, in confirming the existence of the Thompson report, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that "the over-all thrust of the [New York Times] story, which leads to the impression that the pacification and Vietnamization programs are not doing well, is an incorrect impression."

Mr. Ziegler refused to describe the content of the report on security grounds. In an interview with the Associated Press last Dec. 13, Sir Robert declined to comment specifically on that part of the Times article that dealt with

the failure to destroy the Communist subversive organization. He said, however, that the Vietnamization and pacification policies were "unassailable by the enemy."

In mid-December, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird summoned to Washington the head of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, William E. Colby, to discuss the pacification problems. According to Administration informants, this review included questions about the Communist network raised in the Thompson report.

Officials here said today that Sir Robert's new mission would deal with United States and South Vietnamese "police and public safety" programs.

This appeared to suggest that Sir Robert and his advisers—who were not identified—would concentrate on pacification and, particularly, on the problems of the Communist underground.

The allied program to eradicate this organization is run jointly under the name of Operation Phoenix by the Civil Operations and Rural Development Program and the South Vietnamese National Police Directorate. Although the Civil Operations group is headed by a civilian, Ambassador Colby, most of its personnel engaged in Operation Phoenix is drawn from the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Officials indicated, however, that the Thompson mission would concern itself with other phases of the American and South Vietnamese police and public safety programs.

Both the National Police Directorate and the South Vietnamese prison system are advised and supported by the Public Safety Office of the Administration for International Developmental under over-all direction of Ambassador Colby's group.

Last U.S. Green Beret Camps Turned Over to S. Vietnamese

SAIGON, Jan. 4 (AP)—The saga of the Green Berets in Vietnam came to an end today with the transfer of the last two Special Forces camps to the South Vietnamese.

The move reflected the Vietnamization of the war and the downgrading of the Green Berets, currently out of favor with U.S. Army regulars, though their exploits won them fame in song and story, and even a movie.

At their peak, the Green Berets operated 80 camps in Vietnam, mostly near the borders of Laos and Cambodia.

At the camps, small teams of Green Berets recruited and commanded civilian irregular mercenaries, largely mountain tribesmen called Montagnards.

The camps had been operated by the U.S. Special Forces since 1964, although some Green Berets were sent to Vietnam as early as 1961 on temporary assignments. Sources said Green Berets would continue to lead clandestine operations in Laos. Informants said the Green Beret unit is likely to return to Ft. Bragg, N.C.

The last camp transfers were carried out as the U.S. Command announced further cuts in American troop strength and amid unofficial predictions that the American withdrawal from Vietnam would be speeded.

The U.S. Command announced a drop in troop strength of 2,100 men, lowering the total of American servicemen in Vietnam as of Dec. 31 to 335,800.

The figure was the lowest in four years and 8,200 below the 344,000 men President Nixon had set as the goal for the end of last year.

On the battlefields no major action was reported, but U.S. B-52 bombers attacked North Vietnamese positions in South Vietnam for the first time in a month.

In Vientiane today, informed sources said a secret military operation in northern Laos has failed to destroy North Vietnamese supplies pouring into the Plain of Jars.

But the informants said the operation has succeeded partially in taking pressure off the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's Long Cheng nerve center southwest of the plain.

Laotian military spokesmen have refused to disclose details of the month-long operation centered on Ban Ban, east of the Plain of Jars, and newsmen are forbidden to travel to the area.

Saigon's Cinderella Tale Has New Twist

By Peter Osnos

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, Jan. 1 — In late November when the long lost daughter of Central African Republic President Jean Bedel Bokassa was found living in a Saigon hotel, residents of this city rejoiced. For the Vietnamese, happy endings are to be savored.

Bokassa had fathered the girl, Martine, while serving with the French army in Vietnam during the Indochina War and he has been searching for her since 1957. When Martine arrived in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, Bokassa wept publicly. With suitable fanfare, she was spirited to the presidential palace.

Now it develops, Martine is probably a phony. Another girl has turned up, dubbed Martine Two by the enthralled Vietnamese press, with sufficient bona fides to convince the foreign ministry here that she is the real daughter of Bokassa.

Theories on the case are abundant, with the Vietcong and the CIA figuring in the most imaginative. One possibility not yet ruled out is that Bokassa may have fathered more than one daughter in Vietnam.

The renewed Martine saga has engaged the Vietnamese since Dec. 17 when the existence of the second girl was revealed in the newspaper *Trang Den* (White and Black). The paper, which claims the largest circulation in Vietnam, has been notoriously unreliable in the past.

But this time, the publisher, Viet Dinh Phuong, swore his stories about Martine were true.

The French consulate, which had arranged the trip of Martine One, and the Vietnamese foreign ministry, remained silent, although they privately assured that the girl in Bangui was the real McCoy.

Then, yesterday, the official government spokesman here dropped a bombshell. Bokassa had cabled the foreign ministry, he said, that a careful examination of photographs and details sent to him by Phuong appeared to confirm that Martine Two is his true daughter.

Although she does not have a birth certificate, the name Martine Bokassa on it, other papers found in the archive of her village in Bienhoa

called Martine. Villagers, it was said, referred to the girl by that name.

The mother of the girl, Nguyen Thi Hue who has had three husbands and five children since Bokassa left Vietnam in 1954, also produced photographs which had been sent her by the president before he lost track of her.

Martine Two, according to the publisher, will leave for Bangui in about 10 days presumably in the first class comfort that was extended to Martine One. Her departure on Nov. 23 brought many of Saigon's diplomatic corps to the airport.

But who is Martine One? That question remains to be answered. The newspaper *Trang Den* contends that the girl, whose Vietnamese name is Nguyen Thi Ba Xi, is the daughter of a woman known as Nguyen Thi Than alias Hue (aliases are common in Vietnam).

The name of Martine Two's mother is also Nguyen Thi Hue and the similarity of the names, plus the fact that both girls had African fathers may have led to the confusion.

This line of reasoning goes that French and Vietnamese officials, eager to please Bokassa, may simply have been sloppy.

Phuong's theory is that Bokassa was duped by a Vietnamese woman who had been friendly with the president (then only a sergeant) while he was in Vietnam. Bokassa had written to this woman soliciting her help in finding his daughter.

The woman, the publisher contends, could not find the girl, but hoping for a reward from Bokassa persuaded Mrs. Than alias Hue to claim her daughter as Martine.

The Saigon Post newspaper said tonight that the Vietcong may be involved in the case because Bokassa met some

time ago in Paris with Nguyen Thi Binh, the Vietcong negotiator at the peace talks, and sought her help in the search. The CIA has been mentioned, Vietnamese agree, because it is always mentioned in matters of this kind.

Finally, there is the theory quietly being put about by the French. This is that Martine Two is definitely Bokassa's daughter, but Martine One could be also. The president has yet to be heard from officially on this speculation.

But one Saigon newspaper that dispatched a correspondent to Bangui reported tonight that Bokassa acknowledges having two daughters.

Should Martine One turn out to be a fake, Phuong said today, she will be returned to Vietnam by Bokassa on the pretext that she is going home to see her mother. The girl, it seems, has not been told that her Cinderella trip from slum to palace was all a mistake.

TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE C.I.A.

STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Every few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.

How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pressures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature of our aid to Laos."¹ There was no mention of the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 3, 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly] military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the . . . irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."²

There have been revelations about C.I.A. foreign operations before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in Laos is that they have been forced out of the Administration while the activities are still in progress. The revelations come also at a time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.

These events have led to the introduction in the present Congress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without congressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor of even one House, where both were decisively defeated by better than two-thirds majorities.³ The remarkable thing is that the activity was all confined to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Representatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.

Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.⁴ The Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been considerable pressure for such legislation only by announcing that all existing covert financial assistance to the nation's educational and private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the year.⁵ More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administration to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to provide open gov-

STATINTL

10th anniversary of National Liberation Front

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Ten years ago on Dec. 20, 1960, a small group of South Vietnamese patriots decided to set up the National Liberation Front to organize, develop and lead armed resistance against the Ngo Dinh Diem dictatorship installed by the U.S. in South Vietnam.

Sporadic and spontaneous resistance had already broken out in many, widely-separated areas of the country in which the people were using the most primitive sort of arms. Of the central committee elected to lead the movement, a high proportion were Saigon intellectuals, most of whom were members of the Saigon Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Geneva Agreements, banned six years earlier by the Diem regime.

At the beginning, the NLF had neither arms, nor armed forces and their chosen leader, the lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho, who headed the Saigon peace committee, was in a Diemist jail. But within 12 months the greater part of the people of South Vietnam were following the leadership and struggle of the NLF and the Diem dictatorship was shaken to its foundations. During that first year, NLF guerrillas liberated Nguyen Huu Tho from prison and he was able to assume effective leadership of the resistance struggle. Also during the same year, U.S. intervention in South Vietnam was stepped up and took on more direct forms: the first helicopter crews and U.S. military "advisors" were in Vietnam by December 1961. A U.S.-Saigon command was established under Gen. Paul Harkins by February 1962 for directing the "special war" against the NLF, in which the U.S. provided all the means for carrying out the war except American "cannon fodder."

"Special war" defeated

However, by early 1965 the U.S. "special war" had been defeated. The Saigon army was in desperate straits, despite its U.S. "advisors" and massive U.S. air and logistics support. Only the full-scale U.S. intervention could prevent the collapse of the Saigon puppets, and this form of intervention began with the landing of U.S. Marines at Danang in March 1965.

The U.S. expeditionary force expected to crush the NLF in a matter of months, but a little more than three years later—after having built up U.S. forces to over a half million men (the maximum possible without imposing general mobilization within the U.S.); using every sort of weapon (except nuclear devices) of the

U.S. artillery, Air Force and Navy as well as the latest innovations in chemical warfare; and having used up a lot of top-ranking generals—the U.S. was forced to meet in Paris with NLF delegates on an equal basis for official discussions on how to get out of the war.

More than five years after the commitment of U.S. combat troops in Vietnam, the U.S. was still in Paris (having used up a couple of presidents, some Defense secretaries and Paris delegation heads) pleading that the "plight" of U.S. pilots shot down over North Vietnam took priority over any other question concerning the war in Vietnam.

In the meantime, the NLF had blossomed into a Provisional Revolutionary Government, recognized by 28 countries besides having five Information Bureaus with semi-diplomatic status in western European countries.

While there have been a score of coups and counter-coups in Saigon during the course of U.S. intervention, with a dozen different prime ministers and heads of state of the puppet administration, the NLF has prestige and popularity have grown during the long years of struggle. At the same time the NLF has broadened into a government that includes an alliance of national, democratic and peace forces, comprised of urban intellectuals and other patriots.

Could anyone have believed that when Washington sent the first U.S. troops to Danang more than five years ago that it would be sitting down today for peace discussions with the NLF?

Nixon plunges deeper

If Nixon had not been so stupid, he could have retrieved some U.S. prestige by withdrawing from Vietnam, ascribing the disaster to his predecessor. Instead he has plunged in still deeper, trying to march backwards out of the quagmire by instituting a new variant of "special war": by trying to use U.S. arms and dollars to maintain another Diem-type regime, which is the ultimate aim of "Vietnamization." This strategy will never succeed. Nixon is mired up to his eyeballs and he is now hopelessly ensnared by his own duplicity: trying to assure the American public that the U.S. is withdrawing from Vietnam while trying to prove the contrary to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem regime in Saigon.

On its 10th anniversary the NLF is stronger than ever before and its popular support grows daily, especially in the political sphere. Nixon denies this publicly, but he implicitly admits this by the CIA's program for assassinating NLF cadres (which has failed) and by a mobilization of American social scientists to find a strategy for outwitting the NLF.

Despite public pressure in the U.S., Nixon does not want to reduce U.S. armed forces in Vietnam. And further, if he does this—even before a full U.S. withdrawal—the present Saigon regime is likely to fall.

STATINTL

Lawyer Hails Subpenaing of CIA on My Lai

Atlanta, Dec. 25 (UPI)—Lawyer Charles Longstreet Weltner said today he feels he scored "an astounding victory" in requiring Central Intelligence Agency personnel to testify at the court-martial of one of the My Lai defendants.

"It is the first time any court of law has ever succeeded in issuing subpoenas for CIA agents," Weltner, a former congressman, said. "For over 20 years, this activity of government has been so secret, nobody — not even Congress—knew what has been going on."

The Attorney for Torres

Weltner represents Sgt. Esquivel Torres, 22, Brownsville, Tex., scheduled for court-martial at Fort McPherson in Atlanta Feb. 15 on charges of machine-gunning three Vietnamese civilians to death and assault in the hanging of a fourth.

Asked whether he felt the CIA might seek executive immunity for three of its men who were called to testify, Weltner said it would be up to President Nixon, and that he felt Nixon would be placing himself in "an unconscionable and untenable position."

"The question is whether or not taxpayers are going to be supporting operations over which they have no control," he said.

Weltner contends that the CIA planned and dordered the My Lai operation where between 102 and 310 civilians were allegedly massacred March 16, 1968. The Army has thus far ordered six American soldiers to face trial in the case. One Staff Sgt. David Mitchell, 30, of St. Francisville, La., has already been acquitted. A second, 1st Lt. William L. Calley Jr., is awaiting the end of a court-martial at Fort Benning, Ga.

23 DEC 1970

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GI May Call 3 CIA Agents In My Lai Case

Fort McPherson, Ga., Dec. 22 (AP)—An Army sergeant charged in the alleged My Lai massacre won the right today to subpoena three intelligence agents who, his lawyer said, will be used to show a link between the raid and the Central Intelligence Agency.

"With the developments of today, the whole story of My Lai will unfold," said Charles Weltner, defense counsel for Sgt. Esquivel Torres.

"I anticipate being able to show that it was a function of the Central Intelligence Agency to set the whole stage for My Lai," Mr. Weltner said.

Sergeant Torres has pleaded innocent to all charges lodged against him in the alleged massacre on March 16, 1968.

Accused Of Killing 4

A tentative trial date of February 15 has been set for the 22-year-old Brownsville (Texas) soldier. He is accused of killing four civilians and attacking three others with intent to kill.

At a pretrial hearing, Mr. Weltner identified the witnesses he will subpoena as James B. May, Capt. Clarence J. Dawkins and Robert Ramsdell, who were said to be in charge of CIA operations in the My Lai area for Operation Phoenix—the code name for the search and destroy operation.

Mr. Weltner told newsmen here that it is his opinion that the CIA has had more to do with American actions in South Vietnam than the military. He said the CIA planned to eliminate by capture or assassination civilian Viet Cong sympathizers.

Newsman Barred

He initially asked permission to subpoena 24 persons, including the director of the CIA and the Secretary of Defense.

The military judge, Col. James A. Hagan, barred newsmen from the courtroom during arguments over this point. The motion was amended during this closed session to include only the three Mr. Weltner named.

Mr. Weltner also succeeded in having a charge of premeditated murder against Sergeant Torres

reduced to assault. The charge said Sergeant Torres committed the act by hanging a Vietnamese by the neck with a rope.

Mr. Weltner maintained that the threat of hanging was "nothing more than interrogation to obtain evidence of the whereabouts of the Viet Cong" and said that at no time did Sergeant Torres take the life of any person "except in self-defense when attacked by a person with a deadly weapon."

STATINTL

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* * *

Three alleged CIA agents, who are said to have headed intelligence operations of the My-Lai assault, will be subpoenaed for the court-martial of Sgt. Esequiel Torres. Torres is accused of murdering Vietnamese civilians. His attorney, Charles Weltner, told a military judge that by having the three testify, "We will be able to show the function of the CIA in this case ... was to set the stage for what happened at My Lai." Weltner submitted testimony from 62 soldiers that the "shooting, killing, assassination and torture ... of civilians (was) pursuant to ... U.S. Army" orders.

* * *

STATINTL

Green Berets in favor again

By George W. Ashworth

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Fort Bragg, N.C.

The star of the Special Forces seems very much on the rise again.

The Army's elite organization, headquartered here at the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, has emerged from a period of at least partial eclipse with berets intact and prospects excellent.

The raid on the North Vietnamese prison camp at Son Tay helped focus official favor on the Green Berets once again, after a long period in which they were most often thought of, unfavorably, in connection with the alleged slaying of a supposed double agent in Vietnam.

In the wake of Son Tay, a certain air of relief and confidence is evident here. In a matter of weeks, Green Berets have been publicly decorated by the President and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has made a trip here to give out more awards.

One senior officer here put it this way: "It is just this sort of thing that helps bring spirits up. People who might have been thinking of going back into the regular Army or getting out might now pause and decide to stick it out longer with the idea that another bit of action might come along."

Although Son Tay failed to yield any American prisoners, it brought very much to official attention the usefulness of Special Forces units in some extraordinary situations.

With their varied talents, the Berets provide the administration with a broader scope of possible responses to military needs. At a time when military capabilities are shrinking rapidly, they help keep options open.

They fit into the current scene for several other reasons:

- The Nixon doctrine spells out rather clearly what are at least the administration's intentions as to the sort of help friendly nations in Asia can expect. With some differences, the same concepts can — and possibly will — be applied generally to nations in the so-called "third world." As Mr. Nixon sees it, Americans will provide supplies and advice when national-security interests seem to dictate it, but no American fighting men. There are circumstances where help could logically be given primarily by Green Berets, as has been the case in some instances in the past.

- The Army itself has never been completely happy with the Green Berets, with their different garb, ways, and doctrine, but there is a growing realization in the Pentagon that they may be a not-very-costly way to be ready when the White House asks the Pentagon to get something done.

- Because they are an elite unit with a certain attraction for young men with a bent for something different, the Green Berets are being viewed favorably as a way to attract volunteers.

The advent of a volunteer Army is viewed in the Pentagon with a certain degree of trepidation. The Green Berets are strictly volunteer, welcomed by those who have faced the grim statistics showing how very few young men are willing to join the Army in combat roles today.

Now, like everybody else, the Green Berets are being phased out of Vietnam and cut back in strength. From a peak strength of more than 9,000, the Berets appear destined to drop to somewhere between 5,000 and 7,000 men, depending upon how tough the budget strictures get.

Total Army strength is dropping from a total of about 1.5 million at the peak of the war to between 800,000 and 900,000, according to current indications. Thus Special Forces manpower losses appear likely to be less severe than those of the whole Army in terms of percentages.

At present, there are six Special Forces groups. Two are at Fort Bragg. The 5th is in Vietnam, and the 1st is in Okinawa. The 8th is in Panama, and the 10th is divided between Fort Devens, Mass., and Europe. There are also four groups in the reserve forces.

A group varies in size, but it averages around 1,500 men. Special Forces officers say that one group can form the cadre for 4½ divisions.

If the administration decides it is in the security interests of the United States to help out in Asia within limits, it may be that the Special Forces and experts in war of national liberation might be man-for-man the most valuable commodities in the defense establishment.

CIA ties noted

The Green Berets and the Central Intelligence Agency worked often in consort in Laos and in Vietnam. At first in Vietnam, the Special Forces units carried out a broad range of what are often called counter-insurgency tasks. As Army involvement expanded, however, the Green Beret field narrowed.

The Berets have found themselves concentrating in recent years upon training the Vietnamese special force and of Cambodians, montagnards, and other groups to help with border defenses. The civilian irregular defense-group camps have been operated under the aegis of the Berets.

Many elements of the Army have long resented the Green Beret relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Berets are treated with a certain wariness.

It is significant that a man whose credentials are well based in the regular Army is always named to head the school and center at Fort Bragg.

But, because the Berets are the Army's main experts in guerrilla warfare, intelligence missions, and direct unilateral special operations, such as the attack at Son Tay, it appears that there will always be a place for them.

STATINTL

December 16, 1970

Allen	Goldwater	Miller
Albrit	Goodell	Moss
Bugh	Griffin	Murphy
Belmont	Harris	Muskie
Bennett	Hart	Pastore
Bible	Hartke	Pearson
Bishop	Hollings	Pell
Brooke	Brusca	Percey
Cannon	Hughes	Randolph
Care	Inouye	Saxton
Cook	Jackson	Schweiker
Cooper	Javits	Scott
Colton	Jordan, Idaho	Smith
Cranston	Kennedy	Stevens
Gurtis	Long	Stevenson
Engleton	Mathias	Thurmond
Eastland	McCarthy	Tower
Ellender	McGee	Tydings
Fannin	McGovern	Williams, N.J.
Fong	Metcalf	Yarborough

The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

The Senator from Alabama is recognized.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield not to exceed 2 minutes, without losing my right to the floor and without my resumption of remarks being considered a second speech, to the Senator from West Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider a nomination unanimously reported by the Committee on the Judiciary earlier today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

The legislative clerk read the nomination of Dennis R. Knapp, of West Virginia, to be a U.S. district judge for the southern district of West Virginia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is confirmed.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of this nomination.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to the consideration of legislative business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alabama.

SPECIAL FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1971

The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill (H.R. 10611) to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, when I gained the floor, I planned, at the con-

clusion of my remarks, to move to lay on the table the pending amendment, realizing that they would end debate.

I greatly admire the distinguished Senator from Alaska and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas, and feel that I could well take some lessons from them in the conduct of a filibuster.

I have been greatly interested in noting that some of the Senators who are scheduled to discuss at some great length—not these two distinguished Senators—some of the other measures pending before the Senate have been leaders in the effort to amend rule XXII. So those who would curtail the use of the filibuster are the very ones who threaten to use it during the remainder of this session.

The distinguished Senators from Alaska and Arkansas have focused the spotlight on this appropriation. They have served their cause well. They have alerted the country to the fact that this appropriation is being made. They have voiced their views with respect to it; and earlier today, I assured both the distinguished Senator from Alaska and the distinguished Senator from Arkansas that if a cloture motion should be filed to cut off their debate with respect to the pending amendment and the pending bill, I would vote against the application of cloture.

They have followed the rules in discussing this amendment, and the junior Senator from Alabama, in obtaining the floor, only followed the rules as well.

Understandably, the distinguished Senators from Alaska and Arkansas would prefer a direct vote on their amendment, and it is my understanding that they are willing to set a time for voting on both the amendment and on the passage of the bill.

So with that thought in mind, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield for not to exceed 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) in order that he might propound the unanimous-consent request, with the understanding that I do not lose my right to the floor, and that my resumption of remarks after that request has been made will not be considered a second speech on the same subject during the same day.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The Senator from Alaska is recognized.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I would only like to state that this Senator and the Senator from Arkansas should be getting lessons on parliamentary procedure from the distinguished Senator from Alabama. The proof of the pudding, obviously, is the unanimous-consent request I am about to make, which is as follows:

I ask unanimous consent that the Senate vote on my amendment at 2:30 p.m. today, and that it vote on passage of the bill at 3 p.m. today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Alaska? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. ALLEN. Now, Mr. President, if we may have order—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

Mr. ALLEN. Since agreement has been made on the time for the final vote—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, rule XII will be waived for the purposes of the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. ALLEN. Well, rule XII had already been complied with, Mr. President.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. ALLEN. Now that agreement has been made on a vote on the pending amendment and the pending bill, it is the hope of many Senators that agreement can be made to vote on the other major bills pending before the Senate. With that thought in mind, I am going to yield the floor—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. ALLEN. Yes, without losing my right to the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous consent that I may be allowed to have printed in the Record certain material relevant to the pending amendment.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, June 23, 1970]

A GRIM NOTEBOOK ON OUR ASIAN TRAGEDY

(By Stanley Karnow)

HONG KONG.—No exercise is more fascinating, illuminating and depressing for a reporter leaving Asia after a decade than to weed out his voluminous files on Vietnam. For the stacks of frayed notebooks, faded newspaper clippings and unpublished memorabilia provide a personal retrospective of an American tragedy in the making.

And the dominant sensation that emerges from this review of the past is disbelief—disbelief that the United States, purportedly a nation of herdheaded pragmatists, could have stumbled so blindly into a disaster that is now shaking the nation's stability and threatening to undermine its unity for a generation to come.

Equally striking, in retrospect, is how little has changed over the years. The war has grown to monstrous proportions, of course. But it is still, as it has been from the start, an assortment of wars being fought in different ways and for different motives in Washington, Saigon, Hanoi and on the battlefield. Thus nothing can be plausibly measured.

The search for the elusive truth about Vietnam will surely preoccupy historians and social scientists far into the future. Within the scope of my own narrow experience, however, I would suggest that our Vietnam commitment evolved gradually, perhaps inexorably, out of a frustrating conflict between our ideals and our capabilities.

On the one hand, it seems to me, an old-fashioned brand of idealism inspired the conviction among able, intelligent American policymakers that the United States could play a decisive role anywhere in the world. What we discovered, though, was that we could exert only minimal influence in a strange, faraway, alien society such as Vietnam.

Therefore, our enormous power was only marginally effective. We could inundate the South Vietnamese countryside with napalm and try to bomb North Vietnam back to the Stone Age. But we could not compel, or even persuade, our Saigon clients, much less the enemy, to accept an "honorable settle-

14 DEC 1970

STATINTL

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CIA: A Victim of the War

STATINTL

POPULAR MYTHOLOGY, especially in liberal quarters, invariably casts the Central Intelligence Agency in a villainous role in Vietnam. But in fact, the CIA has consistently been the most objective organization functioning out there—particularly in assessing the political realities of the war.

In other words, the CIA has been generally telling it like it is rather than dishing up optimistic reports calculated to please and appease the Establishment in Saigon and Washington.

For that reason, the agency has incurred the envy of State Department officials, the wrath of senior American military officers and something less than full White House support. And, as a consequence, its pres-

ence in Vietnam has been gradually reduced.

There are virtually no CIA men now working at the district and village levels. Instead, the estimated 50 agency operatives currently stationed outside Saigon are assigned mainly to provincial headquarters, where their jobs are largely ritualistic.

The program designed to identify and uproot the Vietcong political network in the countryside, known as Operation Phoenix, has been taken out of CIA hands and put under U.S. military auspices. So has the training of the Saigon government's so-called "revolutionary development" cadres.

WHETHER these programs would have fared better under the CIA is a matter of doubt, since South Vietnamese officials both in Saigon and in rural areas either disregard the importance of the Communists' political infrastructure or are bitterly making local accommodations with the enemy.

But as run by the American military, pacification appears to be making little real headway.

One of the CIA techniques that has never quite satisfied the Establishment has been a tendency to produce qualitative intelligence— anecdotal, descriptive information often too fuzzy to be fed into computers. The Pentagon, in contrast, prefers statistics that can adorn graphs and flip-charts.

In the opinion of many Vietnam specialists, it was the military's quantitative approach that repeatedly created the illusory impression the war was being won.

The military has also tended to paint a rosy picture of the Vietnam situation in order to bolster its claims to have registered significant battlefield gains. With less need to justify itself, the CIA has tried to be more level in its appraisals.

A GOOD EXAMPLE of the kind of frustrations the CIA has encountered was described by Neil Sheehan in a recent New York Times dispatch disclosing that the agency had been rebuffed in

President that more than 30,000 Communist agents have infiltrated various

South Vietnamese government departments.

Though White House sources confirmed the existence of the CIA document, they dismissed it as exaggerated and "overly pessimistic"—apparently because it differed from the more optimistic accounts assuring the President that his policies are resulting in progress.

Similarly, studies undertaken with CIA field participation in two key South Vietnamese provinces not long ago have reportedly been shelved because their findings failed to substantiate military affirmations that the Vietcong in those places have been put out of action.

According to these classified studies, Vietcong political activists are still very much alive in those provinces, even though they have been compelled by increased Saigon government activity to operate more covertly at the present time.

The studies estimate, therefore, that the Communists could make a considerable showing in the two provinces even in a free election if they had eight or nine months during a ceasefire in which to reassemble their apparatus and resume their efforts to influence the local population.

IMPLICIT in this investigation is the suggestion that President Nguyen Van Thieu's Saigon regime is at its strongest point at the moment, and might perform well were a political settlement initiated quickly.

Moreover, the studies recommend that preparations be made for such a settlement by strengthening the regime's village political structures and, among other things, eliminating the ludicrous quota system under which government officials are required to arrest a designated number of Communist suspects each month.

Judging from the fate of these studies, both Washington and Saigon are evidently still persuaded that guns rather than negotiations are the answer in Vietnam. So instead of being hailed as a hero, as in the fable, the little boy who hon-

12 DEC 1971

Eyewitness

ACCUSES

Lt. Calley

By Andy Stapp

Two years, nine months and a day after "C" Company of the Americal Division's 11 Brigade burned the village of Mylai and executed 500 of its inhabitants, 1st Lt. William Calley went on trial at Ft. Benning, Ga., charged with the murder of "102 Oriental human beings."

The 27-year-old Calley, commanding officer of "C" Company's first platoon at the time of the massacre, has not been held in pretrial confinement since he was specifically charged with killing 102 civilians almost a year ago. He has, in fact, been on something of a nationwide tour, autographing his picture on the cover of Time magazine, shaking hands with George Wallace, receiving a thousand-dollar check from an American Legion rally and selling his "confessions" to Esquire magazine.

In 1966 he was only an obscure scab on the Florida railway strike. Today Calley's name is probably better known to the American people than that of the Secretary of the Army (Stanley Resor).

While 14 Army officers have also been indicted, including two generals, one the former commandant of West Point, attention is being focused on Calley's trial because it was his platoon that actually carried out the slaughter, with Calley dispatching many of the victims personally.

When Capt. Aubrey M. Daniels, 29-year-old Army prosecutor opened his case with a description of how Calley and Pvt. Paul Meadlo rounded up a large number of Vietnamese civilians, "women, children, babies and a few old men" and shot them down on the spot with automatic rifle fire, newsmen covering the trial reported that Calley "broke into a grin." The first 17 government witnesses gave general testimony about the assault on the hamlet, stating that they met with no armed resistance of any kind. Only one of the 17 even remembered seeing Calley at Mylai.

The attempt of defense attorney Maj. Kenneth A. Raby to show that the civilians might have been killed by airborne machinegun fire, rockets and artillery was refuted by Brian Livingston, a former helicopter pilot who testified that although "Shark" assault helicopters firing miniguns at 1000 rounds per minute killed

right and left of the road," these particular killings took place 500 yards south of Mylai and not in the village itself where most of the people were murdered.

On Dec. 1, a former Specialist 4 took the stand to testify that he had seen Calley, who was then his platoon commander, kill civilians. Robert Maples, a black 22-year-old warehouse worker, told how the soldiers burst into Mylai, firing their guns as they approached the grass-thatched huts.

"One woman came up and showed me her arm where she was shot," Maples said. "I couldn't do anything about it. She was elderly. The guys from the company just pushed a group in front of us to a clearing on the other side of the village. That's where the big ditch was."

"Lieutenant Calley came up and asked Harry Stanley to interpret for us. After Stanley finished, Calley herded the people into the ditch and he and Meadlo fired into the hole. Meadlo was crying. I saw him. Calley was on his left, his weapon into the hole."

"Did you have any conversation with Calley?" Captain Daniel asked. "Yes." "What did he say?" "He asked me to shoot my machinegun at the hole." "What did you say?" "I refused." "Were any of the people in the ditch armed?" "No." "Was there any resistance?" "No." "Was there any hostile fire?" "No."

At least 70 civilians were shot to death in the ditch.

A former rifleman in Calley's platoon, Renard Doines, testified that in the first group of prisoners turned over to Calley, just one was of military age and he had only one leg. Next on the stand was Roy Wood who stated that when he forced a man, a woman and two girls out of hiding, they were shot to death by a soldier yelling, "Kill them all."

Another GI, PFC Dennis Conti described how Calley and Meadlo killed 30 more prisoners by a trail. "Lieutenant Calley and Meadlo stood side by side and fired directly into the people. The people just screamed and yelled. I guess they wanted to get up. Lots of heads and pieces of hands were shot off and flesh flew off the sides and arms. They were all messed up. The bodies were messed up. At that time there were only a few kids left standing. Lt. Calley fired on them and killed them one by one."

On the first day of Calley's trial in the red-carpeted courtroom, military judge Col. Keith Kennedy said: "The entire transaction at Mylai has got to be disclosed in these proceedings." Whatever the Army brass intends to be Calley's ultimate fate, it is highly doubtful the "entire transaction" will ever be revealed because to do so would be to shed light on the hundreds of Mylai-type massacres that took place in Vietnam in recent years.

The "entire transaction" would also include public information about the secret training manuals military officers such as Calley must read before going to Vietnam, including restricted Army pamphlets 20-234 and 20-243.

Number 20-234, entitled "German Experiences in Russia," was prepared for the U.S. Army by German officers who fought in the Soviet Union, carrying out thousands of Mylai massacres in the Ukraine. Number 20-243, entitled "German Anti-Guerrilla Operations in the Balkans," was written for American military officers by the notorious murderer Lt. Gen. Hubert Lanz and Colonel of Police Karl Gaisser, Nazi "technical advisor" to the puppet Croatian police. Number 20-243 recommends that the actions of the Fifth SS Mountain Corps during Operation Kugelblitz in 1943 against communist guerrillas in Eastern Bosnia, the execution of 200 "suspected communists," "the burning of 10 villages" to break the Piraeus strike in 1944 and other such acts of fascist terror as a model for the suppression of guerrillas by "future occupiers."

What Task Force Barker did to Mylai on March 16, 1968, was no more out of character with the actions and goals of the U.S. Army in Vietnam than the destruction of the Yugoslav town of Leskovik was out of character with Nazi occupation activities in the Balkans.

Capt. Jesse Frosch, a military intelligence officer in Quang Ngai province headquarters, tore apart the myth that the racist slaughter of civilians at Mylai resulted from one U.S. company going berserk with battle fatigue. Upon retirement from the military, Frosch, a UPI reporter, told the story as he had watched it unfold. "Task Force Barker," wrote Frosch, "dispatched Capt. Eugene Kotouze—now charged with murder and maiming of Vietcong suspects in connection with the massacre—to talk to the CIA operative in Quang Ngai City. The CIA coordinated what was known as Operation Phoenix—the systematic elimination of known Vietcong hamlet and village cadres and supporters."

"The blacklist is the heart of the Phoenix program. For Mylai, it contained the names of as many as two-thirds of the entire hamlet population. It listed people who held positions in the Vietcong military-political complex, from secret and semi-secret hamlet guerrillas to chairmen of Vietcong farmers' organizations. The blacklist did not overlook children, documenting members of such groups as the Vietcong young girls' alliance and the Vietcong equivalent of the Boy Scouts. Those on the CIA-Phoenix blacklists were labeled for systematic elimination. To the extent that the CIA has been able to employ acceptable means of elimination,

STATINTL

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Is Nixon preparing for a wider war?

By Wilfred Burchett
Guardian staff correspondent

Paris

Storm signals are in the air for a dangerous new escalation in President Nixon's Vietnam policy now that he has the midterm elections behind him. The situation is being watched with the utmost vigilance by the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) delegations in Paris—and their respective governments.

The most immediate prospects are renewed systematic bombings of the North and an attempt to blow up the Paris conference. The protest movement in the United States needs to be on its tiptoes. The latest pretext for bombing the North every time an American pilot finds he is being tracked by DRV radar—a right claimed by the U.S.-Saigon command on Nov. 30 and later backed up by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird—is a straw in the wind. This is aimed at the very basis of the Paris talks—a total and unconditional halt to the bombing of the North.

The obvious reprisal in Hanoi came in the Dec. 5 edition of the Army paper reaffirming that the armed forces of the DRV were firmly decided to pursue and "shoot down reconnaissance planes; they would place antiaircraft installations where they wanted and concentrate their troops wherever necessary for the defense of the fatherland.

War drums

The renewed bombing of the North and threats by Laird of renewed commando attacks with overtones of attacks of an even more extended nature against the North coincide with veiled attacks on the utility of the Paris talks. U.S. delegation chief David Bruce briefed journalists to this effect on Dec. 1, claiming the Paris conferences were "a propaganda field day for the communists." It was a theme repeated by the U.S. and Saigon briefing offices at a Dec. 3 press conference when the Saigon spokesmen unprecedently refused to answer a journalist's question on the ground that it was "communist propaganda."

Inspired stories from Paris correspondents of the Washington Post and other papers have also taken up the theme as to how long the Paris talks can continue. At the NATO meeting Dec. 4, Secretary of State William Rogers harped on the same theme of U.S. "pessimism" regarding the Paris talks.

The propaganda campaign built up over the artificial POW issue—which Bruce has now made the only question at the Paris talks—is another facet of the same picture. Nixon appears to be preparing some new dangerous adventure.

Why, and why at this time? Because, as predicted many times in the Guardian, "Vietnamization" is about to blow up in Nixon's face. It simply is not working. Even Nixon's anti-guerrilla wizard—Sir Robert Thompson—has made this clear in his latest about-face report confirming an earlier CIA study that the NLF infrastructure has grown immeasurably stronger since Nixon's British advisor was last in South Vietnam. Implicit in Sir Robert's and the CIA report is that "Vietnamization" cannot work because of the existence of the Vietnamese. Only "de-Vietnamization" of Vietnam can solve Nixon's problems in

Catastrophe

In Laos and Cambodia and even in Western press reports it is no longer possible to hide the catastrophic consequences of Nixon's intervention in those two countries.

What does the much-publicized anti-guerrilla "expert" Sir Robert find in his five-week special mission for Nixon to the South in September-October? We do not know exactly but the privileged New York Times, briefed as it states in its Dec. 4 issue by administration officials familiar with the report, says "there has been a general failure in police and intelligence efforts in eliminating the Vietcong apparatus in the country" and that "success in other aspects of pacification cannot solve the basic political problem in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains virtually intact" and much more to that effect.

Stripped of Thompson's jargon of the political police which he represents, this means that the NLF has emerged as a definite victor in the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the South Vietnamese people. If U.S. policy was really for "self-determination" of the South Vietnamese people, as repeated in the weekly sessions of the Paris talks, then there it is.

The New York Times quotes "officials here with experience in Vietnam who have privately not only shared Sir Robert's view and conclusions but also argue that the South Vietnamese political and security situation is so fragile as to pose a critical threat to the Saigon government, even in the presence of 'residual' American combat forces."

Self-determination

What further argumentation does one need to show what is the real option in "self-determination" by the South Vietnamese people, despite the terrible odds stacked against them in the force of the U.S.-Saigon military-police machinery? In the same report, the New York Times confirms what the Guardian has been hammering away at for weeks, with extracts from the Saigon press to support its case: namely, as expressed in the Times' very special language, that "reports from the U.S. intelligence community circulated last week in the administration state that [Saigon President Nguyen Van] Thieu is losing political support at home." That must be one of the political understatements of the year. By reading even the most reactionary Saigon papers, it is clear that apart from the U.S. embassy and the U.S.-Saigon Command, dictator Thieu does not have a friend in South Vietnam.

Why Sir Robert's about-face? In fact the situation has not greatly changed since a year ago, after which Nixon was able to quote, in his famous Dec. 15 speech, this dubious expert's optimistic appraisal of the situation. There has been that steady consolidation of the NLF infrastructure throughout the country, but nothing spectacular to justify such a dramatic reversal of Sir Robert's previous optimism.

GIs say U.S. atrocities routine in Vietnam

More than 40 honorably discharged and active duty U.S. servicemen who fought in Vietnam testified in Washington, D.C., last week that the murder of Vietnamese civilians and torture of prisoners was "a matter of deliberate [U.S.] policy," not just the sadism of individual soldiers.

All told, testimony from over 100 ex-GIs was presented Dec. 1-3 in a conference at the Statler Hilton Hotel called the "National Veterans' Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes." The meeting was sponsored by the National Committee for a Citizens' Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam, which has conducted smaller hearings in 13 cities during the last year.

Purpose of the hearings is to demonstrate that American soldiers in Vietnam "have been compelled to be executioners of inhuman policies in Indochina." Evidence gathered by the committee may also be used in charges against military leaders and government officials.

Regarding the possibility of a legal case against U.S. generals, active Lt. Louis P. Font testified that "I learned at West Point that a commander is responsible for what happens under his command. If Lt. William Calley [who led the My Lai raid] is guilty, then the people who are responsible for him are far more guilty. . . . My Lai was not an aberration. My Lai was part of deliberate, criminal policy."

Other testimony included the following:

Robert Bowie Johnson Jr., a West Point graduate, said that since the war crimes were not "aberrant isolated acts," but rather "the logical consequences of our war policies," the Army was using the Calley trial as a scapegoat. Both Johnson and Michael Uhl testified that neither Army officers nor the Pentagon should be trusted to investigate the atrocities senior officers had witnessed or taken part in since they obviously have an interest in suppressing the truth.

James Dietrich testified that he processed all non-classified war crimes in Vietnam in 1969. Shortly after the My Lai massacre was made public, he reported, a verbal order was sent down the chain of command "to forget about investigating any more atrocity cases in Vietnam so as to prevent any further embarrassment to the U.S. military command." The order originated with deputy commander general of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Mabry (directly responsible to Vietnam commander Gen. Creighton Abrams).

According to Johnson, "generals, colonels—even captains are promoted on the basis of their body counts." Thus, many noncombatant civilians have died for the benefit of adding to a unit's body count.

Phil Wippenbach reported that in December 1968 a platoon leader ordered him to cut the arteries of four wounded NLF prisoners to

Mekong Delta area and that he expected the men to maintain the standards. Maj. Gordon Livingston, regimental surgeon for the 11th Armored Cavalry Division, testified that the standing order for the 11th Division was "Find the bastards and pile on." The chaplain included this in his prayers, he said.

Torture for information

One rationale used for torturing prisoners is to force them to give information. The hearings produced the first eyewitness public disclosure by personnel of Operation Phoenix, the military intelligence effort tied to the CIA, whose objective was to wipe out the National Liberation Front infrastructure.

Kenneth B. Osborn reported that American soldiers torture and murder NLF prisoners to gain intelligence information. Prisoners are thrown from helicopters, tortured with electric shocks and are mutilated as a matter of course. A former medical officer showed photos of a prisoner being given the water torture. Both Osborn and Stephen Nottzel admitted having taken battery-operated field telephones and hooking the leads to prisoners to get them to talk.

Mass murders of civilians are often committed because American soldiers can't distinguish the "enemy" from the people, the ex-GIs testified.

William Marhoun reported that he asked his commanding officer about a killing of 26 women and children. The CO said, "Yah, we got 26 V.C. . . . A gook is a gook; if it's got slanty eyes, kill the bastard." According to Daryl Nelson, any movement that was picked up on the radar screen would be zeroed in for artillery strikes. The result was indiscriminate killing of civilians and wholesale destruction of villages.

Ray Early told of frequent torture of Vietnamese suspects—men, women and children—and of wearing the ears as souvenirs. Bob [name redacted] testified that at least 50% of wounded prisoners were killed by [name redacted] mutilated enemy corpses by carving the First Air Cavalry patch into bodies.

STATINTL

PACIFICATION BOSS DUE IN CAPITAL

Summoned in Controversy
Over Anti-Vietcong Effort

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10.—The head of the pacification program in South Vietnam has been summoned to confer here next week with Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird amid a controversy in the Administration over the effectiveness of the effort to suppress the Vietcong's underground organization.

Defense Department officials declined to discuss the three-day visit by William E. Colby, the third-ranking American civilian official in Saigon. Mr. Colby directs the vast organization known as Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, or CORDS. Operation Phoenix, the campaign to stamp out the Vietcong underground is run jointly by CORDS and the South Vietnamese police.

Mr. Colby is expected to arrive Monday. The State Department has been informed of his visit, which was arranged by the Defense Department.

Pacification is the joint United States-Vietnamese program to establish security in the country's rural areas as well as foster economic development and self-government in villages free of Communist control.

A confidential report presented to the Administration by CORDS last month cast doubts on the success of pacification. It cited a recent survey showing that nearly 60 per cent of South Vietnamese interviewed in 242 hamlets believed their villages could still be penetrated at night by Communist units.

The question of security from the Vietcong bears on President Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, the effort to gradually replace United States forces with the Saigon Government's troops. A failure in pacification could affect the rate of American withdrawals.

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STATINTL

*Veterans' Inquiry into War Crimes**'We can't sleep, man'*

by Lucian K. Truscott, IV

WASHINGTON, D. C.—Kenneth B. Osborn, a slight, good-looking man whose long sideburns taper into points which meet the wry smile that frequently crosses his lips, sat down in front of a covey of microphones, tv cameras,

and reporters at the National Veterans' Inquiry into U. S. War Crimes at the Dupont Plaza Hotel last week to tell the story of his part in the war in Southeast Asia. His manner of speech, articulate, often charming, punctuated by his smile and over-ridden by his easy attitude, was disarming. The story he had to tell was that of Operation Phoenix, the CIA, and the frightening job they do for an army which denies their use.

Osborn, now 26, enlisted in the Army in 1966 to avoid being drafted. He enlisted in the Adjutant General's Corps, an administrative branch which deals largely in personnel management actions. First stationed at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he was put to work cutting orders for assignments and re-assignments. "Pretty soon, I got bored with the job. I wanted to get into something more exciting, so I looked into Military Intelligence and put in for a branch transfer," Osborn explained. Such applications take months to be processed, and Osborn was impatient. "So I cut my own orders—you know—it was my job, right? I was cutting orders, so I just re-assigned myself to Fort Holabird." "How did you decide what you wanted to do?" he was asked. "I wanted to do the James Bond thing. Maybe run spy nets in Berlin or something like that. So I started looking through the MOS (Military Occupational Specialty) catalog, and I found Counter Intelligence Agent—a whole half-page devoted to describing the job. Then I looked next to it, and there was one tiny paragraph explaining Area Intelligence Specialist. He studies 'areas,' learns 'geography,' becomes familiar with 'cultures,' innocuous stuff like that. I said to myself—'that's it,' and sure enough, it was."

What Osborn means by "that's it" is at the heart of his story, for the Area Intelligence Specialist course taught at Fort Holabird, Maryland, is where Army "spies" are trained. "The first day of the school we received what they call the 'searcie lecture,'" Osborn said. "It was given by a colonel; one of the two course coordinators, and the first thing he did was explain that the training we were about to receive violated the Geneva Accords and the rules of land warfare. He went into some detail explaining that we would be involved in illegal active intelligence gathering which would not be shared with the South Vietnamese, thus violating our agreement with them. He told us we would use illegal modus operandi in gathering intelligence covertly, rather than overtly. He then said that we were free to opt out of the program and that we would be given 24 hours to think it over." Only one man dropped out. What the colonel had termed as his "moral decision" had been made.

Osborn completed the course and reported to Vietnam for his first duty assignment. He was to spend 15 months there, eight of them actively engaged in Operation Phoenix, the CIA program to infiltrate and eliminate the VC infrastructure in South Vietnam. "When I reported to Saigon," Osborn recalled, "I was assigned to the 525th Military Intelligence Group. There I was given a 'cover' identity, with identification papers to match, a full set of civilian clothes, and assigned a job as an intelligence operative, or agent case officer in Da Nang. I posed as a GS (government service) 7, a civil service rank for DACs, or Department of the Army civilians. The job I had was completely CIA-funded, and I drew GS 7 pay, as well as special expense money with his tent. I wondered what he was doing around Da Nang." Asked how

many nets he ran at once, and how many agents he controlled, Osborn replied, "three or four nets with a total of 40 to 50 agents."

In effect, Osborn was an Army "spy" in Vietnam. His intelligence nets were to gather information on VC activity in the area which would be relayed to the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force for use in their military operations. Asked why the intelligence was not shared with South Vietnamese units in the area, Osborn replied that "they were just not trusted." It was believed, he said, that the RVN forces would leak the information to the VC counter-intelligence because the RVN army was known to be infiltrated by VC and NVA agents.

Osborn's duties as an "agent handler" were every bit as cloak and dagger as one might suspect. The agent nets he set up were never entirely trustworthy, and his life, he said, was always in a state of precarious balance. "I walked a very thin line in that job. Because I was working under cover, if I were to be threatened, killed, or captured, the Army could not be obligated to do anything for me. And if I 'blew my cover,' or lost my fake identity, it would be all over."

The first problem he encountered was his own credibility, for his "attachment" to the Marines was known only to high-level CIA officials. For security reasons, it was necessary that he remain just one more civilian government official living far off the land. At first, the information he gathered and supplied to the Marines was taken lightly. Osborn recalled with obvious pride the instance which precipitated his acceptance by the Marines. "I got some intelligence from one of my agents late one day that a Marine regimental command post was to be mortared that night. So I drew up a report and turned it over to the lieutenant in charge of the intelligence team at the Marine headquarters. As I walked out of his tent, I wondered what he was doing around and walked back in. He had taken it from me and 'shit-canned' it, as the Marines say. I

STATINTL

December 7, 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE

Development Act requiring the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to follow the dictates of Congress with regard to the establishment of criteria for funding waste and sewer grants.

It has been brought to my attention that a member of the House Banking and Currency Committee, the Honorable THOMAS L. ASHLEY, purportedly stated that he was confident that the conference committee on the housing bill would remove my amendment. It was obvious that the will of the House was behind my amendment because no vote was heard in opposition to its passage, with the chairman of the Housing Subcommittee, the Honorable WILLIAM A. BARNETT of Pennsylvania, voicing his support of my proposal, along with the ranking minority member of the Banking and Currency Committee, the Honorable WILLIAM B. WIDNALL of New Jersey, likewise voicing his support. The author of the substitute measure, the Honorable ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., of Georgia, voiced his support for my amendment and no opposition appeared openly. It is quite presumptuous for anyone to assume that the conference committee will delete an amendment that was adopted without visible opposition at the time of passage.

For the information of my colleagues, I am inserting the New York Times article into the Record:

HOUSE G.O.P. CUES HOUSING MEASURE (By John Herbers)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3.—Republicans in the House of Representatives outmaneuvered the Democratic majority today and struck from a compromise housing bill a provision that would have established broad new authority for building new communities and revitalizing old ones.

The bill, which still contained some provisions opposed by the Administration, then was passed by a vote of 327 to 30.

It now goes to a conference committee, where Democratic and Republican sponsors will attempt to restore the new communities section, which is by far the most important part of the legislation.

Earlier this year the Senate passed a similar \$4-billion bill containing the new communities provision.

By a teller vote of 91 to 84, the House struck the entire section broadening the Government's authority in helping establish new communities. Under a teller vote, members march up the center aisle and are tallied as being either for or against an amendment.

The vote came on an amendment by Lawrence G. Williams, Republican of Pennsylvania, who argued that establishing a corporation within the Department of Housing and Urban Development with powers to acquire land, guarantee loans and make grants for community facilities would place too much power in the Federal Government.

MINORITY OUT IN STRENGTH

The Republican minority was out in strength for the Williams amendment. Only a fraction of the Democrats were on the floor.

Ordinarily, a teller vote can be reversed in a roll-call after the members have been routed out of their offices and conference rooms. But this was impossible today because the Williams amendment was to another amendment and was not subject to a roll-call.

"We had the votes," said Representative Thomas L. Ashley, Democrat of Ohio, author of the bill. "We simply didn't have them on the floor."

Representative William B. Widnall, Republican of New Jersey, ranking minority member on the Banking and Currency Committee, who had helped work out the compromise bill, appealed for retention of the new communities section.

He said it was "responsible, constructive" legislation that followed the concept for urban growth policy and new communities set by the Administration and was needed not only to get new towns under way but also to rebuild residential sections of the central city.

The Ashley proposal would greatly expand the new communities section of the Housing Act of 1968, which has attracted little activity. It would do so by providing loan guarantees to both local governments and private developers, making grants for community projects and assembling the necessary land for development of large projects.

George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, made a similar proposal earlier in the year, but it was rejected by the Budget Bureau as too costly for the time being.

After the Ashley bill came out of committee, Mr. Romney asked Congress to wait until next year, when President Nixon is to make comprehensive housing and urban policy proposals.

The Administration offered a bill that simply would have continued existing housing proposals until comprehensive legislation is drafted next year. That measure was defeated last night.

Today, House Republican leaders had their members out to defeat the Ashley bill. On the new communities section they succeeded, but they were turned back on further substantive amendments.

What emerged was a bill that went considerably further than the Administration proposed. For example, it would expand existing housing programs by about \$2.4-billion over the next three years.

Also it provides for the Government to underwrite crime insurance if rates in high-crime areas become unreasonable. This provision is designed to help small shopowners and others who are faced with heavy losses because of robberies and burglaries.

The House accepted by voice vote and without debate an amendment by Benjamin B. Blackburn, Republican of Georgia, to prevent H.U.D. from withholding water, sewer and other grants to suburban communities because they do not make provisions for low-income housing.

Mr. Ashley said this would clearly stand in the way of plans made in the housing agency to disperse central city poor to the suburbs where employment is more available.

The housing agency has been pursuing such an policy on a limited basis by giving priority to communities that do make provisions for low-income families. But agency plans for a stronger policy in this regard have been questioned by Attorney General John N. Mitchell and others in the Administration. (This was the subject of a White House discussion yesterday by Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Romney and President Nixon.)

Mr. Ashley said he was confident that the Blackburn amendment would be eliminated in conference, even though no one in the House spoke against it.

MILITARY RECORD OF HAWN FAMILY

(Mr. HUNT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Speaker, patriotism and duty to country are words to which more than lipservice is paid by the fam-

ily of Mr. and Mrs. Richard W. Hawn, Sr., of Lindenwold, N.J.

It was certainly refreshing to read on the front page of Lindenwolds Record Breeze of November 26, 1970, that four of the Hawns' children and a daughter-in-law either have served honorably or are presently serving in the U.S. Marine Corps.

Mr. Speaker, on this the 7th day of December—Pearl Harbor Day—the military record of the Hawn family perpetuates the tradition of those who have courageously fought and died for the freedoms which we enjoy in these United States. It is a record, also, which stands in marked contrast to the scores of youth who have reneged on their responsibilities as Americans and have given up their country by seeking the relative comfort of refuge in Sweden and Canada.

Mr. and Mrs. Richard Hawn have a family they can certainly be proud of and I heartily commend them. The Record Breeze article follows:

MILITARY RECORD OF HAWN FAMILY

LINDENWOLD.—To say the Hawn family is a military family would be making an understatement.

Two of the sons of Mr. and Mrs. Richard W. Hawn, Sr., John and Stephen, their fourth and sixth sons, and graduates of Overbrook Regional High School, recently completed their "boot" camp training at the Marine Corps Training Depot at Parris Island, S.C., and are now stationed at Camp Lejeune, N.C., for advanced training.

The two will be home for Christmas leave before departing for California and thence moving on to Okinawa.

The eldest of the Hawn brothers, Sgt. Richard W. Hawn, Jr., also a member of the Marine Corps, is now home, following his honorable discharge from the service in California.

A veteran of the Vietnam fighting, he is staying with his parents while awaiting his wife, Corporal Marsha Hawn, who will be transferred to Philadelphia, where she will finish her enlistment, also in the U.S. Marine Corps.

The Hawns have another son, James, who is stationed in Fort Jackson, S.C. He will return in November and serve with the reserves.

In all, Mr. and Mrs. Hawn have 10 children.

COMMENTS ON THE LATEST TURN IN VIETNAM POLICY

(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. COLEMAN. Mr. Speaker, it has been almost 3 weeks since the original announcement by the Department of Defense about renewed bombing in North Vietnam. During this time, we have been treated to a series of disclaimers followed by corrections followed again by additional briefings.

All this point, only one thing seems clear—the bombing marks a renewed escalation of the Vietnam war. Notwithstanding that Orwellian explanation that these raids were "protective reaction of limited duration" this was clearly a new and regrettable offensive operation.

The raid on the Gontoy prison camp is,

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Thompson Mission To Asia Confirmed By the White House

STATINTL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 3--The White House confirmed today that Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, had made a recent trip to South Vietnam for President Nixon and had submitted his findings to him in a secret report.

The White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said, however, that he could not discuss the contents of the Thompson report because it was secret.

Referring to a dispatch from Washington published in The New York Times today and disclosing the Thompson mission, Mr. Ziegler said that "the over-all thrust of the story which leads to the impression that the pacification and Vietnamization programs are not doing well is an incorrect impression."

The Times dispatch said that the Thompson report described as ineffective the allied efforts to destroy the Vietcong political apparatus in South Vietnam. The article said that this conclusion seemed to "question the validity" of the two programs so long as the Vietcong apparatus remained virtually intact.

A Correction

Because of an editing error, an article in early editions of The New York Times yesterday erroneously described Operation Phoenix on South Vietnam as "a code name for a secret Central Intelligence Agency operation that led to the alleged massacre at Mylai, March 16, 1968." The dispatch dealt with criticism of Operation Phoenix's effectiveness reportedly made by Sir Robert Thompson. The erroneous description did not appear in late editions.

Operation Phoenix is a combined United States and South Vietnamese program to find and imprison or execute Vietcong political officials. The C.I.A. participates in the operation, but there has been no report of a connection between this program and the Mylai incident.

STATINTL

Ex-Army Intelligence Agent Says He Saw POW's Killed

Washington, Dec. 2 (AP)—A former Army intelligence agent told today of being in a United States Marine Corps helicopter in Vietnam and twice witnessing Marine enlisted men, on an officer's orders, shove prisoners out of the door.

The former agent, Kenneth Barton Osborn, added these other points about his 15 months in Vietnam:

1. He said he watched a Marine push a sharpened peg into a prisoner's ear during interrogation. The prisoner died.

2. He said he himself circumvented an order to "terminate with extreme prejudice" (kill) one of his own agents.

3. He told of knowing an Army captain who admitted executing one of Mr. Osborn's agents. The victim was a Vietnamese-Chinese woman, Mr. Osborn said, who had knowledge of many intelligence operations and how they worked.

Mr. Osborn, 25, lives in Washington and is working toward a master's degree at American University. He said his father is an engineer at Cape Kennedy, and that he was born in Baltimore and graduated from a preparatory school there.

For 15 months in Vietnam in 1967-1968, Mr. Osborn said, he was attached as a private to the 525th Military Intelligence Group, masquerading as a civilian government employee in the Da Nang area, recruiting and controlling networks of Vietnamese agents.

He said his work involved feeding information to Marine and Army combat units and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Pentagon says it does not dispute the credentials of Mr. Osborn or any of the 50 other honorably discharged veterans taking part in an anti-war group's "war crimes inquiry."

However, the Pentagon says, it cannot act on the accounts if no official charges have been made. Mr. Osborn said he has never made an official charge.

Asked why he did not complain at the time, Mr. Osborn said: "There is no reason," he said, "except these things were so much the standard operating procedure. My entire peer group was doing the same thing."

He brings it up now, he said, "because we [the United States] should not criticize others for what we are doing ourselves, or, we should cut it out."

Mr. Osborn said, "It's all against the American value system. I don't feel I can be a good Christian or in good conscience be a good citizen" without saying something now.

3 DEC 1970

Expert Now Gloomy In Report to Nixon On Vietcong Power

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2—Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, has told President Nixon that the United States and allied intelligence and police efforts have failed to destroy the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam.

His report, submitted in writing to the President at an unpublicized White House meeting on Oct. 13, appears to be in marked contrast with the relatively optimistic views on the security situation in South Vietnam that Sir Robert offered Mr. Nixon last December.

Sir Robert's findings — outlined to The New York Times today by Administration officials familiar with the report — were based on a new five-week secret mission he undertook in South Vietnam at President Nixon's request during September and October before coming to Washington to deliver his report.

The previous mission for Mr. Nixon, which also lasted five weeks, was completed last Dec. 3, when he met with the President.

In his policy speech on Vietnam on Dec. 15, Mr. Nixon told of the Thompson mission, described his findings as "cautiously optimistic," and quoted him as reporting that, "I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with all previous visits and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas."

Sir Robert's recent mission, however, as well as the existence of his October report



Associated Newspapers

Sir Robert Thompson

has been kept secret, reportedly because his new conclusions seem to question the validity of the pacification and Vietnamization programs, including Operation Phoenix, which has been described as a code name for a secret Central Intelligence Agency operation that led to the alleged massacre at My Lai March 16, 1968.

On Oct. 14, the day after he conferred with President Nixon, Sir Robert discussed the Vietnam situation at a meeting of high level military officers and Defense Department and intelligence officials, paraphrasing in replies to questions the key points contained in his report to the President.

The main theme of Sir Robert's findings was that despite some successes in pacification, particularly in the performance by newly elected officials in South Vietnamese villages, there has been a general failure in police and intelligence efforts aimed at eliminating Vietcong apparatus in the country.

The Thompson report was said to have emphasized that success in other aspects of pacification cannot solve the basic political problem in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains virtually intact.

Despite continuing Administration optimism over pacifica-

tion, as expressed in public statements, there are officials here with extensive experience in Vietnam who privately not only share Sir Robert's new conclusions but also argue that the South Vietnamese political and security situation is so fragile as to pose a critical threat to the Saigon Government even in the presence of "residual" American combat forces.

Follows Earlier Assessment

Sir Robert's report followed an earlier assessment given to President Nixon by the Central Intelligence Agency that more than 30,000 Communist agents had been infiltrated into the Saigon Government, including the office of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

When The New York Times published on Oct. 19 an article based on the C.I.A. report, White House officials said that it exaggerated the extent of the infiltration and was "overly pessimistic." These comments were made, however, five days after the submission of the Thompson report declaring the allied antisubversive program to be "inadequate."

The responsibility for eradicating the underground Vietcong apparatus is vested in an agency known as Civil Operations and Rural Operations Support, or CORDS, an arm of the United States military command in Saigon. CORDS works in cooperation with the South Vietnamese military intelligence and national police.

The American agency's main antisubversive instrument is the highly controversial Operation Phoenix, composed of South Vietnamese police and military and intelligence agents, United States civilian and military personnel and operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, who play a key role in the whole operation.

Sir Robert was said to have reported, however, that the three-year-old Operation Phoenix and related activities were not doing "their job" and had failed to break up the enemy's main effort in South Vietnam.

Other intelligence sources said that Operation Phoenix itself was infiltrated by Vietcong agents.

Officials familiar with Sir Robert's conclusions said that he was much less optimistic over the worldwide aspects of the Vietnam situation than he was last year. Asked at the Pentagon meeting when the United States could leave Vietnansified Communist shelling installations appeared to bear "not right away."

STATINTL

8 DEC 1970

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STATINTL

GIs CHARGE U.S. WAR CRIMES

"We could hear them screaming"

By JERRY OPPENHEIMER

A night in a room with pythons, bamboo shoots placed under the fingernails, dunkings in human excrement, water torture and "the Bell Telephone hour" are methods used by Army interrogators to force information from suspected enemy soldiers, according to a group of anti-war Vietnam veterans.

The allegations were made yesterday at the second session of the National Veterans' "Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes," being held thru today at the Dupont Plaza Hotel.

The forum is aimed at arousing public opinion to the group's contention that the alleged My Lai massacre was just one incident in the de facto policy of war crimes committed by U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Members of the group contend that Lt. William Calley, accused of killing 102 men, women and children in the village of My Lai, is a scapegoat for high level commanders.

Steven Noetzel, of Floral Park, N.Y., a former Special Forces intelligence specialist, testified that in November, 1963, he was with a group of soldiers transporting 16 suspected Viet Cong soldiers by helicopter to an interrogation point.

He said that when they arrived at Tan Son Nhut Airport only four of the suspects remained. "They pushed the other 12 out over the Mekong Delta. A colonel asked what happened to the other prisoners and he was told they tried to escape."

Mr. Noetzel, father of three and an employee of the Bell Telephone Co., said he didn't witness the incident, "but I saw flesh on the door jamb and blood on the floor" of the helicopter. He said the door gunner told him that the men had been pushed out.

While working with a psychological warfare team, Mr. Noetzel said he had the opportunity to witness the day-to-day operations of the Special Forces in the IV Corps area. He claimed that he saw suspected Viet Cong placed in barbed wire cages with their hands tied behind their backs and covered with mosquito-attracting liquid, and detainees thrown blindfolded into rice paddies filled with human waste when they refused to answer questions.

At one camp, Mr. Noetzel said, two or three prisoners were placed overnight in a room containing a python snake. "We could hear



KENNETH B. OSBORNE

them screaming all night." He said he saw two such snakes ranging in length from 8 to 16 feet.

Kenneth B. Osborne, now studying at the International Service School at American University, said he served in Vietnam from September, 1967, to December, 1968, as an intelligence specialist working in an undercover capacity. He said he lived in Da Nang "under a cover name" recruiting and training South Vietnamese agents, in cooperation with the CIA.

Mr. Osborne testified that he witnessed detainees thrown out of helicopters twice during April, 1963, near Da Nang. He claimed the acts were committed "by Marine enlisted men on orders from their lieutenant. I was there to observe. During my 15 months in Vietnam I was responsible for deaths."

Several times, Mr. Osborne said, the CIA asked him "to terminate agents with prejudice," which he described as CIA jargon for killing an agent. After receiving one such order, Mr. Osborne said he told the man to leave the area because he did not want to kill him. Another time he was told "to terminate with prejudice" a Chinese woman who was acting



STEVEN NOETZEL

as his contact with other agents. "They felt she was too cross-exposed to our activities," he said.

He said he also witnessed bamboo shoots stuck under the fingernails of suspects and, in one instance, a sharpened wooden dowel forced into the ear of a man who later died. The so-called "Bell Telephone hour," according to Mr. Osborne, was the placement of live wires from a field telephone to the feet, hands, ears of prisoners.

Gordon S. Livingston, of Baltimore, identified himself as a 1960 graduate of West Point and a physician who served during 1963 with the 82d Airborne as a regimental surgeon. The outfit was commanded by Col. George S. Patton, 3d, who is now a brigadier general serving in Germany. Mr. Livingston, now a resident in psychiatry at Johns Hopkins, said that the slogan of the outfit was "to find the bastards and pile on."

He said that in February of 1969 he witnessed a chaplain in the unit "praying for a big body count at the nightly briefings." Mr. Livingston recited the prayer which he allegedly heard: "Help us, oh Lord, to fulfill the standing order of this regiment. Give us the wisdom to find the bastards and pile on."

STATINTL

8 DEC 1970

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Forced Plunge From Copter To Coerce VC Is Described

By Bernard D. Nossiter
Washington Post Staff Writer

A former Army intelligence agent yesterday said he had twice witnessed Vietnamese thrown to their deaths from Marine helicopters in order to extract information from suspected Vietcong supporters.

The veteran, Kenneth B. Osborn, 26, said that the two victims were pushed out from 200 to 300 feet above the ground in the spring of 1968 over an uninhabited region 15 miles north of Danang.

He spoke out at the second day of a mock tribunal being staged here by an anti-war group, the National Veterans' Inquiry into U.S. War Crimes Policy. The organization has put on similar affairs in 13 other cities but this was the first time that Osborn appeared.

The Pentagon has said it is investigating all allegations of atrocities. Yesterday, a spokesman said that the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam opened an inquiry several months ago into charges that a Vietnamese was hurled from a helicopter. The spokesman, however, did not know whether this examination, still under way, involves the incidents described by Osborn.

Osborn, a native of Baltimore, is a graduate student at American University and now lives at 5205 Sherrier Place,

NW. He outlined his story at the inquiry's public session and then filled in more details for reporters who questioned him more than two hours. He was direct and circumstantial about some matters, but on others he was either deliberately vague or said he could not recall.

This is the essence of Osborn's account:

To avoid the draft, he enlisted in 1966 and volunteered for intelligence. At his training course in Fort Holabird, Md., an intelligence colonel warned students at an orientation lecture that they must make a "moral" decision about staying in a field requiring illegal acts. Only one man, not Osborn, left.

He arrived in Vietnam in September, 1967, and was assigned to the 525th Intelligence Group, First Battalion.

His account continued:

Osborne was sent to Danang where he posed as a Defense Department civilian and established networks embracing 40 to 50 Vietnamese agents. He passed his information on to Marine units stationed there, but complained that he was being disregarded. This, he feared, would also endanger the expense money he was being provided for his agents.

To "prove I was being effectively used," Osborn was invited by a Marine first lieutenant

to observe at first hand the questioning of a suspected Vietcong sympathizer who had been identified by Osborn's network.

He will not name the Marine, but describes him as a former non-commissioned officer in his late thirties, the chief of a Counter Intelligence Interrogation Team for the III Marine Amphibious Force.

Osborn, the officer, two or three Marine enlisted men serving as guards, a Marine pilot and co-pilot took off in a Sikorsky helicopter from Danang in March or April 1968. Their passengers were the suspect, a man in his twenties from the village of Phuongdoc, and the prospective victim, a man in his early thirties. Both had their hands tied behind their backs.

Once aloft, the Marine officer questioned the victim for about 15 minutes in Vietnamese. Twice or three times the man was led to the open door and threatened with expulsion unless he talked. The victim, who Osborn believes was selected deliberately for his lack of knowledge, was finally seized at the officer's orders by two of the Marine guards and thrown out.

"He screamed on the way down," Osborn recalled.

Then, he said, the suspect, cowering in a corner, acknowledged that he had been recruited by the Vietcong and that he had buried a weapons cache in his garden. Osborn said that this cache was later found.

In late April, 1968, Osborn said, the same officer, now a captain, invited him along for a similar ride. The intelligence agent, then an enlisted man, fourth grade, could not remember as many details of this incident. But he said that, once again a man he thought had no knowledge was pushed from the helicopter to frighten a genuine suspect into talking.

Osborn also told of seeking out a Central Intelligence Agency official in Danang to supply him with political information in exchange for extra amounts of expense money to pay agents. Osborn identified the CIA official as Foster Phipps, whose "cover" title was coordinator, Combined Studies Division. The Army veteran said that he received "wads of piasters," perhaps several hundred thousands, under this arrangement.

Osborn was discharged in October, 1969, with a Bronze Star medal. He said he has several times visited the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., to supply information to a friend he had known at Danang. Last spring, he said, this friend proposed that the CIA subsidize his graduate studies and then enroll him in the agency.

Osborn declined. He said: "I waited maybe a year (after leaving Vietnam) to get my head on straight. I didn't have any real guilt hangups there."

But back home, he continued, he decided:

"These things are wrong. America has no place in Vietnam. What little good we do is outdone ten times by the bad. I'm a Christian. I'd like to neutralize what we were doing in Southeast Asia."

This, he said, led him to speak out.

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2 Dec 1970

STATINTL

Ex-CIA man speaks of Vietnam killings

From Our Own Correspondent
Washington, Dec. 2

The veterans inquiry into alleged United States war crimes today resumed with detailed testimony from former Army intelligence operators in Vietnam on the murky world of prisoner torture, assassination and the "termination with prejudice" of Vietnamese agents who had possibly been compromised.

Mr. Kenneth Osborn, aged 25, a language student at American University in Washington who served in Da Nang under a cover name during 1968, said a Chinese woman agent who worked for him was shot in the street by an American captain because it was feared she might have heard too much about United States operations.

He said he had twice been ordered personally to "terminate agents with prejudice"—the euphemism used by the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) for assassination. The first time involved an agent with a wife and family who had once worked as an interpreter for the C.I.A., but had failed to report this.

He said: "I told him what I had been ordered to do and that if he did not disappear with his family for three months I would have to come back and kill him. He disappeared."

The second time, he said, an agent in Phu Bai had become involved in the black market. "I was told to terminate him. I went up to Phu Bai and brought him down to Da Nang to live with relatives."

Mr. Osborn said he had been involved with the C.I.A. on an advisory basis since leaving Vietnam until June this year. One reason agents had been required to take cover names, he alleged, was so that "if any charges were officially brought against the Government there would be no documentation" of the people involved in intelligence operations.

During training at Fort Holabird, he said the intelligence men were warned that much of "all this was against the Geneva accords and if we had moral compunctions we should opt out then."

LANSING, MICH.
JOURNAL

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NOV 24 1970

Winter Weather Forces Anti-War Protesters Inside

By HELEN CLEGG
State Journal Staff Writer

A disconsolate group of anti-war protesters at Michigan State University moved from the wind-chilled steps of the Administration Building during the noon hour Monday to the lobby of the International Center to discuss "where do we go from here."

Even the talk was cool after the six dozen protesters sat on the floor, chairs and tables—amidst other students who were already there and who continued to read, work crossword puzzles or converse.

The withdrawal of troops from Vietnam has defused the anti-war movement, William Derman, assistant professor of

anthropology, told the quiet group.

Derman declared that "CIA-trained troops of the Vietnamese" continued the war for the United States and that the withdrawal of U.S. troops was

M.S.U.

a false indication of the de-escalation of the war.

"We (the anti-war movement) are a critical component and need to remain that way," Derman said.

Richard O. Shields, who was enrolled at MSU last winter term but is not now a student, said he was a member of the Students for a Democratic Society and that "we should

talk about what we can do to keep the anti-war movement going and we should concentrate on ROTC, the most visible arm of the military. I think it is important to realize how important the maintenance of ROTC is to the military."

RIGHT QUESTIONED

Shields went on to reply to a question about what right they had to interfere with the academic freedom of others who want to take ROTC by asking whether any organization has the right to exploit, oppress and murder people.

And to the argument that ROTC cadets will liberalize the Army, Shields replied that all they do is follow the orders of superior officers.

Susan Parry, Lansing graduate student, suggested that the people of the United States bypass the government and make peace with the people of Vietnam. She suggested May 1 be the target date at which time they should "begin to take steps to stop the government from waging war," even if it means militant action.

After about an hour, the group broke up into three smaller groups, one to meet Tuesday night about anti-ROTC activities, one to write a letter to The State News about the renewed bombing and why students should be concerned about it, and the third group to meet and discuss the peace treaty idea.

CHAU CASE UP AGAIN

Thieu Faces Dilemma
On Future of CriticBy HENRY S. BRADSHAW
Star Staff Writer

SAIGON — The lower house of the National Assembly threw back to President Nguyen Van Thieu today the politically explosive question of what to do about Deputy Tran Ngoc Chau.

Thieu faces an awkward choice between releasing a strong critic of his increasingly personalized regime, as the Vietnamese Supreme Court has ordered, or defying the court and putting Chau on trial again probably amid bitter demonstrations of public indignation.

Chau was convicted March 8 of having illegal connections with the Communists and was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

Three times the Supreme Court has ruled against the conviction. The third time, Oct. 28, it nullified the whole action against Chau and ordered him released by Oct. 30.

Instead of releasing him, Thieu wrote last Saturday to the lower house of the National Assembly, of which Chau is a member, seeking authorization for a new trial.

The speaker, Nguyen Ba Luong, wrote back to Thieu today that a controversial earlier House decision on the case still stood and so Thieu did not have to seek new authorization. This was, in effect, a refusal of the House to become further involved while at the same time not challenging Thieu.

The reply letter was sent after the 21-member agenda committee of the lower house, 19 of whose members are government supporters, decided it would raise too much public outcry to take the issue to the full 134-member House, Vietnamese sources said.

Chau is an old colleague of Thieu's from army service together. As an outstandingly effective anti-Communist provincial official, Chau became closely associated with U.S. Central Intelligence Agency officials in Vietnam.

TRAN NGOC CHAU
Brother Northern Agent

After Chau entered the Assembly, his brother Tran Ngoc Hien contacted him. Hien is a North Vietnamese intelligence agent.

In a controversy here and in Washington earlier this year, Chau was reported to have told his CIA friends of the contact but not South Vietnamese officials. When Thieu moved against Chau, the U.S. Embassy here refused to speak up for him in a way that some American critics felt it should have done.

Thieu's belated prosecution of Chau followed Chau's public

charges of corruption in the presidential palace. Chau's contact with his brother apparently had become known to Thieu sometime earlier.

Thieu asked the Assembly on Nov. 15, 1969, to lift Chau's parliamentary immunity, which required a three-quarters vote. But the political overtones of the case kept the president from getting more than 70 votes of agreement that there had been illegal Communist contacts. It was this vote that Luong referred to today.

First Got 20 Years

Then the government declared Chau's offense to be so flagrant that he could be tried anyway. Chau went into hiding and a military court sentenced him in absentia to 20 years.

Chau appeared at the Assembly, was seized by police and tried again, getting 10 years. He is now in Saigon's Chi Hoa jail.

On appeals by Chau's lawyers, the Supreme Court first ruled that the military court was unconstitutional, then that Chau's immunity still existed, and finally that — in view of the government's defiance of the earlier orders — the whole case was nullified and Chau could not be tried again on the same charge.

Chief Justice Tian Minh Tiet told reporters the ruling was effective immediately, as of Oct. 30.

Trouble Expected

Still, Thieu did not allow Chau's release. Instead he turned to the lower house.

Vietnamese observers suggest that whatever Thieu does now will mean trouble.

With presidential elections coming up next October and Thieu determined to seek a second term, Chau would be a dangerous critic to have at large. His martyr status now enhances his previously significant power of attack.

But if Thieu continues to defy the Supreme Court, the lower house, with which his relations are already bad, could be even harder to deal with. Streets which have been quiet for three months could erupt in new demonstrations.

Despite indications so far that Thieu was determined to keep Chau out of circulation, legally or otherwise, observers did not rule out a sudden reversal which would release him.

STATINTL

U.S. Withdrawing 'Berets' in Vietnam

SAIGON, Nov. 16 (AP) — The 5th Special Forces Group, which commands all Green Beret units in Vietnam, will be withdrawn from combat soon. The U.S. Command declined to comment, but sources both in and out of Special Forces confirm that the group will be withdrawn by the end of the year.

A small contingent of Green Berets, staying behind under direct control of the U.S. Command, will work as advisers to South Vietnamese special forces. This contingent will apparently include those joint U.S.-South Vietnamese teams which conduct clandestine reconnaissance operations along the Ho Chi Minh trail as well as in South Vietnam.

Army officials in Washington said they expect the Green Berets force of 9,000 men to lose a third of its strength by the end of 1971.

Future Under Study

The future of the 5th Group itself is still under study, sources said, but it will probably return to its home base at Ft. Bragg, N.C.

The primary mission in Vietnam has been to advise Vietnamese forces in the operation of a series of camps manned by Civilian Irregular Defense Group mercenaries. In fact, U.S. Special Forces trained, paid and led the CIDG troops with little active participation by Vietnamese special forces. There were some 80 CIDG camps at the program's peak, with the bulk along the Laotian and Cambodian borders.

In 1969 and early 1970, 28 camps were turned over to South Vietnamese regional forces and conventional U.S. Army advisers.

The Special Forces' role in Vietnam has been controversial within and outside the Army. Green Beret officers contend that their operations were hampered by conventionally trained commanders who failed to understand the war's guerrilla nature. Regular Army officers assert that control over Special Forces operations was too loose.

Retired Commander

Col. Robert Rheault, retired former commander of 5th Group, believes Special Forces could have been used much more effectively. He told an AP reporter in the United States:

"The CIDG mission was reasonable in its original concept. As time went on and the flavor of the war changed and control of the operation passed from the CIA to the Army, there was no question that in a lot of areas Special Forces did become tied down to a conventional static defense role."

Rheault said Special Forces were partly successful in the border surveillance mission, particularly in the central highlands, where montagnard tribesmen were trained as CIDG soldiers, but that in other areas the mission was "totally unrealistic."

Special Forces could have been used more effectively "had they been given greater freedom of action," Rheault said, and if there had been a greater understanding of the CIDG program and revolution and counterrevolution itself by Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, the U.S. command and some local commanders.

Defies Logic

Rheault said the withdrawal of Special Forces "defies a logical explanation and invites speculation that the reason for it is an emotional one."

"Why does MAC-V want to do away with a program which was Vietnamization in the true sense before anybody else dreamed it up?" he asked. "It operated at a low cost in American dollars and American lives. So why kill this program while thousands of Americans remain in Vietnam? I know the official answer is Vietnamization, but I'm sorry, I just don't buy it."

Rheault retired a year ago even though the Army dropped all charges against him in the so-called Green Beret murder case. The case raised speculation that the U.S. commander in Vietnam disliked Special Forces and their methods.

17 NOV 1970

U.S. Expected to Cut Viet Pacification Staff 20 Pct. in 1971

STATINTL

By Peter A. Jay

Washington Post Foreign Service

SAIGON—The American pacification effort, the side of the war directed at improving local security and ferreting out underground Communists, is likely to undergo some serious belt-tightening next year.

Officials here say the pacification program, which now incorporates about 6,000 American military men and 1,000 civilians spread throughout Vietnam, will be reduced in strength by as much as 20 per cent in 1971.

The program, known by the obscure acronym of CORDS (Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support), is expected to go on shrinking thereafter at a rate determined by a host of variables, among them the Paris peace negotiations, the progress or lack of it demonstrated by the government of South Vietnam, and the actions of the Communists.

Officials Differ

Few Americans attribute these impending reductions to either dramatic success or spectacular failure on the part of CORDS. Rather, the anticipated cutback is usually described in carefully neutral terms as a natural step in the process of handing back the war—and the country—to the Vietnamese.

Though a few pacification officials, mostly military men, say their work will be hampered by the impending loss of manpower, most take the opposite view.

"The way it is now, we're tail-heavy," said a civilian adviser, the senior CORDS representative in a central Vietnam province. "Too many cooks, too many mechanics, too many people whose only job is to provide support. We'd be better off with one-fourth the men."

Pacification Program

The pacification program has American teams in each of South Vietnam's 44 provinces and 242 districts. There are also headquarters teams in

each of the country's four military regions and in Saigon.

Act as Advisers

The teams work with the South Vietnamese colonels and majors who have been appointed province and district chiefs—quasi-civilian posts—by President Thieu. They advise local militia forces, and prod the Vietnamese to fill out the countless reports from which a computerized pacification profile is produced each month.

There has been increased emphasis recently on the so-called Phoenix program, a controversial plan originated by the Central Intelligence Agency two years ago to find and neutralize—by arrest—Vietcong agents, organizers and cadre members.

The program has been met with stiff resistance from Vietnamese officials at the local level, who have been reluctant to arrest friends or relatives suspected of belonging to the Vietcong. Americans who work with the Phoenix program say this resistance is being overcome by new, tougher province and district chiefs.

Older Hands Chary

Despite the optimism radiated by many of the enthusiastic young captains and majors assigned to pacification for one-year- or 18-month tours on province and district teams, older and more experienced hands are chary of glowing assessments.

"Either the Communists will settle for a negotiated peace in which they receive political recognition and are allowed to participate openly in politics, or they'll go on with their harassment at the present rather ineffective level while the GVN (South Vietnamese government) gets stronger.

"Of course," he added, "there is always the third possibility: That the GVN will simply tear itself apart with internal struggles and let the VC win the thing by default."

In any case, it is now widely recognized here that in the next few months the South Vietnamese will have to start filling American jobs in pacification, as well as on the battlefield.

William E. Colby, the quiet-spoken former CIA station chief in Saigon who heads CORDS, told a congressional committee early this year that he was "neither optimistic nor pessimistic" about the future of pacification.

Such careful sentiments are commonplace. Officials who point with pride at the gains in security made in South Vietnam since the Communists' major 1968 offensives often add in the next breath that they have no idea if this progress will be wiped out when American troops leave Vietnam.

"We've really won the military side of the war," one high official said recently, "at least for the next few years. One of three things can happen now.

12 NOV 1970

Some Questions for Ky

STATINTL

SIX WEEKS AGO, when Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky was about to visit these parts, we posed some questions for the Air Marshal. They concerned the weekly receipts he receives in personal profit from the Saigon race track, his associations with corrupt generals, and his own record as a smuggler.

The Nixon administration succeeded—in the nick of time—in postponing Ky's visit until after the election. But now that he is due for an informal visit, here are some further questions:

1—The general you chose when you took over the



Cambodian operation, Gen. Dr Cao Tri, is still in command in the field. You recall his failure to explain the circumstances under which he sent 71 million piasters—in cash—to his uncle in Hong Kong (about \$600,000 in U.S. dollars). But now, at Bien Hoa, General Tri is running a thriving black market in gasoline, oil and Cambodian antiquities. Is that how he managed to buy his Mercedes? For that matter, out of what funds were you able to purchase a DC-6 airplane for your personal use?

2—When the circumstances surrounding Tri's \$600,000 cash shipment came out, Sen. Nguyen Van Chue asked about it. General Tri's reply was to threaten to "have him shot." Is there any connection between that and the fact that Chue's house was bombed a few days later?

3—What about Assemblyman Tran Ngoc Chau? This is the man who worked for U.S. intelligence, according to the testimony of among others, John Paul Vann, pacification chief in IV Corps. Chau gave the United States information received from his brother, a Vietcong agent, which made the Tet offensive of 1968 a less devastating setback than it would otherwise have been. When Chau was jailed by President Thieu for "contact with the enemy," Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker threw him to the wolves and would not intervene. But, Mr. Vice President, your Supreme Court has now ruled three times that Chau was illegally tried and convicted and is entitled to legislative immunity. He remains in jail, because President Thieu, with Bunker's

support, has defied the court and will not release him. You talk a lot, Mr. Vice President, about your country's "national honor." Is any of it involved here?

4—Do you plan to discuss with Mr. Nixon or Mr. Agnew the problem of Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi? When General Thi was commanding I Corps in 1966, you did not hesitate to discuss him with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his assistant, Philip Habib. You recall surely, the circumstances under which General Thi, at your request, was deposed by General Westmoreland. It was Thi's dismissal, as you know best, which touched off the student and Buddhist riots of 1966; they claimed that General Thi was the only honest Corps commander. There is a precedent for discussing the case with President Nixon; his predecessor, whom you so impressed at Honolulu, sent Air Force One to Hawaii in the summer of 1966 to bring General Thi into exile.

5—If you discuss law and order with Mr. Nixon and Mr. Agnew (as many do), will you bring up the recent attack on the home of Assemblyman Ngo Cong Due? Due's house was destroyed by fire and bombing after his coalition peace proposal was published. Your government said it was the work of the Vietcong, but is your security so weak that the enemy can operate within one block of a large police post?

We only ask these questions, Mr. Vice President, because our previous questions went unanswered, although the column was reprinted (and translated) both in Saigon and Paris. The only indirect answer we received was from an admirer of yours, who pointed out (to our chagrin) that your mother-in-law is no longer using the name under which we said she had profited from government contracts. We regret the error.

Calley Judge Won't Bar Key Witnesses

By William Greider
Washington Post Staff Writer

FT. BENNING, Ga., Nov. 10—A military judge ruled today that key witnesses in the Army's Mylai murder prosecutions will not be prohibited from testifying against 1st Lt. William L. Calley.

Judge Reid W. Kennedy's pre-trial decision is a setback for the 23-year-old platoon leader accused of murdering 102 people in the South Vietnamese hamlet. It also conflicts directly with the ruling another military judge issued last month in another Mylai trial—that of S/Sgt. David M. Mitchell at Ft. Hood, Tex.

If convicted, Calley will undoubtedly base his appeal partly on the admissibility of these disputed witnesses. They include six or seven soldiers and ex-GIs who were witnesses to the alleged massacre at Mylai on March 16, 1968. Among them are 1st Lt. Hugh C. Thompson, the helicopter pilot who intervened to try to stop the killings, and ex-Sgt. Ronald MacBerle, the former Army photographer whose gory color pictures shocked the world.

Specifically, Judge Kennedy ruled that these men can testify against Calley even though their private testimony before a House Armed Services subcommittee has not been made available to Calley's defense lawyers for examination. The judge decided that the Jencks Act which requires government investigators to make available their questioning of prosecution witnesses does not apply to closed hearings held by congressional committees.

It was the Jencks Act which Judge George R. Robinson invoked last month at Ft. Hood to exclude four Army witnesses from the trial of Mitchell, accused of assault with intent to murder 30 civilians at Mylai. The loss of those witnesses weakened the Army's evidence against Mitchell, but the House subcommittee chairman, Rep. F. Edward Hebert (D-La.), repeated his intention to keep his hearing transcripts secret until all the Mylai trials are completed.

Now that two trial-level judges have ruled in conflicting ways, the question of the Jencks Act is likely to be a legal cloud hanging over all of the 17 Mylai cases now in various stages of prosecution. The House subcommittee heard from 152 witnesses in its investigation earlier this year, focusing particularly on the alleged "coverup" by senior officers in the Americal Division.

Since the issue has never been decided by a higher court, the Army's judge in each of the other trials will be free to choose between the two interpretations.

George Latimer, the civilian lawyer for Calley, argued that the disputed witnesses should be prevented from testifying to avoid a mistrial.

The law in dispute was enacted in 1957 in order to modify the impact of a Supreme Court decision in the loyalty trial of New Mexico labor leader Clinton Jencks, charged with filing a false "non-Communist" affidavit.

The law says statements from prosecution witnesses which are "in the possession of the United States" must be made available to defense lawyers after the witness testifies so that they may be examined for possible inconsistencies.

Usually, the rule applies to statements taken by government agents such as FBI investigators or Internal Revenue Service examiners.

At Ft. Hood, the judge held that nothing in the legislation limited its scope to the executive branch. Since Hebert had indicated he would not make the subcommittee testimony available, Judge Robinson excluded the disputed witnesses from testifying in order to avoid grounds for a mistrial.

But Judge Kennedy said today that his study of the Jencks Act language and its legislative history in Congress satisfied him that it was never intended to "include within its ambit any statements or testimony given to congressional committees or subcommittees in executive session."

Furthermore, he said, the defense has been supplied with volumes of other government investigations, made by various Army agencies, which provide ample basis for testing the consistency of prosecution testimony.

Judge Kennedy has forwarded a request for the Hebert transcripts to House Speaker John W. McCormack, but the judge said Calley's trial will proceed, regardless of whether the subcommittee is ordered to produce the transcripts.

Jurors for the Calley trial will be selected from among Ft. Benning officers starting Thursday, and testimony is to begin Monday.

Mitchell's trial is scheduled to resume Monday at Ft. Hood; it was recessed because a defense lawyer became ill.

In pretrial skirmishes here today, the Army prosecutor, Capt. Aubrey M. Daniel III, sought unsuccessfully to exclude from Calley's trial many of the larger questions about the Vietnam war and how it has been fought—issues which Latimer claims are crucial to the defense.

Among other things, the prosecutor asked the judge to rule out discussion of: orders which Calley may have received from superior officers, the designation of hostile areas as "free-fire zones" where inhabitants were presumed to be the enemy; Vietnamese atrocities against U. S. troops and Vietnamese civilians, and the CIA's Operation Phoenix, the counter-terrorist activity which defense lawyers claim was a form of authorized assassination.

Latimer insisted that these issues and "the climate of combat" contributed substantially to what Calley and his men did at Mylai.

"If the policy of the U. S. Army over there of search and destroy means kill everything, if those boys were given orders to search and destroy and kill everything in sight, I think that's relevant," Latimer said.

The judge rejected the prosecution's motion to restrict

discussion of these matters. "Judging from what you said," he told Latimer, "it would cut the heart out of your defense, which I don't intend to do."

The judge did agree to prohibit the lawyers from mentioning to the court-martial members their choice of sentences. If Calley is convicted of premeditated murder, the court-martial can choose only between life in prison and death.

ASBURY PARK, N.J.
PRESS

E - 57,614
S - 63,640

NOV 10 1970

Andrew Tully

WASHINGTON — It is quite possible that President Nixon's next political campaign — conducted in the utmost privacy — will be aimed at ousting the present South Vietnamese government in favor of a retired Vietnamese general known as "Big Minh."

Indeed, there are reports that our geopolitical spy shop, the Central Intelligence Agency, has called certain specialists to action stations to stage-manage a coup by Maj. Gen. Duon Van Minh and a group of other generals now in political pasture.

Washington's interest in Minh's ambitions, including a probable candidacy for president of South Vietnam in next September's election is based on a burning desire to get the peace talks in Paris on the track to an eventual settlement.

Whether he admits it or not, President Nixon is about convinced that Hanoi will never deal with the present regime of President Thieu. Thus he is being urged by certain advisers, including Dr. Henry Kissinger, his special assistant on national security affairs to "encourage" a change in the Saigon government.

Big Minh, one of South Vietnam's most popular personalities, all but announced his presidential candidacy in a three-page National Day statement. His thinly-veiled suggestion that he would run, it is said here, was prompted by a friendly nod from the Nixon administration.

Meanwhile, the CIA apparently is ready to step in if needed. Big Minh was the leader of the group of generals who overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem seven years ago. Minh served for a year as chief of staff before he was ousted in 1964 and sent into exile. But his popularity has persisted, and — now back in South Vietnam — Minh was joined by many of the generals who helped overthrow Diem when he issued his statement calling for a move toward "national reconciliation."

CIA's possible role would be based on in-

Ousting of Thieu Regime Seen Next Nixon Political Effort

telligence that the time is now ripe, or ripening, for a repeat of the 1963 coup. It would also acknowledge the realities of the situation. That is to say, if there should be a Minh-led coup, Washington for its own reasons would want a piece of the action.

One fascinating report leaked here is that Washington dictated the most significant statement made by Big Minh during an impromptu news conference at a reception at An Quang pagoda following the meeting with his generals. Minh declined to say flatly he would run for president, but he said "we are ready," and added that "many changes can be expected between now and election time."

As one diplomatic aide pointed out, "There can't be any changes between now and election time unless somebody like Big Minh forces them."

Washington also might have dictated Minh's criticism of foreign involvement in the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon wants out of the war, but by courtesy of a South Vietnamese government, and he could buy Minh's assertion that as long as the war raged both North and South Vietnam would continue to be dependent on foreign powers.

There is also the matter of face-saving. Hanoi has been so violent in its condemnation of the Thieu regime that any agreement to negotiate with Thieu would seem out of the question. But it could accept a government headed by Big Minh — an avowed anti-Communist — as a "surrender" to its demands for the ouster of Thieu and Co.

Finally, Minh sounds like a man who would be willing to compromise with the North Vietnamese. He has dismissed the "improvement in the military situation" in the South, declared that "weapons alone cannot bring about a lasting peace," and emphasized that the people of the South are "thirsty for peace." Those words could have been written by Eugene McCarthy, or Dr. Spock.

STATINTL

MONTREAL, CANADA "MIDNIGHT"

9 NOVEMBER 1970

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-0160

WORLDWIDE EXCLUSIVE!
Top Attorneys Charge:

STATINTL

CIA Framed U.S. Troops In My Lai Slaughter

***ORIENTAL DEATH SQUAD
BRANDED REAL KILLERS***

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000900030001-2

continued

2 NOV 1970

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

The Enemy Within

For months, the Nixon Administration had luxuriated in an almost unrelenting flow of good news from Vietnam. The enemy was in disarray, the tempo of the fighting had declined and the pacification program in the countryside was going remarkably well. But then last week the idyllic picture was suddenly marred. A Central Intelligence Agency report, portraying a massive penetration of the Saigon government by Communist espionage agents, was leaked in Washington to The New York Times, and the subsequent newspaper stories raised disturbing questions about the real state of affairs in South Vietnam. The CIA document also created fresh doubts whether the Administration's Vietnamization program would succeed in the long run after all.

According to the CIA report, the number of Communist spies operating inside the South Vietnamese Government, army and police force now totals more than 30,000. And that level of penetration, the report maintained, has been gradually rising as the enemy continues to switch his emphasis from the battlefield to the political arena. Many of the new espionage agents, the report contended, are false defectors under the government's *Chieu Hoi* (Open Arms) amnesty program. But many of the top-ranking agents have for years operated in the highest circles, including President Nguyen Van Thieu's official family, and even on the South Vietnamese negotiating team in Paris. During this time, moreover, few of these agents have reportedly been rooted out—although there have been some notable exceptions. Just last year, Huynh Van Trong, President Thieu's special assistant on political affairs and a man long privy to the highest government secrets, was convicted of treason and sentenced to life at hard labor.

'Peanuts': In Washington, many officials tried to brush off the report. "The CIA in Vietnam is notoriously unreliable," commented a Pentagon officer. And a high-level adviser added: "The study dealt with the infiltration of the South Vietnam Government by VC agents, but that is not a particularly significant problem anymore. What counts is the progress in the countryside, in the village and hamlet. The VC hidden in the government may pass on some secrets, but that's peanuts."

Not everyone, however, shared this placid assessment. For whether or not the CIA was correct in its figures, it was widely accepted as fact in Saigon that the South Vietnamese Gov-

ernment was thoroughly infiltrated by enemy agents at all levels. On many occasions, spies inside the Saigon government have tipped off the enemy in advance to U.S. and South Vietnamese military operations. And at this stage of the war, Americans close to the U.S. Embassy admit, the infiltrators are busy trying to thwart the pacification program—all too often with stunning results.

The most glaring example of the effectiveness of the Communist spy rings has been their impact on Operation Phoenix. This lavishly funded operation, considered as top priority by the U.S., is supposed to identify and "neutralize" members of the deeply embedded Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). But so far,



Huynh Van Trong (left): Spying at the top

Phoenix has been unable to make much of a dent in the VCI, and many Americans connected with the program say that enemy agents within the South Vietnamese intelligence agencies are somehow undermining the operation.

In Saigon, however, spokesmen close to President Thieu openly scoffed at the report and called the 30,000 figure "ridiculous." And, indeed, the South Vietnamese Government did seem far less worried last week about Communist espionage than about the motivation of the Administration official who leaked the CIA report. "The news from Vietnam was too good for some people," commented one Saigon official. "It was a last desperate move by some hidden Democrat to hurt the Nixon Administration before the election."

Speculation: Other Vietnamese saw a far more devious purpose in the CIA leak. The document, they asserted, carried the highest security classification that exists in the U.S. Government and

thus any low-echelon aide who made the details available to the press risked imprisonment for betraying national secrets. Accordingly, these Saigon officials speculated that the leak must have been okayed by a very high U.S. source—possibly even by President Nixon himself. The President's motive? "Maybe," said one Vietnamese, "Mr. Nixon wanted to worry President Thieu a little about his support in the U.S. Administration—soften him up on such things as the timetable of the U.S. withdrawal. Or on an accommodation with the Communists."

But while this kind of far-fetched political speculation was rampant in Saigon last week, South Vietnamese officials gave little sign that they meant to do anything about the problem of Communist infiltration. "Eventually, they will have to take drastic measures if they want to survive," commented one American. "As we keep pulling out, this enemy network will become more and more important. How the government deals with it could be the most critical aspect of the coming phase of the war."

Soldiers

by Ward Just

STATINTL

"If you believe the doctors, nothing is wholesome; if you believe the theologians, nothing is innocent; if you believe the soldiers, nothing is safe."

—Lord Salisbury

MACHINES

The machine stood on a vacant knoll, its foreshortened gun pointed north. There were deep ruts in the stony earth, and the land fell away and then came up steeply in a rise two miles distant. This was Fort Hood in East Texas, and the machine was a Sheridan tank.

The sergeant was brisk. He was explaining the machine, how it worked, what the equipment did and how it did it. He touched and patted the machine as he spoke, pointing to the huge treads and kicking them, and then looking at the gun and smiling, patting the armor plate. There was no trouble with this vehicle, Sergeant Rosario said. It is the best vehicle he has had in twenty years in the Army. We looked at it, dark green against the sandy earth, squat and lethal, permanent as the sphinx or some other rough beast. The sergeant opened a flap at the front end and extracted a canvas cover, then unhooked other flaps to show how the canvas could be deployed so that the machine could float, could move through the water like a fish. But it was not really meant for water warfare, because the guns did not work well in water. It was designed to act in support of the cavalry scouts, the armored personnel carriers; the cav was the spearhead, the reconnaissance element, of an armored division. The Sheridan was the scout for a platoon of infantry, so was the

31 OCT 1970

STATINTL

10-Year-Sentence Of Saigon Deputy Annulled by Court

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 30—The Supreme Court today annulled the 10-year sentence imposed on Representative Tran Ngoe Chau, the controversial Deputy jailed earlier this year.

The decision would appear to open the way for the release of the articulate critic of the Government, but President Nguyen Van Thieu is not expected to let him go. The President said earlier this year that release of the Deputy would mean yielding to the Communists and "there would be no point in going on."

Mr. Chau, who had served in the National Assembly for the last three years, was found guilty in March of having maintained contact with his brother, a Vietcong intelligence agent who was jailed in 1969. Mr. Chau, tried by a military court, was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor in a case that stirred controversy here and in the United States.

Mr. Chau, who is now in Chi-hoa prison, near Saigon, admitted his contacts with his brother but said that he had kept the United States Embassy and the Central Intelligence Agency informed. He also testified that embassy officials had encouraged the meetings.

Today's decision was the second in the case by the Supreme Court. In May, it ruled that the military tribunal that had convicted him and the prosecution of him were unconstitutional. That decision made it possible for the appeal, decided today, to annul the sentence.

The World

Both Sides In Vietnam Spy but North Does It Better

SAIGON — "Late one winter night [in North Vietnam] aspirant Hoang Ngo Ban received the order to lead a team to quickly hunt down a spy-commando group that had just infiltrated. In spite of the piercing cold wind, everybody was enthusiastic. They eagerly carried their weapons as they marched.

"When Ban detected enemy footprints near a valley, he assigned a comrade to come close to the enemy assembly area. A remote shot resounded. The enemies thought they were being attacked by surprise so they ran in panic. One of them carried a radio set and sneaked through the dense jungle.

"Ban saw him and raised his weapon to shoot the lackey, but he thought it would be better to capture him, so he dashed after him. The enemy noticed that Ban was small and thin. He underestimated Ban's strength and stopped to fight back. . . . Ban bravely threw him to the ground, tied him up. . . . then continued to hunt the enemy with his team. By the time the operation was completed, Ban's team had captured and killed a number of the enemy, and had seized all their weapons and radio equipment."

And thus, according to this North Vietnamese article last year, Ban became a Hanoi hero. He had met the spies and saboteurs from the South and conquered them. It was bad news for Saigon, if in fact it all happened. But it would not have been a surprise. When it comes to spying and sabotage, South Vietnam clearly comes out on the short end.

Saigon's efforts to infiltrate into the Government of North Vietnam, to send its special forces into the jungles there, even to slip quietly into the Vietcong ranks in the South, have apparently amounted to exercises in frustration. A former intelligence officer here said last week that "we are essentially on the defensive in the field of intelligence and espionage."

Like others in Saigon, he expressed no great shock at the disclosure that the Central Intelligence Agency had compiled a report showing that the Vietnamese Communists had infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government. The only objections raised were over the accuracy of the figures.

The report said the largest segment of agents were 20,000 operating within the South Vietnamese military to undermine morale and effectiveness; 7,000 throughout all levels of the police, armed forces and civilian administration, principally for espionage, and a network of 3,000 within Saigon's intelligence units, including the Central Intelligence Office, the South Vietnamese C.I.A.

President Nguyen Van Thieu, one of whose own assistants was jailed last year as a spy, called the report exaggerated and added that, if it were true, his Government would have fallen long ago.

Unhappy Officials

Government officials, nevertheless, were clearly unhappy over the report, which raised questions about Saigon's ability to survive once American troops leave. Censors ordered references to the report deleted from Saigon newspapers, though some reached the streets before the orders went out.

"In our society it seems rather easy for them to blend into the system," said one Government official. "We do the best we can to track them down. We have our counter-espionage agencies. But it is clearly more difficult for us to do the same up North. We rely on other methods for information."

The other methods used with erratic results by South Vietnamese and Americans to determine Communist strategy include extensive interviews with defectors from the Vietcong and close study of the documents captured in battle. United States reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam also help in tracking the movement of enemy troops and materiel inside North Vietnam and the southern portions of Laos.

Apart from trying to find the agents within the ranks of Government and the military, the South Vietnamese, with American help, also attempt to root out the Vietcong in the countryside under the so-called Phoenix Program, which has been far from a roaring success. Some American advisers report, for example, that villagers are unwilling to inform on known Communists because in many cases they are relatives or friends. Saigon also offers rewards for capturing and killing Vietcong, posting wanted signs of known suspects, reminiscent of the F.B.I. signs in American post offices.

The South Vietnamese, however, have tried a variety of schemes. A few years ago they began an intensive effort to send men on special missions to North Vietnam after a vigorous training program that included lessons on surviving on tree roots and insects. They were mostly North Vietnamese refugees dropped in areas of their former homes. Many succeeded in making several such missions, but many more were either captured or killed. Generally, it was believed that the missions were not very effective and they dwindled away.

—ALVIN SHUSTER

23 OCT 1970
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Capitol quiddities

Richard L. Strout

Washington

Leafing through newspapers one finds items too important to pass over, too complicated to hope to settle. For example, note the following.

A federal judge here has dismissed bribery charges against former Sen. Daniel B. Brewster of Maryland on the grounds that the Constitution (Art. 1; Sect. 6) gives immunity to legislators from prosecution for any act they perform, even though the act resulted from a bribe. Preposterous? That's the way some might consider it. But it's the ruling of Judge George L. Hart Jr. Congress has authority to regulate its members, he says, not the courts. The case is headed for the Supreme Court. Comment: as it stands, the quirk in the law (or its interpretation) would seem to give legislators a license to act much as they see fit.

Another legal quirk raises questions about the Army trial for the alleged massacre at My Lai. The Army has not been happy about the court-martial. The incident occurred in 1967 where, according to the Army prosecutor, the accused fired their M-16 rifles point blank at "helpless, unarmed, old men, women and children," numbering between 100 and 300. There were pictures of the affair. The trial has been marked by postponements and dismissals, by the award of a Pulitzer prize, and by substantial corroboration of charges by a House subcommittee under Rep. Edward Hebert (D) of Louisiana. The House subcommittee refuses to let the court-martial defense see the record of its findings, and the presiding Army judge consequently bars certain witnesses who testified before the subcommittee.

The court-martial has now started. Some congressmen feel that it would be better to drop the whole thing. One is Chairman Mendel Rivers (D) of the Armed Services Committee who has publicly so stated, and another is Rep. William Brock (R) of Tennessee who says he is "sick at heart" that American boys are being tried for doing only what "any human being would do under the same circumstances." Comment: many here wonder how military justice will ultimately sort out the diverse moral standards in this case. Comment: Some observers here feel the war will be over before the My Lai trial.

The New York Times publishes a story declaring that the Central Intelligence Agency has found that 30,000 Vietnamese Communists have infiltrated the South Vietnamese Government in an apparatus that is virtually impossible to extirpate. The existence of the CIA report is said to be confirmed at the White House where Mr. Nixon has been informed of it, but officials argue that it is exaggerated and overly pessimistic.

Yet the suspicion exists, now given equivocal support by the CIA, that after the U.S. troops pull out the Communists will step in and grab the Saigon government.

Comment: Many observers have questioned from the beginning the logic of America's telling North Vietnam that it had better make peace now before U.S. troops are pulled out. The argument is that Hanoi can make a better deal now than later and should come to terms before Vietnamization is complete. But is this sophisticated reasoning valid; isn't the withdrawal of U.S. forces just what North Vietnam seeks? How can you "threaten" an adversary with something it desperately wants? The new CIA analysis raises awkward doubts in a new form.

Another item comes from the New York-er magazine (Oct. 17) which notes that the hijacked Pan American 747 jet that was destroyed by the Arab guerrillas was not owned by the airline but was apparently leased to Pan Am by the Bankers Trust Company as trustee, and is owned by the First National City Bank and another bank not disclosed. The magazine asked, how come? It concluded that it was just another little tax loophole. One of the biggest holes in the income tax sieve, it notes, is over depreciation, and few large objects depreciate faster than a \$24 million airplane.

What happens is that a group of trust-account customers of a bank join together to "buy" a 747. As owners they get the tax benefit of the big depreciation. The law permits the taxpayer to put down income on one side and depreciation on the other, and subtract one from another. If depreciation is big enough the taxable income may be small. Ingenious? Very. In five or six years the airplane is "totally" depreciated. Does that end it? Not at all. The first group of taxpayers have milked their share of quick depreciation dry and they sell the airplane. The airplane continues to fly; it's in fine shape. It can show movies and everything. Only in the peculiar vision of the tax collector has its usefulness ended. Indeed, the 747 is now a very valuable property for the next owner (maybe another bank consortium) which could totally depreciate it all over again.—That's the beauty of depreciation; an oil well, for example, has almost limitless capacity in this field.

Comment: Congress recently plugged loopholes in the income tax but consumer groups say they only made a start. Oil companies average far less taxes than industrial concerns because of depreciation; the example of the hijacked 747 show what shrewd lawyers can do in this fertile field. If loopholes were eliminated maybe your tax would be lower.

22 OCT 1970

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MYLAI TRIAL IS OFF FOR AT LEAST DAY

Defense Is Granted Time to
Round Up Witnesses

By DOUGLAS ROBINSON

Special to The New York Times

FORT HOOD, Tex., Oct. 21—

The court martial of S. Sgt. David Mitchell was postponed today until tomorrow at the earliest to allow defense attorneys time to round up witnesses to testify on the alleged mass killing at the South Vietnamese hamlet of Mylai 4.

The trial of Sergeant Mitchell on a charge of assault with intent to murder some 30 South Vietnamese civilians in the hamlet was thrown into disarray yesterday when the trial counsel, or prosecutor, suddenly rested his case after just three witnesses had been heard.

All of the three prosecution witnesses were enlisted men in Sergeant Mitchell's infantry company. One of them testified that he had seen the sergeant fire his rifle into a six-foot-deep ditch where old men, women and children had been pushed. Another said he had seen the sergeant aim his weapon into the ditch and had heard rifle fire.

The Third Witness

The other witness, Charles Sledge of Sardis, Miss., was the only man of the three to testify that he had actually seen the people falling when Sergeant Mitchell and First Lieut. William L. Calley Jr., the platoon commander, opened fire.

Today, Ossie B. Brown, the sergeant's civilian attorney, conferred throughout the day with the military members of the defense team. He declined to reveal who his first witness would be. Yesterday, he said that he had originally planned to subpoena 48 persons.

The attorney also has hinted that he was thinking of calling a former Central Intelligence Agency executive who, he said, had volunteered to testify that "many of the people in Mylai had been marked for political assassination as part of Operation Phoenix."

Mr. Brown refused to identify the former C.I.A. man, but said he was an authority on Operation Phoenix, the code name for the search for and capture of American prisoners in South Vietnam.

Rebuffed On Subpoenas

He stressed, however, that he had not yet made up his mind whether the witness would be needed.

Last week, Mr. Brown was rebuffed by the court in his effort to issue subpoenas for Richard C. Helms, the director of the C.I.A., and Evans J. Parker, a C.I.A. official whom he described as being connected with Operation Phoenix. At the time, the attorney contended that the Government had "condoned" a program of political assassination while, at the same time, it accused Sergeant Mitchell of participating in the killing of civilians.

The military judge, Col. George R. Robinson, denied the motion on the ground that no evidence had been offered to show that troops in a so-called free-fire zone were authorized to disregard the rules of warfare that protect unarmed civilians.

Among the defense witnesses already here at Fort Hood is Paul Meadlo of Terre Haute, Ind., whose television "confession" about the alleged massacre was a key element in the national uproar a year ago when the Mylai incident came to light. Mr. Meadlo, who is now a civilian, was a member of the infantry company.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.
POST-DISPATCH

E - 333,224
S - 558,018

OCT 20 1970

Red Infiltration Report Assailed

By RICHARD DUDMAN
Chief Washington Correspondent
of the Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, Oct. 20 —
Knowledgeable officials are
blaming an "anti-Vietnamiza-
tion" lobby for leaking a report
yesterday that the government
of South Vietnam is heavily in-
filtrated by Vietnamese Com-
munists.

The officials generally scoffed
at the report as being exagger-
ated, out of date, or both.

They speculated that the re-
port had been leaked to the
New York Times by someone in
the Pentagon who sought to
bring pressure on President
Richard M. Nixon to slow the
rate of withdrawing United
States troops as he carries out
his Vietnamization program of
gradually turning the war over
to the Saigon government.

One official said he under-
stood that the report, said to
have been completed last May
by the Central Intelligence
Agency, had not been shown to
Mr. Nixon by the White House
staff.

The official suggested that
giving it to the New York
Times might have been consid-
ered the only way to get it to
the President's attention.

30,000 Red Agents

The CIA report, as described
in ~~the~~ Post-Dispatch yesterday,
said that the Vietnamese Com-
munists had infiltrated more
than 30,000 agents into the
South Vietnamese government
through an apparatus that had
proved virtually impossible to
destroy.

The Times reported that the
CIA warned that, as U.S. troop
withdrawals proceed, a resurg-
ence of Communist strength in
South Vietnam could be expect-
ed.

Officials complained that the
Times account was overwritten,
particularly where it said that
the CIA had informed President
Nixon of its findings. They said
that the report was one of
many that the agency made, al-
ways "through channels."

The report itself, the officials
said, was, as one put it, "not
very well staffed out, not a
very thoughtful job."

One official guessed that it
had not been prepared by the
CIA at all but by its Depart-
ment of Defense counterpart,
the Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy.

"That figure of 30,000 sounds
like a statistical derivation," he
said. "That's the way the CIA
works. They see three toads
jump across a path in Long
Dong Province and deduce that
100,000 Viet Cong are ~~hanging~~
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail."

Opposite Impact

Although the report and its
surfacing this week may have
been intended as pressure
against rapid withdrawal of
U.S. troops, some officials fore-
saw exactly the opposite im-
pact.

The report, as described in
the Times, amounted to a
gloomy view that none of the
various pacification programs
in Vietnam was working well. It
tended to offset the rosy reports
that have been coming from the
U.S. embassy in Saigon and
from pacification officials there
— reports that have been re-
peated by Administration offi-
cials from the President on
down.

Among the findings said to
have been reported by the CIA
were that hundreds of spies
were gaining clearance as loyal
citizens by pretending to
change sides in Saigon's defec-
tor program.

Another was that the Phoenix
Program, designed to root out
the Viet Cong infrastructure
throughout the country, was
heavily infiltrated by the Viet
Cong and had seriously broken
down.

Such findings, as reported by
critics of continued U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam, have
been used as arguments that
the U.S. effort is doomed to
failure and should be terminat-
ed at once rather than pro-
longed.

19 OCT 1970

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C.I.A. Says Enemy Spies Hold Vital Posts in Saigon

By NEIL SHEEHAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the Vietnamese Communists have infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government in an apparatus that has been virtually impossible to destroy.

Because of this, the C.I.A. reported, as United States troop withdrawals proceed, a resurgence of Communist strength in South Vietnam can be expected.

The report to Mr. Nixon said that the secret Communist agents had included an aide to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, a former province chief and high officials of the police and of military intelligence.

Confirmation by Officials

While the study is not addressed specifically to the question of the President's war policy, officials of the United States Government who have read it say that it does raise questions about a key aspect of this policy—Vietnamization, or gradually giving the South Vietnamese the main burden of defending themselves against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese and thus allowing American troop withdrawals.

High White House officials confirmed the existence of the report. They contended, however, that it exaggerated the extent of infiltration and they rejected the analysis as inaccurate and "overly pessimistic." They said that the President had read a summary of its contents and that he is understood to believe that the analysis is unwarranted because of the generally optimistic reports he has been receiving from other sources about the progress of pacification, the improved military performance of the South Vietnamese and the effects of the Cambodian incursion.

The Central Intelligence Agency's analysis does not assert or imply that the South Vietnamese Government is likely to be overthrown in the months, the officials who have read it said. Nor does the study

South Vietnamese Army will perform well in battle for some time to come, as occurred in Cambodia.

What the study does imply, the officials said, is that the South Vietnamese Government has little chance of enduring over the long run because of the great extent of Communist penetration.

In terms of troop withdrawals, the President has so far committed himself only to reducing American men in South Vietnam to 284,000 by next May. He has indicated, however, that he hopes, to make further withdrawals at his Vietnamization program continues. The President has also repeatedly stated, as did high White House officials in commenting on the C.I.A. analysis, that the Vietnamization program is going well.

Details of the top-secret study were made available to The New York Times by the Government officials who read it. The study was made last May, the officials said, and has been circulated in the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. Information received since May—especially after the two-month attack on Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia that ended June 30—has continued to confirm the C.I.A.'s findings, the officials said.

Fresh Analysis of Documents

The study was apparently based on new information about the nature and size of the Communist spy organization in South Vietnam as well as on a fresh analysis of captured documents and interrogations of prisoners and defectors during the last two to three years.

In its analysis, the Central Intelligence Agency says that early last year, after a number of setbacks on the battlefield, the Communists decided to shift their long-range strategy from intense military activity to political erosion, against the day when American troop strength would no longer be a serious threat because of withdrawals.

The enemy is confident that this strategy will succeed, the analysis pointed out. It offered no contradiction.

To carry out the new strategy, the report asserts, the Communists stepped up their infiltration of secret agents into various branches of the South Vietnamese Government.

Most Natives of South

The study estimates that the enemy has infiltrated more than 30,000 agents—most of them natives of the southern part of divided Vietnam—into the armed forces, the police force and the South Vietnamese intelligence organizations charged with eradicating the Vietcong guerrillas and their North Vietnamese allies. (High White House officials said that the study gave a total of about 20,000 agents, but the officials who had read it said they were certain the figure was 30,000.)

The number of such agents is said to be growing, with a goal of 50,000. If this goal is reached, the spy organization would be 5 per cent of the South Vietnamese military and police forces. The C.I.A. study doubts, however, that the Communists achieved their goal by the end of 1969, the target date.

While the enemy operatives range from very effective to very poor, the study says, the network derives its power from the fact that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have nothing remotely comparable.

The study describes the workings of three Communist political-action and intelligence organizations, one of which has proven so impervious to Government countermeasures that none of its important agents

have been arrested. The C.I.A. refers to the relatively few arrests to tell how Communist agents have reached into army headquarters, into President Thieu's office and even into the negotiating team at the Paris peace talks.

Apathy a Possible Reason

In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency reports the failure of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese policemen and soldiers to report contacts by Vietcong agents. The report adds that the enemy network could not exist without the tacit complicity—whether from fear, sympathy or apathy—of the majority of South Vietnamese soldiers and policemen.

The C.I.A. cited such feelings as evidence that the Saigon Government could not command the deep loyalty of the men on whom it depends to defend itself.

Although the South Vietnamese Government is infiltrated from bottom to top, the study said, the United States and Saigon have had little success not only in penetrating the Communist organization but also in identifying the areas the Communists control.

The study offers the following assessment of the advancing

tages of the enemy's virtual monopoly on subversion:

There is a permanent imbalance in tactical military intelligence. The enemy is usually forewarned of allied moves and the United States and South Vietnam are usually ignorant of Communist ones.

Because most Government-held areas are nominally, rather than firmly, controlled, the enemy is able to recruit selectively and to decide freely who should be assassinated for maximum political effect.

The enemy has excellent security and can thwart Government efforts to infiltrate its organization and territory. Government agents are exposed in advance and programs such as Phoenix—an effort begun in 1967 to uncover and destroy the Vietcong apparatus in the countryside—are undermined. Officials noted that the study provided the most plausible explanation yet for the continuing failure of Phoenix, a program considered vital to Vietnamization.

Penetration of non-Communist political parties and religious groups allows the Communists to take advantage of, and worsen, the chronic political weakness of the South Vietnamese Government.

The Communists can survive despite great allied military pressure. Thus, as American troop withdrawals proceed, a resurgence of Communist strength can be expected. The United States expects to have 344,000 soldiers in Vietnam by the end of 1970—a reduction of 205,000 in two years.

Hanoi Sends the Orders

Discussing the make-up of the enemy apparatus, the C.I.A. report says that the three Communist organizations that control the estimated total of 30,000 agents receive their orders from Hanoi, through the Central Office for South Vietnam, the Communist command for the South. The destruction of its headquarters was a goal of the American drive into

Cambodia, but it is still operating in the jungles.

According to the C.I.A. the full-time operatives are to be distinguished from the many more tens of thousands of part-time agents and Vietcong sympathizers in South Vietnamese society.

The largest segment of about 20,000 full-time operatives is run by the Military Proselyting Section, whose primary aim is to undermine the morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces and police, according to the study.

The operatives are South Vietnamese officers and non commissioned officers.

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Rheault writes, jogs defends Green Berets

By Monty Hoyt

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Boston

In sweat shirt and army camouflage pants, a lonely figure with a somehow familiar face runs along the edge of placid Leverett Pond in Boston each day at noon.

A year ago the face was blazoned on every newsstand across the nation. But today, Col. Robert Rheault, former commander of the Green Beret special forces in South Vietnam, runs unnoticed by the traffic and the people passing by.

The colonel spends much of his time these days sitting in a small apartment in the suburb of Brookline, writing a history of the Special Forces. He runs to clear his thoughts—and because physical exercise is a way of life for a man long accustomed to ticking off six-minute miles in the heat of day in Vietnam, in full gear and heavy combat boots.

Retirement recalled

He retired from the Army in a thunder-clap of publicity, to "avoid bitterness" as he puts it. He and seven other Green Berets had been charged with killing a Vietnamese double agent.

President Nixon intervened in the case, and the charges were eventually dropped, but the colonel felt he had no choice but to get out.

His iron-gray hair now grown out to civilian length, he keeps as active a schedule as he can: skiing in New Hampshire; swimming, skin diving, and sailing off Martha's Vineyard with the family; riding the white waters in Idaho; or barring all else, circling Leverett Pond.

But he says he never expects to find an occupation to match the physical and mental challenge, the intrigue, and demand of leadership of the Green Berets.

Primary concern voiced

Today, his primary concern, along with his own future, is the uncertain existence of the Special Forces program in which he spent so much of his military career.

He speaks slowly and cautiously at first, but warms up as he defends the concept of the Berets.

The Special Forces program is fighting for its very life, he says.

Reductions in Special Forces in Vietnam were on the books when he was commander in May and June, 1969. But he said in an interview, they have mushroomed to include the entire force, almost to the last man. Special Forces, except for a handful of advisers, would be out of Vietnam by Christmas, he said.

The Berets are partly victim of military rivalries, and partly of overall force reductions, he believes.

When the guerrilla-fighter trainers became the pet project of President Kennedy in the early 1960's, they were heralded as the hope of the future in waging counter-insurgency warfare.

Vietnam entry noted

Special Forces were brought into Vietnam in 1961. At the peak of the conflict close to 50,000 Vietnamese nationals were being advised and directed by 3,500 Green Berets.

Popularization of the Berets as "a loud-mouthed, swaggering bunch of killers with knives between their teeth did irreparable damage for us with the Army and the Vietnamese," says Colonel Rheault.

The former Beret says the cutback in Vietnam may not spell the end of Special Forces, but he feels if they are to survive they will have to do three things: "get small, get selective, and get quiet."

Special Forces have always had trouble with their parent organization, the U.S. Army, by virtue of being an elite, semi-independent group, according to Colonel Rheault.

'Age of the guerrilla'

Yet this is the "age of the guerrilla," he says. It would be a travesty, he believes, to do away entirely with the one Army unit devoted to waging guerrilla warfare and training counterrevolutionaries.

Through the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG), which is the Special Forces counterrevolutionary program, Berets have gone into remote areas of Vietnam and trained "Montagnards, Cambodians, Hoa Hao, and Cao Dai" to defend their home areas from guerrilla attack.

"The name of the game in Vietnam has always been support of the population," the Colonel emphasizes.

"Why cut the muscle of the Vietnamization program while the fat is allowed to remain?" His own answer: "There must be an emotional reason."

Obscurity predicted

The former commander does not expect the universal demise of the Special Forces concept. Hopefully, he states, the forces will fade into obscurity and if necessary do away with the green-beret symbol in order to carry on their work.

Since the inception of Special Forces in 1952, units have been active in all parts of the globe training counterinsurgency forces and starting civic-support programs. Special Forces has been called the operating arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the episode involving Colonel

Rheault at Nha Trang last year, there were implications that the CIA had first advised the Berets to do away with the suspected double agent, only to withdraw its support after the deed had been carried out, leaving the Berets holding the bag.

Colonel Rheault counters, "The CIA do not run Special Forces; although we have helped each other out on certain projects."

Secrecy cloak denied

The colonel denies that Special Forces is a clandestine organization. Rather, he describes the forces as having intelligence-gathering capabilities which come under the overall coordination of the CIA. "The same as the CIA coordinates intelligence with the services," he notes.

When Special Forces first moved into Vietnam in 1961, the CIA was directing the small counterinsurgent band. However, the CIA became leery of the activity because it became too big and too well publicized. In 1963, it severed its relationship, Colonel Rheault says. Since then, he says, Special Forces has been squarely under the command of the Army.

Charges termed false

Discussing the incident at Nha Trang which led to his short-term imprisonment and his being relieved of command, he says: "What offends me is the gross and blatant hypocrisy of those who brought the charges. They are totally false."

He bristles at the way, he says, Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor dropped the charges. "He condemned us in a backhanded way. There is still no way to exonerate ourselves without exposing tremendous amounts of classified material."

This Colonel Rheault refuses to do. For a man who has spent 26 years in the military, he declares it would be totally inconsistent for him to tear down everything he has believed in.

"I'm not that mad," he says. "My conscience is clear."

ATLANTA, GA.

JOURNAL

E - 257,863

JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION

S - 536,497

OCT 18 1970

Lawyer Says Hebert Gives CIA Cover

By KEN BOSWELL

An attorney for one of the My Lai defendants said Saturday that Congressman F. Edward Hebert's refusal to release a subcommittee investigation transcript is a deliberate effort to protect the Central Intelligence Agency.

Charles Weltner, of Atlanta, representing Sgt. Esquivel Torres in a court-martial at Atlanta's Ft. McPherson, made the charge after learning that Hebert has repeated his refusal to allow testimony from witnesses to be examined by attorneys.

Hebert, contacted at his home in New Orleans, denied the charge.

Weltner also criticized U.S. Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor, who on Friday dismissed a charge of dereliction of duty filed by Torres against Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the Army's chief of staff.

WELTNER filed the charge against Westmoreland who, at the time of the March 1968 assault on My Lai, was commander of the American troops in Vietnam. He charged that Westmoreland was responsible for the actions of all soldiers under his command.

Resor, in dismissing the allegations, contended that Westmoreland "had no knowledge"

of the My Lai incident "until many months after he returned to the U.S." from Vietnam.

"Sgt. Torres has never claimed that Gen. Westmoreland was on the spot at My Lai," Weltner said Saturday, "nor did the U.S. claim that Gen. (Tomoyuki) Yamashita was on the spot at the Philippine incident."

Yamashita was a Japanese general in World War II whose execution was ordered by the U.S. for "violation of the laws of war" in connection with atrocities committed by his troops in the Philippines in 1944.

Yamashita "wasn't even in the Philippines," the attorney said. "His troops were completely cut off from communications at the time."

RESOR, Weltner said, "apparently has overlooked the major principle involved, which is that a commander is responsible for the conduct of his troops. That is so by the virtue of the various international agreements . . . and it is so under the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the (Yamashita case)."

Weltner said Resor's action "is not a surprise. It is consistent with the now apparent Army policy of protecting the generals and placing all of the blame on the teen-age boys."

Torres, now in his early 20s, was a teen-ager at the time of the incident. He is one of 10 soldiers charged in connection with the alleged massacre at My Lai.

Turning again to Hebert's denial of the transcript, Weltner said the congressman's action is the result of "an understanding" between Hebert and the CIA "to cover the involvement of the CIA in the whole affair."

HEBERT, however, said there was "definitely not" an agreement. "The CIA has never been consulted in this matter," he said. "We (Congress) make our own decisions, and the CIA is not involved in any way."

"There is no agreement or understanding with anyone outside the committee. No promises have been made to anyone," Hebert said.

Several defense attorneys in the various My Lai cases have charged that the CIA was involved in formulating policies for the elimination of Vietnamese civilians believed to be Communist sympathizers.

The congressman said his refusal to release the testimony is based on the investigating committee's pledge to the witnesses that their comments would not be released publicly.

"That is the commitment that the committee made, and that is the commitment the committee is going to keep," he said.

Hebert said "in excess of 100" witnesses were called by his committee.

STATINTL

BALTIMORE, MD.

SUN

M - 177,087

E - 205,425

S - 344,023

OCT 16 1970

'More Realistic' Asian Policy

By RALPH ROCHEFORT WHITE

The President picked up the chant of the protest marchers. "What do we want? Peace! When do we want it? Now!" He touted no heroics about "tough stands" lest Communists sense a "lack of resolve." He declaimed no all-or-nothing ultimatum with a time limit. He offered a forthright peace proposal that inspired respect throughout the Western world. Unless it becomes fuzzed with qualifying amendments to satisfy Asian military-politicos and CIA and Pentagon hard liners, it appears to presage a fresh U.S.A. policy for Southeast Asia.

The President seems disposed to relax our Chinaphobe concern to organize Southeast Asia in support of an economic and political containment of the Peking government.

This adventure began with a donation of over \$2 billion to the effort of France and the Bank of Indochina to regain their colony. Our commitment frayed when we blocked the implementation of the Geneva accord stipulation for an all-Vietnamese election and established a separate South Vietnamese government headed by an expatriate Vietnamese-American college professor. It progressed with CIA political intrigue, the donation of "surplus" arms and the sending of military advisers. Finally, it culminated in a \$3 billion a month carnage of attrition against a peasant nation of 17 million persons.

Now, Mr. Nixon's reconsidered policy affirms that "the essential elements of the Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as a basis for settlements of problems between states in the Indochina area." There has indeed been a change.

Certainly the present government of South Vietnam and possibly the governments of Cambodia and Laos can not long survive without a strong U.S. military presence. When and if they fall, their replacements are unlikely to be pro-American. Almost certainly, these countries

Chinese sphere of influence. Laos, which lacks economic potential, might be ignored as it was by France, but South Vietnam will no doubt resume its rice trade with Red China—and Cambodia (to borrow Prince Sihanouk's phrase) should be "ripe for plucking."

Our original policy objectives in Indochina will have been thwarted without any substantial Red Chinese military or financial sacrifice. North Vietnam was never a threat to the "Free World." Putting aside the noble sounding histrionics of chauvinism, wasn't the containment of Red China what our CIA, AID, and military involvements have been all about? Mr. Nixon apparently has chosen to embrace a more realistic Asian policy before a change is imposed upon us by forces beyond our control.

Quite naturally, Hanoi's response to the President's proposal was negative. The North Vietnamese and V.C. don't trust us any more than we trust them and the fanatical hatreds that have been aroused make rational decisions difficult. But if, as it appears, we have decided to abandon our policy of Asian brinkmanship, the peace we seek will have to be approached in a way not greatly dissimilar from that which the President has proposed.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong may hold out indefinitely against a political settlement not preceded by the removal of the Thieu-Ky government. They could expedite the obstacle with assassinations, but a safer and more certain, typically Asian alternative is available. Time is probably on their side.

The sick economy of South Vietnam is dependent upon a substantial U.S. presence. As our troops leave, it should get sicker and the security of unpopular politicians will become weaker. When Generals Thieu and Ky judge their time is about to run out, they may be expected to take off for the sanctuary of the Riviera. Mr. Nixon's realistic proposal can bring a face-saving peace for both sides.

(Mr. White is a recently retired Foreign Service Officer who lived for many years in Southeast Asia.)

EXPRESS
 M - 78,259
 EXPRESS-NEWS
 S - 120,347



Jack Kofoed Says

Is the CIA Involved In My Lai Massacre?

THE MOST suspect organization in America's security setup is the Central Intelligence Agency. It does what it chooses to do, spends an enormous amount, each year, and doesn't have to account for a dollar. It is pretty well accepted, too, that the CIA has ordered murders. Remember the Green Beret officers, who admittedly shot to death in cold blood a Vietnamese double agent. When the Berets were scheduled for court martial, and it became clear the CIA would be dragged into the testimony, the case was dropped.

Now, the intelligence experts will probably be dragged into the cases of Lt. Calley and Sgt. Kelly accused in the My Lai massacre. There are whispers that the CIA had ordered killings there and in other places, and the defense is certain to place in evidence whatever facts they can find to bolster the claim. It's far past the time when restrictions would be placed on the Central Intelligence Agency.

★ ★ ★

IT IS perfectly obvious that young Americans who go to Cuba to help harvest the sugar crop are indoctrinated with communism, and taught guerrilla tactics to use against their country. So, why aren't these traitorous "revolutionaries" forbidden re-entry? If they admire Cuba so much, and hate their own country so bitterly, let them stay with Castro for the rest of their lives . . .

H10188

STATINTL CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--HOUSE

October 11, 1970

rity buildings constructed in the Baltimore area by having language inserted in the 1957 appropriation bill requiring immediate selection of a site which had been delayed for 5 years. They might have mentioned that it was SAM FRIEDEL whose efforts were responsible for having the Navy repair and transport the historic ship, *Constellation*, to Baltimore and ultimately transfer it by gift to the State of Maryland and city of Baltimore. This relic of our country's naval history now rests in Baltimore Harbor, the site of its origin, for all to see.

Mr. Speaker, as you are well aware the list is a long one and I have mentioned only a few of SAM FRIEDEL's accomplishments. However, there is one thing further that I must point out. One of the sins of Representative FRIEDEL was, according to the editorial referred to, that he had accumulated 18 years consecutive service and the Sunpapers decided in their wisdom that was enough. Enough for what, I am not sure.

In any event, as a result of these 18 years of service, SAM FRIEDEL had achieved the following positions of distinction from which he was in a position to aid his constituents, as we all know and the Sunpapers should be made aware, far more than a freshman Member could ever hope to, until he, too, has accumulated many years of service in this body. He is chairman of the House Administration, chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics, chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, vice chairman of the Joint Committee on the Library, and ranking member of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. This unprecedented leadership took Marylanders years to achieve but it has been lost overnight. Certainly the Sunpapers can take pride in the role they played in helping the citizens of Maryland to lose the distinction held by our State as a result of SAM FRIEDEL's important positions.

I insert the Sunpapers editorial at this point in the RECORD. It is as follows:

[From the Baltimore Evening Sun, Oct. 6, 1970]

STATESMAN

This newspaper withheld support from Representative Friedel in his 1970 campaign for renomination, not in disapproval of his progressive voting record and certainly not unmindful of the extraordinarily close personal ties he maintained with his constituents in the Seventh district. We acted in the conviction that 18 years in Congress was enough, that the district's changed and younger voices must be attended. Now that Mr. Friedel has cooled off a potentially explosive situation by stepping aside, we salute him for a final demonstration of selfless statesmanship.

It was not easy for the congressman. A lesser man would have balked at the frail margin, 38 votes, by which Mr. Friedel ran second. Still further temptation to resist arose from the chaotic Election Day conditions, and a man of greater vanity but smaller responsibility might well have held out for the whole bitter sequence of challenges, recounts, court actions and appeals. But Mr. Friedel recognized the destructive possibilities of this course: he knows too well the racial embers smoldering just beneath the surface. He knew that if he continued in pride, he declined to stir them to flames.

We hope this show of quiet fortitude will not be lost on the pair now left to fight it out for the Friedel seat in the general elections next month. Both Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Parker have permitted themselves flashes of racist provocation; each has forsworn any further relapse, but the lure lingers on. The fact is that the Seventh district is caught this year in a perhaps decisive shift of its center of political gravity, from the Jewish voters who have sustained Mr. Friedel since 1952 to the Negro voters who gave Mr. Mitchell the Democratic nomination last month. There is no blinking the facts of political life, and this is one. But there is no excuse for racial demagoguery on either the white or the black side in a moment when the racial balance is still in question. Too much is at stake for the whole city, in terms of the long-range racial good will stored up, for some misguided outburst to spill it away now.

Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Parker are entrusted with a grave public responsibility to carry through to a constructive and a delicate unfolding of Baltimore history. Representative Friedel has shown them the way.

MYLAI TRIAL OF SERGEANT MITCHELL AND THE CIA

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. RARICK), is recognized for 30 minutes.

(Mr. RARICK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, because of the significance of the Mylai incident, many Americans are vitally interested in the trial of S. Sgt. David Mitchell which is taking place at Fort Hood, Tex.

Yet, for some strange reason, news coverage, at least in our area of the Nation, has been suppressed or blacked out.

The morning Washington Star contained the statement:

Colonel George R. Robinson, the military judge, denied a defense request that subpoenas be issued for Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Evan J. Parker of the same agency.

The city edition of the Washington Daily News, on page 2, contained a slightly more detailed news release, indicating that CIA subpoenas were requested to gain evidence of the assassination plan called Operation Phoenix. The Washington Daily News clipping follows at this point:

[From the Washington Daily News, Oct. 14, 1970]

PLOT CHARGED TO CIA IN VIET KILLINGS

FT. HOOD, TEX.—The chief defense attorney for My Lai massacre defendant David Mitchell claims the CIA developed a plan to assassinate South Vietnamese civilians suspected of helping the Viet Cong.

Ossie Brown attempted to subpoena two top CIA officials to testify to Sgt. Mitchell's courtmartial. Mr. Brown said the CIA agents could tell about an alleged CIA plot to assassinate civilians who were aligned with the South Vietnamese communists.

Mr. Brown said yesterday the CIA carried out "a systematic program of assassination and elimination of Viet Cong and suspected Viet Cong."

"Here are the CIA and the army condoning such acts as this in one instance, then in another instance trying this man for allegedly assaulting 30 people in the same area," Mr. Brown said.

But Col. George Robinson rejected Mr. Brown's charges. He said the CIA was not involved in the My Lai massacre. He said Richard Helms and Evans Parker, who, Mr.

Brown said, headed the assassination plan called Operation Phoenix.

Mr. Brown and Sgt. Mitchell's attorneys planned to confer in closed session today with Col. Robinson in an attempt to clear the legal technicalities blocking the opening of the trial.

Mr. Brown said testimony in the case could begin today. But army prosecutor Capt. Michael Swan said it will probably be tomorrow before the first witness can be called.

Strangely, as if someone decided that the Mitchell trial was not newsworthy, the final edition of the same newspaper which came out only hours later, for suburban Washingtonians, did not contain any mention of the Mylai trial. Feeling that this is bizarre behavior for a newspaper to delete news once it had been printed in its earlier edition, I then obtained a copy of the Washington Evening Star. Equally bizarre, not one word appeared in this evening paper.

The only plausible explanation for the killing of news stories about the Mylai trials at Fort Hood must be the reference to the CIA and that operation in Southeast Asia known as Operation Phoenix or Phuong Huong. If this be the case, one need only look to the record of past attempts to try American military men in the infamous Green Beret case. Time and the place lead to the reasonable conclusion that the political and military identities were the same.

Those of us who followed, with great scorn, the Green Beret preliminaries recall that the case was dismissed when the CIA agents and their leader, Richard Helms, refused to accept subpoenas and to testify in the Green Beret case. In fact, such statements were issued by Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor and approved by President Nixon. The justification given for the CIA refusal was that the appearance of CIA personnel as witnesses was not in the interest of national security.

Yet, in the presently underway trial of Sergeant Mitchell, at Fort Hood, Tex., we read in the brief report of the news media that the defense counsel, Mr. Ossie Brown, was denied the military court's subpoena power of the CIA director and Evans Parker, who is said to have headed Operation Phoenix.

Before dismissing the Green Beret case, Army Secretary Resor had stated:

Except where the most compelling reasons exist, our carefully developed legal procedures should not be shortcut . . . A trial . . . will provide a chance for full exploration of matters bearing on innocence, guilt, excuse, justification, mitigation, or extenuation.

If this is the Army's position, how can Mr. Resor expect Sergeant Mitchell to defend himself on innocence, excuse, justification, mitigation, or extenuation, when he is denied benefit of witnesses within reach of the military tribunal, who his defense counsel, Ossie Brown, feel are necessary to exonerate an American soldier who has fought for his country and now must feel that his country is fighting him?

The Army's denial of a defense counsel's motion for subpoena of witnesses and the mysterious and sporadic news reporting to the American people can but is taking place at Fort Hood, Tex.

My Lai Lawyer Accuses the CIA

By MICHAEL McGOVERN

Staff Correspondent of THE NEWS

Fort Hood, Tex., Oct. 13—Defense attorneys for Staff Sgt. David Mitchell charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind an American Army operation of random assassination of Vietnamese civilians in the area where the alleged My Lai Massacre occurred.

Ossie Brown, civilian defense attorney for Mitchell, 30—who is charged with participating in the alleged massacre of Vietnamese civilian men, women and children—made the charge in an attempt to support his demand to have high ranking officials of the CIA, including its director, Richard Helms, subpoenaed for the court-martial.

Trial Judge Col. George Robinson denied the motion after in-
Staff Sgt. David Mitchell sits in courtroom in Ft. Hood, Texas.
Cause arguments by the attorney and the prosecutor, Capt. Michael Swan.

Attorney Present

Seated quietly in the spectators' section of the small wooden bungalow where Mitchell is being tried, was John Greaney, a clean-cut, stony-faced CIA attorney who flew here on short notice from Washington. He was not called on.

Outside court, Greaney said the CIA was "absolutely not" responsible for the assault on My Lai.

Today's session was called after a three-day delay to allow attorneys to prepare for the court-martial.

"CIA Condoned It"

"In 1967 and 1968," Brown told the judge, "there was (in Vietnam) a systematic program of assassinations and elimination of Viet Cong and suspected Viet Cong. The CIA condoned such a program, and now the government is trying a man on this charge."

Brown said he was basing his charge on information obtained from government officials, including a congressman. He said he would not identify his sources.

The attorney had sought to have Helms and Evans Parker subpoenaed. Parker was identified

by Brown as a CIA official and "acknowledged head of Operation Phoenix."

Operation Phoenix has been defined by government officials as an American military program of rural pacification in South Vietnam. As described by Brown, the operation included the assassination of Viet Cong to allow villages to return to South Vietnamese government control.

"It went further" than assassinations of Viet Cong and suspected Viet Cong, Brown drawled. "It was a systematic elimination of people."

Brown made the charge while

standing, rocking on his feet, his large hands plunged deep in trouser pockets of his bright green suit.

Prosecutor Swan answered coolly: "The defense is engaged in nothing but a fishing expedition, trying to harass high ranking officials of the CIA."

Judge Robinson interrupted the arguments to ask Brown if the alleged CIA assassination program "authorized complete disregard for the (Army's) rules of engagement." Brown answered that it did not.

Brown said Operation Phoenix included a "black list" identifying those to be killed.

Before denying the motion for subpoenas, the judge noted with irritation that Brown and Capt. James Bowdish, another defense attorney, had been involved in Mitchell's case for a year. He indicated that the motion to subpoena CIA officials was ill-timed.

STATINTL

14 OCT 1970

SONMY JUDGE BARS C.I.A. SUBPOENAS

Sergeant's Lawyer Rebuffed —Panel Is Completed

By DOUGLAS ROBINSON
Special to The New York Times

FORT HOOD, Tex., Oct. 13—

The civilian defense attorney for S. Sgt. David Mitchell, who is being court-martialed here in connection with the alleged massacre at Sonmy, South Vietnam, lost a bid today to subpoena high officials of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The attorney, Ossie B. Brown, contended that the C.I.A. had been involved in a "systematic program of assassination of Vietcong and suspected Vietcong" in South Vietnam as part of Operation Phoenix, the American-planned rural pacification program.

Mr. Brown told Col. George R. Robinson, the military judge, that the United States Government condoned "this constant killing and systematic assassination," then turned around and "charged Sergeant Mitchell with assault to commit murder."

For this reason, he said, he requested the authority to subpoena Richard C. Helms, director of the C.I.A., and Evans J. Parker, whom he described as the C.I.A. official in charge of Operation Phoenix. Mr. Parker, he said, was the man who "signed documents, certain blacklists" of Vietnamese to be assassinated.

'Fishing Expedition'

For its part, the Government's counsel, Capt. Michael K. Swan, argued that the Sonmy operation, which took place in March, 1968, had been planned and carried out by the military who had designated the village to be part of a free-fire zone. The Central Intelligence Agency, he said, had nothing to do with the operation.

Captain Swan charged that the defense was embarking on a "fishing expedition" and that it was "trying to harass high ranking officials."

Colonel Robinson denied Mr. Brown's request to subpoena the C.I.A. officials, agreeing with the trial counsel, or prosecution, that no evidence had been offered to show that troops in a free-fire zone were authorized to disregard the rules of warfare and to kill unarmed civilians.

Sergeant Mitchell is charged with assault to murder about 30 Vietnamese civilians.

Outside the courtroom an attorney for the C.I.A., John Creaney, told newsmen that the agency was "absolutely not" involved in the Sonmy operation. Asked if the agency had played a role in the Sonmy area before the incident, he replied: "I don't know."

During the day, Mr. Brown exercised the defense's sole peremptory challenge, which allows him to excuse a prospective court member for no reason. Col. Richard G. Trefry was dismissed.

Court Completed

Under military law, a general court-martial requires a minimum of five court members to act as jurors, although the judge has discretion to allow any number in excess of five.

By the end of the court day, seven officers had been questioned and tentatively selected for the jury. Colonel Robinson then announced that the court had been formed and that the next open session of the court-martial would not be held before 1 P.M. tomorrow.

The jury is made up of two full colonels, three captains, and two first lieutenants. All but one officer have served in Vietnam. All are white. Sergeant Mitchell is black.

Evidentiary proceedings are not expected to start before Thursday morning. One defense attorney is still in Washington examining documents in the case. Tomorrow afternoon, the jury will probably be sworn in and Sergeant Mitchell may be formally arraigned on the assault charge.

Calley Trial Date Set

FORT BENNING, Ga., Oct. 13 (AP)—Col. Reid W. Kennedy, the military judge who will preside at the trial of Lieut. William L. Calley Jr. on charges of mass murder at Sonmy, today set Nov. 16 as the date for the court-martial to begin.

At the final session of pre-trial hearings for the young Army lieutenant, Colonel Kennedy also denied a defense motion for a civilian trial and granted a defense motion to obtain secret testimony given before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

Colonel Kennedy set Nov. 9 as the date for calling prospective members of the court-martial and for hearing other pre-trial matters.

Lieutenant Calley, 27, of Miami, is accused of slaying 102 Vietnamese civilians. He was in command of a platoon of the 1st Infantry Division at the village of Sonmy.

STATINTL

-14 OCT 1970

Plot charged to CIA in Viet killings

FT. HOOD, TEX. (UPI)—The chief defense attorney for My Lai massacre defendant David Mitchell claims the CIA developed a plan to assassinate South Vietnamese civilians suspected of helping the Viet Cong.

Ossie Brown attempted to subpoena two top CIA officials to testify at Sgt. Mitchell's court-martial. Mr. Brown said the CIA agents could tell about an alleged CIA plot to assassinate civilians who were aligned with the South Vietnamese communists.

Mr. Brown said yesterday the CIA carried out "a systematic program of assassination and elimination of Viet Cong and suspected Viet Cong."

"Here are the CIA and the army condoning such acts as this in one instance, then in another instance trying this man for allegedly assaulting 30 people in the same area," Mr. Brown said.

But Col. George Robinson rejected Mr. Brown's motion to subpoena CIA director Richard Helms and Evans Parker, who, Mr. Brown said, headed the assassination plan called Operation Phoenix.

Mr. Brown and Sgt. Mitchell's military attorneys planned to confer in closed session today with Col. Robinson in an attempt to clear the legal technicalities blocking the opening of the trial.

Mr. Brown said testimony in the case could begin today. But army prosecutor Capt. Michael Swan said it will probably be tomorrow before the first witness can be called.

Why the Paris Talks Are Getting Nowhere

by Zalin B. Grant

In the process, we lose sight of one of the cardinal maxims of a guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.—Henry Kissinger, Foreign Affairs, January, 1969.

The Nixon Administration is not prepared to negotiate in Paris under any terms short of capitulation by the other side. An impasse strategy has taken shape, based, unfortunately, on that glimmer of marsh gas

ZALIN B. GRANT in recent weeks has observed the war from Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris and Washington.

known as Vietnamization. Listen. A war bureaucrat speaks on the Paris talks: "The only alternative to their absurd demands is for us to improve our position militarily while reducing our forces." Another: "Our interest is in letting it become a totally Vietnamese impasse."

An excellent example of the impasse strategy is the US handling of the Vietcong's new negotiating proposals. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research predicted months ago that the other side would try to make it stormy for Mr. Nixon during the pre-election period. The forecast was for new proposals which would link a US withdrawal to the prisoner of war issue. The Provisional Revolutionary Government did, of course, recently make the predicted proposals. Just as predictably, Ambassador David K. E. Bruce quickly labeled them with a botched cliché as "new wine in old bottles" (an aide later reversed the adjectives).

The PRG's proposals are perhaps not the *Grand Cru* Mr. Nixon wants, but they are better than anything served up in Paris in the past year and a half. The first point of the VC's new eight-point package states: "In case the US government declares it will withdraw from South Vietnam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the United States and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp, and the parties will engage at once in discussion on:

"The question of ensuring safety for the total withdrawal of US troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp.

"The question of releasing captured military men."

As seen through the State Department's tinted windows, the PRG's proposals are a PRG's proposal on the POW issue and garnished with an extra three months'

grace time for a US withdrawal. Last December, the PRG offered to discuss the modalities of withdrawal in return for a US commitment to get out in six months.

In their haste to discredit the proposals, however, the US negotiators apparently failed to give them the deep study they deserved. More strangely, the PRG's proposals have been left largely undiscussed by the national news media, which are suffering, perhaps, from battle-fatigue or are too absorbed with the Mideast.

First of all, what's really in the proposals for the US? Just a nine-month eviction notice, another artful dodge by the North Vietnamese, as the Administration would have us believe? Hardly. Some Vietnam experts say, for openers, that a signal from Mr. Nixon would bring a quick response from North Vietnam on the modalities of a withdrawal. If the US firmly said it would get out, these sources predict, North Vietnam would first extend the withdrawal time, perhaps up to 18 months. This particular point could prove extremely damaging to the Administration if the public awoke to its possibilities. Mr. Nixon has indicated that most US troops will be withdrawn within the next year or so anyway. Why not, then, make a firm declaration that we're getting out and get negotiations for a permanent peace started?

Moreover, a close reading of Point One of the new proposals uncovers a lot more hidden doors, perhaps one leading to that mutual troop withdrawal by Hanoi and the US that our policy makers long for. It doesn't take New Math to calculate that North Vietnam will never openly agree to a mutual troop withdrawal, especially when you add the Asian desire for a face-saving device to the Communists' undeniable strength at the bargaining table. The problem must be approached from a side entrance. Point One's double-jointed emphasis on troop safety during a withdrawal may be the key.

Were this simply a call for a unilateral troop withdrawal, North Vietnam and the PRG could have stopped with the first phrase "the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops . . ." Instead, they followed up with "and the parties will engage at once in discussion on the question of ensuring the safety for the total withdrawal . . ." The ideal method to "ensure the safety" is, of course, by 1) cease-fire and 2) mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. North Vietnam is well aware that these would be priority US demands in a withdrawal. Mr. Nixon declares he intends to withdraw totally and the secret

STATINTL

The Road From War

Vietnam 1965-1970.

By Robert Shaplen.

368 pp. New York: Harper & Row. \$7.95.

By JAMES C. THOMSON Jr.

Robert Shaplen is a gifted reporter, a man of humane and liberal instincts. He is also an Old Asia Hand, having covered the Pacific War, the Korean War, and — off and on — the 25-year Indochina War. Since 1962 his "Letter from Saigon" has appeared fairly regularly in The New Yorker.

Five years ago Shaplen gave us "The Lost Revolution," an account of America's involvement in Vietnam, 1945-65. Now he has chosen to update the earlier book with an edited and abbreviated collection of his New Yorker pieces from March, 1965, through January, 1970. For anyone temporarily drained of rage from the events of last May and, indeed, the past several years, this book can revive that rage for more than one reason.

To begin with, Shaplen chronicles with considerable skill the folly of our nation and of our Vietnamese clients. "Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam," he tells us in his Introduction, "... the long conflict has beyond any doubt written one of the most tragic chapters in American history, and surely in Vietnamese history, too."

In his actual dispatches, that perception develops somewhat slowly. He early doubts the efficacy of the bombing of North Vietnam in bringing Hanoi "to heel"; but not until June 1967 does he note, in a discussion of alleged Vietcong genocide, that "there are, of course, many Vietnamese, not to mention millions of people abroad, who regard the American bombing of North Vietnam as an example of genocide at its worst." As for the slaughter produced by American devastation of the South, one must look not to Shaplen but to the writings of others. Shaplen's focus is different: the hopes, plans, programs, gimmicks and intrigues of the big shots, both Vietnamese and American. And on this kind of thing he is often first-rate.

He exposes, for instance, innumerable occasions of American misjudgment, poor planning, stupidity, wishful thinking and even more. He offers shrewd insights into the multi-

ple webs of South Vietnamese non-Communist politics. He transmits poignant critiques of our actions by anti-Communist Vietnamese. He helps make sense of the tortuous road to the Paris talks and the nature of their deadlock.

And he broods. Our massive military intervention eventually appalls him; far better, from his viewpoint, discreet and covert "counter-insurgency" assistance plus economic aid, all contingent on Vietnamese reforms.

Mr. Thomson was a Far East specialist in the State Department and White House, 1961-66, and now teaches the history of American East-Asian relations at Harvard.

He feels the deepening tragedy and rarely shares in the chronic official optimism. In his June, 1970, "Postscript" he speaks with sorrow of our "long misbegotten Vietnam adventure the result mainly of abysmal political miscalculations."

There are, then, in these dispatches, data and observations aplenty to rekindle one's anger about what we have done to Vietnam and also to ourselves. But exasperation with Robert Shaplen is, I regret, a stronger and simultaneous reaction. For Shaplen is all of us, or most of us, at what once seemed to be our best.

In simplest terms, he is part Willsonian romantic, part Cold Warrior, and — in the old Kennedy-Johnson lingo — part "can-do guy." He wants "revolution with freedom" (as the dedication page tells us); he disdains Communism; he has faith in American know-how; he longs to help change Asia — and, way back there as a journalist, he lucked onto Vietnam and those charming Vietnamese people. He really believes — or believed — we can give them The Answer. Twenty years or so later, Old Asia Hand that he is, he is still Graham Greene's Quiet American.

Throughout these pages there is one unbroken theme: Shaplen's quest (which also happens to have been our quest) for a "true nationalist" or "true revolutionary" movement in South Vietnam as a "dynamic" counter-force to Communism. In November, 1965, for instance, he looks to "true revolutionary social change" to produce a "meaningful alternative to Communism."

Later on (July, 1969), while blaming Saigon, he also castigates Washington for its "failure to inspire a more successful consolidation of anti-Communist forces in the fifteen years since the beginning of the American commitment." By January, 1970, he has whittled down his objective to the rediscovery of something he wistfully calls "a southern consciousness, which exists but lies deeply submerged." He hopes, one gathers, that American withdrawal won't take place so fast as to prevent that rediscovery.

Shaplen's yearnings are tempered here and there by flashes of political realism. He is candid about the confusion, corruption and authoritarianism of successive Saigon regimes — all of them out of touch with the majority of their people. (Most recently, Thieu alarms him as a new Diem, aloof and dictatorial.) And he sometimes acknowledges the central reality that Ho Chi Minh's Communists "captured the nationalist movement of the country back in 1945" and "ever since have determined the course of the Vietnamese revolution."

Yet he backs off from the clear implications of that central reality; he fails to reflect on the reasons for national Communism's persistent appeal; and off he goes again on the same old quest for that elusive "revolutionary alternative." One senses, in the process, that Shaplen, like many others, confuses revolutionary jargon and C.I.A. gimmickry with revolution.

There is, moreover, a largest-of-all question about our Vietnam tragedy that remains unasked and unanswered by Shaplen throughout these years. To put it tersely: Why Vietnam?

Nowhere in this book does he tell us why involvement in Vietnam and former French Indochina is now or has ever been in America's national interest. Indeed, the most irritating aspect of his reportage is its "Vietnocentrism," or more accurately, its "South Vietnocentrism." We are told endless interesting things about Vietnamese politics and American operations. But nothing about why this benighted Asian land has critical importance to anyone except Shaplen's undoubtedly estimable friends who